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Despite extensive research on government and ministerial duration, there are still 
relatively few comparative studies of ministerial survival and accountability. This thesis 
uses the analytical tools provided by the agency theory to study the variation in the 
length of ministerial tenure and makes an original contribution to the study of this topic 
from two points of view. First, whereas earlier literature studied cabinet members solely 
as prime ministerial agents, this thesis explicitly adopts a three-principal-agent model to 
analyse the accountability of cabinet ministers to their own parties, directly-elected 
presidents, and prime ministers. For this reason, the variation in the length of ministerial 
tenure is analysed in countries with semi-presidential constitutions, which maximise the 
intra- and inter-case variation in principal-agent relationships. Adopting an 
interactionist view on the factors that explain the variation in the ability of presidents, 
prime ministers, and parties to control cabinet members in semi-presidential systems, 
we expect that the ministers’ survival in office depends on the interaction between 
institutional scenarios and party relationships between the minister, the president and 
the prime minister. The second contribution of this thesis is empirical. A unique data set 
on the tenures of French, Portuguese and Romanian ministers during two legislative 
terms has been collected in order to test these theoretical expectations. In addition to 
fixed characteristics at the moment of appointment, the data set records resignation calls 
and conflicts between ministers and their principals. This data allow one to measure the 
variation in the political influence of presidents, prime ministers and political parties 
that is not easily observable. The results indicate that principals who act as de facto 
party leaders are more likely to control the process of ministerial deselection under 
certain institutional scenarios. Such a study is important because it addresses the link 
between institutional design and political accountability and emphasises the extra-
constitutional factors accounting for the variation in political practices across and within 
similar institutional frameworks over time. 
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Nicolas Sarkozy gave up running for the presidency of the Gaullist party in 1999, after 
President Chirac warned him that the leader of the majority party would not be prime 
minister in 2002. Chirac had nevertheless appointed Alain Juppé as prime minister in 
1995 although he was the leader of the majority party. Sarkozy’s abandonment of the 
party leadership race did not lead to him being appointed as prime minister in 2002, 
when Jacques Chirac was re-elected as President of France. He was nevertheless 
appointed as minister of economy and finance and second in the hierarchy of PM Jean-
Pierre Raffarin’s cabinet. However, President Chirac could not dissuade Sarkozy from 
contesting the presidency of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in 2004, when 
Alain Juppé stepped down amid accusations of embezzlement of public funds. Before 
new party elections were organised, though, Chirac warned that ministers who are 
elected as party leaders must give up their cabinet seats to prevent any damage to the 
prime minister’s authority over cabinet ministers. As a result, Sarkozy stepped down 
from government in November 2004, when he was elected as president of the UMP. Six 
months later, the Raffarin government resigned following the rejection of the 
referendum on the European Constitution and Sarkozy, who was still party leader, was 
re-appointed in government as Minister of the Interior, the only state minister in 
Dominique de Villepin’s newly formed cabinet. Why did President Chirac appoint the 
leader of the majority party as prime minister in 1995, but refused to do so in 2002 and 
in 2005? And why was Nicolas Sarkozy asked to step down in 2004 as a result of his 
election as UMP leader, only to be re-appointed in government six months later when 
he was still a party leader? President Chirac’s concern about the personal loyalty of 
prime ministers and leaders of the majority party and his refusal to allow a party leader 
sit at the cabinet table indicate that party relationships are an important explanatory 
factor of the variation in the influence of presidents, prime ministers, and political 
parties over cabinet composition. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
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The puzzle: Why do some ministers keep office longer than others? 
Although ministerial resignations attract considerable public attention and media 
coverage, little is known about the reasons why some ministers resign while others do 
not under similar political circumstances. The rules concerning the simultaneous 
holding of party and cabinet responsibilities change from one government to another, 
depending on the circumstantial interests of the political actors involved. The doctrine 
of collective ministerial responsibility does not explain why only some of the ministers 
who pass critical judgements on their governments’ decisions resign while others do 
not. Individual ministerial responsibility also fails to explain why personal and 
departmental errors and scandals bring down some ministers, but not others. By and 
large, departures from ministerial office are viewed as part of the hazards of the job 
(Blondel, 1985, p. 3) and few studies have inquired what makes some ministers more 
durable than others (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2012, p. 1). 
Studies of ministerial careers have focused on the personal, social and political 
background of the individuals who serve in government. There have been extensive 
analyses of the routes to ministerial office in individual countries, such as the UK 
(Berlinski et al., 2012; Heady, 1974a; Rose, 1971; Theakston, 1987), Canada (Kerby, 
2009), Australia (Weller, 2007), New Zealand (McLeay, 1995), the United States 
(Burstein, 1977), France (Dogan, 1967, 1986, 1987; Gaxie, 1986; E. G. Lewis, 1970), 
Spain (P. H. Lewis, 1972), Portugal (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002; P. H. Lewis, 
1978), Sweden (Ruin, 1969), Japan (Cheng, 1974), India (Jha, 1974), the Soviet Union 
(Rigby, 1977) and the post-communist Russian Federation (Shevchenko, 2005). Other 
works have looked at patterns of ministerial careers in geographic clusters. Several 
collective works have put forward a broad perspective on the patterns of ministerial 
recruitment, deselection, and executive decision-making in Europe (Blondel & 
Thiébault, 1991; Dowding & Dumont, 2009a; Heady, 1974b; Herman & Alt, 1975; 
Laver & Shepsle, 1994), others have analysed ministerial careers separately in Western 
Europe (Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 1997; Blondel & Thiébault, 1991), Southern 
Europe (P. T. de Almeida, Pinto, & Bermeo, 2003), and Eastern Europe (Blondel, 
Müller-Rommel, & Málova, 2007; Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009). A few ground-
breaking works have also studied the world-wide variation in the social background of 
ministers and in the routes to ministerial office (Blondel, 1985). 
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The durability of individual ministers in office has also been studied across 
different regions of the world (Blondel, 1985) and with regard to the duration of the 
cabinets in which they serve (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2004). The impact of 
political institutions on the length of ministerial tenure has also been taken into account. 
Blondel (1985) has analysed the impact of regime change and military takeovers on 
ministerial tenure and has compared the length of tenure under military and 
constitutional presidential systems, and under communist systems, prime ministerial 
systems, and monarchical systems. This large-n study found that “Institutions do have 
an impact on ministerial duration, even if it is sometimes difficult to measure precisely 
the extent of the impact” (Blondel, 1985, p. 136). The impact of democratic transition 
on ministerial turnover has also been considered in studies of Central and Eastern 
European countries (Blondel et al., 2007; Shevchenko, 2005). Other works have 
considered the impact of institutional factors on the length of ministerial tenure, such as 
government types, the constitutional powers of prime ministers, the durability of prime 
ministers, coalition attributes, and party-specific variables (Budge & Keman, 1990; 
Budge, 1985; Dewan & Myatt, 2010; Dowding & Dumont, 2009b; Huber & Martinez-
Gallardo, 2008; Quiroz Flores, 2009). Scholars have attended to differences in 
ministerial mobility, cabinet ranks and the importance of portfolios (Berlinski, Dewan, 
& Dowding, 2007; Blondel, 1985; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridason & 
Kam, 2008; Shevchenko, 2005). Some of these studies found that ministerial durability 
is independent of cabinet durability and that the institutional factors that influence 
cabinet duration, such as investiture votes and party systems, have no effect on 
individual turnover (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). Whether ministers serve in 
single-party or multi-party governments has also been found irrelevant for ministerial 
durability (Bakema, 1991). In general, party politics variables have emerged as better 
predictors of ministerial longevity in office. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008) have 
shown that whether ministers are from the prime minister’s party or from other parties 
in a coalition government makes a difference for the amount of time they survive in 
office. 
Compared to the body of literature that considers the impact of institutional 
factors and personal characteristics on the length of ministerial tenure, considerably 
fewer studies have incorporated the events experienced by ministers during their time in 
office as determinants of longevity in office. Resignation calls are the most popular 
measure of ministerial performance and have been used in the estimation of ministerial 
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longevity in the UK (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2010; Berlinski et al., 2012; 
Dewan & Dowding, 2005; Dowding & Kang, 1998), Germany (Fischer, Kaiser, & 
Rohlfing, 2006), and Iceland (Kristinsson, 2009). Adopting a principal-agent approach 
to study the relationship between prime ministers and cabinet members, Berlinski, 
Dewan and Dowding (2010, 2012) have used resignation calls as an indicator of the 
information that prime ministers acquire during the ministers’ time in office to decide 
how long ministers can serve under them. This analysis has shown that resignation calls 
are a good indicator of the ministers’ performance in office and a strong predictor of 
ministerial deselection. However, this relationship has only been studied in the case of 
British ministers. The lack of institutional variation within a single-country study has 
made it impossible to test whether this effect varies across institutional environments 
(Berlinski et al., 2010, p. 570).  
Overall, the study of ministerial duration has been acknowledged as a different 
research programme than that of government duration (Fischer, Dowding, & Dumont, 
2012, p. 516). In contrast to the study of government duration, though, the study of 
ministerial longevity lacks a firm theoretical foundation. A  growing body of literature 
has advanced the theoretical study of ministerial accountability by analysing the 
relationship between cabinet members and prime ministers within a principal-agent 
framework (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012). However, due to institutional, parliamentary, 
and party differences across countries, these authors believe that the agency relationship 
between cabinet members and prime ministers is likely to  vary across different 
institutional structures (Fischer et al., 2012, p. 516). Additionally, the exclusive focus 
on the relationship between prime ministers and cabinet members neglects the role of 
political parties as principals for their agents in government and the important role of 
backbenchers (Lord Wilson, 2013). The position of political parties as principals for 
cabinet members is borne out by the resignation of prime ministers from government 
when they are defeated in party leadership ballots, as illustrated by the cases of 
Margaret Thatcher and Julia Gillard. This research aims to build on the principal-agent 
approach to suggest a theoretical framework that takes into account the ministers’ 
accountability to the complete range of political actors who can hold cabinet members 
accountable across institutional settings.  
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The argument: ministers are accountable to multiple principals in 
government and in the party 
This project aims to contribute to the study of ministerial turnover by focusing on the 
decision-making process that leads to the recalling of ministers. The relationships 
between ministers and their superiors in the government and in the party hierarchy are 
modelled with the use of agency theory, which provides a single framework for the 
study of representative democracies and emphasises who is accountable to whom at 
each stage in the process of delegation across national and institutional contexts (Strøm, 
2000). This is not the first work to employ a principal-agent model for the study of 
ministerial resignations and dismissals. The agency theory has been used to study the 
durability of British ministers (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012) and as an underlying theory 
in the strategic study of cabinet reshuffles and resignation calls (Berlinski et al., 2010; 
Indridason & Kam, 2007; Kam & Indridason, 2005). This is also not the first work to 
theorise the subordination of cabinet ministers to more than one principal. Rudy 
Andeweg (2000) has described cabinet ministers as double agents, due to their position 
in the chain of democratic delegation as both members of government and heads of 
department. Andeweg (2000, p. 389) also argued that only a direct link from parties to 
individual ministers can prevent the problem of agency loss and circular delegation. 
However, he found little evidence that the link between parties and their minister-agents 
goes beyond the appointment of party members to ministerial office and argued that 
only the use of recalls and reshuffles could indicate that parties effectively control their 
agents in ministerial office. Overall, political scientists like Andeweg (2000) and Muller 
(2000) have long stressed the role of parties in the process of political delegation and 
the existence of a double chain of delegation from voters and political parties to 
governments. However, the extent to which political parties control their agents in 
government following their appointment has hardly ever been tested empirically and 
comparatively. This thesis is the first to adopt a multiple-principal-agent approach to 
study ministerial longevity in office and to test this model empirically across several 
countries.  
The competing-principals model adopted in this study starts from the 
assumption that in everyday politics cabinet ministers are accountable not only to prime 
ministers, but also to their own parties outside public office and, under certain 
circumstances, to directly-elected presidents. Thus, the principal-agent approach can be 
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used to study ministerial deselection in any democratic system, regardless of the number 
of political actors who are granted the formal powers to fire cabinet members. However, 
the largest intra- and inter-case variation in principal-agent relationships occurs in 
countries with semi-presidential constitutions, where a directly elected president shares 
the executive power with a prime-minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible 
to the parliament. Thus, presidents, prime ministers, and political parties act as 
competing principals for cabinet members in this political system. Therefore, to take 
full advantage of the principal-agent approach and highlight the impact of different 
agency relations on ministerial accountability, this research studies the process of 
ministerial deselection in semi-presidential systems.   
While agency theory has become a standard tool of analysing ministerial 
longevity in office, this topic is not usually studied within the context of institutional 
debates that are discussed in the party government literature. By studying the variation 
in ministerial accountability to presidents, prime ministers, and political parties, this 
thesis speaks to the debates concerning the operation of political institutions in semi-
presidential systems and the variation in presidential and prime ministerial powers 
across semi-presidential countries despite their similar constitutional design (Cheibub & 
Chernykh, 2008; Elgie, 2009; Roper, 2002; Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Siaroff, 2003).  
The theoretical argument tested in this thesis generates several expectations 
regarding the institutional circumstances under which presidents, prime ministers, and 
party principals are expected to control the process of ministerial deselection in semi-
presidential systems. The main argument is that the impact of principal-agent relations 
on ministerial accountability depends on the interaction between executive scenarios 
and party relationships between presidents, prime ministers and cabinet members. This 
idea builds upon the link identified by Samuels and Shugart (2010) between the 
separation of powers and party organisation and behaviour and tests the hypothesis that 
the presidents’ influence over the government derives from their de facto position as 
party leaders (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). Since political parties have no ex-post 
control mechanisms for their agents in a directly elected presidential office, a highly 
valued presidency may loosen the party-government relationship (Schleiter & Morgan-
Jones, 2009a, p. 668). The pursuit of the presidency is likely to introduce a tension 
between the executive and legislative branches of the party and decrease the 
accountability of party leaders (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 16). As a result, party 
leaders who win the presidency are able to use their informal partisan authority to 
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control the political system as de facto leaders of their former parties. Presidents who 
act as de facto party leaders reverse the party-leader principal-agent relationship by 
turning prime ministers into their own agents, depriving political parties of the ability to 
control either of their two agents (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). If this happens, 
then parties should also lose the ability to control their ministers, who become 
presidential agents. 
The concept of de facto partisan authority is operationalised by taking into 
account the positions held by presidents and prime ministers in the party hierarchy 
before they take office. Presidents who step down as party leaders, only to be sworn in 
as heads of state are expected to continue to control their parties. By contrast, presidents 
who did not contest the presidential race as party leaders are expected to have little or 
no impact on cabinet composition. Consequently, we do not expect them to control the 
cabinet either. Similarly, prime ministers who are not party leaders are expected to be 
less influential than prime ministers who come to office as party leaders. Due to their 
centrality in the chain of democratic delegation in representative democracies, party 
principals should retain a certain amount of influence over the cabinet under all 
circumstances, as long as they can hold accountable their agents in government, 
including the president and the prime minister. Thus, if neither the president, nor the 
prime minister is a party leader, then we expect party principals to keep a tight grip over 
cabinet ministers.  
Apart from party leadership roles, institutional context also matters for the 
extent of presidential and prime ministerial powers over the cabinet. The variation in 
presidential and prime ministerial influence over the political system as a function of 
institutional context was first noted by Duverger (1980, 1996). He suggested that the 
president’s authority over the political systems depends on whether he or she is the 
leader, a disciplined member, or opposes the parliamentary majority. To account for the 
variation in presidential influence as a function of institutional context, we 
operationalise the “modalities” of presidential influence identified by Duverger 
according to the political affiliation of presidents and prime ministers. Thus, 
institutional context varies according to whether the president and the prime minister are 
from the same party (a situation known as unified executive), or whether the president 
and prime minister are from different parties but the president’s party is in government 
(a scenario known as divided executive), or whether the president’s party is not in 
government (a situation defined as cohabitation). Institutions are expected to interact 
8 
 
with party relationships and to modify their impact on presidential and prime ministerial 
authority. All else equal, we expect that presidents who act as de facto party leaders are 
able to influence the process of ministerial deselection when they are in the same party 
with the prime minister. The extent of their control over cabinet composition is 
expected to decrease when they are not in the same party with the prime minister and 
even more so under cohabitation, when their party is not in government. However, we 
do not expect presidents who are not de facto party leaders to have any impact on 
cabinet composition, regardless of whether or not their party is in government.  
The results of this thesis confirm the expectation that presidents and prime 
ministers who control their parties are also able to hold accountable the party’s agents in 
government under certain institutional circumstances. The analysis of ministerial 
turnover in France and in Romania, where presidents usually come to office as party 
leaders, has shown that political parties are not likely to control cabinet members under 
unified executive. By comparison, political parties are in a better position to hold 
ministers accountable across executive scenarios in Portugal, where presidents do not 
usually act as de facto party leaders. In this case, the extent of party influence over the 
government depends on the strength of prime ministerial leadership and on the 
autonomy of prime ministers relative to their parties. Therefore, as far as semi-
presidential systems are concerned, if political parties undergo a process of 
presidentialisation, then we expect party principals to lose control over cabinet 
members, who become presidential agents when the president and the prime minister 
are from the same party. In other words, presidents who act as de facto party leaders are 
expected to take control over the cabinet when they are in the same party with the prime 
minister. When the president and the prime minister are not from the same party, we 
expect intraparty politics to influence more the process of ministerial deselection. 
Presidents are expected to have the least amount of influence over the cabinet when 
their party is not in government, as in this case they lack both formal and partisan means 
of influence over the cabinet. Under these circumstances, ministers no longer act as 
presidential agents and both prime ministers and parties should regain control over the 
cabinet.  
In addition to the debates surrounding the operation of semi-presidential 
systems, this research also speaks to the debate regarding the challenges faced by party 
government in modern democracies (Katz, 1986, 1987; Mair, 2008; Webb, Farrell, & 
Holliday, 2002; Webb & White, 2007a). Regardless of the definitions given to the 
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concept of party government, one of the conditions for parties to be able to influence 
government requires that political leaders are selected within parties and held 
responsible for their actions and policies through parties (Katz, 1986, 1987; Mair, 2008; 
Rose, 1969). The parties’ ability to place their agents in public office is seen as a form 
of institutional control that operates for the benefit of the party organisation (Kopecký 
& Mair, 2012a, p. 7). However, the literature on party government has also emphasised 
that simply having party members appointed to government is in itself a weak measure 
of party control over the government (Andeweg, 2000, p. 389). Thus, the extent to 
which parties are able to recall ministers is a question that still needs to be assessed 
empirically. Due to the challenges inherent in the recruitment of party leaders by, but 
not necessarily through parties (Mair, 2008, p. 227), the political parties’ ability to 
contain agency loss and fire ministers is a good complementary test for the extent of 
their control over the executive decision-making process. 
Original data 
This study argues that the length of ministerial tenure depends on the ability of 
presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to sanction agency loss under different 
political circumstances. The principals’ control over cabinet composition is estimated as 
a function of party relationships and institutional context. For an effective test of this 
argument we need to observe the process of ministerial deselection under different 
political circumstances within and across national contexts.  
The research question set out above is studied in France, Portugal, and Romania, 
due to the variation in institutional context that these countries have experienced over 
time. The analysis of ministerial turnover in France is carried out for the most recent 
periods of cohabitation and unified executive, which occurred between 1997 and 2002 
and between 2007 and 2012 respectively. The time period under analysis in the case of 
Portugal spans from 2002 until 2009. With the exception of a short period between 2005 
and 2006, when President Jorge Sampaio and José Sócrates of the Socialist Party shared 
executive power, the deselection of Portuguese ministers is observed under conditions 
of cohabitation. Romania presents the greatest variation in institutional context. During 
the time interval under analysis, which spans from 2000 until 2008, there was a period 
of unified executive between 2000 and 2004, one of divided executive between 2004 
and 2007, and one of cohabitation between 2007 and 2008. To capture the variation in 
the party relationships between ministers and their principals we focus on the position 
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held by presidents and prime ministers in the party hierarchy before taking office. Our 
expectation is that presidents and prime ministers who come to office as party leaders 
are in a better position to fire ministers who deviate from their preferred position. The 
alternation of dual executive scenarios within the countries selected for comparison 
allows us to verify whether the impact of party relationships on the length of ministerial 
tenure varies across national contexts under similar political circumstances.  
This study makes an empirical contribution to the study of ministerial turnover.  
A new data set has been collected for each country under study based on content 
analysis of print press news. Apart from the information related to the fixed 
characteristics of the ministers at the moment of appointment, each data set records 
resignation calls, as a measure of ministerial performance, and disagreements with 
principals, as a measure of principal-agent relationships. Similar to previous studies that 
have relied on agency theory to study the relationship between prime ministers and their 
cabinets (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2010, 2012), we see resignation calls as 
indicators of the ministers’ performance in office. Consequently, we expect that 
principals use this information when they decide to end ministerial appointments and 
we expect that the occurrence of resignation calls increases the ministers’ risk of losing 
office. To compensate for this measure’s exposure to noisy signals of the minister’s 
performance (Berlinski et al., 2010, p. 561), we also take into account the direct 
relationship between ministers and their principals. Our assumption in this case is that 
the risk of losing office increases when the occurrence of conflicts between ministers 
and their principals is made public. The accumulation of conflicts between ministers, 
presidents, prime ministers and parties is therefore a proxy for agency loss that each 
principal should aim to contain. If the principals have the power to fire agents, then they 
should be in a position to do so when the level of conflict with their agents increases. If 
the ministers’ risk of losing office does not increase in the presence of conflicts with 
principals, then we assume that the latter do not have the ability to sanction agency loss. 
The indicator of conflicts between ministers and principals is the number of times the 
former are criticised by the latter during their time in office, as reported in the press. 
Similarly, resignation calls are recorded each time ministers are asked to resign, as 
reported in the press. If they are asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new 
resignation call is recorded only if new information comes to light or if a different actor 
asks the minister to resign. The issue at stake for both resignation calls and conflicts 
with principals may be related to the ministers’ performance in executive or party office 
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or to their personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial departments or policy issues. 
Since the occurrence of conflicts and resignation calls is unrelated to the variation in 
institutional context and party relationships we can investigate which conflicts are more 
likely to lead to deselection and under which circumstances this is more likely to 
happen within and across countries.  
The structure of the thesis 
Chapter One reviews the normative expectations derived from the doctrines of 
individual and collective ministerial responsibility and the empirical studies that have 
studied their relevance in concrete cases of ministerial resignation and dismissals across 
different parliamentary systems, ranging from Westminster systems to Central and 
Eastern European democracies. This analysis shows that although the British doctrines 
of ministerial responsibility have travelled to other political systems and aspects of 
ministerial office, the current literature has not identified a set of clear-cut rules that one 
can use to predict what kind of faults or responsibility breaches are likely to cost 
ministers their jobs. 
The second chapter argues that agency theory can supply the theoretical power 
that the study of ministerial survival has so far lacked and situates this topic within the 
broader area of studies that focus on the process of delegation and accountability in 
representative democracies. This analysis shows that while agency theory can be used to 
study ministerial deselection across national and institutional contexts, a semi-
presidential environment maximises the intra- and inter-case variation in principal-agent 
relationships. Using the principal-agent framework, this chapter argues the length of 
ministerial tenure depends on the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party 
principals to sanction agency loss under different political circumstances. Using insights 
from the literature on semi-presidentialism and party politics, this analysis argues that 
certain political circumstances increase the ability of principals who act as de facto 
party leaders to sanction agency loss. 
Chapter three explains the research design used in this study. This chapter 
justifies the adoption of a small-n comparative approach and the selection of cases 
where the theoretical argument is tested. Subsequently we present the use of 
quantitative case studies for the collection, validation, and analysis of the new data 
collected for the purpose of this study and we explain the operationalisation and 
measurement of the dependent and independent variables.  
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Chapters four, five, and six analyse the process of ministerial turnover in France, 
Portugal, and Romania. These chapters have an identical structure. First we outline the 
data, the time period, the institutional context, and the determinants of ministerial 
duration that are captured by the analysis of ministers in each country. Then we focus 
on intraparty politics and we inquire to what extent holding the presidency of a political 
party before taking office allows presidents and prime ministers to play a de facto party 
leadership role after they formally step down as party leaders in each country. 
Subsequently we describe the data sets and we explain the measurement of fixed 
characteristics and events in each country. The chapters conclude with a multivariate 
analysis that evaluates the impact of fixed characteristics, events, and principal-agent 
relationships on the length of ministerial tenure and estimate the ability of presidents, 
prime ministers, and party principals to control the process of ministerial deselection 
under different executive scenarios.  
Due to the limited variation in party relationships in individual countries, the 
case studies do not allow us to estimate the variation in the ability of principals to 
control the process of ministerial deselection as a function of the party leadership roles 
they play. However, the three case studies indicate a link between party systems and 
ministerial accountability. The French and the Romanian cases show that institutional 
context makes a difference for the ability of presidents and prime ministers to control 
the process of ministerial deselection when they act as de facto party leaders. 
Conversely, the Portuguese case suggests that when political parties do not regard the 
presidency as the most important political contest, cabinet ministers are more likely to 
be accountable to prime ministers and their parties independently of institutional 
context. Additionally, the Romania case indicates that inter-executive conflicts may 
reduce the presidents’ influence over the government even under a scenario of unified 
executive and even when they are perceived as de facto party leaders. Similarly, a high 
level of intra-executive conflict during periods of divided executive may decrease the 
ability of both presidents and prime ministers to fire cabinet members. Both situations 
lead to an increase in the ability of the party principal to control cabinet ministers.  
Chapter seven presents a comparative analysis of ministerial turnover in France, 
Portugal, and Romania. Due to the variation in both institutional context and party 
relationships across the three countries, this analysis can estimate the authority of 
presidents and prime ministers over cabinet composition as a function of both party 
leadership positions and executive scenarios. This chapter highlights the impact that 
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formal and informal hierarchies of party leadership have on the ability of presidents and 
prime ministers to influence the process of ministerial deselection and emphasises the 
political circumstances that are likely to strengthen this effect. The results presented in 
this chapter confirm our theoretical expectations and show that the de facto party 
leadership roles played by presidents and prime ministers explain the discrepancy 
between the formal powers held by political actors and their actual influence over the 
cabinet. 
The concluding chapter relates the findings obtained in the empirical chapters to 
the research question and discusses their implications for a general theory of ministerial 
turnover. These findings also emphasise a broader link between the literature on 
ministerial turnover and the literature on party government. In this context we highlight 
the relationship between institutional design and political accountability and we 
emphasise the extra-constitutional factors accounting for the variation in political 
practices across and within institutional frameworks over time. 
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Two Polish ministers lost their jobs in April 2013. Donald Tusk, the Polish prime 
minister and Civic Platform leader, fired Mikołaj Budzanowski, the non-partisan 
minister of treasury, for failing to inform him about a memorandum signed between 
Gazprom and the Polish gas company EuRoPol regarding the construction of a new 
branch of the pipeline transporting gas to Poland. Jarosław Gowin, the Civic Platform’s 
Justice Minister, was also fired in April after stating, while the prime minister was in a 
state visit in Germany, that Polish fertilization clinics were selling embryos in Germany 
for scientific experiments. PM Tusk accused the minister of indiscipline and of 
repeatedly overstepping his jurisdictional competences. Mr Gowin had criticized the 
state funding for IVF treatment and had voted against the government’s draft bill on 
same-sex civil partnerships in February. Sławomir Nowak, the Civic Platform’s 
Transport Minister, also found himself in the hot seat in April 2013, when the lower 
house of parliament tabled a motion of no confidence against him. The motion was 
initiated by the conservative party United Poland following the European Commission’s 
decision to freeze funds for road-building amid allegations of price-fixing. Apart from 
the opposition parties, the motion was also voted by three MPs from the Polish Peasant 
Party, a junior coalition partner to PM Tusk’s Civic Platform. The minister of transport 
survived the no-confidence motion. However, by the end of the month he got involved 
in several other media scandals. First he was accused of friendship with businessmen 
who secure important government contracts. Then he also hit the headlines for flashing 
an expensive collection of watches, which he later on claimed to have borrowed. Mr 
Nowak did not lose his job this time either, although the ruling party continued to fall in 
the opinion polls. What explains the prime minister’s decision to keep in office a 
cabinet member who had received a negative vote in the parliament from a coalition 
partner and who came under heavy media fire, after having shown his decisive 
leadership in firing ministers who had created far less problems for the government? 
This is the sort of question that this thesis aims to answer. 
This chapter is organised in four sections that deal with different aspects of 
ministerial termination events. The first section puts forward a typology of ministerial 
termination events that focuses on their collective or individual nature, as well as on 
Chapter One: The literature on ministerial resignations
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their voluntary or forced character. This section discusses both collective resignations 
and dismissals and justifies their exclusion from this study. The second and third 
sections of the chapter deal with individual resignations and dismissals separately. This 
section draws on primary and secondary literature and uses historical accounts, 
theoretical works, and concrete examples to illustrate the various weaknesses of 
normative expectations about ministerial termination events. The fourth section focuses 
on the literature that analyses patterns of resignations and dismissals across different 
parliamentary systems, ranging from Westminster systems to Central and Eastern 
European democracies. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the current 
literature’s ability to answer to the question ‘when do ministers resign?’, locates the gap 
in the academic endeavour to explain ministerial termination events and emphasises the 
contribution of this study to the understanding of one of the key features of 
parliamentary and semi-presidential government and to the current literature on 
ministerial responsibility. 
1.1 Ministerial termination events 
This section presents a typology of ministerial termination events focusing on the 
collective or individual form that they may take, as well as on their voluntary or forced 
character. For purposes of simplification, only the clear-cut categories of resignations as 
voluntary departures and dismissals as forced exits from the cabinet are illustrated in 
Table 1.1. Although ministerial careers may be ended by other unpredictable events, 
such as illness, personal problems or even death, these possibilities are not covered here 
since they are independent of political factors. 
 
Table 1.1 A typology of ministerial termination events 
 
 Collective Individual 
 
Resignations 
 
Cabinet resignation after 
general elections and PM 
dismissal, resignation, or 
death. 
Ministers step down because of a 
political, administrative or personal 
scandal. 
 
Dismissals 
 
Cabinet dismissal by 
presidents or legislatures. 
Ministers fired by presidents, prime 
ministers, or legislatures (through 
individual no-confidence motions). 
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The first column in Table 1.1 refers to collective termination events, while the 
second one indicates individual exits from the cabinet. Since collective ministerial 
terminations are simultaneous with cabinet terminations, it is possible to classify them 
using the three classes of termination modes put forward by Budge and Keman (1990, 
p. 160) for the analysis of Western European cabinet duration. Consequently, collective 
exits from the cabinet are expected after general elections (either fixed or anticipated) or 
prime ministerial resignations, and when specific political procedures are used to bring 
down the government, such as a change in the cabinet’s party composition leading to 
the mass resignation of ministers belonging to that party, the loss of a vote of 
confidence, and constitutional interventions, such as the president’s decision to dissolve 
the assembly and call new elections (Budge & Keman, 1990, p. 164). By and large, the 
cabinet can be dismissed only in parliamentary systems, where the two branches of 
power can remove each other. Since all parliamentary systems are characterised by what 
is known as a “responsible executive” (Marshall, 1989a, p. 1), the assembly can dismiss 
the cabinet by passing a no-confidence motion. Although the degree to which this basic 
feature of parliamentarism can be enforced depends on the structure and organisation of 
political parties (Marshall, 1989a, p. 1), it has remained the most important mechanism 
of collective ministerial dismissal. Additionally, in certain political systems where a 
directly elected president coexists with a responsible executive, the president may also 
influence cabinet duration (Shugart & Carey, 1992, p. 24). 
The causes of collective ministerial terminations can be inferred from the 
literature dealing with government survival. The main theories that seek to explain the 
causes of cabinet terminations in Western European parliamentary democracies have 
traditionally focused on “structural attributes” (Warwick, 1979), “critical events” (E. C. 
Browne, Frendreis, & Gleiber, 1986) or “strategic interactions” (Budge & Keman, 
1990; Damgaard, 2008; Lupia & Strøm, 2009). In order to use the insights of the 
“attributes” and “events” approaches, King et al. (1990) put forward a model of cabinet 
survival that, while being essentially stochastic, assumed that the probability of cabinet 
terminations is also a function of several country, party-system and cabinet attributes. 
Additionally, by relating government duration to party system fractionalisation, the 
existence of an investiture requirement, the polarisation of the opposition and the 
number of attempts for each government formation, the authors emphasised the key 
relevance of the bargaining environment for the durability of coalition cabinets (G. King 
et al., 1990, p. 869).  Similarly, Lupia and Strøm (Lupia & Strøm, 2009) focused on the 
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bargaining power of political parties and modelled the hazard rate of coalition cabinets 
as a function of two overlapping games, the coalition-building process and the 
bargaining process in anticipation of the next election’s outcomes. They argued that 
electoral incentives influence the parliamentary decision-making game and that 
electoral expectations have a critical impact on cabinet stability (Lupia & Strøm, 2009). 
Using a similar argument, Damgaard (2008, p. 306) differentiated between technical 
terminations, which occur in the aftermath of regular elections or when prime ministers 
resign for non-political reasons; and discretionary terminations, which involve strategic 
actions decided by party leaders and include early elections, voluntary cabinet 
enlargement, cabinet defeat in parliament, intra-party conflict, inter-party conflict, inter-
party policy conflict and inter-party personal conflict. Damgaard’s analysis has 
emphasised that with the exception of enlargement terminations, which have so far 
occurred rarely and mostly in Finland, the remaining types of discretionary terminations 
are triggered by political conflicts and occur when the cabinet is defeated by one of the 
cabinet’s principals, presidents or political parties (Damgaard, 2008, p. 307). To sum 
up, most approaches to cabinet duration have in common a strong focus on political 
bargaining. 
The bargaining dimension of cabinet politics is also relevant for the distinction 
between the voluntary and forced character of ministerial termination events, which sets 
resignations apart from dismissals. As far as individual ministers are concerned, 
drawing a line between requested resignations and dismissals is particularly difficult 
given the fact that in both cases ministers leave office against their will (Brazier, 1997, 
p. 289). As a matter of fact, some authors believe that the proper term for a minister 
being “fired” is “resignation”, since the decision to dismiss is only taken if ministers 
refuse to resign (Dewan & Dowding, 2005, p. 47). However, by paying attention to the 
role played by ministers faced with resignation issues, Brazier (1997, p. 290) 
differentiated between ministers who take the initiative to resign over a collective 
responsibility matter and ministers who are punished for personal or departmental 
errors. In the first case external pressures for resignations are rare, while in the second 
case ministers resign involuntarily, as a result of media, assembly or party pressures. 
Although it may not always be easy to clearly recognise ministerial promotions and 
demotions, the reallocation of ministers to other posts through cabinet reshuffles is a 
similar response to ministerial insubordinance, unwanted initiatives, or mistakes. In any 
case, when faced with a resignation issue, whether a minister resigns voluntary, is 
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constrained to resign, sidelined in the cabinet, or dismissed is likely to depend on his 
bargaining position within a given political climate. 
By and large, although the factors that trigger collective ministerial terminations 
are to a large extent unpredictable at the beginning of a government’s mandate, the 
smooth resolution of such situations is guaranteed by constitutional provisions, which 
ensure that in case the prime minister vacates office, the entire cabinet must step down. 
By contrast, an individual exit from the government, on grounds of either personal or 
departmental faults, is often likely to follow a unique course of action that varies 
according to the different factors that brings it into public attention and the institutional 
mechanisms that are allowed to interfere in the process.  
To sum up, collective ministerial terminations are simultaneous and mutually 
exclusive with cabinet resignations and dismissals, as a fall of government 
automatically attracts the end of all ministerial tenures. Individual terminations, on the 
other hand, are generated by the actions and responsibilities of individual ministers and 
strongly influenced by institutional and political relationship between ministers and 
other political actors involved in executive politics. Since the focus of this study is on 
the dynamics of power relations that tie line ministers to prime ministers, party leaders 
and presidents and aims to determine the impact of these interactions on the length of 
ministerial tenure, we do not deal with the problem of collective ministerial 
terminations. The next sections of this chapter analyse separately resignations, 
dismissals and regional patterns of these events in different types of parliamentary 
systems. 
1.2 Individual resignations 
This section focuses on the individual exits from the cabinet that take the form of 
resignations. Apart from discussing the literature that classifies and looks into the 
causes of ministerial resignations, this section analyses the British constitutional 
doctrines of collective and individual ministerial responsibility and emphasises their 
expansion to other political systems and aspects of ministerial office, as well as the 
attempts made to change their operation. Following a review of the literature dealing 
with ministerial resignations, attention is drawn to the inability of accountability 
theories to explain why some breaches of the responsibility conventions are followed by 
resignations while others are not. The section concludes with a summary of the roles 
played by resignations within complex political environments, ranging from voluntary 
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or upward moves that benefit ministers, to sanctions and demotions that reflect the cost-
benefit equation for other political actors. 
In a restricted sense, resignations can be defined as the course of action taken by 
line ministers who decide to pull up stakes and leave office as a result of political 
disagreements with their superiors (Brazier, 1997, p. 290). Such principled resignations 
are “the right and duty of a Minister who finds himself in disagreement with his 
colleagues on fundamental issues of principle and each man must decide for himself 
whether an issue is one of principle or judgement” (The Manchester Guardian, 8 
January 1959). However, in a broader sense, resignations may also function as a 
disguise for sanctions that ministers receive either as a result of insubordination towards 
the head of government or as a consequence of media, assembly or party pressures to 
resign, which are usually triggered by personal or departmental scandals (Brazier, 1997, 
p. 290). It is for this reason that more detailed research on ministerial resignations is 
required in order to determine whether the factors that are responsible for bringing the 
resignation issue on the political agenda are also responsible for the final act of 
resignation. 
Although they are not a perfect indicator of accountability, resignations are one 
of the few indicators that are part of the public record, notwithstanding the fact that it 
would be difficult to tell whether a large number of resignations indicates a good level 
of accountability or an excess of ministerial misdeeds (Woodhouse, 1993, p. 290). At 
the same time, in order to understand when ministers resign one has to be aware of the 
instances in which they do not resign, since the same conditions that led some ministers 
to resign might have also occurred in other cases when ministers were able to avoid 
resignations (Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 412). From this perspective, non-resignations 
can be defined as “any case where the press, a non-political organization or MPs in the 
House have suggested the minister should resign” (Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 412). 
Consequently, in order to understand the causal process of resignations and the 
evolution of theoretical expectations, it is necessary to pay equal attention to both 
resignations and non-resignations. 
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility 
The concept of “ministerial responsibility” indicates an executive branch of government 
that is answerable and removable by the legislature and sets parliamentarism apart from 
presidential government, where the two branches of power are independent of each 
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other (Marshall, 1989a, p. 1). The convention of ministerial responsibility is an old 
British constitutional principle that grew out of Westminster political practices between 
1780 and 1815, when the principles of unanimous agreement of ministers on major 
policies, unity of cabinet under the control of the Prime Minister and the requirement to 
resign following defeat on a confidence vote imposed themselves as unwritten but firm 
rules (Birch, 1989, p. 27). The consolidation of these practices has led to the 
development of two concepts of ministerial responsibility: collective responsibility of 
the prime minister and cabinet members for government policies and personal 
responsibility of each of the ministers for their own political, administrative or personal 
errors.  
The principle of collective responsibility binds cabinet ministers to share 
responsibility for all government policies and confines the expression of any critical 
views to cabinet meetings (Doig, 1993, p. 167). Therefore, the theoretical expectation 
derived from this convention is that ministers failing to obtain cabinet approval for their 
preferred policies have only two options left: resign from the cabinet or conform to the 
common decision. If they choose to publicly voice disagreement with governmental 
decisions or policies, one would expect either a resignation or a dismissal, since “the 
unanimity requirement turns the cabinet into a formally unitary actor from which each 
minister cannot dissociate without resigning” (Palmer, 1995, p. 173). A textbook 
example in this regard is that of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a former French minister 
who chose to step down three times from the departments of Technology and Industry 
(1983), Defence (1991) and Internal Affairs (2000) to protest against his government’s 
decisions. Chevènement is famous for having outlined the attitude that line ministers 
must adopt in the cabinet:  “a minister has to keep his mouth shut and if he wants to 
open it, he has to resign” (Méritens, 2005). After he left the department of technology 
and industry in 1983 over the policy that locked the franc to the mark, Chevènement 
compared the situation in government with the debate within the Socialist Party, 
emphasising why he considered necessary to resign from the cabinet: “My decision to 
resign from the government was the only possible option, since there cannot be two 
political views within the government. But it is possible to have them both within the 
party” (Chevènement, 1983, p. 1). Additionally, the principle of collective responsibility 
plays a double political function as it can be used by the prime minister in the 
parliament in order to defend a minister under attack and in the cabinet in order to give 
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dissenting ministers the ultimatum of accepting a policy or resign (Sutherland, 1991, p. 
95). 
The convention of individual responsibility covers “a minister’s responsibility 
both for his or her actions and for actions undertaken in the minister’s name and with 
the minister’s authority or approval” (Doig, 1989, p. 319). For this reason, individual 
responsibility is twofold, covering both personal and departmental faults. However, the 
boundaries of both types of resignations generated by breaches of individual 
responsibility principles have been constantly expanded. While personal fault 
resignations could be expected over political misjudgements that “arise from a 
minister’s official position but do not involve his or her department” (Woodhouse, 
2004, p. 1), ministers have often been constrained to resign over private indiscretions, 
such as sexual scandals (Doig, 1993; Woodhouse, 1993, p. 282). Rather than 
sanctioning inappropriate conduct for cabinet members for which no formal rules exist, 
this kind of resignation has the role of minimising the detrimental effects that negative 
mass media coverage can have on the government and the respective minister’s party 
(Doig, 1993, p. 178).  
The second type of personal fault resignations, related to a minister’s duty to 
resign over departmental and administrative mismanagement, has been defined as the 
“major element of uncertainty in the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility” 
(Marshall, 1989a, p. 7), given that political practices have rarely acknowledged it. Even 
in Sir William Dugdale’s case, whose resignation in 1954 over the Crichel Down Affair 
is often cited as a textbook example of a minister who took full responsibility for 
departmental errors, it was the hostility of his own party’s backbenchers to the land 
disposal policy that eventually triggered the resignation (Finer, 1989, p. 124; Jones, 
1987, p. 89; Marshall, 1991, p. 464; Woodhouse, 2004, p. 7). Nevertheless, this 
precedent motivated ministers to separate actions in which the minister is personally 
involved from actions carried out by officials (Chester, 1989, p. 111), thus trying to 
revise the doctrine and turn its application in their favour. Examples in this regard 
include James Prior, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and Kenneth Baker, Home 
Secretary, who refused to resign over the escape of IRA prisoners in 1983 and 1984 
respectively, unless it was proved that the escape had occurred because a governmental 
policy had failed or had been badly implemented. Such arguments have been interpreted 
as an attempt to reformulate the individual responsibility convention so that it would not 
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be possible to ask ministers to resign unless matters of high policy are involved 
(Woodhouse, 1993, p. 286). 
Because of its floating boundaries, efforts are being made to eliminate the 
category of departmental resignations either by making public servants responsible for 
their own actions, or by placing all types of individual responsibility resignations under 
a unique category. The first approach was at the core of an extensive debate on the 
operation of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and the requirement to revise the 
responsibilities assigned to ministers and civil servants alike, which was generated by 
the Westland Affair in 1986. This debate opposed traditionalist-academics to realist-
politicians, contesting and defending the need for civil servants to assume responsibility 
for their own actions (Robinson, 1987, p. 64). On the one hand it was argued that a 
political class of civil servants should be set up in order to render ministers able to come 
to grips with the modern demands of executive decision-making (Shepherd, 1987, pp. 
74–77). On the other hand, academics stressed the role of the ministerial responsibility 
principle in ensuring political control over the bureaucracy, a key aspect of democratic 
government that would be loosened if ministers retained purely managerial functions 
(Jones, 1987, p. 88). The second approach was adopted by Diane Woodhouse (2004), 
who analysed the resignations of Stephen Byers, a British Secretary of State for 
Transport, and Estelle Morris, the State Secretary for Education. Woodhouse (2004, p. 
2) argued that as these resignations had been triggered by departmental errors rather 
than political misjudgements, it was necessary to reconsider the constitutional and 
political aspects of the convention. She emphasised that if departmental fault 
resignations are based on the acceptance of a causal responsibility, then it is possible to 
identify in all instances of British resignations in the twentieth century a causal link 
between the error in question and the minister who should have known what was 
happening in his department. As the exclusion of administrative duties from ministerial 
responsibilities makes it difficult to use causal responsibility as a basis for determining 
constitutional fault, Woodhouse argues that more attention should be given to the 
minister’s role responsibility in managing the department, which includes the capacity 
to prevent and correct mistakes (Woodhouse, 2004, p. 11). Should this classification be 
adopted, ministerial role responsibility would group together political, policy-making 
and supervisory duties, with no need to distinguish between different types of 
responsibilities. 
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The principle of collective responsibility has influenced the course of action 
sought by individual ministers in order to set the executive agenda and implement 
policies in their own departments. Frequent evaluation of the consequences associated 
with the breach of collective responsibility and tacit support given to controversial 
decisions is a common attitude adopted by ministers in Westminster systems. For 
example, Bertie Ahern, the Irish Minister of Finance in the Albert Reynolds cabinet 
(1992-1994), has explained in his autobiography why he eventually decided to accept 
the prime minister’s decision regarding a tax amnesty bill that he had initially strongly 
opposed: “The only choice for me was to swallow it, or make a lone stand. That would 
have meant having to walk, because if I say we’re not doing it and then the cabinet 
decides to do it anyway, that’s a resignation issue” (Ahern & Aldous, 2009, p. 153).  
The principle of ministerial responsibility has not been limited to Westminster 
systems, such as Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For example, the 
Portuguese constitution includes the principle of collective responsibility (article 189), 
according to which cabinet members are bound by the government’s programme and its 
collective decisions. Additionally, the case of Jean-Pierre Chevènement mentioned 
above reinforces the idea that the principle of ministerial responsibility continues to 
shape ministerial behaviour and political practices in Western Europe. However, 
accountability theories have usually failed to explain why only some of the 
responsibility breaches are sanctioned. The next section presents further examples of 
their inability to account for the complex situations that surround ministerial termination 
events. 
Breaches of collective ministerial responsibility 
The hypothesis that accountability doctrines fail to provide a satisfactory account to 
ministerial resignations and dismissals has been acknowledged once academics decided 
to verify empirically the existence of departmental fault resignations, which imply that 
ministers take upon themselves the blame for the mistakes of their civil servants. The 
first systematic analysis of British ministerial resignations forced by parliamentary 
criticism during 1855-1955 was carried out by Samuel Edward Finer (1989). Having 
noticed the exceptional nature of resignations, Finer emphasised that a breach of 
ministerial responsibility triggered resignations provided two conditions were met: 
minority government or backbench revolts (Finer, 1989, p. 121). Additionally, 
resignations could still be avoided if the prime minister decided to reshuffle the cabinet. 
24 
 
As a result, Finer concluded that actual charges of incompetence were rare, arbitrary 
and unpredictable and neither the circumstances of the offence nor its gravity were 
decisive for the imposition of resignations, since no matter how serious or trivial a 
reason, the minister concerned was likely to lose parliamentary support and be forced to 
resign only “if the Minister is yielding, his Prime Minister unbending, and his party out 
for blood” (Finer, 1989, p. 126).  Finer’s conclusion was also backed by Dawn Oliver 
(1994, p. 631) and Geoffrey Marshall (1989b, p. 130) who found no example of a post-
war British minister forced to step down for civil service errors. These findings 
emphasised the discrepancy between the smooth resolution of ministerial responsibility 
breaches prescribed by constitutional conventions and the complexity of political 
contexts within which some ministerial careers seemed randomly terminated by 
personal or departmental faults, while others were not. 
Despite his extensive analysis of ministerial resignations over a long period of 
time, Finer adopted a traditional approach to study these events, selecting only the 
events that matched his initial assumptions, without taking into account non-
resignations and paying excessive attention to famous cases, such as Crichel Down 
(Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 412). The key relevance of non-resignation events in 
understanding the causal process as well as the nature and changing conditions of the 
conventions and expectations surrounding ministerial resignations was emphasised 
several decades later by Dowding and Kang (1998, p. 424), who showed that ministers 
who resigned or were reshuffled had often been previously confronted with resignation 
issues. However, whether and under what circumstances ministers resign as a formal 
requirement of the individual responsibility convention, or as a result of the political 
cost-benefit equation of the political climate remained an unsettled issue (Palmer, 1995, 
p. 178). 
A famous example of how the classic responsibility doctrine interacts with 
political factors is that of the Westland Affair, where Michael Heseltine is famously 
reported to have resigned over both policy disagreements and prime ministerial 
leadership style (Woodhouse, 1993, p. 278). The Westland Affair has called into 
question the convention of collective responsibility, as Heseltine’s struggle to find an 
European solution for Westland’s financial difficulties also reflected his fight “for more 
governmental involvement in industry, for the rights of ministers to run their own 
departments with less back-seat driving from Downing Street, and, most of all, for the 
right of ministers to bring departmental policy issues to the full cabinet” (The 
25 
 
Economist, 4 January 1986, p. 18, cited in Dunleavy, 1990, p. 36). Heseltine’s refusal to 
accept the rules of ministerial solidarity and his eagerness to turn an inter-ministerial 
dispute into a deep political crisis was also decoded as a leadership challenge to 
Margaret Thatcher (Dunleavy, 1990, p. 50), which was supposed to attract the approval 
and support of party members (The Times, 10 January 1986). As a result, his resignation 
focused attention on the leadership struggles in the Conservative Party at the expense of 
the policy disagreements at stake (James, 1994, p. 672). All in all, this episode “reduced 
old constitutional nostrums to rubble” (P. Hennessy, 1989, p. 80), given that ministerial 
dissent was followed by the naming and blaming of civil servants and the leaking of 
official documents. However, it also proved that a minister may be able to turn a 
resignation situation to his or her advantage and thus avoid the demotion costs usually 
attached to the loss of ministerial office. 
Resignations are often perceived as “euphemistic words of use” when some 
ministers have to be moved out to make room for others (Arnold, 1986). To put it 
differently, while some resignations may precede promotions outside the cabinet, most 
of them follow overt criticism from political actors and mass media and are seen as 
“pushed” resignations (Fisher, Kaiser, & Rohlfing, 2006, p. 712). The reasons that 
motivate this kind of “push” range from political to non-political reasons and may be 
subdivided in personal errors, departmental errors, policy disagreements, personal 
enrichment and third party favouritism (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 713). Depending on the 
gravity of their errors, ministers may be expected to step down. However, as 
emphasised in numerous political memoirs of prime ministers who have dealt with 
situations of ministers accused of various offences, resignations are not imposed as 
sanctions for the doctrine’s sake, but to allow the cabinet to conserve its political and 
moral authority in the eventuality of ministers having to undergo judicial inquiries 
(Balladur, 2009, p. 313). Since “resignations are not always what they seem” and “some 
that seem to be without fault may be in anticipation of future dismissal”, while “some 
others that are on the face of it stout-hearted withdrawals as the alleged result of policy 
differences may in reality be polite expulsions or prudent subterfuges” (Marshall, 
1989b, p. 127), it is difficult to differentiate between resignations and dismissals in 
practice.  
The concept of ministerial responsibility can be better grasped if one looks 
separately at the roles that ministers play in relations to prime ministers, cabinet 
colleagues and departmental subordinates. Using this approach, Weller (1999, pp. 62–
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64) identified three ministerial responsibility categories that generate different 
resignation types: the superior-subordinate relations that characterise the relationship 
between cabinet members and prime ministers bring about behavioural resignations; 
collegial relationships among cabinet members trigger collective responsibility 
resignations; while ministerial departmental management approaches are associated 
with individual responsibility resignations. However, the situations where ministers 
resign exclusively on the ground of collective or individual responsibility infringements, 
either voluntary or at the request of their political superiors are rare. Even clear-cut 
examples of resignations generated by the infringement of classic doctrines, such as the 
Westland Affair, emphasise the fact that “politics, not theories of accountability, 
determine the fate of ministers” (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 49). As a result, 
further research is necessary in order to determine what circumstances and combination 
of political factors translate a resignation issue into a ministerial termination event. The 
next section of this chapter focuses on individual dismissals and emphasises several 
ways of terminating a ministerial appointment based on different institutional 
arrangements that characterise various political systems. 
1.3 Individual dismissals 
As far as dismissals are concerned, there are two ways in which ministers can be fired: 
they can be either removed from the cabinet altogether, or sidelined to less important 
portfolios. This section focuses on both strategies of ministerial demotion. The aim of 
this analysis is to determine whether the relationship between breaches of ministerial 
responsibilities and career sanctions is as straightforward as theories of accountability 
imply. Nonetheless, attention is also called to situations where ministerial faults are not 
sanctioned by dismissals and contradict theoretical expectations. 
One-step demotion strategy: outright dismissal 
Depending on the institutional framework that characterises every political system, 
cabinet members may be dismissed by prime ministers, legislatures, presidents, or a 
combination of these actors. Nevertheless, prime ministers are usually credited with the 
key role in dismissing or forcing ministers to resign (Brazier, 1997, p. 290; Dewan & 
Dowding, 2005, p. 47; Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 425). For this reason, before 
focusing on the literature that deals with ministerial dismissals and emphasising the 
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range of powers that prime ministers, legislatures and presidents can use to fire cabinet 
members, this section provides several examples that illustrate the universe of situations 
in which prime ministers decide to fire cabinet members. These examples have been 
selected from the Irish government. The Taoiseach is generally considered more 
powerful than any other prime minister, with the exception of his British counterpart 
(O’Leary, 1991, p. 159). For this reason, one may expect Irish prime ministers to have 
full control over cabinet composition under most circumstances. 
The “Arms Crisis” scandal occurred in 1970 during the Fianna Fáil government 
led by Jack Lynch and led to the dismissal of two cabinet ministers, Charles Haughey 
and Neil Blaney. At the beginning of this crisis and throughout his time in government, 
Jack Lynch renounced force as a means of resolving the ethno-political conflict in 
Northern Ireland  and supported the idea of an Irish union rooted in consent (Desmond, 
2000, p. 82). However, Ministers Haughey and Blaney disapproved this cautious policy 
and were suspected of orchestrating a government-IRA response to the crisis behind 
Lynch’s back (Desmond, 2000, p. 82). As a result, when they were accused by the 
opposition of importing arms illegally for the IRA in April 1970, Jack Lynch did not 
hesitate to fire both of them when they refused to resign (Reynolds, 2009, p. 67). 
This example illustrates a clear-cut situation where ministers were put under 
official accusations and the prime minister had no choice but to terminate their 
appointment. However, not all decisions to dismiss are grounded on official 
accusations, and not all official accusations lead to dismissals. For example, Charlie 
Haughey’s decision to dismiss Brian Lenihan, one of his closest friends and political 
partners, during the 1990 presidential elections campaign was perceived as a shocking 
albeit not totally unjustified action (Desmond, 2000, p. 109; Reynolds, 2009, p. 134). 
After Lenihan’s involvement in Fianna Fáil’s attempt to persuade President Hillery to 
refuse the Dáil’s dissolution that was sought by Taoiseach FitzGerald in January 1982 
hit the headlines, he kept changing stories about the telephone call he had made to the 
President in 1982 (J. Walsh, 2008, pp. 474–484).  Eventually, he gave an interview to 
the Irish Times confirming his participation to this event. As a result, the Progressive 
Democrats who formed a coalition government with Fianna Fáil threatened to bring 
down the government if Lenihan was not fired (O’Brien, 1991). Under these 
circumstances, “Haughey, although insisting he would put no pressure on Brian 
Lenihan, his friend of thirty years, drew up a letter of resignation for him to sign. It was 
a grave demand and Brian, who had a lot of support within the party, refused to comply. 
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In the end Haughey sacked his old friend Lenihan from the cabinet” (Reynolds, 2009, p. 
134). Rather than emphasising a situation where a minister is punished for trying to 
tamper with constitutional decision-making rules, since Lenihan was actually acting at 
the request and on behalf of Haughey, this example illustrates a prime minister’s ability 
to take advantage of his power to fire cabinet ministers and make a demonstration of 
strong party and government leadership. 
Additionally, the same Taoiseach managed to use his unlimited power over 
cabinet composition in order to sanction ministers not for constitutional breaches of 
ministerial errors, but as a result of their attempt to challenge his party leadership. Such 
an event occurred in November 1991 when Albert Reynolds and Padraig Flynn, the 
Irish ministers of Finance and Environment respectively, were sacked after Reynolds 
challenged Haughey’s party leadership by supporting an internal no-confidence motion 
against the leader (Murdoch, 1991). This course of action is confirmed by Albert 
Reynolds in his autobiography: “As I anticipated, my support for the motion of no 
confidence led Haughey to demand my resignation from the cabinet; and when I refused 
he sacked me, along my supporters Flynn, Geoghegan-Quinn, Brendan Smith and Noel 
Tracy” (Reynolds, 2009, p. 142).  This example shows that prime ministerial powers to 
fire are not exclusively used to sanction personal or administrative errors, but also to 
preserve strong leadership over both the party and cabinet. In this case, ministerial 
dismissals may indicate the length that prime ministers go to defend their leadership 
positions. Had the Taoiseach not been a party leader as well, the ministers in question 
might have kept their jobs. 
Last, but not least, ministers committing a constitutional breach may not always 
have to face dismissal. A controversial episode of this kind took place in Ireland in 
1976, when a conflict between the president and a line minister resulted in the former’s 
resignation. In July 1976, following the IRA’s assassination of Christopher Ewart-
Biggs, the British ambassador to Ireland, the government passed an Emergency Powers 
bill in order to secure additional legal powers to confront the IRA. Acting in accordance 
with the Constitution, President Ó Dálaigh decided to refer the Emergency Powers bill 
to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality before enacting it into law. However, 
Minister of Defence Patrick Donegan criticised severely this action during a military 
function in Mullingar in October 1976 and characterised the President as a “thundering 
disgrace” for the state (J. Walsh, 2008, p. 415). Subsequently, Fianna Fáil, the main 
opposition party, called for the minister’s dismissal on the ground of constitutional 
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breach by challenging the Constitutional authority of the President (D. Walsh, 1976a). 
Following the Taoiseach’s refusal to take any action against the Minister of Defence, 
Fianna Fáil tabled a motion of no confidence requesting Donegan to resign, given that 
the conflict opposed one office of the state to another rather than being a mere clash of 
personalities (D. Walsh, 1976b). When the government won the no-confidence vote 
with a five-vote majority, President Ó Dálaigh tendered his resignation as the “only way 
to protect the Presidency”, given that his relationship with the Minister of Defence had 
been irreparably breached because of the circumstances and the persons before whom 
the minister had made his criticism (The Irish Times, 23 October 1976). The opposition 
laid the blame for the President’s resignation on Taoiseach Cosgrave, accusing him of 
tolerating a “gross breach of the Constitution” and standing “over a serious denigration 
of the highest office of the State” (The Irish Times, 23 October 1976). Patrick Hillery, 
the newly elected President on 3 December 1976, praised Ó Dálaigh’s decision to resign 
defending his constitutional responsibilities and commented that “in any other country 
the insulter would have been the one to resign” (J. Walsh, 2008, p. 428). 
Any attempt to understand the reasons why the Irish Minister of Defence was 
not dismissed must start from the institutional rules that regulate the termination of 
ministerial appointments. According to the Irish Constitution, the president cannot ask a 
minister to resign and may accept the resignation of a minister only upon the advice of 
the Taoiseach (Article 13). The parliament also lacks to capacity to fire an individual 
minister, as the government is collectively responsible to the legislature (Article 28). 
Only the Taoiseach has the power to ask a cabinet member to resign and may advise the 
President to terminate a ministerial appointment in case the minister concerned refuses 
to comply with the resignation request (Article 28). It is for this reason that as soon as 
the Minister of Defence was accused of a constitutional breach, the responsibility of 
action was considered to have moved in the Taoiseach’s hands, the only one who could 
have re-established the primacy of the Presidency by urging the minister to resign (The 
Irish Times, 25 October 1976). The President’s decision to resign took place in the 
context where it would have been difficult to tolerate a situation where the Taoiseach 
and the Government upheld the action of a minister who had gravely offended the office 
of Presidency (The Irish Times, 25 October 1976). However, any attempt to understand 
why this dispute did not result in the minister’s dismissal cannot be satisfactorily carried 
out by a simple reading of constitutional rules. Quite the contrary, it requires a more 
complex evaluation of the relationship between the political actors involved in this 
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constitutional conflict and a deeper understanding of the institutional relationship 
between the government and presidency. The suggestion that one of the reasons why 
Donegan was spared dismissal was related to Cosgrave’s reluctance to see Ó Dálaigh 
acting akin to a third house of parliament (Fanning, 2006), offers a starting point for the 
analysis of the consequences of institutional rivalry for the length of ministerial tenure. 
Comparative analyses of prime ministerial powers among different political 
systems have emphasised the existence of three main factors that are responsible for the 
variation of authority over cabinet composition: institutional constraints, government 
types and individual leadership styles (Rose, 1991, p. 10). Given that a prime minister’s 
career-control ability depends on the type of government that is formed in the aftermath 
of elections, it is widely agreed that prime ministers of single-party governments are 
more influential than prime ministers of multi-party coalition governments, the latter 
having to share authority over cabinet with coalition party leaders (A. King, 1994a, p. 
154; Rose, 1991, p. 16). This explains why the British prime minister’s overwhelming 
power over the government has been linked to his or her total control over cabinet 
appointments, promotions, demotions and dismissals, as well as to his or her ability to 
intervene in departmental business at any time (A. King, 1994b, p. 212). In comparison, 
the Dutch prime minister’s powers to dismiss or reshuffle the cabinet are considerably 
more limited (Andeweg & Bakema, 1994, p. 59; Andeweg, 1991, p. 117). Additionally, 
any assessment of prime ministerial authority over cabinet composition needs to take 
into account their relationship with presidents, a complex aspect that led King (1994a, 
p. 152) to omit French and Finnish prime ministers from his ranking of prime ministers 
because of their “idiosyncratic” power-sharing with the head of state. 
In addition to prime ministers, presidents and legislatures may also have the 
power to dismiss cabinet ministers individually. As far as presidents are concerned, they 
have full ministerial appointment and dismissal powers only in those political systems 
where they are also formal heads of government. Outside pure presidential systems, 
presidents may have the power to dismiss the cabinet as a whole, but they can only 
appoint and remove individual ministers at the proposal of the prime minister. The 
legislature’s prerogative to terminate ministerial careers is not confined to one regime 
type. Firstly, the principle of responsible government, which is valid in any 
parliamentary system, allows the legislature to dismiss the cabinet at any time, provided 
some technical conditions are satisfied. Secondly, in some parliamentary regimes, such 
as Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Sweden, the 
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parliament can pass an individual no-confidence vote and discharge the minister 
concerned without triggering the fall of the entire cabinet (Fish & Kroenig, 2009). 
Additionally, even if the legislature cannot remove the government as a whole in 
presidential systems where the executive and legislative branches of power are 
independent of each other, in certain Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, it may still 
censure cabinet members through ministerial interpellations (Fish & Kroenig, 2009). 
The remaining of this section is devoted to the analysis of the second strategy 
that heads of government can use in order to sideline a minister who is no longer 
considered an asset for the executive but for various reasons cannot be eliminated 
through a one-step procedure such as dismissal. 
Gradual demotion strategy: cabinet reshuffle 
While to a certain extent resignations and dismissals may be contrasted as ministerial 
voluntary and involuntary termination events, cabinet reshuffles resist a clear-cut 
inclusion in either of the two categories. These events may be interpreted as both 
promotions and demotions of ministers (Kam & Indridason, 2005, p. 327). Since we are 
primarily concerned with ministerial termination events, this section focuses exclusively 
on the demotion function of cabinet reshuffles. For this reason, they will be seen as 
consequences of errors sanctioned by switches to different posts rather than by outright 
dismissals (Brazier, 1997, p. 281). 
Cabinet reshuffles have been defined as tools that prime ministers use in order to 
maintain power and improve their odds of winning re-election (Kam & Indridason, 
2005, p. 354). Aiming to identify the political function of cabinet reshuffles in Britain, 
Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand during 1960-2001, Kam and Indridason 
(2005, p. 327) showed that prime ministers use the option of reshuffling their cabinets 
as strategic devices to retain power in the face of both intraparty and electoral 
challenges to their leadership. This study has confirmed an earlier hypothesis, according 
to which prime ministers decide to reshuffle as a way of dealing with politically or 
administratively incompetent ministers (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 57). 
However, the questions raised in this section do not concern the role of cabinet 
reshuffles in empowering prime ministers or increasing cabinet popularity. Instead, the 
emphasis here lies on the circumstances under which a minister may expect to be 
demoted through a shift of responsibilities. At this point, one should be aware that the 
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task of accounting for cabinet reshuffles is not unlike that of explaining resignations, to 
the extent that sometimes reshuffles punish ministers who achieved good results in their 
portfolio, while promoting ministers with rather modest performances. For example, in 
a cabinet reshuffle that took place in Ireland in September 2004, a minister who had 
successfully carried out his task to restructure several semi-state transport companies 
was relegated to a different portfolio despite his public protests (McGee, 2004), while a 
minister whose performance in the Communication portfolio had placed Ireland on the 
second worst place in EU for broadband was promoted to the Foreign Affairs 
Department (McManus, 2004). Seamus Brennan’s demotion from the Department of 
Transports attracted a good deal of attention as it seemed that his success in breaking-up 
Aer Rianta and opening Dublin Bus up to competition had cost him his job. 
Furthermore, the stark contrast with the promotion earned by the Communication 
Minister’s “lacklustre performance” indicated that the reshuffle did not reflect the 
ministers’ success in delivering on governmental election promises, but something 
utterly different (McManus, 2004). According to Brennan’s biographer, the Transport 
Minister considered that he was being moved from his department because he had 
rattled the trade unions’ vested interests with his efforts to reorganise the aviation and 
public transport (Lahiffe, 2009, p. 127). Although the prime minister rejected any claim 
that Brennan had been demoted in the reshuffle (M. Hennessy & Humphreys, 2004), the 
minister declared that had felt shafted out of Transport and had been hugely 
disappointed by the Taoiseach’s decision (Lahiffe, 2009, p. 126). 
Additionally, while some ministers seem to have no choice but to accept the 
prime minister’s decision to move departments, other ministers may be able to stay firm 
and reject prime ministerial reshuffle plans. This situation may be illustrated by 
contrasting the case of Seamus Brennan, who was reshuffled in 2004 despite his good 
performance and efforts to oppose the Taoiseach’s decision (McGee, 2004), and Barry 
Desmond, whose demotion in a cabinet reshuffle was avoided at last moment in 1986 
(V. Browne, 2000). In February 1986, Garret FitzGerald, the Irish Prime Minister 
leading a Fine Gael – Labour coalition, decided to reshuffle Barry Desmond, the Labour 
Minister of Health and Social Welfare, because of the unpopularity attracted by his 
measures during his three-year mandate (V. Browne, 2000). However, Desmond felt 
that “to throw in the towel in the health portfolio would be an abject surrender to the 
hard core of reactionary backbenchers on the government and opposition benches” 
(Desmond, 2000, p. 315) and threatened to resign rather than change office. As opposed 
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to a prime minister presiding over a single-party cabinet, FitzGerald had limited powers 
over the composition of his coalition cabinet and Desmond was aware that if the prime 
minister had decided to fire him at all costs, he would have brought down the entire 
government (Desmond, 2000, p. 319). When the Taoiseach was persuaded to agree to a 
compromise solution and allow Desmond to stay in Health, while assigning the Social 
Welfare portfolio to a different minister, political commentators characterised the prime 
minister as a weak leader and pointed towards the minister’s success in sweeping away 
a prime ministerial decision (Arnold, 1986). Furthermore, the opposition tabled a 
motion of no confidence as soon as the reshuffle was announced. Charles Haughey, the 
leader of the opposition, declared that no Taoiseach whose freedom to rearrange his 
cabinet had been disrupted by a single minister should be allowed to continue in office 
(Desmond, 2000, p. 328). However, while some political commentators admired 
Desmond’s decision to stay firm against the prime minister’s decision or resign from the 
cabinet (Arnold, 1986), other observers wondered why this episode of self-interested 
obstinacy was necessary, since nowhere in his own account of the events did he suggest 
that there was any issue of policy or principle involved (V. Browne, 2000). Desmond 
himself declared in retrospect that he was aware of the credibility damage his resistance 
inflicted on the government by exposing a Taoiseach unable to exercise his most 
important constitutional power of hiring and firing ministers (Desmond, 2000, p. 319). 
He was nevertheless able to count on the Taoiseach’s lack of authority over the 
ministers of a coalition party (Desmond, 2000, p. 319), which made all the difference 
compared to Brennan, who was subordinated to the Taoiseach on the party line. 
One may therefore conclude that cabinet reshuffles, just like resignations, cannot 
be fully explained by institutional arrangements and responsibility relations as it is 
rarely possible to determine a straightforward relation between ministerial performance 
and the likelihood of being dropped out or moved to other departments. The fact that 
reshuffles may also take place when they are by no means necessary, such as when the 
government is united, “working well as a team”, “taking tough decisions, sticking with 
them, and riding out storms of unpopularity” and showing “no glaring weaknesses”, 
(Arnold, 1986), shows that performance alone is not a strong indicator of a reshuffle’s 
timing and extent. As a result, in order to understand the role of a ministerial demotion 
or promotion when it is operated through a cabinet reshuffle, one should better pay 
attention to power-relations between prime ministers, line ministers and party leaders, 
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as ministers may not necessarily be dropped because of weakness, “but in order to fulfil 
the ambitions of others, and give a new shape to the overall structure” (Arnold, 1986).  
So far, this literature review has focused on the expectations generated by the 
classic doctrines of ministerial responsibility, emphasising the expansion in their use 
and their adoption in different types of political systems. The next section builds on the 
latter approach and deals with the literature that analyses patterns of resignations and 
dismissals across different parliamentary systems, ranging from Westminster systems to 
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
1.4 Patterns of ministerial termination events 
Cabinet ministers have traditionally been studied from two broad perspectives: personal 
characteristics, such as age, education, social background, profession, and career 
characteristics, such as duration and mobility (Blondel et al., 2007; Blondel & 
Thiébault, 1991; Blondel, 1985). This trend continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
focusing more on ministerial careers and technical organisation of portfolios than on the 
roles played by ministers in the process of executive policy-making (Blondel & Müller-
Rommel, 1997, 2001). Nevertheless, during the 1990s, another wave of ministerial 
studies started to develop, aiming to identify patterns of ministerial selection and 
deselection using dedicated datasets and a single case-study approach (P. T. de Almeida 
& Pinto, 2002; Berlinksi, Dewan, Dowding, & Subrahmanyam, 2009; Berlinski et al., 
2007; Blondel et al., 2007; Dewan & Dowding, 2005; Dowding & Dumont, 2009b; 
Dowding & Kang, 1998; Fisher et al., 2006; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2004, 2008; 
Indridason & Kam, 2008). Subsequently, a growing literature that takes a comparative 
approach to the study of ministerial resignations has emerged, especially for the analysis 
of Westminster systems and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Blondel et al., 2007; Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009; Indridason & Kam, 2008; Kam & 
Indridason, 2005; Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999). On the one hand, the significance of 
the ministerial responsibility convention in the British political system explains the 
special focus on the comparative analysis of Westminster systems. On the other hand, 
the relative freshness of the East European democracies accounts for the emphasis of 
most comparative studies on the institutional procedures that regulate the hiring and 
firing of ministers. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the emergence of comparative 
research, several frameworks for analysis have been put forward, emphasising the 
necessity to take into account both structural and strategic factors that affect the hiring 
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and firing processes (Dowding & Dumont, 2009b, p. 4). This section focuses on 
patterns of ministerial resignations in parliamentary democracies and takes separate 
looks at Westminster systems, and Western and Eastern European democracies. 
Ministerial resignations and dismissals in Westminster systems 
The first study that has ever looked at all instances of resignations that took place 
between 1903 and 1986 in the UK recorded the primary reasons that caused them and 
compiled a list of 98 resignations that have been triggered by unwillingness to accept 
collective responsibility, budget leaks, private scandals, non-political, or unworthy acts 
for a minister (Butler & Butler, 1989, p. 102). A thorough examination of this list 
showed that about 80% of the resignations in Britain during most of the twentieth 
century had been caused by disagreements of principle in the cabinet (Sutherland, 1991, 
p. 106). Later on, Dowding and Kang (1998, p. 424) signalled the importance of taking 
into account non-resignation events for an accurate understanding of the causal process 
of resignations and for the expectations regarding the punishment of ministerial 
breaches of collective and individual responsibility doctrines. 
As far as Australia is concerned, academics argue that the link between 
departmental actions and ministerial resignations is weak (Mulgan, 2002, p. 121; 
Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 50). Analysing patterns of ministerial resignations from 
1990 to 1998 at federal level and from 1941 to 1998 in New South Wales, Thompson 
and Tillotsen (1999, p. 53) found out that Australian ministers do not resign and are 
actually not expected to resign over policy or administration errors in their departments 
or for the mistakes of their subordinates if they share no personal responsibility for the 
blame. Rather than considering themselves bound to resign by the principle of 
individual responsibility, ministers stick to the “tough-it-out” strategy as long as 
possible. However, while Australian ministers are unlikely to resign over departmental 
failures, empirical analyses showed that they regularly resign when they infringe the 
principle of collective responsibility, for matters of personal impropriety and after 
knowingly misleading the parliament (Mulgan, 2002, p. 122). Additionally, political 
judgements also tip the balance in Australia, as the prime minister has to weigh the 
“comparative political costs of either defending the minister and ‘toughing it out’ or 
‘lancing the boil’ by letting the minister go” (Mulgan, 2002, p. 122). Turning to the 
expectations generated by the convention of collective responsibility, failure to support 
collective cabinet solidarity indicates an intense level of conflict between the minister 
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and the prime minister and resignations occur only when the conflict is so intense that it 
cannot await a cabinet reshuffle (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 55). To sum up, while 
it is agreed that the infringement of collective responsibility principle is usually 
sanctioned by resignation, the issue of whether ministers should resign for departmental 
failures usually calls in the question of how appropriate is to use the Westminster model 
to understand Australian constitutional and political practices (Mulgan, 2002, p. 122). 
The convention of individual ministerial responsibility is also considered a myth 
in Canada (Sutherland, 1991, p. 91). However, some authors believe that the convention 
is still built into the Canadian constitution because of the answerability component and 
despite the frailty of its resignation component (Kernaghan, 2009, p. 392). That said, the 
political importance of resignations for individual errors is also considered to be lower 
than that of collective solidarity resignations, as in Canada nobody expects ministers to 
resign for maladministration by officials (Sutherland, 1991, p. 101). In an empirical 
study focusing on ministerial resignations between 1867 and 1990, Sutherland (1991, p. 
104) found that no Canadian minister had been forced to resign for errors attributable to 
public servants. 
Comparative quantitative analyses of ministerial resignations in Westminster 
systems support the claim that resignations for errors of public servants are not part of 
the political practice in these political systems, while collective responsibility is the 
most frequent reason offered for refusal to resign (Sutherland, 1991, pp. 106–107). 
However, the proportion of ministers resigning for disagreements of principle was 
found to be similar in Britain in Canada, averaging 80% (Sutherland, 1991, p. 106), 
while in Australia the frequency of resignations depends on whether there is a single-
party or a coalition cabinet (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 56). Thus, the party system 
makes a difference for the extent and degree of authority that the legislative branch has 
over the executive (Marshall, 1989a, p. 1). One of the reasons why the responsibility 
convention is considered a major element of the British unwritten constitution resides in 
its emergence from the single party cabinet system (Marshall, 1989a, p. 2). Other 
Westminster systems that are characterised by coalition cabinets developed laxer rules 
(Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 56). This also explains why the protection role of 
collective responsibility is limited in Australian minority governments where the 
cabinet cannot protect a minister whom the opposition has decided to bring down 
(Sutherland, 1991, p. 106).  
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Ministerial resignations and dismissals in Western and Eastern Europe 
The convention of ministerial responsibility has also been challenged by studies of 
ministerial resignations in West European cabinets. Fisher et al. (2006) analysed 
German resignations during 1969-2005 and argued that ministerial resignations follow a 
systematic cost-benefit political logic (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 709). These authors 
analysed resignation and non-resignations events in Germany during more than 35 years 
and found that the Federal Chancellor and the minister’s own party are central for the 
outcome of resignation debates. On the other hand, Fisher et al (2006) could not find 
empirical evidence for their “threshold hypothesis”, according to which “ministers do 
not have to resign as a consequence of singular events that imply costs for the 
government but can accumulate resignations events, which reach a threshold at which 
the ministers’ power to resist is so much weakened, and political costs so much 
increased, that they are forced to leave office” (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 710). One of the 
reasons why this hypothesis was not supported by empirical data may reside in the 
restrictive definition of policy disagreement resignations, which are thought to occur 
only when “the opposition demands the resignation of a minister so as to express its 
discontent with his policies or performance” (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 710). As a result, the 
analysis fails to take into consideration collective responsibility resignations, which 
occur when ministers resign over principled policy disagreements, irrespective of their 
party membership.  
While the comparative study of ministerial selection and deselection in Central 
and Eastern European democracies is still in its early stages, current research has 
emphasised that as opposed to Western Europe where ministerial duration is, on 
average, twice as long as cabinet duration, the average ministerial tenure in Eastern 
Europe is almost the same as the average duration of cabinets (Blondel et al., 2007, pp. 
50–51). The same observation applies to prime ministers, whose duration in office is 
only slightly longer than that of cabinets and on average does not overcome three years. 
However, as far as individual countries are concerned, the relationship between cabinet 
duration and ministerial and prime ministerial survival is directly proportional. At the 
same time, it has been shown that, similarly to West European cabinets, despite the fact 
that most ministers finish their mandate on time, prime ministers and political parties 
usually decide if a minister needs to leave the cabinet (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, 
pp. 221–222). 
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Fettelschoss and Nikolenyi (2009) carried out an extensive quantitative study 
that analysed ministerial resignations that took place between 1990 and 2007 in the 
twelve newest EU member states and noticed several trends. First of all, they found that 
more than 80% of ministers in CEE cabinets leave office as a result of government 
termination and in every new cabinet which comes into office one minister out of three 
has already served in the preceding cabinet (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, p. 220). 
On the other hand, out of the remaining 20% of ministers who decide to leave office 
before the end of the government, 15.3% do so because of external pressures coming 
from the prime minister and political parties, as well as from mass media (Fettelschoss 
& Nikolenyi, 2009, pp. 221–222).  
Fettelschoss and Nikolenyi (2009) were also interested to determine whether the 
differences between single countries are related to constitutional rules. As far as 
ministerial duration is concerned, they have shown that where the prime minister is free 
to decide the composition of his or her cabinet, as in Latvia, Slovenia and to a certain 
extent in Bulgaria, the number of ministers who regularly finish a term is high 
(Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, p. 222). These authors have also asked whether the 
constitutional powers that presidents, prime ministers and parliaments have to control 
the cabinet are causally related to the influence of these political actors on the 
deselection of cabinet members. Their intuition is to a certain extent confirmed. Thus, 
presidents have been able to shorten ministerial appointments in Poland and Estonia, 
where their constitutional role is enhanced. However, these are not the only East 
European countries where presidents have executive powers. While on average the 
parliament does not appear to play a key role in the firing of cabinet ministers, this 
study shows that in Slovenia, Poland and Romania the legislature has actively exercised 
its influence. This finding is rather surprising if one takes into account that in Slovenia 
and Romania the parliament cannot vote individual ministers out of office. Finally, 
prime ministerial influence is decisive in Hungary, Latvia and Poland, which is 
explained by their constitutionally prominent position concerning the organisation of 
government. Although constitutional rules appeared to capture fairly well the variation 
in ministerial turnover across Central and Eastern Europe, this study has emphasised 
that additional variables related to governmental stability and political practices need to 
be taken into account in order to explain all differences between single countries 
(Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, p. 226). 
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1.5 Conclusion 
This literature review has emphasised the strengths and weaknesses of normative 
expectations for ministerial resignations and dismissals. Despite their relevance in 
Westminster systems and although they have been extended to other political systems 
and aspects of ministerial office, British constitutional doctrines of ministerial 
responsibility are unable to explain why some breaches of responsibility conventions 
are followed by resignations while others are not, even in what may seem to be clear-cut 
constitutional infringements, such as the Westland Affair. This review has also focused 
on the literature that analyses comparatively resignations and dismissals across different 
parliamentary systems, ranging from Westminster systems to Central and Eastern 
European democracies. This analysis has emphasised that the current literature has not 
identified a set of clear-cut rules that one may use in order to predict what kind of faults 
or responsibility breaches are likely to cost ministers their jobs. 
This research will advance the study of ministerial resignations in three ways. 
Firstly, it will contribute to the literature discussing the effects of political institutions, 
as it aims to explain ministerial resignations in parliamentary democracies as a function 
of different hierarchical and transactional relationships that take place between 
presidents, prime ministers, party leaders and line ministers under different cabinet 
configurations and party systems. In this regard, this literature review has emphasised 
the gap between the popular, media and political attention given to resignations and 
non-resignations, and the lack of a systematic academic focus on this matter. However, 
the scarcity of academic literature is explained precisely by the absence of an 
encompassing theory that could fuel a rigorous and systematic analysis of resignations. 
Secondly, the majority of empirical studies testing theoretical expectations 
against concrete examples of resignations take a single case-study approach and focus 
on Westminster systems of government, although the collective responsibility principle 
has long been incorporated as the cornerstone of parliamentary systems in general. By 
contrast, this study will extend the scope of current research by carrying out a 
comparative analysis of ministerial resignations in both West and East European 
parliamentary democracies. 
Thirdly, the literature acknowledges that theories of accountability, both 
collective and individual, fail to explain individual terminations of ministerial 
appointments and suggests that the outcome of each case depends on additional political 
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factors, such as the minister’s reputation and attitude, party and prime ministerial 
support for the minister in question, and the electoral prospects of governing parties. 
However, the causal relationship between these conditions and individual terminations 
is yet to be pinned down. We aim to put forward a theoretical framework that isolates 
the causal effects of political factors on ministerial durability focusing on the 
accountability of cabinet members to prime ministers, party leaders and presidents. This 
approach enables us to make a significant contribution, both theoretically, by 
developing a framework for the understanding of ministerial termination events, and 
empirically, by carrying out a systematic and comparative analysis of the variation in 
the length of ministerial tenure. 
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This study aims to solve the puzzle of ministerial termination events – why do some 
cabinet ministers lose their jobs while others do not under what would seem to be 
similar political circumstances. This chapter suggests an alternative way of studying the 
variation in the length of ministerial tenure by focusing on the place cabinet ministers 
hold in the chain of delegation from voters and political parties to public office holders. 
This is a topic of significant relevance that crosses the boundaries of regime types or 
geographic regions. However, to emphasise the impact that the variation in power 
relations has on political accountability, this study analyses ministerial turnover in semi-
presidential systems, which for various reasons maximise the variation in the principal-
agent relationships that define the position of ministers in the chain of delegation from 
voters and political parties to governments. 
The chapter opens with a presentation of principal-agent models and their 
applications in the study of economic, bureaucratic, and political organisations. This 
section argues that the agency theory can supply the theoretical power that the study of 
ministerial survival has so far lacked and situates this topic within the broader area of 
studies that focus on the process of delegation and accountability in representative 
democracies. This analysis shows that the largest variation in principal-agent 
relationships is found in semi-presidential systems and justifies this study’s focus on 
ministerial turnover in this regime-type. 
The second section of this chapter discusses the institutional sources of variation 
in the operation of semi-presidential governments and identifies the institutional and 
intraparty factors that are used in this study to capture the variation in the powers of 
principals on cabinet composition systematically within and across semi-presidential 
countries over time. In the third section, we use a principal-agent approach to model the 
relationship between ministers, presidents, prime ministers, and parties in different 
semi-presidential sub-types as a function of both institutional and partisan factors. This 
analysis justifies this study’s exclusive focus on ministerial turnover in premier-
presidential systems, due to the lack of variation in institutional context under president-
parliamentarism. The fourth section of the chapter argues that in order to identify the 
impact of principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure one should 
Chapter Two: A principal-agent account of ministerial deselection
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take into account both institutional context and the party relationships between 
presidents, prime ministers and cabinet members. The chapter concludes with a model 
of relations between the agent-ministers and their principals which sums up the 
conditions under which presidents, prime ministers, and party principals are more likely 
to control the process of deselection. 
2.1 Agency theory in representative democracies 
The idea of using formal analysis and principal-agent models for the study of political 
organisations is rooted in the new economics of organisation. Principal-agent models 
were first used to analyse contractual relationships and solve control problems 
generated by conflicts of interest and asymmetric flows of information at different 
levels in the hierarchical structure of private economic organisations. Terry Moe (1984, 
p. 756) defined this framework of analysis as “an analytic expression of the agency 
relationships, in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual 
agreement with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently 
choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the principal”. Moe suggested that the 
principal-agent model could also be used to solve the problem of administrative 
accountability and identify the institutional mechanisms that allow politicians to hold 
bureaucrats accountable. His interpretation of democratic politics in principal-agent 
terms was as follows: “Citizens are principals, politicians are their agents. Politicians 
are principals, bureaucrats are their agents. Bureaucratic superiors are principals, 
bureaucratic subordinates are their agents. The whole of politics is therefore structured 
by a chain of principal-agent relationships, from citizen to politician to bureaucratic 
superior to bureaucratic subordinate and on down the hierarchy of government to the 
lowest-level bureaucrats who actually deliver services directly to citizens. Aside from 
the ultimate principal and the ultimate agent, each actor in the hierarchy occupies a dual 
role in which he serves both as a principal and as agent” (Moe, 1984, pp. 765–766). The 
contractual interpretation of democratic politics emphasises that the notion of 
hierarchical control can be used for the study of institutional mechanisms, monitoring 
devices and incentive structures that officials use at every level of government to 
control and hold their subordinates accountable for their actions. 
In political science, the contractual paradigm refers to the logic of governance 
that all democratic regimes share. Representative democracy is a form of government 
based on mechanisms of delegation (from citizens to individual politicians and 
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collective actors, such as political parties) and accountability (Müller, Bergman, & 
Strøm, 2003, pp. 3–4). From a principal-agent perspective, delegation takes place when 
“one person or group, called a principal, relies on another person or group, called an 
agent, to act on the principal’s behalf” (Lupia, 2003, p. 33). Accountability, the 
complementary process of delegation, is measured by weighting the relationships 
between principals and agents: “an agent is accountable to a principal if the principal 
can exercise control over the agent and delegation is not accountable if the principal is 
unable to exercise control” (Lupia, 2003, p. 35). By and large, if a political system 
operates according to a clear system of delegation and accountability, then it can be 
classified as a representative democracy. Thus, agency theory provides a single 
analytical framework for the study of representative democracies that emphasises who 
is accountable to whom at each stage in the process of delegation across national and 
institutional contexts (Strøm, 2000). 
Different types of democratic regimes can be recognised depending on the 
number of political actors empowered by voters to act on their behalf and according to 
their powers to make and break cabinets (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, p. 874). 
While parliamentary systems are characterised by a single and unitary chain of 
delegation, whereby every principal delegates power to just one agent, presidential 
systems are characterised by complex and indirect chains of delegation (Strøm, 2003, p. 
65). Despite the different shape that the chain of delegation takes under parliamentary 
and presidential systems, a common characteristic of these systems is the government’s 
subordination to a single agent: the parliament or the president. This is not the case in 
semi-presidential systems, where a directly elected president shares executive power 
with a prime-minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the parliament. 
From a principal-agent perspective, the position of cabinets in semi-presidential systems 
is that of an agent facing two principals (Protsyk, 2006, p. 221; Schleiter & Morgan-
Jones, 2009a, p. 668) as both presidents and assemblies may be involved in the 
appointment and dismissal of the executive. Regardless of the variation in institutional 
rules, though, a principal-agent approach can be used to study ministerial deselection in 
any democratic system as soon as the number of political actors who are granted the 
power to fire cabinet members is known. Since the same formal logic can be used to 
describe the ministers’ accountability to different principals under different political 
systems, various hypotheses regarding the impact of institutional and partisan factors on 
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ministerial survival can be derived and tested empirically across a wide range of 
countries.  
Due to the double chain of delegation from political parties and heads of 
government to cabinet members, ministers must respond to competing principals 
(Carey, 2007) in all democratic systems. However, the largest intra- and inter-case 
variation in principal-agent relationships is likely to occur in countries with semi-
presidential constitutions, where presidents, prime ministers, and political parties act as 
competing principals for cabinet members. This is the ideal setting where the principal-
agent approach can be used to capture the impact of different power relations on 
ministerial accountability. However, semi-presidential regimes are characterised by 
considerable variation in both constitutional rules and political practices. The next 
section discusses the institutional sources of variation in the operation of semi-
presidential governments. This analysis singles out the institutional and contextual 
factors that are used in this study to capture the variation in the powers of principals on 
cabinet composition within and across semi-presidential countries over time. 
2.2 Semi-presidentialism and its sub-types 
Although it had already been in use for several decades in both journalistic and 
academic environments, the concept of semi-presidentialism was formally introduced as 
a new regime type in 1980, when Duverger defined it as a situation where “the president 
of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, he possesses quite considerable powers 
and he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess 
executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not 
show its opposition to them” (Duverger, 1980, p. 166). At that time, only a few Western 
European countries could fit into this regime category and Duverger focused on the 
constitutional framework and political practices that characterised the Fifth French 
Republic in order to define this new regime type. This is one of the reasons why France 
continues to be considered the archetypal example of such a system, despite the wide 
variation among semi-presidential constitutions (Elgie, 2009, p. 249). The number of 
countries adopting semi-presidential constitutions has increased after the fall of 
communism in 1989. The proliferation of semi-presidentialism across different 
continents has led to a significant heterogeneity among both constitutional frameworks 
and political practices within this regime type. Under these circumstances, the 
ambiguity of Duverger’s criteria regarding the president’s election by “universal 
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suffrage” and the “quite considerable” presidential powers has led to confusion over the 
countries that can be classed as semi-presidential. The concept of semi-presidentialism 
was then reformulated so that a list of countries that can be included in this category can 
be unequivocally established. Robert Elgie (1999, p. 13) has put forward a purely 
constitutional definition of this regime, which can be recognised where “a popularly 
elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime-minister and cabinet who are 
responsible to the parliament”. This is the standard definition used by most studies of 
semi-presidential politics (see for example Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 620; 
Cheibub & Chernykh, 2008, p. 273, 2009, p. 206; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a; 
Shugart, 2005; Siaroff, 2003, p. 293; Skach, 2007, p. 93).  
Although the institutional definition of semi-presidentialism allows the 
identification of this political system through a simple constitutional reading, it is 
usually not sufficient to understand how a semi-presidential system operates. The 
heterogeneity of political practices among semi-presidential regimes has raised several 
questions. Why do similarly designed constitutions entail so many divergent practices? 
(Cheibub & Chernykh, 2008) What explains the variation in the relationship between 
presidents, prime ministers, and assemblies among semi-presidential regimes (Samuels 
& Shugart, 2010; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart, 2006). To solve this kind of puzzle, 
several typologies of semi-presidential regimes that capture the variation in several 
institutional variables have been put forward. 
Most classifications of semi-presidential regimes have been inspired by the 
variation in presidential powers among the countries that can be included in this 
category. Focusing on the presidents’ involvement in the origin and survival of cabinets, 
Shugart and Carey (1992) differentiated between premier-presidential and president-
parliamentary systems, depending on whether the cabinet is responsible solely to the 
assembly or dually accountable to the president and to the assembly1. In premier-
presidential systems, presidents may have powers related to the formation of 
governments, such as the selection of the prime minister and the appointment of cabinet 
members, but they lack the power to dismiss the government collectively, or to fire the 
                                               
1
 Shugart and Carey (1992) initially rejected the notion of semi-presidentialism because of the 
“misleading” implication that this political system is located “midway along some continuum running 
from presidential to parliamentary” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 23). Instead, they adopted Duverger’s 
definition of a new regime type and stated that the regime type originally described by Duverger referred 
to a situation where “there is both a premier (prime minister), as in a parliamentary system, and a 
popularly elected president” and should be called “premier-presidentialism” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 
23). As a matter of fact, premier-presidentialism and pure presidentialism were initially defined as “ideal 
types of democratic regimes with popularly elected presidents” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 24). 
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prime minister or other cabinet members individually. Instead, a situation where “the 
president both appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers and the ministers are subject to 
parliamentary confidence” is typical of president-parliamentarism (Shugart & Carey, 
1992, p. 24). Other scholars who focused on the variation in presidential powers have 
suggested a differentiation between parliamentary-like, dual presidential/prime 
ministerial and presidential-like semi-presidential subtypes (Elgie, 2005, p. 102). The 
high variation in presidential powers across semi-presidential systems has also been 
used as an argument against the use of this concept altogether, given that “there is no 
such thing as a semi-presidential system when viewed through the prism of presidential 
powers” (Siaroff, 2003). 
The relationship between presidents and parliamentary majorities is another key 
explanatory variable used in the differentiation between different types of semi-
presidential governments. Duverger used this factor to capture the variation in 
presidential influence within and across national contexts: “In the countries without a 
parliamentary majority, there is the greatest coincidence between the constitution and 
practice, the latter putting the president in an intermediary position, neither figurehead, 
nor all-powerful. In the countries where coherent and stable majorities are normally 
found, there is a disparity between the constitution and practice, the latter placing the 
president either in a dominant position, or in the situation of a parliamentary Head of 
State, reduced to a symbolic status” (Duverger, 1980, p. 182). Focusing on the 
relationship between presidents and parliamentary majorities, Duverger (1996) 
identified three different scenarios that capture the variation in presidential influence 
over the political system depending on whether the president is the leader, a disciplined 
member, or opposes the majority. According to Duverger (1996, p. 516), the prime 
minister’s constitutional powers are weakened when the president leads the 
parliamentary majority as a de facto leader of the dominant party in the assembly. 
However, if the president is just a disciplined member of the majority or if he or she 
opposes the parliamentary majority then the prime minister may use the full extent of 
his or her formal prerogatives (Duverger, 1996, p. 517). Although Duverger’s 
“modalities” of presidential influence explain well the variation in presidential influence 
over the political system in France, other studies have emphasised that this schema of 
presidential/parliamentary relations does not capture the variation in presidential and 
prime ministerial powers in other national contexts  (Elgie, 2009; Skach, 2005, 2007). 
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Focusing on the relationship between presidents, prime ministers, and 
parliamentary majorities, Cindy Skach (2005) has singled out the circumstances that are 
likely to generate constitutional crises and undermine democratic consolidation. She 
differentiates between three electorally generated subtypes of semi-presidentialism: 
consolidated majority, divided majority and divided minority governments (Skach, 
2005, pp. 15–19). A consolidated majority government corresponds to a situation where 
the president and the prime minister belong to the parliamentary majority; during 
periods of divided majority or cohabitation government the prime minister is part of the 
majority and the president is opposed to it; and when divided minority government 
occurs, neither the president, nor the prime minister have the support of the 
parliamentary majority. The latter scenario combines “the gridlock of presidentialism’s 
divided minority government with the cabinet instability of parliamentarism’s minority 
government” (Skach, 2005, p. 7). The absence of a clear majority is considered a source 
of instability “characterised by shifting legislative coalitions and cabinet instability and 
a strong incentive for presidential active participation in the government process at the 
expense of political parties” (Skach, 2005, pp. 17–18). Under these circumstances, the 
risk of democratic breakdown is also likely to increase. 
The problem with the classification of presidential/parliamentary relationships 
put forward by Duverger (1996) and Skach (2005) is that they do not capture enough of 
the variation across the entire population of semi-presidential cases, or do not apply 
exclusively to semi-presidential systems. Duverger’s account of the variation in 
presidential influence as a function of the president’s relationship with the 
parliamentary majority has little explanatory value beyond the case of France (Elgie, 
2009, pp. 260–261).  
The combination of institutional factors is not mutually exclusive in the three 
electorally generated semi-presidential sub-types identified by Skach. For example, the 
consolidated majority sub-type includes both scenarios where the president and the 
prime minister belong to the same party or to different political parties. However, the 
president’s ability to intervene in the governmental process when he or she is a party 
leader is likely to differ significantly from that of presidents who are only simple 
members of the coalition. The variation in presidential influence makes it difficult to 
identify a constant effect of presidential influence on governmental stability under this 
scenario. As far as the divided minority government sub-type is concerned, the absence 
of any indication regarding the inclusion of the president’s and/or the prime minister’s 
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party in the governing coalition makes its occurrence possible under both minority 
coalition governments and cohabitation. Thus, just because the president and the prime 
minister belong to different political parties that do not hold a majority of seats does not 
rule out the possibility that these parties form a minority coalition government. 
Consequently, the government could still function along the lines of a consolidated 
majority, given that by and large even a minority cabinet retains the support of a 
majority of the legislature (Laver & Shepsle, 1996, p. 40). Under these circumstances, 
the president could be a member of the parliamentary majority. If the president’s party 
is not represented in the minority government, the president could be an opponent of the 
government coalition, just as in a cohabitation situation. As a result, depending on 
political context, divided minority governments may deal with problems that are typical 
for both minority governments and cohabitation. Consequently, it would be difficult to 
decide whether the problems that divided minority governments encounter are generated 
by minority governments or cohabitation situations. To sum up, since none of the three 
scenarios identified by Skach respects the condition of unit homogeneity with regard to 
presidential powers, they cannot be used to analyse the principal-agent relationship 
between presidents and cabinet members at different levels of presidential influence.  
Following Shugart and Carey (1992), this study adopts the distinction between 
premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. To account for the variation in 
presidential influence as a function of institutional context, we also operationalise the 
“modalities” of presidential influence identified by Duverger according to the political 
affiliation of presidents and prime ministers. Following Elgie (2011, pp. 56–57), if the 
president and the prime minister are from the same party, then we define this situation 
as unified executive. If the president is from one party and the prime minister is from 
another party, then two situations may occur. If the president’s party is in government, 
then we recognise a situation of divided executive, while the situation where the 
president’s party is not in government is defined as cohabitation. The latter scenario can 
only occur in semi-presidential systems and is substantively different from both 
minority government under parliamentarism, which takes place when the prime minister 
lacks the support of the parliamentary majority, and divided government under 
presidentialism, where the president remains the head of government (Hellwig & 
Samuels, 2007, p. 70).  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the conditions that characterise the occurrence of executive 
scenarios in semi-presidential regimes. The situations of unified executive, divided 
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executive, and cohabitation can be clearly identified, are mutually exclusive, and can 
occur in either of the two semi-presidential sub-types. Their variation within and across 
countries over time allows us to analyse the variation in presidential and prime 
ministerial powers over the cabinet as a function of institutional context.  
 
Figure 2.1 Dual-executive sub-types in semi-presidential systems 
 
The next section uses a principal-agent approach to conceptualise the 
relationship between ministers, presidents, prime ministers, and parties in different 
semi-presidential sub-types as a function of both institutional and partisan factors. This 
analysis confirms that institutional factors alone do not explain the variation in 
presidential power across premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes and 
that institutional context captures better the president’s control over the cabinet within 
and across semi-presidential sub-types. Due to the lack of variation in institutional 
context in president-parliamentary regimes, though, this section argues that a systematic 
and unbiased analysis of ministerial deselection and principal-agent relations can only 
be carried out in premier-presidential systems. 
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2.3 Executive scenarios in semi-presidential sub-types 
Semi-presidential constitutions maximise the variation in the principal-agent 
relationships that define the position of ministers in the chain of delegation from voters 
and political parties to governments. In contrast to parliamentary and presidential 
regimes, the position of cabinets in semi-presidential systems is that of an agent facing 
two principals, as both presidents and assemblies can decide on their appointment and 
dismissal (Protsyk, 2006, p. 221; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, p. 668). However, 
the involvement of both presidents and assemblies in the origin and survival of cabinets 
blurs the lines of ministerial responsibility and accountability. Are ministers more 
inclined to conform to the president’s or to the assembly’s position? Do institutional 
rules and institutional context make a difference for the extent of their accountability to 
competing principals?  
To answer these questions, Oleh Protsyk (2003, p. 1078) has drawn on the 
distribution of dismissal powers to predict the cabinet’s behaviour towards the president 
or the parliament. From a purely institutional perspective, he argued, cabinets should 
conform to the interests of legislatures in premier-presidential systems, where the 
assembly has exclusive dismissal powers, and should follow presidential preferences in 
president-parliamentary systems, where both presidents and assemblies have the power 
to dismiss the government. Similarly, Shugart (2005) has argued that the relationship 
between the president and the cabinet is strictly transactional in premier-presidential 
systems due to the exclusive formal accountability of the former to the assembly. In 
president-parliamentary systems, though, the president and the assembly need to engage 
in transactions over the composition and direction of the cabinet as both have the 
constitutional power to end its appointment (Shugart, 2005, pp. 333–334).  
However, Shugart (2005) points out that the purely institutional definition of 
semi-presidential sub-types fails to take into consideration the president’s informal 
authority over the cabinet, which varies depending on whether or not he or she is on the 
same ideological side with the parliamentary majority or an outsider to the 
parliamentary majority. Consequently, once the institutional variation between the two 
semi-presidential sub-types is situated in the party system context in which they operate, 
the behavioural patterns followed by political actors and the overall operation of the two 
systems may diverge from institutional expectations (Shugart, 2005, p. 335). For 
example, although Austria is a president-parliamentary system from an institutional 
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point of view, because the president has the constitutional power to dissolve the 
assembly, it operates like a parliamentary system due to the particular development of 
its post-war party system that has considerably limited the presidential sphere of action. 
Conversely, presidents have been shown to hold the cabinet accountable even in some 
premier-presidential systems, where they lack formal dismissal powers (Schleiter & 
Morgan-Jones, 2009a, 2009c; Shugart, 2005). Using examples from France, Finland, 
and Romania, Samuels and Shugart (2010, pp. 103–104) have shown that presidents 
have been able to fire prime ministers when they were on the same side of the 
parliamentary majority.  
Overall, these authors find sufficient evidence to conclude that the influence of 
presidents over the deselection of prime ministers in premier-presidential systems 
during periods of unified government is “systemic and not limited to their own party” 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 105). These findings indicate that the presidents’ 
authority over cabinets is not constant within semi-presidential sub-types and that 
institutional factors alone do not fully capture the variation in presidential and prime 
ministerial authority over the cabinet. Instead, the type of executive scenario emerges as 
a better explanatory factor for the variation in the powers of presidents and prime 
ministers within as well as across semi-presidential sub-types. While presidents have 
been able to fire prime ministers during periods of unified government, no instances 
where presidents were able to force prime ministers out of office have been found 
during periods of cohabitation in either of the two semi-presidential sub-types (Samuels 
& Shugart, 2010, p. 107). 
That said, it is clear that there is also less institutional variation within president-
parliamentarism relative to premier-presidentialism. Here, the constitutional format of 
president-parliamentary systems increases considerably the formal and informal sources 
of presidential influence. Presidents are likely to dominate the political system not only 
when they are on the same side of the parliamentary majority due to their formal power 
to dismiss the government, but also when they are opposed to the parliamentary 
majority, due to their constitutional right to dismiss the assembly. The analysis of 
ministerial turnover in semi-presidential regimes carried out by Samuels and Shugart 
(2010, p. 101) has shown that the reasons for prime minister termination under 
president-parliamentary systems were due to presidential factors in almost 60% of the 
cases. Thus, one may expect that prime ministers have more incentives to act as 
presidential agents than as party agents in this semi-presidential sub-type. The same 
52 
 
study has shown that cohabitation occurred less than 1.5% of the time under president-
parliamentarism between 1945 and 2004. As a result, this semi-presidential sub-type 
offers fewer opportunities to observe the variation in presidential and prime ministerial 
influence as a function of institutional context. 
The fact that president-parliamentary systems operate mostly under unified and 
divided executive scenarios, where presidents command parliamentary majorities and 
have the upper hand over the selection of prime ministers, does not rule out the 
subordination of line ministers to multiple principals. However, the impact of different 
principal-agent relations on ministerial deselection cannot be observed in the absence of 
variation in executive scenarios. By contrast, the fact that unified executive, divided 
executive and cohabitation stand a good chance of alternation at every electoral cycle in 
any premier-presidential system allows us to capture the impact of institutional context 
on the ability of presidents and prime ministers to control cabinet composition. Because 
of the lack in variation in institutional context in president-parliamentary systems, this 
study will focus on ministerial turnover in premier-presidential regimes. The selection 
of premier-presidential cases allows us to control for the formal powers enjoyed by 
presidents and prime ministers and to estimate their ability to control cabinet ministers 
under different executive scenarios.  
2.4 The interaction of executive scenarios and party politics 
This section aims to identify what explains variation in ministerial deselection 
within premier-presidentialism. To do so we focus on the factors that account for the 
variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence over the political system. Three 
research approaches are available. The first one adopts a purely institutional view on the 
relationship between institutional scenarios and the extent of presidential and prime 
ministerial influence over the political system. This idea has been inspired by the 
operation of semi-presidentialism in France. Even before the first occurrence of 
cohabitation in France, there was an expectation that if the president ever had to put up 
with an opposing parliamentary majority, then semi-presidentialism would work not as 
a synthesis of parliamentary and presidential systems, but as an alternation between 
presidential and parliamentary phases (Vedel, 1978 cited in Duverger, 1980, p. 186). 
The idea of alternating phases of presidential and parliamentary government was also 
adopted by Arend Lijphart, who argued that semi-presidential governments could be 
classified as either presidential or parliamentary by asking the question of “who is the 
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real head of government – president or prime minister (Lijphart, 1992, p. 8, his 
emphasis). According to Lijphart, the answer to this question depends on whether the 
president’s party has a majority in the legislature. As a result, Lijphart defined semi-
presidential systems as an alternation of presidential and parliamentary phases where 
the political power shifts from the president to the prime minister accordingly (Lijphart, 
1992, p. 8, 2004, p. 102). 
This argument, according to which presidents are powerful when they are on the 
same side of the parliamentary majority and weak when they oppose the majority, has 
been embraced by many French scholars. For example, typologies of French prime 
ministers have differentiated between prime ministers appointed during periods of 
cohabitation and outside cohabitation (Parodi, 1997a; Portelli, 1997). The former are 
defined as “institutional and political subordinates of a president who is the leader of the 
majority”, while the latter belong to the category of dominant prime ministers, who are 
indisputable leaders of the majority (Portelli, 1997, p. 21). Periods of cohabitation are 
defined by “prime ministerial supremacy”, while “ordinary times” are characterised by 
“presidential supremacy” (Ardant & Duhamel, 1999, p. 8). In other words, we should 
expect presidential leadership under unified executive and prime ministerial leadership 
under cohabitation. Alain Peyrefitte, a former minister who served under Charles de 
Gaulle and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, believed that French presidents are weaker under 
cohabitation than the presidents of the Third and Fourth Republics, who were able to 
influence the appointment of prime ministers and cabinet members at all times 
(Peyrefitte, 1999, p. 28). During periods of cohabitation, Peyrefitte argued, French 
presidents are just as weak as the King of Sweden, who must appoint as prime minister 
the leader of the party who wins the general election (Peyrefitte, 1999, p. 28). However, 
the emergence of prime ministerial leadership during periods of cohabitation has not 
entailed a “de-presidentialisation” of government outside this executive scenario 
(Parodi, 1997b, p. 310). François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac were able to regain full 
control over the government at the end of their experience with cohabitation in 1988 and 
2002 respectively. Nevertheless, the occurrence of cohabitation has contributed to an 
unparalleled increase in the authority of prime ministers over their cabinets and 
parliamentary majorities, incomparable with the influence of prime ministers under the 
Third and the Fourth Republics or even with that of other European prime ministers 
(Parodi, 1997b, p. 310). 
54 
 
Despite its popularity in France, the thesis regarding the increase in presidential 
powers during periods of unified executive and their weakening under cohabitation has 
not received unanimous support in the literature. For example, Margit Tavits (2008) 
reckons that presidents have few incentives to be politically active during periods of 
unified or divided executive, when policy preferences are likely to be compatible across 
all branches of government. She thinks that presidents are likely to pursue their 
objectives more actively during periods of cohabitation, when their party is not in power 
and they face opposition both in the government and parliament (Tavits, 2008, p. 16). 
Cindy Skach (2005, 2007) also expects presidents to be more active when they do not 
enjoy the support of the legislature and during periods of minority government. The 
range of competing explanations and empirical findings regarding the variation in 
presidential and prime ministerial influence under different executive scenarios 
indicates that their impact on the powers of presidents and prime ministers should not 
be taken at face value. Moreover, the occurrence of unified executive and cohabitation 
may not make any difference for the extent of presidential and prime ministerial 
authority. For example, in countries like Ireland, Austria, Iceland, or Slovenia, 
presidents are always weak and prime ministers have full control over the cabinet 
regardless of the relationship between presidents and parliamentary majorities (Elgie, 
2009, p. 261). Therefore, executive scenarios do not fully capture the variation in 
presidential and prime ministerial influence in premier-presidential systems, although 
they do seem to explain it to a certain extent. 
Secondly, one may wish to focus on contextual factors in order to capture the 
variation in the powers of presidents and prime ministers over the cabinet. For example,  
Tavits (2008) does not believe that whether presidents are directly elected or not makes 
a difference for the extent of their activism. In other words, she does not think that 
semi-presidentialism explains why some presidents are more powerful than others. 
Instead, this author believes that the level of presidential activism depends on the 
framework of political opportunities. According to this view, presidents are more likely 
to be active when the level of political consensus is low, during periods of cohabitation 
and divided government. The incentives for activism should be even stronger under 
conditions of minority government, irrespective of whether the cabinet is ideologically 
opposed to the president, as the other policymaking institutions, the government and 
parliament, are likely to be weak and fragmented under these circumstances (Tavits, 
2008, pp. 39–40). Using the share of non-partisan ministers as a measure of presidential 
55 
 
activism in both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, Tavits (2008, p. 49) finds 
that presidents are more active in the case of minority government and during periods of 
cohabitation irrespective of their mode of election. Therefore, the determinant for the 
variation in presidential authority is not believed to reside in the institutional structure 
of semi-presidentialism.  
Another example of a context-related factor that may account for the variation in 
presidential and prime ministerial powers is that of inter-executive conflict. Several 
studies have found that the level of inter-executive competition between presidents and 
prime ministers over the control of the executive is likely to be considerably higher in 
president-parliamentary systems than under premier-presidential systems. (Protsyk, 
2006; Sedelius & Berglund, 2012; Sedelius & Ekman, 2010; Sedelius, 2006). However, 
these studies have also found that the level of party system development and 
fragmentation, electoral systems, the temporal proximity of presidential and legislative 
elections, the party affiliation of presidents and prime ministers, the extent of 
presidential legislative powers, and the level of support enjoyed by prime ministers in 
the legislature also affect the presidents’ ability to control the executive. 
Our third option is to take into account the impact of both institutional scenarios 
and contextual factors on the range of presidential and prime ministerial powers. In this 
thesis we focus on the impact of intraparty politics on the extent of presidential and 
prime ministerial influence over the government. The party relationships between 
presidents, prime ministers, and cabinet members are an important part of the principal-
agent analysis of delegation and accountability in representative democracies. Although 
political parties take part in each step of the delegation process from voters to elected 
politicians and bureaucrats, their direct intervention to control agents in public office is 
often limited by legitimate public concern regarding the independence of national 
institutions from anonymous party machines (Müller, 2000, p. 311). Consequently, 
party principals must share their authority over cabinet members with presidents and 
prime ministers who own the formal power to contain agency loss.  
The range of ex-post intra-party mechanisms through which party agents can be 
held accountable by their principals depends on the delegation regime that characterises 
a political system. For example, in parliamentary systems intraparty politics determines 
who runs the government. Here, parties retain the power to fire prime ministers 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 94; 121). By contrast, since political parties have no ex-
post control mechanisms for their agents when there is a directly elected presidential 
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office, a highly valued presidency is expected to loosen the party-government 
relationship (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, p. 668).  
The idea that the extent of presidential influence over the political system 
depends not only on the relationship between presidents and parliamentary majorities, 
but also on the authority of presidents over their own parties is also part of Duverger’s 
work. According to his schema of presidential modalities, one may expect that 
presidents are considerably more powerful when they are on the same side as the 
parliamentary majority and there is a unified executive. Under these circumstances, the 
power of prime ministers should be limited. Conversely, under cohabitation, which 
occurs when the president is opposed to the parliamentary majority, the prime minister’s 
authority over the government is expected to increase at the expense of the president’s 
authority. However, Duverger also emphasises that, under certain circumstances, 
presidents may be weak even under unified government: “If the president is not the head 
of the majority party, while belonging to it or coming under it, this means that the party 
has decided to give its leader the office of prime minister, to whom the real power then 
belongs” (Duverger, 1980, p. 184). This is how Duverger explains the figurehead 
positions of Austrian and Irish presidents, who have never been regarded as leaders of 
parliamentary majorities, although they have usually been part of it (Duverger, 1980, 
pp. 184–185). So, the president’s position in the party hierarchy makes a difference for 
the extent of his or her influence over the government even during periods of unified 
executive.  
Several authors expect presidents to retain considerable authority over the 
cabinet even when the president and the prime minister belong to different parties that 
are both in government. This is the scenario of divided executive. For example, while 
examining a large-n sample of reasons for prime minister terminations in semi-
presidential regimes, Samuels and Shugart (2010, p. 101) have shown that presidents 
have been able to dismiss prime ministers who were not their co-partisans. The 
president’s unexpected capacity to hold accountable the agent of a different party is put 
down to the functions of alliance-formation: “In multiparty systems, parties sometimes 
form coalitions in which one party gets the presidency while another gets the 
premiership. When entering such alliances, parties apparently accept a deal in which the 
president determines how long the premier and the cabinet stay in office” (Samuels & 
Shugart, 2010, p. 105). Another example is that of Hellwig and Samuels (2007, p. 70), 
who assume that the president is the effective head of government when the president 
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and prime minister belong to the same coalition, regardless of whether or not they are 
from the same party. Therefore, even though we may expect presidents to be less 
powerful during periods of divided executive, relative to periods of unified executive, 
we would still expect them to be more powerful than under cohabitation. Similarly, we 
would expect the prime minister’s influence to increase under divided executive and 
even more so under cohabitation. 
Following Duverger, Samuels and Shugart (2010) show that presidents are likely 
to have more control over the political system if they are the de facto party leaders. 
From a principal-agent perspective, “when presidents are de facto party leaders, the 
importance of parliamentary confidence to the chain of delegation […] vanishes, 
because the premier becomes an agent of the president” (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 
43). Thus, presidents who carry on in their role as de facto party leaders reverse the 
party-leader principal-agent relationship by turning prime ministers into their own 
agents, which deprives political parties of the ability to control either of their two agents 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). If this happens then parties should also lose the 
ability to control cabinet ministers, who become presidential agents during periods of 
unified executive. All the same, the delegation relation varies as a result of executive 
scenarios. So, intra-party politics matter more under cohabitation, when presidents lack 
both formal and partisan means of influence over the cabinet. Under these 
circumstances, ministers no longer act as presidential agents. The relationship between 
political parties and their agents in government is therefore an important explanatory 
factor for the variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence over the cabinet. 
The following section emphasises that the interaction between executive scenarios and 
party relationships can also capture the variation in ministerial accountability towards 
presidents, prime ministers, and party principals. 
2.5 Ministerial deselection, executive scenarios, and party politics 
This study argues that the impact of principal-agent relations on ministerial 
accountability depends on the interaction between executive scenarios and party 
relationships between presidents, prime ministers and cabinet members. This idea builds 
upon the link identified by Samuels and Shugart (2010) between the separation of 
powers and party organisation and behaviour and tests the hypothesis that the 
presidents’ influence over the government derives from their de facto position as party 
leaders (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). To do so, we operationalise the concept of 
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de facto partisan authority by taking into account the positions held by presidents and 
prime ministers in the party hierarchy before they take office. Thus, we expect that 
presidents who step down as party leaders, only to be sworn in as heads of state 
continue to control their parties. By contrast, we expect that presidents who did not 
contest the presidential race as party leaders have little or no impact on cabinet 
composition regardless of whether they take office during a period of unified executive, 
divided executive, or cohabitation. Consequently, we do not expect them to control the 
cabinet either. If the president is a de facto party leader, then his or her authority over 
the cabinet should increase under a divided executive and even more so under a unified 
executive. However, unless the president enjoys some formal constitutional powers over 
the government and/or individual ministers, we do not expect that partisan sources of 
authority matter for his or her ability to hold cabinet members accountable under 
cohabitation.  
Similarly, we expect party leadership positions to render prime ministers more 
influential than prime ministers who are not party leaders. If prime ministers are not 
party leaders, then we expect them to be weak irrespective of whether there is a unified 
executive, a divided executive, or cohabitation. However, as opposed to presidents, 
prime ministers enjoy a range of formal powers over the cabinet, including the right to 
fire ministers. Due to this institutional feature, we expect that prime ministers who are 
party leaders take advantage of both constitutional powers and intraparty mechanisms of 
control and hold cabinet members accountable irrespective of executive scenarios. 
However, the authority of prime ministers may decrease during periods of divided 
executive if they share executive power with presidents who also act as de facto party 
leaders. 
Due to their centrality in the chain of democratic delegation in representative 
democracies, party principals should retain a certain amount of influence over the 
cabinet under all circumstances, as long as they can hold accountable their agents in 
government, including the president and the prime minister. Thus, if neither the 
president, nor the prime minister is a party leader, then we expect party principals to 
keep a tight grip over cabinet ministers regardless of whether there is a unified 
executive, a divided executive, or cohabitation. However, if the president and the prime 
minister are both party leaders, then we do not expect party principals to control the 
cabinet during periods of unified executive and divided executive. If presidents are de 
facto party leaders under these scenarios, then parties have no means of sanctioning 
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agency loss. However, party principals should be more influential under cohabitation 
even when the president and the prime minister are party leaders. In this case, the 
president is opposed to the parliamentary majority and has fewer means to compete for 
control over the cabinet, while parties retain the power to sanction agency loss by 
replacing the prime minister. 
Table 2.1 summarises the variation in the authority of presidents, prime 
ministers and party principals over the cabinet as a function of both executive scenarios 
and party relationships. 
 
Table 2.1 Presidential, prime ministerial, and party influence over cabinet ministers 
PRESIDENT Unified Divided Cohabitation 
President party leader? 
Y +++ ++  +  
N 0 0 0 
PM Unified Divided Cohabitation 
PM party leader? 
Y +++  ++  +++  
N 0  0  0 
PARTY Unified Divided Cohabitation 
President and PM party leaders? 
Y 0 0 + 
N  +++  +++    +++  
 
 
Thus, to capture the full impact of party relationships between ministers, 
presidents, and prime ministers on the length of ministerial tenure we need to take into 
account not only the hierarchy of party relations during their term of office, but also 
their positions in the party hierarchy before taking office. This approach allows us to 
determine to what extent and under what circumstances a de facto party leadership 
position may account for the discrepancy between the formal powers held by political 
actors and their actual influence over the decision-making system. The interactive 
relationship between executive scenarios and party relationships differentiates this study 
from other works that associate the variation in the authority of presidents and prime 
ministers over cabinets with the occurrence of executive scenarios. A systematic 
analysis of ministerial termination events will reveal whether the risk of losing office 
increases when cabinet members enter into conflict with their principals in the party 
hierarchy and whether institutional context makes a difference for their longevity in 
office. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a theory-driven way of analysing the process of ministerial 
deselection. Building upon the use of agency theory for the study of delegation and 
accountability in representative democracies, we have emphasised the link between the 
deselection of ministers and their place in the chain of delegation from voters and 
political parties to public office holders. Seen from a principal-agent perspective, 
cabinet ministers respond to competing principals (Carey, 2007) in the government and 
party hierarchy. As a result, the length of ministerial tenure can be estimated as function 
of their principals’ ability to sanction agency loss.  
Due to the ministers’ subordination to competing principals in any institutional 
environment, the principal-agent approach is a valid and reliable analytical tool for the 
formulation of testable hypotheses across national and institutional contexts. However, 
semi-presidential systems, and in particular its premier-presidential sub-type, constitute 
an ideal setting to study the impact of different power relations on ministerial 
accountability, due to the intra- and inter-case variation of principal-agent relationships 
in this political regime. As a result, we can study which principal-agent relationships 
associate with longer and shorter lengths of ministerial tenure. To capture the variation 
in the impact of different principal-agent relationships on ministerial durability we focus 
on institutional context and party relationships. We expect that the length of ministerial 
tenure depends on the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to 
sanction agency loss under different political circumstances.  
The principals’ control over cabinet composition is estimated as a function of 
party relationships and executive scenarios. We know that the president’s and the prime 
minister’s influence over the political system increases under certain circumstances. 
However, the political circumstances under which they become more influential vary 
across countries. This study argues that the party relationship between presidents and 
prime ministers captures the variation in their influence over the political system and 
that presidents and prime ministers who act as de facto party leaders are more powerful 
than presidents and prime ministers who do not. However, the extent of political 
influence is not independent of institutional context. Due to their limited range of 
constitutional powers, we expect that presidents who are de facto party leaders have 
more control over the cabinet during periods of unified executive than under divided 
executive or cohabitation. Nevertheless, presidents who act as party leaders during 
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periods of divided executive and cohabitation may be more influential than presidents 
who take office during a period of unified executive, but are not regarded as de facto 
party leaders. Similarly, prime ministers who are party leaders will have more control 
over the cabinet under cohabitation, than under divided executive and unified executive, 
when the president’s party is in government. However, we expect that the influence of 
presidents and prime ministers over the political systems decreases when they do not act 
as party leaders. It is under these circumstances that we expect the influence of party 
principals over the cabinet to rise. 
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This thesis aims to explain the variation in the length of ministerial tenure and focuses 
on the role that political institutions and intraparty politics play in determining why 
some ministers survive in office longer than others. The first section of this chapter 
justifies the adoption of a small-n comparative approach to test the principal-agent 
theory. The second section accounts for the selection of case studies and the time period 
under analysis. The third section explains the method of quantitative case studies used 
in this project and outlines the qualitative and quantitative techniques used at different 
phases in the research process to collect, analyse and validate the data. The fourth 
section presents and operationalises the dependent and independent variables used in the 
analysis. The chapter concludes by presenting the expected outcomes of this research 
and emphasises the external validity of the results obtained using the methods discussed 
in this chapter. 
3.1 The comparative method 
This thesis adopts a comparative approach. The principal-agent approach is an abstract 
framework of analysis that can be used to study the process of ministerial deselection in 
any representative democracy. The aim of this study is to show that the implications of 
this theory are generalisable across the population of premier-presidential systems. This 
argument can be tested comparatively across countries or investigated in-depth in a 
single country.  
A single case study permits the intensive study of a theory and aims to shed light 
on the entire population of cases where this argument applies (Gerring, 2004, p. 344). 
Thus, the analysis of ministerial turnover in a single country allows one to probe the 
causal roots of this political process in a particular national context using both deductive 
logic and contextual knowledge (Gerring, 2007, p. 172). However, a single case study is 
not a useful technique for testing deductive theories because it often hinders the 
evaluation of alternative explanations (G. King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 211). 
Although it aims to generalise to a population of cases, the single case study is focused 
on within-case variation (Gerring, 2007, p. 21). Here, the main hypothesis is that the 
Chapter Three: Research design
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ability of presidents and prime ministers to fire cabinet ministers depends on the 
interaction of institutional context and party relationships. This hypothesis can only be 
tested if we observe variation in both executive scenarios and in the party leadership 
roles played by presidents and prime ministers. This argument could be studied in a 
single case study which presents variation in these explanatory factors across time. 
However, no crucial case can test whether a hypothesis is generally true due to the 
multicausal and probabilistic nature of political phenomena (Coppedge, 2007, p. 2). 
According to Coppedge (2007, p. 2), “the kind of generalization that one does in a case 
study is not testing generalizations, but hypothesizing them”. Thus, although relevant or 
crucial cases relate to the population by proposing relationships that might be generally 
true, they cannot reveal if they are generally true. The researcher cannot rule out the 
possibility that the causal significance of an event or structure depends on other features 
of the case than those under investigation (Ragin, 1987, p. xiii). Thus, case-oriented 
research may be able to avoid the simplifying assumptions of the variable-oriented 
approach, but cannot explain similarities and differences among many cases (Ragin, 
1987, p. xiii). 
Overall, the single case research is considered more useful for generating new 
hypotheses, and more concerned with internal validity and the investigation of causal 
mechanisms (Gerring, 2007, p. 38). However, if the aim is to test a general hypothesis 
and if the researcher is concerned about external validity and aims to gain insight about 
average causal effects and generalise on the basis of new results, then the case study 
research is associated with several comparative weaknesses (Mahoney, 2007, p. 8). As 
this research aims to test a general theory of ministerial deselection and reveal its 
potential for generalisation across the entire population of premier-presidential 
countries, the comparative method appears as a more adequate choice.  
The comparative approach is regarded as a method of “discovering empirical 
relationships among variables” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683) and “controlling whether 
generalisations hold across the cases to which they apply” (Sartori, 1991, p. 244). 
However, the goal of testing theories and establishing general empirical generalisations 
between two or more variables is shared by both large-n and small-n research. 
According to Lijphart (1971, p. 684), the difference between the statistical and the 
comparative method resides in the method of control they use: while the statistical 
method resorts to partial correlations and accounts only for certain key variables that are 
considered to exert substantial influence on the phenomenon under investigation, the 
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comparative method deals with a number of cases that is not large enough to permit 
systematic control by means of partial correlations. Thus, the main difference between 
the two approaches comes down to the number of cases available for analysis.  
Ragin (1987) discusses the differences between small-n and large-n studies in 
terms of case-oriented and variable-oriented research strategies. The former is seen as 
an evidence-oriented strategy, while the latter is theory-centered (Ragin, 1987, p. 53). 
Theory plays an important role in both approaches. However, while its main role is to 
guide the identification of causal factors in case-oriented studies, variable-oriented 
studies test hypotheses derived from theory (Ragin, 1987, p. 55). Although this 
approach fits the aim of this thesis, which is to test whether the principal-agent model 
can work as a general theory for the study of ministerial turnover, the variable-oriented 
approach includes several caveats. According to Ragin (1987, p. 69), its main weakness 
is its tendency towards abstract generalisation and its reliance on conjunctural causal 
arguments. Large-n studies are also thought to give insufficient attention to causal 
mechanisms and to depend heavily on unttested assumptions (Collier, Brady, & 
Seawright, 2010a, p. 155). In contrast with single-case studies, cross-national studies 
are likely to be biased in favour of structural explanation at the expense of social 
processes and human agency (Ragin, 1987, p. 70).  
To overcome the limitations of both single case and large-n studies, this thesis 
combines the two research methods using a small-n comparative approach. The main 
advantage of the small-n method stands in its ability to use the leverage afforded by the 
differences and similarities of comparable cases drawing on the deep background 
knowledge of the countries being examined (Tarrow, 2010, p. 243). The small-n 
comparison differs from single-case studies through its ability to compare the impact of 
a single variable or mechanism on outcomes of interest (Tarrow, 2010, p. 244). 
However, the advantages of focusing on just a few cases must be weighed against the 
costs which include “forgoing large-n tools for measurement validation and losing the 
generality that might be achieved if a wider range of cases is considered” (Brady, 
Collier, & Seawright, 2010, p. 22). To compensate for the analytical leverage that 
characterises large-n studies, one must employ strong tools of within-case analysis 
(Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010b, p. 10).  
A further choice that we need to make regards the logic of inquiry based on 
which the cases are selected and compared. The strategy of small-n comparison requires 
us to choose between John Stuart Mill’s (1846) methods of agreement and difference. A 
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research design that is based on as many similar cases as possible and adopts a method 
of difference to focus on intersystemic similarities and differences is known as a “most 
similar systems” design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 32). Conversely, a research 
design that is based on dissimilar countries and adopts the method of agreement to 
identify common causal relationships for the social phenomenon under study is known 
as a “most different systems” design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 34). Our choice of 
a most-similar systems analysis is determined by the scope of the theory tested in this 
thesis, as well as by the quantitative case studies method used for the small-n 
comparison. First, this thesis proposes an abstract theory regarding the accountability of 
cabinet ministers to competing principals in government and in the party. Thus, we 
focus on the chain of delegation and accountability as the main similarity that all 
representative democracies share. We assume that these political systems have many 
circumstances in common and we aim to interpret the variation in the process of 
ministerial deselection by concentrating on the variation in the process of delegation and 
accountability across cases. Therefore, this study adopts a logic of inquiry that is based 
on the co-variation between political institutions, intraparty politics and ministerial 
deselection and focuses on cross-system differences (Pennings, Keman, & 
Kleinnijenhuis, 2006, p. 39). Second, the techniques employed for data collection and 
analysis allow us to control for variation in institutional context across the countries 
under analysis. The validity of our quantitative measures is increased by the qualitative 
method of data collection, which ensures that the independent variables are highly 
context-specific. As a result, the mix of qualitative and quantitative methods of data 
collection and analysis balance the trade off involved by the most similar systems 
design between internal and external validity. 
The quantitative and the case study analyses are also clearly integrated. The case 
studies speak to each other and do not simply test or illustrate the theory. Each country 
study opens with a brief narrative illustrating the kind of puzzle that this research aims 
to answer. These examples emphasise the differences between apparently similar 
political circumstances under which some ministers have had to resign, while others 
continued in office. The case-study chapters also include fine-grained analyses of 
intraparty politics and examine the organisational transformation undergone by 
presidential and prime ministerial parties. These extended qualitative sections explore 
the validity of coding decisions corresponding to the de facto party leadership roles 
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played by presidents and prime ministers even though they do not test directly the 
process of ministerial deselection predicted by the principal-agent theory.  
Furthermore, the quantitative analyses carried out in the case studies do not 
simply reproduce the cross-country statistical analysis. The case studies are an integral 
part of the investigation and they deepen the analysis in two different ways. First, the 
country-based quantitative analyses pay attention to the impact of country-specific 
factors on the length of ministerial tenure. For example, in the case of France we take 
into account the importance of the local route to ministerial office and the practice of 
combining local and national offices in this country and we control for the impact of 
local electoral defeats on the ministers’ risk of losing office. Second, the qualitative 
analyses of intraparty politics single out the conditions under which the main 
explanatory variables are likely to have an impact on the length of ministerial tenure. 
For example, the cross-country analysis confirms that presidents who act as de facto 
party leaders during periods of unified executive are more likely to exert control over 
cabinet members than presidents who are not party leaders. The case study analyses 
address this issue by contrasting the impact that a directly elected presidency has on the 
organisation and behaviour of political parties in different countries. 
A research design is able to fit the case-oriented and the variable-oriented types 
of investigations closely together when they are both anchored by the same explicit 
model (Ragin, 1987, p. 78). This is the role played by the principal-agent theory in this 
study, which guides both qualitative and multivariate analyses and aims to explain the 
process of ministerial turnover generally in representative democracies. As a result, the 
thesis aims to interpret the results more in light of their generality than toward 
appreciating the complexity and specificity of the case studies. At the same time, 
particular attention is given to the impact that country-specific factors have on the 
length of ministerial tenure. The generality of the findings is borne out by the cross-
country analysis, which shows that the relationship posited between the dependent and 
independent variables still holds when country-specific factors are not taken into 
account. As a result, the integration of case-oriented and variable-oriented comparison 
methods allows us to use a middle path between complexity and generality to test the 
internal validity of a theoretical argument using the same method that would be applied 
for its analysis across a large population of cases. 
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3.2 The countries selected for examination and the time period under study 
The universe of cases to which the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter 2 
apply consists of premier-presidential countries, where directly elected presidents share 
executive power with cabinets and prime ministers who are collectively responsible to 
assemblies alone. The only condition used to restrain this universe of cases is that of 
democratic consolidation, as the agency theory on which this analysis relies only applies 
to representative democracies. Further limiting the present analysis to European states 
does not violate any of the case selection conventions, as this sample of countries has 
not been selected by a rule correlated with the dependent variable of ministerial 
termination events (Geddes 1990: 131; King et al. 1994: 129). Since the number of 
European semi-presidential systems has increased after the fall of communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the universe of European premier-presidential systems 
presents substantial variation in democratic experience. Thus, the population of 
European premier-presidential countries satisfies the assumption of unit homogeneity or 
constant causal effects underlying the method of comparative case studies (King et al. 
1994: 93).  
The in-depth analysis of ministerial termination events is structured around the 
examination of executive politics in three countries, France, Portugal, and Romania. 
These countries have been selected according to the principles of the most-similar 
system design outlined above. They are all premier-presidential systems, where 
ministers are accountable to presidents, prime ministers and party principals. The 
empirical analysis will emphasise the factors responsible for the variation in the length 
of ministerial tenure within and across cases despite the common institutional 
framework they share. The scope conditions of the theoretical argument are also 
progressively tested through the selection of cases that vary with respect to the age of 
democracy (Tarrow, 2010, p. 251). The analysis includes a country that was a 
consolidated democracy at the end of the Second World War, a country that 
democratised during the 1970s and a country that started the transition to democracy 
during the 1990s. This strategy works as a way of testing for omitted variable bias and 
verifies that the scope conditions within which this theory is developed work in other 
national contexts irrespective of their democratic experience (Tarrow, 2010, p. 249). 
The three countries vary in ways that illustrate and put to the test the theoretical 
expectations set out in Chapter 2. Keeping in line with the most important research 
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design convention regarding the intentional selection of cases for small-n analysis 
(Geddes, 1990, p. 13; G. King et al., 1994, p. 137), France, Portugal, and Romania have 
been selected due to the significant variation in the key explanatory variables of dual-
executive scenarios and party leadership roles played by presidents and prime ministers 
within and across these countries. The intentional selection of case studies is consistent 
with the justification that this study offers for its exclusive concern with ministerial 
termination events in premier-presidential countries: the assumption that the scenarios 
of unified executive, divided executive and cohabitation stand a good chance of 
alternation at every electoral cycle holds true for each of the countries under study. One 
can therefore look in each of these case-studies for empirical evidence that the 
alternation of dual-executive scenarios in conjunction with party leadership roles played 
by different political actors introduces variation in the impact of principal-agent 
relationships on the length of ministerial tenure. Additionally, no attention has been 
paid to the distribution of ministerial termination events in any of these countries. Thus, 
in agreement with the strategy advocated by King, Verba and Keohane (1994), it is only 
during the research that the values of the independent variable will be discovered. This 
strategy allows the formulation of “causal inference by examining the differences in the 
distribution of outcomes on the dependent variable for given values of the explanatory 
variables” (G. King et al., 1994, p. 140). 
The time period under analysis in each country has been selected so that the 
process of ministerial deselection can be observed under different political 
circumstances within and across national contexts. To determine which principal-agent 
relationships are associated with shorter and longer spells of ministerial tenure, we have 
focused on the most recently completed periods of unified executive, divided executive, 
and cohabitation. The neutral selection of beginning and endpoints is not correlated with 
the values taken by the dependent variable and should not bias the conclusions of this 
study.  
The analysis of ministerial turnover in France is carried out for the most recent 
periods of unified executive and cohabitation. The former occurred between 2007 and 
2012, when President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister François Fillon of the Union 
for a Popular Movement shared executive power. The last time a French government 
operated under a period of cohabitation was between 1997 and 2002, when the Gaullist 
President Jacques Chirac and the Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin shared 
executive power. 
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The time period under analysis in the case of Portugal begins with the 
cohabitation between President Mário Soares of the Socialist Party and the centre-right 
coalition governments led by Manuel Durrão Barroso and Pedro Santana Lopes of the 
Social Democratic Party between 2002 and 20042. The second time interval included in 
the analysis of Portuguese ministers is the first Socialist government formed by PM José 
Socrates between 2005 and 2009. Two executive scenarios characterised this period of 
time. The unified executive between President Mario Soares and José Socrates lasted 
until March 2006, when Ánibal Cavaco Silva of the Social Democratic Party succeeded 
Mário Soares as President of Portugal. The cohabitation between PM Socrates and 
President Cavaco Silva lasted until a new government was formed after the 2009 
legislative election. 
The analysis of ministerial turnover in Romania focuses on the governments that 
were formed between 2000 and 2008. The Social-Democratic government that took 
office in December 2000 operated under a scenario of unified executive, as President 
Iliescu and PM Năstase of the Social Democratic Party shared executive power until 
2004. The new government formed after the 2004 elections started off under a scenario 
of divided executive, as President Traian Băsescu of the Democratic Party appointed 
Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu of the National Liberal Party as the prime minister of a 
coalition cabinet that was dominated by the two parties. The period of divided executive 
ended in April 2007, when President Băsescu’s party left the government coalition. This 
event triggered the onset of a period of cohabitation that lasted until new legislative 
elections were organised in December 2008. Table 3.1 maps the cabinets, the 
occurrence of executive scenarios, and the time period under analysis in the three 
countries. 
The impact of principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure is 
assessed by focusing on the variation in the party leadership positions held by presidents 
and prime ministers before and after they took office. According the theoretical 
argument set out in Chapter 2, the presidents’ and the prime ministers’ de facto partisan 
influence is one of the main explanatory factors accounting for the extent of their 
control over cabinet composition. The concept of de facto party leadership is 
operationalised as the position held by presidents and prime ministers as party leaders 
before taking office. Table 3.2 classifies the cabinets under study according to executive 
                                               
2
 The caretaker government led by PM Santana Lopes between December 2004 and March 2005 has been 
excluded from the analysis for several theoretical and methodological reasons explained in Chapter Five. 
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scenarios and the party leadership positions held by presidents and prime ministers 
before taking office. 
 
Table 3.1 Countries, cabinets, time period, and executive scenarios 
 France  Portugal  Romania  
Scenario Cabinet Time period Cabinet Time period Cabinet Time period 
Unified 
executive Fillon 
17/05/2007 
10/05/2012 Socrates 
12/03/2005 
11/03/2006 Năstase 
28/12/2000 
28/12/2004 
Divided 
executive         Tăriceanu 1 
29/12/2004 
05/04/2007 
Cohabitation Jospin 2/06/1997 6/05/2002 
Barroso 17/05/2002 17/07/2004 
Tăriceanu 2 06/04/2007 22/12/2008 
Santana Lopes 17/07/2004 13/12/2004 
Socrates 11/03/2006 26/10/2009 
 
Table 3.2 Executive scenarios and de facto party leadership positions 
      SCENARIO   
LE
AD
ER
SH
IP
 
  Unified Cohabitation Divided 
PR 
(RO) Năstase (2000/04)     
(FR) Fillon (2007/12)      
PM (PT) Socrates (2005/06) 
(PT) Barroso (2002/04) 
  (PT) Santana Lopes (2004) 
(PT) Socrates (2006/09) 
PR, PM 
  (FR) Jospin (1997/02) 
(RO) Tăriceanu 1 
(2004/07)   (RO) Tăriceanu 2 (2007/08) 
Neither       
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 validate the grounds on which the three countries have been 
selected and based on which they are compared. Table 3.1 shows that institutional 
context varies within and across the three cases. Each of them includes a period of 
unified executive and cohabitation. The Romanian case also includes a period of 
divided executive. Table 3.2 shows that party relationships also vary within and across 
countries. The theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2 suggests that if the presidency 
is a highly valued office, then political parties are likely to nominate their leaders as 
presidential candidates. Table 3.2 confirms this expectation in France and Romania, 
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where the heads of state contested the presidential race as party leaders. Party 
relationships do not vary in Portugal, where political parties do not nominate their 
leaders as presidential candidates. Although the Portuguese presidents covered by this 
study had also been party leaders as some point during their political career, they had 
not contested the presidency of the country from this position. The importance of party 
leadership roles in Portugal is nevertheless confirmed by the fact that all prime ministers 
included in the analysis held the presidency of their parties before and after elections, 
regardless of the executive scenario under which their government operated. The 
situation of French and Romanian presidents differs from that of Portuguese presidents, 
as all of them contested the presidential race from the position of party leaders. The 
French and the Romanian cases also vary as far as the party leadership positions held by 
prime ministers before and after elections are concerned. While Lionel Jospin stepped 
down from the presidency of the Socialist Party upon his appointment as prime 
minister, Adrian Năstase succeeded Ion Iliescu as president of the Social-Democratic 
Party after he was appointed as prime minister. The variation in party relationships 
across and within countries create a favourable framework to estimate their impact on 
the length of ministerial tenure when the independent variable of institutional context is 
held constant, as well as when it varies across and within countries. 
The variation in ministerial durability is analysed within and across countries. 
The selection of case studies respects the three assumptions underlying the concept of 
conditional independence (G. King et al., 1994, p. 94): the endogeneity problem and 
selection bias are ruled out as the values taken by explanatory variables are independent 
of the values assigned to the dependent variable of ministerial termination events. The 
risk of omitted variable bias is considerably reduced by the inclusion of a battery of 
control variables that capture the impact of additional determinants of ministerial 
durability in office highlighted in other studies of ministerial turnover. The selection of 
control variables is also independent of the values taken by dependent variables in the 
three countries under study. The operationalisation and measurement of the control 
variables is explained in the last section of this chapter. 
The comparative analysis of the principal-agent approach to ministerial 
deselection gains analytical leverage from a variety of methods that allow us to 
investigate the research question from different angles (Tarrow, 2010, p. 250). In 
addition to quantitative analyses, the case studies include short narratives, descriptions 
of intraparty mechanisms of accountability and leadership selection processes, and 
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detailed analyses of different routes to ministerial office. The cases speak to each other, 
they highlight country-specific factors that differentiate the three countries from one 
another, and they discuss new findings in light of the results obtained in the other single 
studies. The cross-country findings are also strengthened by the replication of the 
general hypothesis at a smaller scale. As a result, the research design localises the 
general argument tested in this thesis and strengthens it (Tarrow, 2010, p. 252). 
The next sections of this chapter explain the range of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods that have been used to collect and analyse the data. 
3.3 Quantitative case studies 
Using a small-n comparison, this study examines the effect of institutions and 
parties on ministerial deselection through the use of quantitative case studies. This 
approach consists in combining a data collection method that generates a large number 
of observations from the context with a quantifying technique that relies on the 
qualitative analysis of each observation before it is transformed into a number. We carry 
out a qualitative content analysis of print press news as a method for collecting data on 
the events experienced by ministers during their time in office. The analysis carried out 
in each case study draws on large-n data sets that include up to 2,815 observations. The 
increase in the number of data points available for analysis increases the analytical 
leverage of single studies and is one of the solutions given to the “many variables, 
small-n problem” associated by Lijphart (1971, p. 685), with the comparative method 
(Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010c, p. 183). As a result we can use the same data to 
test whether the causal relationships posited by the theoretical argument are replicated 
within and across case studies. 
The data on cabinet ministers has been collected through a detailed analysis of 
newspaper content. An original data set has been compiled for each country under 
analysis. The data sets cover the cabinet ministers who served in government during the 
time period indicated above and contain information regarding the events they 
experienced during their time in office. Taking into account the fact that cabinet politics 
receive high coverage in the media, we use the coverage that ministerial termination 
events, resignation calls and conflicts between ministers, presidents, prime ministers, 
and political parties receive in well-known quality newspapers in each of the countries 
under study. Due to the popularity and widespread use of online newspaper archives, 
the press is the most tractable media source in all countries under study (Elgie & 
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McMenamin, 2005, p. 547). As a result, a well-known daily national newspaper that can 
be treated as an independent and repute media source has been identified for each 
country. The three newspapers are Le Figaro (for the French ministers), Diário de 
Notícias (for the Portuguese ministers), and Evenimentul zilei (for the Romanian 
ministers).  
Although Le Monde is seen as the French newspaper of record in France, Le 
Figaro was preferred for data collection because Le Monde was not included in the 
LexisNexis database when this project started. However, the correlation scores between 
the number of minister-related articles in Le Monde and Le Figaro for the time period 
under analysis indicate negligible differences in news reporting between the two 
newspapers. As a result, the right-wing orientation of Le Figaro was not considered 
problematic, given that the observations recorded in the data set are related to the 
occurrence of events and draw exclusively on the newspaper’s reporting function and 
not on the political stance it takes with regard to the events reported. In addition to its 
reputation as one of the most important Portuguese dailies, Diário de Notícias was 
chosen as the primary source for data collection due to the extensive online archive that 
is available on its website. The archive offers full text access to the entire Diário de 
Notícias collection published since 2000. Similarly, apart from its reputation as one of 
the most important Romanian dailies, Evenimentul zilei was chosen as the primary 
source for data collection due to its extensive online archive that offers full text access 
to all articles published since 1994. 
Irrespective of the source used for data collection, similar keywords were 
employed to select the newspaper articles containing information related to the events 
experienced by ministers. A validity test of this method was carried out for the case of 
Luís Campos e Cunha, the Portuguese Minister of Finance who stepped down in July 
2005 after serving in José Sócrates government for four months. Two searches were 
carried out, one with keywords and another one without keywords. The keyword search 
returned 34 articles, while the simple search returned 112 articles. However, the 
information contained in the 34 articles returned by the keyword search led to the 
identification of the same number of terminal and non-terminal events as the simple 
search: one resignation, one resignation call and four episodes of policy disagreements. 
Overall, 50,291 articles were selected from the three newspapers used for data 
collection. Based on these articles, 5,072 observations were recorded. The France data 
set contains 2,815 observations coded on the basis of 50,291 articles; the Portuguese 
74 
 
data set includes 540 observations coded from 3,500 articles; and the Romanian data set 
includes 1,717 observations that were coded based on 23,724 articles.  
The internal validity of the data collected using the method indicated above is 
further assessed in the next sections of this chapter, which explain the operationalisation 
and the measurement of the independent variables. However, the use of identical units 
of measurement for all the cases included in the analysis ensures that the basic criteria 
for internal validity of the new data collected are met by this study (Pennings et al., 
2006, pp. 11–12). Furthermore, the fact that the indicators used in this study have been 
conceptualised for the pupose of testing the specific argument formulated in this project 
maximise the validity of our measurements (G. King et al., 1994, p. 25). The collection 
of data using the content analysis of print press news increases the reliability and 
internal validity of the quantitative data sets that serve as the basis for within-case and 
cross-case statistical modelling. The adoption of such a labour-intensive method of data 
collection has involved a trade off between the internal validity of the quantitative 
measures and the replicability of the data collection process. However, we believe that 
the advantages of using reliable data to test a general theory in a way that is consistent 
with the context outrank the disadvantages of exact replications of data sets. The 
conceptual and external validity of the data collected derives from the hypothesis testing 
role served by case studies in this research. The theoretical argument tested in this thesis 
has been developed deductively and is thought to apply to the entire population of 
premier-presidential countries, not only to the three countries included in this study.  
3.4 Event history analysis 
To estimate the impact of independent variables on the length of ministerial tenure 
across countries and over time we will use the method of event history analysis, which 
involves the “statistical examination of longitudinal data collected on a set of 
observations” (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 1). Due to their focus on the impact 
that the variation in independent variables has on the values of the dependent variable 
over time, event history models are explicitly comparative statistical models (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 3). Since every event history model contains 
longitudinal data across many observations, we will compare the results obtained by the 
duration models that use single-country data sets with the results obtained by a pooled 
model that uses the data collected for the three countries. This approach allows us to 
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identify the factors that increase the ministers’ risk of losing office in certain national 
contexts and to reach a conclusion regarding their generalising effect across countries. 
Duration models are preferred over other types of regression models due to their 
advantages in modelling survival in a given state and transition to a subsequent state, 
which is the event under analysis (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 8). For 
example, regression-based approaches are unable to account for time-varying 
covariates, which are a characteristic of this study since the independent variables (such 
as institutional context and party relationships) are likely to change values across the 
time period under study. By contrast, the event history approach provides several 
solutions to incorporate information on time-varying covariates and determine the risks 
associated with changes in the values of key covariates (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
2004, p. 116). Since the aim of this research is to gain a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between the dependent variable and covariates rather than focus on a 
particular form of duration dependency, the multivariate analyses carried out in the 
country-studies use the Cox proportional hazards model. This model does not impose 
any restriction on the shape of hazard function and appears as an appropriate model 
choice since we have no reason to assume that a minister’s risk of losing office 
increases or decreases as time passes. As a result, the analysis focuses on how the 
events experienced by ministers push the slope of the hazard function up and down.  
However, simply summing up events and conflicts between ministers and their 
principals as a measure of the principal-agent relationships might overestimate the 
extent of career-control powers. For example, when presidents are unable to influence 
executive affairs during periods of cohabitation they are likely to adopt a going-public 
tactic to pass judgements about the government’s performance. In this context, a simple 
additive model is completely oblivious to the passing of time and fails to take into 
account the relativity of the principals’ powers because it has no capacity to “forget”. 
As a result, the influence of a particular conflict on the resulting risk of ministerial 
deselection cannot be observed since all conflicts are equipotent. The additive model 
can nevertheless be improved by adding a specification that allows it to “forget” events 
when the time of their occurrence is sufficiently far back into the past with respect to the 
moment of ministerial deselection. As a result, the impact of any event on the hazard of 
ministerial termination events is no longer equipotent but weighted by the following 
exponential decay function 
 			 
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The value of lambda is determined with respect to the event half-life, defined as 
the period of time after which the likelihood of being fired because of that event drops 
to 50%.  As a result:  λ = − log0.5t 								 
 
The only remaining issue is how to choose a good estimate for the event half-
time. The resolution of ministerial scandals often involves the set up of special 
investigations to determine the personal responsibility of the ministers in question. For 
example, this was the case of Eric Woerth, who was promoted as Minister of Labour, 
Solidarity and Civil Service in François Fillon’s cabinet in March 2010. Woerth was 
involved in a financial scandal during the summer of 2010 after he had been accused of 
receiving illegal campaign donations in 2007. Although an inquiry into these corruption 
allegations was immediately commenced, Woerth left the government only several 
months later in the context of a major reshuffle. To account for similar situations where 
the outcome of some events depends on the intensity with which they are followed up 
by the public and authorities alike, it seems reasonable to allow a three-month time-span 
before the weight of an event on the risk of sacking drops by half. As a result, the value 
of lambda is 0.0077 (for a half-life value equal to 90 days). This value is used to 
compute the cumulative impact of any type of event that ministers may experience on 
their risk of failure. The fact that the statistical models are specified in such a way as to 
allow the importance of events to diminish in time, as it would happen in real life, 
renders this analysis considerably more fluid and dynamic than most statistical models 
that focus on static characteristics of governments and ministers alike.  
The empirical design of this study creates the conditions for an effective use of 
duration models. The use of new data collected and recorded for the purpose of duration 
analysis ensures that the method of event history modelling is correctly implemented 
and avoids problems related to poor measurement of events (Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones, 2004, p. 197). Nevertheless, while the event history models used in this study 
will provide information regarding the factors associated with an increase in the risk of 
losing office, this information needs to be backed out of the statistical model (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 197). The combination of the formal logic of the 
theoretical argument provided by the principal-agent model and the multivariate 
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analysis provides a strong research design to study the variation in the length of 
ministerial tenure across countries and over time.  
3.5 The dependent variable: the length of ministerial tenure 
This study argues that the deselection of line ministers, which is conceptualised as the 
termination of a principal-agent relationship, reflects the variation in the influence of 
presidents, prime ministers, and party principals over the cabinet. We expect each 
principal’s ability to fire ministerial agents to vary as a function of political institutions 
and party relationships. In other words, the length of ministerial tenure can be regarded 
as a dependent variable that can be used to explain the variation in the political practices 
we want to explain (Cheibub & Chernykh, 2008, p. 292).  
The data sets cover all ministers who held a full cabinet position in their 
respective governments. In addition to standard cabinet members the data sets also 
includes ministers of state, a position that indicates the most senior members of cabinet 
in each country under study, and delegated ministers, a position that features in the 
French and the Romanian governments. State secretaries from all countries have been 
excluded from the analysis because of their direct subordination to a single principal. As 
opposed to state secretaries, the French and the Romanian delegated ministers 
participate in cabinet meetings and respond directly to the prime minister. All 
individuals who have served as ministers, senior ministers or junior ministers during the 
time period under study have been identified from official sources. 
The data sets include the exact dates when ministers take and leave office. The 
dependent variable records the length of ministerial tenure. The ministers’ observed 
tenure is right-censored if they leave office collectively as a result of a government 
termination or general elections. Ministers are also right-censored if they are still in 
office at the end of the time period under study. The duration in office is not interrupted 
if ministers are assigned to different portfolios, if there is a change of prime minister, or 
if the government receives a vote of investiture in the parliament after a reshuffle. 
However, if the same ministers leave the cabinet and return after a certain period of 
time, they are recorded as new cases. 
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3.6 The independent variables 
While the units of observation in the data set are the individual ministers the 
units of analysis are the events experienced by ministers. The events included in the 
analysis are the independent variables that are expected to affect the length of 
ministerial tenure. In addition to the events experienced by ministers, the analysis also 
controls for the ministers’ fixed characteristics at the moment of appointment. 
Conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals 
To measure the variation in principal-agent relationships, we collect data on 
disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and party principals. 
We assume that the risk of losing office increases when the occurrence of conflicts 
between ministers and their principals is made public. The accumulation of conflicts 
between ministers, presidents, prime ministers and parties is therefore a proxy for 
agency loss that each principal should aim to contain. If the principals have the power to 
fire agents, then they should be in a position to do so when the level of conflict with 
their agents increases. If the ministers’ risk of losing office does not increase in the 
presence of conflicts with principals, then we assume that the latter do not have the 
ability to sanction agency loss3. The indicator of conflicts between ministers and 
principals is the number of times the former are criticised by the latter during their time 
in office, as reported in the press. The issue at stake may be related to the ministers’ 
performance in executive or party office or to their personal behaviour, as well as to 
ministerial departments or policy issues.  
The information contained by the three explanatory variables that record 
disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties is 
                                               
3Several alternative explanations regarding the conditions under which we are actually able to observe 
conflicts between ministers and their principals must be considered. While public evidence of a 
conflictual relationship between ministers and their principals is a strong indicator of agency loss, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that principals may see it in their interest not to make public some conflicts. 
For example, presidents, prime ministers and parties outside public office may not wish to harm their 
electoral chances by publicly exposing the mismanagement errors of their representatives in government. 
In this case, the reasons for the ministers’ demotion may be difficult to observe. Unpopular principals 
may also find it disadvantageous to criticise or sanction popular ministers. Principals who lack the formal 
power to fire ministers, such as presidents under a situation of cohabitation, may criticise cabinet 
members simply to draw attention upon themselves. By contrast, principals who can actively exercise the 
power to fire may choose not to choose their ministers in public. Nevertheless, although the publicness of 
conflicts may often be strategic, their systematic recording can still provide valuable information about 
the timing and the circumstances under which principals decide to make public their perception of agency 
loss.  
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used to estimate the influence of each principal on the deselection of ministers in the 
country studies as well as in the cross-country analysis. Some country-specific 
information is included in two of the case studies. The analysis corresponding to 
Portuguese ministers includes the president’s ability to veto executive decrees in 
addition to parliamentary bills. Similarly, the analysis corresponding to Romanian 
ministers includes the Romanian president’s power to demand the onset of legal 
proceedings against cabinet members and to request their suspension from office. To 
make sure that the pooled analysis is not driven by idiosyncratic elements, any country-
specific factor that is not encountered in each of the case-studies is excluded from the 
comparative analysis of ministerial turnover.  
Resignation calls 
To understand why some ministers lose their jobs while others do not under 
similar circumstances, it is important to pay equal attention to both instances of 
deselection and non-deselection (Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 412). Similar to previous 
studies that have relied on agency theory to study the relationship between prime 
ministers and their cabinets (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012), we see resignation calls as 
indicators of the ministers’ performance in office. Consequently, we expect that 
principals use this information when they decide to fire ministers and we expect the 
relationship between the number of resignation calls and the length of ministerial tenure 
to be negative.  
Resignation calls are recorded each time ministers are asked to resign. If they are 
asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new resignation call is recorded only if 
new information comes to light or if a different actor asks the minister to resign. The 
proximate reasons for resignation calls are grouped into four categories:  
 
(i) Personal errors – ministers held responsible for their own mistakes, errors of 
judgement, gaffes, involvement in personal or financial scandals, or seen to 
be performing badly over a long period of time; 
(ii) Departmental errors – when serious mistakes occur in the minister’s 
jurisdiction or department; 
(iii) Policy disagreements – ministers asked to resign because of the policies they 
initiated and/or implemented; 
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(iv) Breaches of collective responsibility – ministers called on to resign because 
they challenged a decision already made by cabinets or prime ministers; 
 
In cases where ministers were asked to step down over a mix of motives, two or 
three proximate reasons were coded. Cross-references have been made to interviews, 
biographies, autobiographies and any other sources available in order to reach a 
decision regarding the categorisation of termination reasons. Some debate may remain 
about the coding of some cases where personal and departmental errors may overlap, 
while performance and policy disagreements may be closely related. Due to the sample 
size of resignation calls, though, the advantages of estimating the combined effects of 
closely related reasons for resignation, such as personal errors and performance, instead 
of estimating the separate impact of several very small categories of reasons for 
resignation outweigh the disadvantages.  
The non-deselection cases are considered essential for a correct understanding of 
the causes of ministerial firing, particularly given the puzzling nature of ministerial 
termination events, which sees some ministers surviving in office under similar 
circumstances that cost other ministers their jobs. From this point of view, previous 
immunity to resignation issues could indicate a set of political circumstances under 
which ministers may expect to survive resignation debates, as well as the existence of a 
“threshold” of resignation issues that ministers may accumulate before they are 
constrained to leave office (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 710). Additionally, non-resignation 
instances may also indicate the circumstances under which the decisions to resign and 
dismiss depend on the agency relationship established between ministers and different 
principals and are not necessarily a consequence of the offence committed. 
Fixed characteristics 
The existing literature on ministerial turnover provides extensive analyses on the 
background of ministers and inquires whether differences in individual characteristics 
explain the variation in the durability of cabinet members. The range of fixed 
characteristics included in these studies contains information on the age and gender of 
ministers as well as on their social, educational, and political backgrounds. This thesis 
takes a different stance on the analysis of ministerial careers. We believe that personal 
characteristics play an important role for ministerial selection. However, this study 
focuses on the dynamic aspect of ministerial careers and aims to reveal the impact that 
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the events experienced while in office have on the length of tenure. We believe that 
static characteristics, such as social and educational backgrounds, are less likely to play 
a determinant role for the amount of time that ministers survive in office. As a result, 
our data does not include this kind of information. 
Due to the importance attached to the impact of party relations on ministerial 
durability, the range of fixed characteristics included in the analysis focus on indicators 
of political experience that are likely to be valued by party principals. These 
characteristics are grouped along the four aspects of ministerial career-paths that are 
compared across the country studies: cabinet experience, parliamentary background, 
experience in local administration, and involvement in party organisations. 
Previous appointments to government in either full or junior positions are the 
main indicator of previous experience of serving in office. The weight of legislative 
careers on the length of ministerial tenures is assessed by taking into account not only 
the ministers’ recruitment from the parliamentary pool, but also their previous 
experience as members of parliament. Within case-study analyses, the latter indicator 
measures the number of terms ministers served in the parliament prior to appointment in 
government. To avoid the possibility that different perceptions associated with the 
status of national representatives within individual countries drive the relationship 
between parliamentary experience and ministerial durability across countries, the 
comparative analysis takes into account the number of times ministers had previously 
been elected in the parliament only for those cabinet members who held a parliamentary 
seat at the moment of appointment.  
Depending on the importance of a background in local politics, the country 
studies control separately for the impact of mayor and councillor positions and prior 
experience in local administration on the length of tenure. To compensate for the 
variation in the role of local politics for the advancement of political careers at national 
level, the comparative analysis only looks at whether ministers held an elective position 
in local administration at the moment of appointment.  
Involvement in party politics is captured by two variables. The first one 
indicates whether ministers held a position in the party’s national executive bodies, 
while the second one indicates whether they were leaders of local party organisations. 
We also compare the party offices held by ministers at the moment of appointment with 
the party roles they played at the end of tenure in each of the three countries under 
study. Similarly to the assessment of parliamentary and local administration experience, 
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the cross-country analysis does not take into account the ministers’ positions in the 
party hierarchy prior to the moment of appointment.  
Other control variables 
Large-n studies of ministerial turnover have also considered the impact of cabinet-
related characteristics on ministerial durability (Budge & Keman, 1990; Budge, 1985; 
Dewan & Myatt, 2010; Dowding & Dumont, 2009b; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; 
Quiroz Flores, 2009). While there is little doubt that the ministers’ survival in office 
depends to a certain extent on government and coalition attributes, the small-n research 
design adopted in this study and the limited period of time covered by this analysis has 
not generated sufficient variation in these explanatory variables. As a result, they have 
not been included in the statistical tests of ministerial turnover.  
One of the explanatory factors included in the country studies takes into account 
the formal link of delegation between parliaments and cabinets and controls for the 
impact of parliamentary control on the risk of deselection. However, while an indicator 
of parliamentary control on individual ministers has been identified in each country, 
there is significant variation in the type of parliamentary pressure that ministers 
experience in each case. Romanian MPs can table simple motions against individual 
ministers and may recommend their removal from the cabinet. These recommendations 
are, however, not binding for the government. Although Portuguese MPs cannot vote on 
individual motions of no-confidence, they can request ministers to attend urgency 
debates when they wish to discuss unexpected polemical issues and to put pressure on 
the government. French MPs can neither vote on individual no-confidence motions nor 
request individual ministers to take part in special debates. However, the roll-call 
records of the French National Assembly can be used to identify policy disagreements 
between cabinet members and parliamentary majorities by analysing the abstentions and 
the votes cast against ministerial bills. Each of these indicators of parliamentary control 
is included in the country-based analyses to test the impact of parliamentary pressure on 
the risk of losing office. However, since each form of parliamentary pressure relies on a 
different aspect of the relationship between parliaments and cabinets, their impact on 
ministerial careers cannot be compared across countries. 
Ministers do not experience the same range of events during their time in office 
in the three countries. For example, while Portuguese ministers must step down if they 
want to compete in local elections, the French and the Romanian ministers are not 
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required to do so. In practice, though, Romanian ministers are expected to resign before 
engaging in electoral campaigns. As a result, we only analyse the impact of defeats in 
local elections on the risk of losing office in France. Additionally, although there is no 
legal or party ban on the mobility of Portuguese ministers in the party hierarchy while 
they are in office, in practice no cabinet member has been demoted or promoted in the 
party hierarchy during the time period under study. Consequently, we only verify 
whether promotions in the party hierarchy are used as compensatory moves for 
ministerial deselection in France and in Romania. 
As emphasised in Chapter 1, cabinet reshuffles sometimes play a demotion role 
and can be used by prime ministers as a way of dealing with incompetent or hostile 
ministers (Brazier, 1997, p. 281; Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 57). This study takes 
into consideration the demotion function of cabinet reshuffles and controls whether 
shifts in individual portfolios are associated with shorter lengths of tenure. 
The literature on ministerial turnover has also shown that ministerial 
resignations have a corrective effect on government popularity (Dewan & Dowding, 
2005, p. 46). Taking into account the frequency of strikes and protests triggered by the 
introduction of new policies and reforms and the fall in government popularity they may 
cause, it is worth testing if social unrest jeopardises the ministers’ survival in office. For 
this reason, a variable that measures the level of social unrest generated by specific 
reforms and policies that can be associated with individual ministers is incorporated in 
the analysis. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This thesis adopts a comparative approach to test the principal-agent model of 
ministerial deselection. The three countries where this theory is comparatively tested 
have been selected according to the principles of the most similar research design. 
France, Portugal, and Romania share the similar institutional framework, which 
subordinates ministers to presidents, prime ministers and political parties. Since we 
expect that party relationships and political institutions affect the principals’ ability to 
fire ministers, these countries and the period under analysis have been selected based on 
the variation they present in the main independent variables.  
The investigation of the theoretical argument at both case-study level and across 
countries combines the advantages of case-oriented and variable-oriented research 
strategies and allows us to test a parsimonious explanation of ministerial turnover in 
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different national contexts. Additionally, this research design allows alternative 
explanations of this process to emerge in different national settings. Since both research 
strategies are guided by the principal-agent theory, we can test whether the causal 
relationships are replicated both at case study level and across cases. 
The country-based investigations of the theoretical argument and the 
multivariate analyses are fully integrated. The data used in both types of analysis are 
generated qualitatively through an in-depth analysis of newspaper content. However, the 
use of such a labour-intensive method of data collection has involved a trade-off 
between the breadth and the scope of the quantitative analysis. While the qualitative 
method of data collection allows us to test the theoretical argument using quantitative 
methods of analysis in a way that is consistent with the political context, the cross-
country analysis is limited to the three countries selected for the small-n comparison. 
Nevertheless, the qualitative and quantitative analyses carried out in the country studies 
add to our understanding of ministerial careers in national contexts and deepen the 
multivariate analysis. When conducted at the country-level, the quantitative analyses 
take into account political factors that are specific to each national context. The case 
studies are also accompanied by short narratives of ministerial termination events and 
descriptions of intraparty politics in each country, which back up the adequate use of the 
principal-agent model to study this topic outside of the statistical models. The fact that 
the theoretical argument is validated by the cross-country analysis which excludes 
country-specific factors is a strong indicator for the external validity of this research.  
Based on the variation in the independent variables described above we can 
hypothesise their impact on the length of ministerial tenure. Overall, we do not expect 
fixed characteristics to emerge as a strong explanatory factor for the variation in the 
length of ministerial tenure. We believe it is unlikely that fixed characteristics at any 
moment in a minister’s career can explain a dynamic phenomenon like survival in a 
particular office, which depends primarily on what ministers do while they hold that 
office. However, due to the importance attached to individual characteristics in the 
literature of ministerial turnover it is necessary to control for fixed characteristics that 
might provide an alternative explanation regarding the variation in ministerial tenure.  
The main expectation of this study is that the accumulation of conflicts between 
ministers, presidents, prime ministers and parties is a proxy for agency loss that each 
principal should aim to contain. If the principals have the power to fire agents, then they 
should be in a position to do so when the level of conflict with their agents increases. If 
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the ministers’ risk of losing office does not increase in the presence of conflicts with 
principals, then we assume that the latter do not have the ability to sanction agency loss. 
The principals’ control over cabinet composition is estimated as a function of executive 
scenarios and party relationships. Overall, we expect that the principals’ ability to 
sanction agency loss increases when they are perceived as de facto party leaders, but 
only under certain circumstances. 
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The British doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility has been adapted to the 
French context by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who stepped down as Minister of 
Research and Industry in 1983 to protest against the economic change of course 
undertaken by François Mitterrand saying that “A minister has to keep his mouth shut. 
If he wants to open it, he has to resign” (Courtois, 2000). Jean-Pierre Chevènement 
followed this rule in two more occasions – first in 1991, when he walked out of the 
Ministry of Defence in protest against the French engagement in the Gulf War; and 
again in 2000, when he stepped down as Minister of Interior in disagreement with 
Lionel Jospin’s autonomy plan for Corsica. However, Chevènement’s example was not 
followed by his colleagues in Lionel Jospin’s government. For example, Dominique 
Voynet, the Green party’s minister for environment, and Marie-George Buffet, the 
Communist party’s minister for youth and sports, sided with unemployment movements 
against the policies put forward by one of their cabinet colleagues and protested against 
the government’s policy for the regularization of illegal immigrants. However, neither 
of them resigned over their publicly assumed differences with their government’s 
policies, nor were they asked to do so by Lionel Jospin as a result of breaching the rule 
of collective responsibility. What may explain then the different courses of action taken 
by cabinet ministers under similar political circumstances? 
This chapter uses a principal-agent approach to capture variation in the tenure of 
French ministers. Within this theoretical framework, ministers are conceptualised as 
subordinates to principals in the government and party hierarchy. As a result, the 
ministers’ survival in office depends on the kind of relationships they establish with 
each of the principals and on the ability of principals to use career-control powers to 
sanction agency loss. Thus, although the political context surrounding the resignation of 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement and the non-resignations of Dominique Voynet and Marie-
George Buffet may seem identical at first sight, they are quite different from a principal-
agent perspective. While the minister of interior disagreed with the prime minister, the 
latter two ministers clashed with cabinet colleagues on an equal standing. 
 This chapter is organised into four parts. The first section outlines the data, the 
time period, the institutional context, and the determinants of ministerial duration that 
Chapter Four: Ministerial deselection in France
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are captured by the analysis of French ministers. The second section focuses on 
intraparty politics and examines the organisational transformation undergone by the 
Gaullist and Socialist parties during the time period under analysis. This analysis 
highlights how and to what extent holding the presidency of a political party before 
taking office allows presidents and prime ministers to keep on playing a de facto party 
leadership role after they formally step down as party leaders. The third section 
describes the data collected for the France case study and explains the measurement of 
fixed characteristics and events in this context. The last section of this chapter 
completes the study of ministerial turnover in France with a multivariate analysis that 
estimates the length of ministerial tenure as function of fixed characteristics, events, and 
principal-agent relationships between cabinet members, presidents, prime ministers, and 
party principals. 
4.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in the France 
France is a good case for the study of principal-agent relationships and their impact on 
the ministers’ length of tenure due to the variation in institutional context according to 
whether the president and the prime minister are from the same party and whether the 
president’s party is in government. For a direct comparison of ministerial survival under 
different political circumstances the analysis focuses on the length of ministerial tenure 
during the most recent periods of cohabitation and unified executive. The most recent 
cohabitation occurred between 1997 and 2002, when the Gaullist President Jacques 
Chirac and the Socialist PM Lionel Jospin shared executive power. The most recently 
completed period of unified executive took place between 2007 and 2012, when 
President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed François Fillon of the UMP as prime minister. The 
data set includes all ministers of state, the most senior members in any given cabinet, 
ministers and delegated ministers who served in the two governments. State secretaries 
have been excluded from the analysis due to their direct subordination to cabinet, which 
rules out their accountability to multiple principals. As opposed to state secretaries, 
delegated ministers participate in cabinet meetings and report to the prime minister. 
Overall, the France data set covers 75 ministers. 
While the units of observation in the data set are the 75 ministers, the units of 
analysis are the events experienced by ministers while in office. Overall, 2,815 
observations related to the events experienced by ministers were recorded from 23,060 
articles published in Le Figaro during the time period under analysis. The articles were 
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accessed through LexisNexis. They were selected using 24 keywords related to major 
events, such as resignations, dismissals and reshuffles, and to conflictual situations 
involving scandals, ministerial responsibility, disagreements, ministerial performance 
and errors, protests and strikes. Each observation includes the type of event recorded, 
the political actors involved, and the reasons that caused it. The events experienced by 
ministers may be terminal, such as resignation and dismissals, or non-terminal. The key 
non-terminal events that are analysed in order to explain the variation in the ministers’ 
length of tenure are resignation calls, as a measure of ministerial performance, and 
conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals, as a measure of 
principal-agent relationships. Other non-terminal events taken into account are 
reshuffles, electoral defeats, promotions and demotions in the party hierarchy, policy 
disagreements between ministers and majority deputies, and national-level strikes and 
protests related to specific ministerial jurisdictions. The proximate reasons used for 
coding the events range from policy disagreements, personal or departmental errors, 
personal or financial scandals, political and electoral performance, appointments outside 
cabinet, intra-cabinet and intra-party conflicts to non-political reasons.  
According to the theoretical framework put forward in Chapter 2, the principals’ 
ability to influence the deselection of ministers is expected to depend on their 
relationship with parliamentary majorities. As a result, the extent of presidential and 
prime ministerial influence over the cabinet should depend on whether the president’s 
party is in government, during periods of unified and divided executive, or in 
opposition, during periods of cohabitation. Due to the process of presidentialisation 
undergone by French political parties following the introduction of the directly-elected 
presidency in 1962 (Clift, 2003, 2005; Knapp, 2004; Samuels & Shugart, 2010) 
presidents are expected to reverse the principal-agent relationship with their parties 
during periods of unified executive (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). However, 
ministerial autonomy from party decisions is expected to decrease during periods of 
cohabitation, when presidents have no political authority over the parliamentary 
majority. According to Thiébault (1994, pp. 141–142), it is under these circumstances 
that party leaders are more likely to be involved in the conduct of executive politics, 
either directly by joining the cabinet or indirectly by monitoring their ministers closely. 
Consequently, the president’s influence over cabinet composition is expected to 
increase during periods of unified executive, while the prime minister’s control over 
cabinet members is expected to increase under cohabitation. 
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Regardless of the institutional context in which conflicts occur, the ministers’ 
risk of being fired should increase when they clash with principals who are perceived as 
de facto party leaders. The relationship between leadership in the party and in the 
government was singled out by William Schonfeld (1983), who argued that membership 
in the party elite shapes and forms the behaviour of national leaders. As a training-
ground for governmental positions, political parties transfer the patterns of behaviour 
and interaction established between the members of their elite to the national level when 
they gain control over the government. Thus, given the recruitment of governmental 
leaders from party elites, it is reasonable to expect a certain continuity in their behaviour 
since working relations are not likely to change just because the context of the 
interaction changes (Schonfeld, 1983, pp. 495–496). This is a plausible explanation for 
the ongoing authority of presidents and prime ministers over their parties even when 
they are formally required to step down as party leaders. Schonfeld’s expectation is 
confirmed by Duverger’s observation that the variation in presidential influence in the 
Fifth Republic has been caused more often by intraparty factors than by institutional 
ones (Duverger, 1996, p. 542). Similarly, Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that the 
presidents’ ability to control executive politics in some premier-presidential systems, 
where they lack formal powers to do so, is explained by their ability to maintain  de 
facto control over political parties even when they formally step down as party leaders. 
Notwithstanding its ability to account for the discrepancy between the range of 
formal prerogatives enjoyed by some political actors and their actual influence over the 
political system, the informal nature of de facto leadership makes it difficult to measure. 
Little is known about the circumstances that allow presidents and prime ministers to 
continue playing the role of party leaders after they step down from party office, or for 
how long they can rely on this resource. To understand the relationship between parties 
and their agents in government we can analyse the organisational way in which parties 
deal with the dilemma of restoring their internal leadership when their leaders take 
national office. This approach has its limitations. As pointed out by Panebianco (1988, 
p.35), party statutes do not reveal more about how political parties work than written 
constitutions do about the operation of political systems. However, the adjustment of 
party statutes as a result of leadership transfers may indicate the type of hierarchical 
relationship that parties aim to establish with their agents. The second section of this 
chapter focuses on the changes introduced in the organisation of the Gaullist and 
Socialist parties following the inauguration of their leaders as presidents and prime 
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ministers during the time period under study. This analysis emphasises the formal and 
informal means that presidents and prime ministers can use to continue in their role as 
de facto party leaders after they formally give up their party responsibilities.  
The analysis of ministerial turnover also accounts for the impact of fixed 
characteristics on the length of tenure. The analysis takes into account standard 
measures of ministerial recruitment, such as prior appointments to government, 
parliamentary background, as well as experience in local administration and in party 
organisations. Additionally, particular attention is given in the French context to the 
simultaneous holding of multiple elective offices at national and local level, which is 
widespread among both members of the parliament and cabinet ministers. 
The cumul des mandats is often regarded as the defining feature of French 
politicians (Dewoghélaëre, Berton, & Navarro, 2006; Mény, 2008). The generalisation 
of this practice in France has been put down to the past centralisation and territorial 
organisation of the French state, to the electoral rules used in local elections, to the 
weakness of party organisations, and ultimately to the absence of a legal ban on holding 
more than one elective mandate, as is the case for example in Portugal and Romania, as 
well as in Ireland, Belgium or Luxembourg (Decamp, 1995; Dogan, 1967; François, 
2006; Knapp, 2004; Mabileau, 1995; Olivier, 1998; Sadran, 2000). However, the 
absence of legal interdictions in other European democracies, such as Spain, Germany, 
Denmark, or Norway has not led to similar levels of multiple-office holding (Bach, 
2012; Decamp, 1995; Sadran, 2000). According to Knapp (2004), the strong 
centralisation of the French state and weakness of political parties explains why directly 
elected local government institutions came to be regarded as the only legitimate 
intermediaries between citizens and central authority. The levels and numbers of local 
institutions exploded under the Third Republic. Even nowadays France has over 36,550 
communes that elect a mayor and a council. Nevertheless, despite the increase of power 
granted to municipalities and the introduction of the one-person, one-vote method for 
the election of municipal councils and mayors under the Third Republic, the practice of 
simultaneously holding national and local offices is a rather recent phenomenon. As 
shown by Bach (2012, pp. 27–29), the percentage of French deputies who were also 
mayors or departmental councillors decreased by 40 per cent and 25 per cent 
respectively between the Third and the Fourth Republic. However, the number of 
deputies holding a mayor or another local position doubled in the early days of the Fifth 
Republic and rose above 80 per cent in the early 1990s, before it went down again to 70 
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per cent during the 2000s (Bach, 2012, p. 30). This rising trend indicates that the causes 
of multiple-office holding have more to do with the institutional configuration of the 
Fifth Republic, than with the Napoleonic system of territorial organisation. According 
to Mabileau (1995, p. 10) the personalisation of local powers was also the consequence 
of using direct elections for the election of both presidents and mayors, which 
established a sort of constitutional mimicry between the two positions. 
Paradoxically, the attempt to limit this practice by law made it even more 
systematic. The legal ban introduced in 1985 and reinforced in 2000 on holding more 
than one elective mandate in addition to that of a deputy or senator4 has not only 
strengthened the practice of multiple-office holding (Olivier, 1998) but also stimulated 
politicians to seek an optimal configuration of the multiple offices allowed by law 
(Sadran, 2000, p. 93). This development singled out the importance of holding a 
mayoral position for the advancement of political careers at national level. For example, 
while French deputies have always tended to combine the positions of departmental or 
regional councillors and mayors, the restriction in the number of offices that can be 
legally held simultaneously has resulted in an increase in the number of 
parliamentarians who gave up any additional mandate in order to keep the mayor 
position. As a result, the most common combination of offices in the National Assembly 
became the deputé-maire (Nakano, 2000; Sadran, 2000). According to Dewoghélaëre et 
al. (2006), in 2006 almost 90 per cent of all French deputies held one or more additional 
elective offices and 50 per cent of them were mayors.  
The opportunity of combining national and local elective offices has important 
consequences for the range of political resources that are available to cabinet ministers. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional ban on the simultaneous holding of cabinet and 
parliamentary seats and despite a certain tendency in the early days of the Fifth 
Republic to recruit ministers from among top civil servants, the National Assembly 
remains the most common pool for ministerial selection (Berstein, 1986; O. Costa & 
Kerrouche, 2009; Dogan, 1986). While ministers must choose between the cabinet seat 
and the legislative mandate, the only local office they can be legally asked to give up is 
the presidency of the regional council of the Île-de-France (Carcassonne, 2011, pp. 133–
134). An inquiry carried out in 1997 showed that 25 per cent of the city mayors who 
                                               
4Pursuant to the LO 2000-294 of April 5, 2000, a parliamentary mandate is incompatible with holding 
more than one of the following offices: regional councillor, councillor to the Corsican Assembly, 
departmental councillor, councillor of Paris, municipal councillor of a commune with more than 3,500 
inhabitants (Avril & Gicquel, 2010). 
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were in office at that time had held executive responsibility as ministers or state 
secretaries, while three of them had also been prime ministers (Sadran, 2000, p. 97). 
The combination of national and local executive offices as well as the possibility 
of holding party leadership positions adds another layer of complexity to a minister’s 
relationship with his or her three principals, presidents, prime ministers and parties. 
Bach (2012, p. 17) notes that the selection of cabinet members is often based on the 
range of political resources displayed by various candidates to ministerial portfolios. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that ministers who are direct representatives of local 
strongholds have a better chance of survival in office. Due to the weak organisation of 
political parties, the deselection of ministers with a strong electoral base is not likely to 
be easily accepted by party principals. The importance of local offices for the 
advancement of ministerial careers is also emphasised by the ministers’ involvement in 
second-order elections during their time in office, as French ministers do not have a 
legal obligation to resign before they can engage in electoral contests. Moreover, 
presidents and prime ministers may encourage or prevent ministers from running in 
local elections (Bach, 2012, p. 17). In this case, electoral victories and defeats may have 
direct consequences for the length of ministerial tenure. For this reason, compared with 
the Portuguese and the Romanian cases, where the analysis must be limited to prior 
local government experience, the analysis of French ministers also considers the impact 
of incumbency in local office and of electoral performance in second order-elections, 
such as municipal and regional contests. The absence of a party ban on holding party 
leadership positions while in office allows a similar test of the impact of promotions and 
demotions in the party hierarchy on the length of ministerial tenure. To sum up, the 
range of political resources covered in the third section of this chapter captures the 
traditional career-path of French political elites, which is usually characterised by the 
pursuit of a national mandate, the implantation in a local stronghold, and involvement in 
a party organisation (Sadran, 2000, p. 99).  
The last section of the chapter analyses the variation in the length of ministerial 
tenure as a function of fixed characteristics, events experienced by ministers while in 
office, and principal-agent relationships. We also verify to what extent the principals’ 
influence on the process of ministerial deselection depends on institutional context. To 
do so their ability to sanction agency loss is estimated separately during periods of 
unified executive and cohabitation. The multivariate analysis emphasises that the 
ministers’ personal background at the moment of appointment does not explain why 
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some ministers survive in office longer than others. Conversely, we obtain strong 
evidence that, depending on institutional context, some principal-agent relationships are 
more likely to influence the ministers’ durability in office than others. Specifically, the 
analysis shows that conflicts with presidents and party principals increase the risk of 
losing office during periods of unified executive, while conflicts with prime ministers 
pose a high risk of deselection under cohabitation. 
4.2 Party relationships in the French executive 
This section focuses on intraparty politics and examines the organisational 
transformation undergone by the Socialist and the Gaullist parties during the time 
period under analysis. This analysis highlights the interdependence between changes in 
a political actor’s ability to control the party and her authority over the cabinet. The 
analysis focuses on adjustments of party presidencies, leadership structures, and voting 
methods used for intraparty elections. For example, the suspension of the party 
president position or its temporary replacement with a collegial structure of leadership 
for as long as former party leaders assume the presidency of the country or the prime 
ministership indicates that presidents and prime ministers are allowed to continue in 
their role as de facto party leaders. Similarly, if new electoral rules are adopted for the 
election of party executive bodies, then it is also possible to determine their impact on 
the principal-agent relationship between former leaders and their parties depending on 
whether they are meant to increase or to reduce intraparty democracy. The two 
intraparty sources of variation in the principal-agent relationship between presidents, 
prime ministers and their parties are used in the comparative analysis of the leadership 
recruitment procedures employed by the Gaullist and the Socialist parties in the 
aftermath of the 1995, 1997, and 2007 elections.  
The president-party relationship in the RPR (1995-2002) 
Between 1995 and 2002 the RPR organised internal elections for the selection of its 
national leaders on four different occasions. Following his election as President of 
France in 1995, Chirac nominated Alain Juppé, one of his closest collaborators, for the 
presidency of the RPR and appointed him as prime minister. Juppé, who had assumed 
the caretaker presidency of the party in November 1994, was formally elected as party 
president by the RPR’s executive body in October 1995. Chirac’s ability to impose his 
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own choice not only in government but also as his successor in the party, despite 
Juppé’s unpopularity and against the Gaullist barons’ concern regarding the 
simultaneous holding of government and party offices, suggests a strong presidential 
grip on the RPR between 1995 and 1997 (Bell, 2000; Clift, 2005; Knapp, 1999).  
Juppé’s premiership (1995-1997) is a good example of the impact that the 
indiscipline of majority backbenchers can have on the president’s influence even during 
a period of unified executive. Although Chirac’s decision to dissolve the Assembly in 
1997 confirmed his institutional ascendancy over the Right (Portelli, 1999, p. 63), the 
RPR’s defeat in the ensuing elections exhausted his authority over the party. His loss of 
control was confirmed by Alain Juppé’s immediate replacement as party leader with 
Philippe Séguin at a special conference convened in July 1997. One year later, Séguin 
initiated and carried out a statutory reform widening the election of the party president 
to all party members. The establishment of a democratic chain of delegation from party 
members to national leaders should strengthen the party principal’s authority over its 
agents in governmental office. However, the increase in the Gaullist party’s internal 
democracy was motivated by factional infighting and was aimed at legitimising the new 
leadership at the expense of the old one (Clift, 2005, p. 228; Knapp, 2004, p. 265). 
Ultimately, Séguin’s confirmation as party leader by a “Soviet-style 95 per cent of the 
vote” (Knapp, 1999, p. 138) was not enough to prevent the RPR’s further fragmentation 
and his own resignation after only six months in office. 
The election of the next leader of the Gaullist party in 1999 marked the final 
turning point in the party-president relation before the 2002 presidential elections. The 
key moment in the party leadership race was Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision not to enter the 
competition. Although he did not doubt his chances of winning the party race, Sarkozy 
was unwilling to assume this position as long as Chirac remained the party’s best option 
for the next presidential elections (Sarkozy, 2001, pp. 57–58). However, the 1999 party 
contest did not turn into a one-horse race as a result of Sarkozy’s pulling out (Knapp, 
2004, p. 266). In the first round, the party members rejected the candidate supported by 
Jacques Chirac, the RPR senator Jean-Paul Delevoye. Although it looked like the 
incumbent president could no longer aspire to simply delegate the party leadership 
position to one of his supporters, Michèle Alliot-Marie, the candidate who won 63 per 
cent of the vote in the run-off, fell in line behind him and designated Chirac as the 
RPR’s présidentiable in the 2002 elections soon after her election.  
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Despite the Gaullist party’s embrace of his presidential candidacy, Chirac was 
aware that the formal support of the RPR could no longer work as a powerful resource 
of political influence. To widen his base of support Chirac decide to pursue the 
unification of the entire Right into a single party (Chirac & Barré, 2011, pp. 267–272). 
The main organisational task was delegated to Jérôme Monod, a former RPR general-
secretary and Chirac’s lasting political advisor, who had also been instrumental in the 
setting up of the RPR during the 1970s as a vehicle for Jacques Chirac’s personal 
pursuit of power. The unification project of the Gaullist, centrist and liberal families 
proceeded with the set up of the Alternance 2002 association during 2000-2001, the 
creation of the Union en Mouvement in April 2001 as an electoral coalition, and the 
official founding of the Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle (UMP) as a political party 
in April 2002, renamed as Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) in November 
2002. The election of the first UMP leader with almost 80 per cent of the votes cast by 
party members at the 2002 founding congress did not weaken the tacit understanding 
that the UMP was a party created for the support and under the command of the head of 
state (Fillon, 2006, p. 19).  
To sum up, the different rules adopted for the election of the Gaullist party’s 
leadership between 1995 and 2002 illustrate the variation in Jacques Chirac’s authority 
over his party. His ability to install a self-designated successor as president of the RPR, 
coupled with the absence of any organisational changes at the national leadership level 
between 1995 and 1997 indicate his ongoing authority over the party during this period 
of time. However, his marginalisation in the party following the onset of cohabitation in 
1997 and the introduction of direct internal elections for the position of the party 
presidency in 1998 suggest that Chirac’s authority over the RPR decreased significantly 
between 1997 and 1999. Between 1999 and 2002, though, he was able to turn the 
increase in intraparty democracy to his own advantage and regain control over his 
former party. The variation in the principal-agent relationship established between the 
head of state and the RPR suggests that presidents go to great lengths to safeguard a de 
facto leadership of their party even during periods of cohabitation and even when their 
grip on the party loosens after elections. 
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The president-party relationship in the UMP (2007-2012) 
Compared to Jacques Chirac’s relationship with the Gaullist party from 1995-2002, 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s ongoing authority as a de facto party leader following his election as 
President of France in 2007 comes across much more clearly. Even before taking office 
in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, Nicolas Sarkozy 
and François Fillon displayed their agreement about the de facto leadership of the head 
of state in two programmatic books they published in 2006 (Fillon, 2006; Sarkozy, 
2006). Speaking at the UMP convention on the institutions of the Fifth Republic on 
April 5, 2006, Sarkozy also pleaded for the acknowledgement of the presidential style 
of government as the French executive’s modus operandi, despite the leadership role 
conferred to the prime minister in the constitution. As a result, following Sarkozy’s 
accession to the presidency and Fillon’s appointment as prime minister, there was no 
confusion about the head of state’s authority over the government and the majority party 
(Copé, 2009, pp. 178–180).  
Just as he assumed openly his intention to take control over the government, 
Nicolas Sarkozy also institutionalised the abandonment of the Gaullist doctrine of the 
presidency above parties. Elected as party president with 85 per cent of the votes 
expressed by the UMP members in November 2004 and designated as the party’s 
candidate by over 97 per cent of the members who participated to a primary-like 
campaign organised in January 2007, Sarkozy was determined not to allow the majority 
party overshadow his authority. To do so, he demanded a revision of the party statutes 
and obtained the replacement of the party president position with an unelected collegial 
leadership in charge of the daily management of the party. In exchange for giving up the 
power to elect their president, UMP members were guaranteed a say in the selection of 
their party’s candidate before the 2012 elections. The statutory reform was first 
approved by a large majority of the national council on July 7, 2007 and endorsed by 
the UMP voters through electronic voting. Thus, not only did Nicolas Sarkozy manage 
to suspend the practice of direct internal elections for the party president, but he also 
had his de facto leadership formally acknowledged in the revised statutes of the UMP. 
The democratic deficit displayed by the reorganisation of the UMP party in 2007 
raised hardly any opposition. No concerns about the eradication of the democratically 
elected presidency of the party were even voiced until the majority party was defeated 
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in the 2008 municipal elections5. Following this electoral defeat, Sarkozy carried out a 
minor reshuffle of executive responsibilities by appointing several ministers and 
presidents of parliamentary commissions in the UMP’s executive bodies (Waintraub, 
2008c, 2008d, 2008e). At the same time he also strengthened his influence over the 
parliamentary majority by organising informal meetings not only with the UMP leaders 
and the leaders of the majority parties, but also with cabinet ministers in the absence of 
the prime minister (Bouilhaguet, 2009; Jaigu, 2008b; Waintraub, 2008b, 2008g). 
The first official reorganisation and redistribution of party leadership roles in the 
UMP took place in January 2009. On this occasion, Patrick Devedjian, the increasingly 
unpopular secretary-general, swapped places in government with Xavier Bertrand, a 
minister of Labour in François Fillon’s cabinet who had been defeated in two 
consecutive local elections. The new appointments and redistribution of roles operated 
by Sarkozy in the UMP’s first and second-order leadership structures raised hardly any 
internal debates6. By comparison, Sarkozy’s freedom of manoeuvre in the second 
reorganisation of the party leadership was considerably more limited. As a matter of 
fact, Jean-François Copé, the leader of the UMP group in the National Assembly, 
launched a party leadership bid following Nicolas Sarkozy’s announcement that a 
second party reorganisation would take place before the end of 2010  (Huet, Jeudy, & 
Jaigu, 2010). However, despite his ongoing rivalry with Sarkozy and although he did 
not refrain from calling publicly for the reorganisation of the party (Copé, Baroin, 
Jacob, & Le Maire, 2010), Copé did not demand an increase in the party’s internal 
democracy or a reversion to the direct election of the secretary-general by the party 
members7. Under clear pressure to appoint one of his main rivals in the party as the next 
secretary-general (Garat & Waintraub, 2010b, 2010c), Sarkozy eventually agreed to 
hand the party over to Jean-François Copé. He nevertheless made clear that any other 
appointments would be made at or in agreement with the Élysée (Garat & Waintraub, 
2010a, 2010b; Waintraub, 2010b).  
In conclusion, the analysis of the president-party relationship in the case of the 
UMP provides strong evidence that the position held by presidents in the party 
                                               
5
 See for example the concerns raised by Christian Estrosi, one of the few ministers who managed to win 
a mayorship in the 2008 elections (Jaigu, 2008a; Jeudy & Waintraub, 2008; Jeudy, 2008a; Waintraub, 
2008a). 
6
 Several examples of public endorsements of Sarkozy’s legitimacy to change the composition and 
political hierarchies in the UMP executive bodies can be found in (Garat & Waintraub, 2008; Garat, 
2008; Geisler & Garat, 2008; Huet et al., 2010; Jeudy, 2008a, 2008b; Waintraub, 2008h, 2008i, 2008j, 
2008a, 2008e, 2008f, 2008g) 
7
 For a couple of exceptions to this rule see (Hamladji & Goulliaud, 2010; Waintraub, 2010a). 
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hierarchy before taking office strengthens their authority over the cabinet. The 
institutionalisation of Nicolas Sarkozy’s power over the majority party through the party 
statutes provides strong evidence for his ability to reverse the principal-agent 
relationship between the party’s representatives in government and turn the prime 
minister and cabinet members into his own agents. 
The PM-party relationship in the PS (1995-2002) 
Lionel Jospin emerged as an undisputed leader of the Socialist party following 
his unexpectedly successful performance in the 1995 elections, when he was narrowly 
defeated by Chirac in the run-off but managed to draw the largest number of first-round 
votes. Jospin also increased the Socialist party’s internal democracy by forcing the party 
leadership to open up the selection of presidential candidates to party members in 1995. 
He not only won more than two-thirds of the votes cast in the first primary elections 
organised by the PS in 1995, but also defeated the party leader, Henri Emmanuelli. 
Subsequently he also insisted on the adoption of the one-member, one-vote method for 
intraparty elections. His election as party leader with over 94 per cent of the party 
members’ vote in 1995 conferred him an ascendancy over the party that none of his 
predecessors had enjoyed since he had left the leadership in 1988.  
Lionel Jospin owed his sudden rise in the party hierarchy in 1995 to the rank-
and-file. Had he taken the standard route of advancement on the party ladder, his bid for 
the party presidency would have been most likely unsuccessful. The composition of the 
Socialist party’s national council and of the executive bureau is decided by proportional 
representation according to the votes party members cast on the motions submitted by 
the party courants. However, for the election of the first secretary a majority of votes in 
the executive bureau is required. This leadership structure has been defined as 
“presidentialised factionalism”, as each courant is led by a présidentiable and the intra-
party factionalism revolves around the presidential nomination (Bell & Criddle, 1994; 
Haegel, 1998). Lionel Jospin was not in a position to win the support of any courant in 
1995, as he had been marginalised in the party after losing both his cabinet portfolio and 
his parliamentary seat between 1992 and 1993. Thus, the increase in the Socialist 
party’s internal democracy was Jospin’s only chance to win the party leadership without 
having to negotiate with the courants (Allègre, 2000; Vaillant, 2001). As party leader, 
though, Jospin did not try to strengthen his own faction. The composition of his national 
secretariat exposed his commitment to include all party factions in the decision-making 
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system (Le Monde, 1995; Noblecourt, 1995a, 1995b). According to his closest 
collaborators, he also chose François Hollande to succeed him as first secretary in 1997 
due to his lack of involvement in factional infighting and his lack of interest in 
becoming a chef de courant (Allègre, 2000; Vaillant, 2001). Under these circumstances, 
it is difficult to conclude whether Jospin led the PS from a position of authority or 
whether he was more concerned with circumventing and neutralising the competing 
factions. 
Jospin’s resignation as party leader before taking office as prime minister, a 
decision that emulated François Mitterrand’s determination to separate national and 
party office following his election as head of state in 1981 (Jospin, 2010, p. 88), reveals 
his intention to establish a president-type relation with the majority party (Clift, 2003, p. 
102). As prime minister, Jospin aimed to come across as a head of government free 
from both party and coalition constraints (Jospin, 2010, p. 229). Although he was 
recognised as the uncontested leader of the parliamentary majority and unifier of the 
Left (Cole, 1999, p. 83; Gaffney, 2002, p. 315; Glavany, 2001, p. 45; Voynet, 2003, p. 
63), Jospin insisted on presenting himself as the head of government, rather than as the 
chef de la majorité (Hollande, 2009, p. 90; Schrameck, 2001, p. 33; Vaillant, 2001, p. 
180). The distance he had taken from the parties of the majority at the beginning of his 
term widened as the 2002 elections approached. For example, Jospin would not 
coordinate with his coalition partners before announcing highly divisive decisions, such 
as the reform of the presidential term and the reversal of the election calendar. The 
relationship between the prime minister and the PS first secretary also came under 
particular strain when Jospin refused to consider Hollande’s proposals for a strategic 
cabinet reshuffle in 2000. Shortly before the elections Jospin moved even further away 
from his party in an attempt to appeal to a broader range of voters. As a result he 
refused to involve the first secretary of the PS in his campaign, made a public statement 
that he was not running on a Socialist program, and encouraged Socialist mayors to 
endorse rival candidacies on the left (Hollande, 2009, pp. 185–191).  
 Although Lionel Jospin resigned as party leader before taking office as prime 
minister, he continued to act as a de facto leader of the majority party. The Socialist 
party consented to Jospin’s choice of his own successor, re-elected him twice during his 
prime ministership and did not attempt to change the leadership structure or the rules of 
leadership selection. While Jospin’s rise to the party presidency in 1995 due to popular 
support as well as his decision to step down as party leader and to keep the new 
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leadership at a distance may indicate his disaffection with the party, there can be hardly 
any doubt that his ability to maintain a strong grip over cabinet members was rooted in 
his unquestioned authority over the majority party. 
4.3 The data set on French ministers 
This section begins by describing the variables included in the France data set and the 
distribution of data according to the cabinets included in the analysis. Subsequently we 
discuss the measurement of fixed characteristics and events experienced by ministers 
according to the cabinets in which they served and with respect to survival. This 
analysis is structured along four aspects of ministerial career-paths that are common to 
the country-studies included in the present work, such as prior appointments to 
government, parliamentary background, as well as experience in local administration 
and in party organisations. 
The France data set covers 75 ministers. 32 of them served in Lionel Jospin’s 
government and 43 in François Fillon’s cabinet. Over the time period under analysis 
there have been four state ministers, 54 cabinet ministers and 17 delegated ministers. 
The data set contains 29 individual termination events. The fixed characteristics 
included in the analysis indicate the ministers’ prior appointments to government, their 
legislative experience and incumbency or past experience in local administration, and 
their involvement in party organisations at national and local level. Table 4.1 provides 
definitions for the variables recording personal characteristics and shows basic 
descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers. 
 
Table 4.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (France) 
Variable Definition Mean 
Executive experience Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
had previously held full cabinet positions. 
0.39 
MP/SEN Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
won a seat in last general elections. 0.73 
Parliamentary experience Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
have won at least 2 parliamentary mandates 
during their career. 
0.61 
Mayor Dummy variables equal to one for ministers who 
are mayors. 0.48 
Local administration 
experience 
Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
have held a position in local administration 
during their career (local or regional councillors, 
mayors, and presidents of general or regional 
0.84 
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councils). 
Party executives Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
are members in their parties’ national executive 
bodies. 
0.25 
 
The main events variables included in the France data set record disagreements 
between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties and resignation 
calls. Apart from testing the impact of conflicts with presidents, parties and prime 
ministers on the risk of deselection, we also consider the interaction between ministers 
and parliamentary majorities due to the formal delegation link between parliaments and 
cabinets. To test the expectation that the autonomy of French ministers is not 
constrained by the threat of legislative sanctions (Thiébault, 1994, p. 140), the analysis 
controls for the impact of policy disagreements between ministers and majority deputies 
using records of votes against and abstentions on ministerial bills. Another control 
variable takes into account the impact of individual shifts from one portfolio to another 
on the length of ministerial tenure. 
The weight of political experience on ministerial durability is not only captured 
by fixed characteristics at the moment of appointment, but also monitored during the 
ministers’ time in office. Two control variables verify whether defeats in local elections 
increase the risk of losing office and if promotions in the party hierarchy are used as 
compensatory moves for ministerial deselection. 
The literature on ministerial turnover has also shown that ministerial 
resignations have a corrective effect on government popularity (Dewan & Dowding, 
2005, p. 46). Taking into account the frequency of strikes and protests triggered by the 
introduction of new policies and reforms in France and the fall in government 
popularity they may cause, it is worth testing if social unrest jeopardises the ministers’ 
survival in office. For this reason, a variable that measures the level of social unrest 
generated by specific reforms and policies that can be associated with individual 
ministers is incorporated in the analysis. Table 4.2 provides definitions for the events 
variables and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers.  
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Table 4.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (France) 
Variable Definition Mean St. dev. Range 
Tenure The length of ministerial tenure is 
measured in days.  
759.55 504.49 (32, 1816) 
PR Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and 
presidents. 
1.69 2.55 (0, 11) 
PM Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and prime 
ministers. 
1.47 2.24 (0, 14) 
PARTY Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and parties. 2.96 4.04 (0, 18) 
Resignation calls Number of times ministers have been 
asked to resign. 
1.13 2.40 (0, 13) 
Reshuffles Number of times ministers have been 
reshuffled during current mandate. 
0.51 0.92 (0, 4) 
Local elections lost Number of defeats in local elections 
during current mandate. 
0.29 0.51 (0, 2) 
Party promotions Number of promotions in the party 
hierarchy during current mandate. 
Includes elections and re-elections as 
party leaders or presidents of local party 
organisations as well as promotions in 
national executive bodies. 
0.28 0.67 (0, 3) 
Legislative defeats Policy disagreements between ministers 
and parliamentary majorities. Votes 
against/abstentions from party and/or 
coalition deputies on the minister’s bills. 
3.85 6.72 (0, 27) 
Protests Number of national-level strikes and 
protests organised during current term. 
12.04 17.61 (0, 80) 
*Source: Obtained from the roll-call records of the votes cast in the scrutins solenels 
organised in the French National Assembly for the adoption of government bills. The roll 
calls are published in the Journal officiel and list the names and votes cast by deputies. 
 
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics for personal characteristics and events 
across and within the government in which the ministers served. The two governments 
operated under different executive scenarios and lasted an equal period of time. Thus, 
the chance of observing ministerial deselections under each scenario should be similar 
and independent of the presence of exogenous shocks. However, if the occurrence of 
unified executive and cohabitation makes a difference for the dismissal powers of 
presidents, prime ministers and party principals, then the impact of principal-agent 
relationships on the risk of deselection should be different under the two scenarios. 
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Table 4.3 Average fixed characteristics and events across cabinets (France) 
 
Jospin 
(Cohabitation) 
Fillon (Unified 
executive) Overall 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
N. Ministers 32 43 75 
N. Failures 10 19 29 
Length of tenure (days) 1059.69 566.91 790.14 446.68 905.15 515.65 
Fixed characteristics     
Cabinet experience 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 
MP/SEN 0.81 0.40 0.67 0.47 0.73 0.45 
Parliamentary experience 0.59 0.50 0.63 0.49 0.61 0.49 
Mayor 0.53 0.51 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Local admin. experience 0.81 0.40 0.86 0.35 0.84 0.37 
Party executives 0.22 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.44 
Events      
Conflicts PR 1.41 2.56 1.91 2.55 1.69 2.55 
Conflicts PM 2.13 2.92 0.98 1.41 1.47 2.24 
Conflicts PARTY 3.09 4.16 2.86 4.00 2.96 4.04 
Resignation calls 1.50 3.03 0.86 1.79 1.13 2.40 
Reshuffles 0.19 0.54 0.74 1.07 0.51 0.92 
Local elections lost 0.31 0.54 0.28 0.50 0.29 0.51 
Party promotions 0.06 0.25 0.44 0.83 0.28 0.67 
Legislative defeats 3.50 6.90 4.12 6.65 3.85 6.72 
Protests 19.00 23.00 6.86 9.56 12.04 17.61 
 
The data in Table 4.3 shows that the mean length of tenure and the frequency of 
deselections vary under different scenarios. The mean observed tenure is nine months 
longer under cohabitation than under unified executive. The increase in ministerial 
durability under cohabitation may be explained by the number of actors whose 
agreement is necessary for the operation of cabinet changes under different executive 
scenarios. Due to their ascendancy over the parliamentary majorities, presidents are 
likely to control the executive decision-making process during periods of unified 
executive. Despite the shift from presidential to prime ministerial leadership under 
cohabitation, presidents may still preserve some influence over cabinet composition, as 
prime ministers are formally required to propose cabinet changes to the president. The 
increase in the number of political actors who must agree on ministerial appointments 
and deselections may explain why periods of cohabitation are likely to reduce the 
likelihood of changes in the cabinet (Indridason and Kam 2007: 8).  
The data in Table 4.3 indicates that not only resignations and dismissals, but also 
reshuffles are more frequent under unified executive. The data also show that the 
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frequency of individual deselections and shifts from one portfolio to another is smaller 
in Jospin’s cabinet despite an increase in the number of conflicts between ministers and 
principals. The most conflictual principal-agent relationship under both cabinets is the 
minister-party one, which confirms the party principal’s endeavour to minimise agency 
loss independently of institutional context. The level of pressure coming from the 
parliamentary majority does not vary significantly from one cabinet to the other either.  
The frequency of resignation calls has a similar distribution. Ministers were 
more often asked to resign under cohabitation despite losing office less frequently. 
Overall, 89 resignation debates were recorded. Figure 4.1 illustrates the frequency and 
the types of resignation calls across the two governments and their correlation with 
deselection events. The proximate reasons for resignation calls are grouped into four 
categories: personal errors, when ministers are held responsible for their own mistakes, 
gaffes, personal or financial scandals, or are seen to be performing badly over a long 
period of time; departmental errors, when serious mistakes occur in the minister’s 
jurisdiction or department; policy disagreements, when ministers are asked to resign 
because of the policies they initiated and implemented; and breaches of collective 
responsibility, when ministers are called on to resign because they challenged a decision 
already made by cabinets or prime ministers. In cases where ministers were asked to 
step down over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded. This is 
why the total number of resignations differs depending on whether one focuses on the 
exact number of calls or on the reason given for their occurrence. 
Figure 4.1 indicates that that the number of veto players involved in the policy-
making process can also influence the type of resignation calls experienced by cabinet 
members. The data reveals a considerably higher number of resignation calls related to 
policy errors and breaches of collective responsibility experienced by the ministers who 
took office in Lionel Jospin government, which was a four-party coalition and operated 
under a period of cohabitation. By contrast, the vast majority of resignation calls 
experienced by ministers who belonged to François Fillon’s government, which was 
made up by the UMP and its satellite parties and operated during a period of unified 
executive, were related to personal errors.  
Another difference in the distribution of events regards the level of social unrest 
experienced by two governments. Jospin’s Socialist cabinet was confronted with many 
more protests than Fillon’s conservative government. If social unrest makes a difference 
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for ministerial durability in office, then one may expect its impact to be stronger when it 
is directed against a left-wing government. 
 
Figure 4.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (France) 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while numbers 
inside the bars indicate the number of resignation calls recorded under each category. Both 
percentages and numbers refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis and not to the 
total number of resignation calls recorded across cabinets. Source: Own calculations. 
 
The remaining parts of this section focus on the four types of political 
experience that are relevant for ministerial recruitment in France: prior appointments to 
government, experience as national legislators or local officials, and party careers. 
Overall, the analysis of descriptive statistics does not indicate a strong correlation 
between fixed characteristics and the length of tenure. 
4.4 Political background of French ministers 
Cabinet experience 
The information related to cabinet experience concerns the ministers’ previous 
appointments as junior or full cabinet members. While the Portugal study also takes into 
account the ministers’ ranking in the cabinet, the absence of any state ministers in 
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Lionel Jospin’s cabinet does not allow us to observe the impact of this characteristic 
under different executive scenarios. Figure 4.2 illustrates the distribution of cabinet 
experience across governments and with respect to survival. There is a remarkable 
similarity of recruitment patterns among Jospin’s and Fillon’s governments from this 
point of view: only one third of the ministers lacked prior experience in any kind of 
portfolio, about one quarter could claim some expertise as junior ministers, and almost 
40 per cent had already held a full ministerial portfolio.  
 
Figure 4.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (France) 
  
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
The correlation between cabinet experience and durability in office indicates that 
experienced ministers incur a higher risk of deselection. While experienced ministers 
make up 40 per cent of government composition, they account for almost 60 per cent of 
those who leave office prematurely. Although one may expect that experience correlates 
with ability and greater durability, this finding is in line with similar evidence produced 
for the survival of British ministers, which shows that ministers without previous 
experience are less predisposed to a premature departure from office (Berlinksi et al., 
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jurisdictions. Under these circumstances, inexperienced ministers may be less likely to 
deviate from the preferred positions of their principals during the course of their first 
term in office and as a result less prone to conflictual relationships.  
 However, the range of political resources possessed by ministers is not limited to 
cabinet experience. For example, none of the eleven ministers who had never held a 
cabinet portfolio before joining Lionel Jospin’s government was a non-partisan cabinet 
member. Additionally, only three of them had never been elected in the parliament, 
namely Claude Allègre, Hubert Védrine and Pierre Moscovici. Similarly, out of the 
fifteen ministers who could not claim any cabinet experience prior to their appointment 
in the Fillon government, only one was not politically affiliated and only five had never 
been elected as deputies. Only Frédéric Mitterrand belonged to both of these categories. 
Thus, in order to understand the full extent of the experience required from potential 
ministers it is necessary to consider their parliamentary background, as well as their 
local roots and party credentials. 
Parliamentary experience 
Despite the strict separation between government and parliament intended by the 1958 
Constitution, the patterns of ministerial recruitment under the Fifth Republic reveal a re-
parliamentarisation” of ministerial careers (O. Costa & Kerrouche, 2009). Although the 
majority of cabinet ministers serving under de Gaulle and Giscard d’Estaing had 
followed a career in central administration, parliamentary experience has gradually re-
emerged as a prerequisite for ministerial appointments (Dogan, 1986). While on average 
less than 15 per cent of the ministers appointed during the first years of François 
Mitterrand’s presidency could claim some parliamentary background (Gaxie, 1986, p. 
64), the proportion of ministers recruited from the parliamentary pool increased to 63 
per cent in the next two decades (Kam & Indridason, 2009, p. 44). Overall, the amount 
of time spent by ministers in the parliament before their first appointment to 
government increased from three years in 1962 to seven years by 2002 (O. Costa & 
Kerrouche, 2009, p. 342).   
 Figure 4.3 confirms the parliamentarisation of ministerial careers for the two 
governments under analysis. More than three quarters of the ministers invited to join the 
Jospin and Fillon cabinets had been elected at least once to the National Assembly. The 
proportion of ministers recruited from the parliament is higher in the case of Jospin’s 
government, which included only six non-parliamentary members during its entire 
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course. Moreover, only four of these ministers had never held any parliamentary 
mandate. The higher proportion of non-parliamentary ministers in François Fillon’s 
government is explained by Nicolas Sarkozy’s ouverture policy, which resulted in the 
appointment of several professionals and civil society representatives, such as Christine 
Lagarde and Frédéric Mitterrand, as well as personalities associated with the centre-left 
parties, such as Bernard Kouchner, the founder of Médecins sans Frontières. Overall, 
Fillon’s government included fourteen non-parliamentary ministers, ten of whom had 
never held a legislative mandate.  
Figure 4.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (France) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
The data in Figure 4.3 indicates that parliamentary background makes a 
difference for the length of ministerial tenure, as ministers who had received at least one 
legislative mandate are likely to survive longer in office. Conversely, non-parliamentary 
ministers are more likely to leave office prematurely. As a matter of fact, both non-
parliamentary ministers and very experienced ministers, who had been elected at least 
five times to the parliament, incur a higher risk of losing office. This counterintuitive 
correlation may be explained by an increase in the independence of highly experienced 
ministers. Similarly to the case of ministers with a strong executive background, 
ministers who have already developed a career as deputies may be less inclined to 
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engage in policy compromises with their principals than their less experienced peers and 
more preoccupied to protect their professional reputation.  
 The prerequisite of democratic legitimacy to gain access and preserve a cabinet 
seat may also explain why ministers contest legislative elections even when they are 
determined to choose their cabinet post over the assembly seat. Furthermore, prime 
ministers may condition the ministers’ permanence in office on their performance in 
national elections. This is the case especially when presidential elections proceed 
shortly before the legislative elections and a new cabinet is appointed before the 
legislative contest. For example, François Fillon made it clear ahead of the 2007 general 
election that none the cabinet ministers who were appointed in the cabinet formed 
following Nicolas Sarkozy’s election as head of state in May 2007 would continue in 
office if they failed to win a seat in the legislative elections scheduled one month later. 
According to Fillon, a minister’s defeat at the polls meant that he or she  had not been 
endorsed by the people to represent them in government (Jeudy, 2007). The first victim 
of this canon was Alain Juppé, a minister of state and second in the cabinet hierarchy, 
who resigned after failing to win a parliamentary seat in his Bordeaux stronghold. 
However, the rule of conceding ministerial office as a result of electoral defeats does 
not always apply in the elections for the second chamber of the parliament. For 
example, out of the three ministers who ran in the senatorial elections of September 
2011, only two were successful. While Chantal Jouanno, the Sports Minister, was 
constrained to give up her cabinet seat in exchange for the Senate one, Gerard Longuet 
was not asked to step down as Defence Minister. Nor was Maurice Leroy, the Minister 
of Cities, asked to resign as a result of his failure to win a seat. This episode illustrates 
the multiple roles that ministers are asked to play during their time in office and the 
context-dependency of their survival in government following both electoral victories 
and defeats. In general, though, it is reasonable to expect a correlation between electoral 
defeats and ministerial deselection. 
Experience in local administration 
The data related to experience in local administration is considerably richer in the 
French study compared to the Portuguese and the Romanian cases, where ministers are 
not allowed to hold simultaneously any other office and are also not permitted to contest 
local elections during their time in office. Thus, in addition to prior local government 
experience, the analysis of French ministers also takes into consideration the impact of 
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incumbency in local government positions and of electoral performance in second-order 
elections on the length of ministerial tenure.  
An appointment to national government is seen as the pinnacle of a political 
career which normally starts at local level. French politicians who wish to advance their 
careers at national level are expected to advance in the hierarchy of local administration 
before contesting general elections and aim for a cabinet seat (Copé, 2009, p. 17). The 
explanation for such a strategic planning of political careers resides in the incentives 
generated by the French political system, which has traditionally encouraged the 
recruitment of candidates for general elections from among local representatives and the 
selection of ministers from the parliamentary pool (Dogan, 1967).  
Figure 4.4 indicates that the ministers who were appointed in the Jospin and 
Fillon governments had strong local roots. Only a small proportion of cabinet members 
ministers had never been elected locally. Additionally, more than half of the ministers 
had been elected at least once as mayors or presidents of departmental or regional 
councils. On the other hand, the data in Figure 4.4 does not indicate a correlation 
between experience in local administration and the length of ministerial tenure. 
Figure 4.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival 
(France) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
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The accumulation of political resources at local and national level not only 
increases one’s chances of being appointed to government, but also strengthens their 
position in the cabinet. As noted by Duhamel (2011, p. 604), the extent of ministerial 
authority depends not only on the importance of the portfolio assigned, but also on 
political patronage and local strongholds. The ministers’ interest in running for local 
offices while in government is explained by the “baobab strategy”, according to which  
more elective offices help French politicians obtain more resources and power in 
executive decision-making (François, 2006, p. 269) 
As mayors and presidents of departmental or regional councils, cabinet ministers 
are held responsible for the electoral performance of their parties at local level. Due to 
their notoriety at national level, ministers are often asked to head party lists in second-
order elections. As a result, they are responsible for both victories and defeats. Figure 
4.5 indicates the proportion of ministers who contested local elections in each 
government. The higher percentage of ministers who did not contest any election in the 
Fillon government is explained by the increased presence of non-partisan ministers in 
this cabinet. Figure 4.6 shows the relationship between electoral success and survival in 
office. 
Figure 4.5 Local elections contested by ministers (France) 
  
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 4.6 Success in local elections and survival in cabinet office (France) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
 Although second-order elections are usually seen as tests for the popularity of 
governments (Collard, 2002; Gougou & Labouret, 2011; Gougou, 2008), several factors 
increase the difficulty of accurate predictions about how electoral victories and defeats 
may affect the length of ministerial tenure. As a matter of fact, both situations may lead 
to deselection. Ministers may be asked to choose between the cabinet seat and the local 
office if their parties adhere to a non-cumul rule. However, if the enforcement of such 
non-cumul rules is not preserved throughout the duration of a given cabinet, some 
ministers may be subjected to double standards. For example, Lionel Jospin conditioned 
the appointment of his cabinet ministers in 1997 on their giving up of high local 
executive offices. However, an exception to this rule was made for the 2001 municipal 
elections. On this occasion, while some members of the cabinet decided not the run in 
the elections in order to protect their executive seat, many of the high-profile ministers 
who continued to stand as heads of their local party lists were defeated. Given the 
Socialist party’s defeat in many urban areas, the non-cumul would have forced Jospin to 
fire successful and popular ministers, while allowing the unsuccessful ones to continue 
in office, which ran against the French political tradition of rewarding electoral 
successes (Chevallier, Carcassonne, & Duhamel, 2009, p. 466). Under these 
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circumstances, both successful and unsuccessful ministers were allowed to keep their 
seats, as the data in Figure 4.6 indicates.  
The ministers serving in François Fillon’s government had a different 
experience with the non-cumul rule. While the accumulation of national and local 
offices was allowed at the moment of appointment, a non-cumul rule of cabinet and 
local offices was announced ahead of the 2010 regional elections. However, all 
ministers who run in the elections were defeated. The data corresponding to the Fillon 
government in Figure 4.6 suggests a strong correlation between electoral defeats and 
deselection. 
Party experience 
The importance of political militantism as a channel for ministerial appointments has 
gradually increased since the early days of the Fifth Republic. The proportion of 
national party elites appointed to cabinets has almost tripled from 1958 until the mid-
1980s, and reached a peak of 77 per cent under Mitterrand’s first presidency (Gaxie, 
1986, p. 64). A high proportion of party executives in government is also confirmed by 
Kam and Indridason (2009, p. 45) for the time period up to 2005. This trend confirms 
the hypothesis put forward by William Schonfeld (1983), regarding the symbiotic 
relationship between national and party elites. Figure 4.7 confirms this expectation for 
the Jospin and Fillon governments.  
The data in Figure 4.7 shows that the composition of both governments was 
dominated by incumbent or former party executives. While no independent minister sat 
in the Socialist government, a small number of non-partisans joined the UMP cabinet as 
a result of ouverture policy taken on by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. However, Figure 4.7 
does not indicate a strong correlation between the ministers’ positions on the party 
ladder and their length of tenure. One may also expect local party leaders to survive 
longer in government. As the control of a local party organisation strengthens 
considerably the standing of the respective ministers within their parties, prime 
ministers may be more cautious about ousting them. However, this expectation is not 
confirmed by the data in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7 Party experience across governments and by survival (France) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Similar to the interdiction of holding national and local office simultaneously, 
French parties may also ask ministers to choose between cabinet and party positions. 
The decision to separate the two offices was introduced by François Mitterrand in 1981 
and revived by Lionel Jospin in 1997. Although never formally adopted, a similar 
practice could also be noticed in the UMP after Nicolas Sarkozy’s election in 2007. For 
example, Xavier Bertrand and Patrick Devedjian swapped their positions in the 
government and party leadership in late 2008, following the former’s defeat in two 
consecutive local elections and the latter’s growing unpopularity in the UMP’s general 
secretariat. A more straightforward adoption of the party-government non-cumul rule 
was noticed after Jean-François Copé became the UMP secretary-general in November 
2010, when most UMP ministers were excluded from the new leadership of the party 
(Rovan & Garat, 2010). In this case, one may expect that promotions in the party 
hierarchy are used as compensatory moves for ministerial deselection. Figure 4.8 shows 
the relationship between the ministers’ promotion in the party hierarchy and their length 
of tenure. 
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Figure 4.8 Party promotions across governments and by survival (France) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
The data in Figure 4.8 confirms Lionel Jospin’s determination to separate political and 
governmental responsibilities. Few ministers were promoted on the party line between 
1997 and 2002 and with little consequences for their longevity in office. The data 
corresponding to François Fillon’s cabinet shows a different picture. There were more 
party promotions during this period of time and the data clearly indicates that an 
increase in party responsibilities was more likely to cost ministers their cabinet seats. 
4.5 Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, and ministerial 
durability in France 
This section presents a multivariate analysis of ministerial tenure in France. Apart from 
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takes into account a range of alternative hypotheses drawing on the explanatory power 
of cabinet reshuffles, resignation calls, legislative sanctions, and social protests. The 
statistical estimation of the impact of these factors on the risk of ministerial deselection 
is carried out using survival analysis. Since there is little theoretical and empirical 
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model that imposes no restriction on the shape of the hazard function appears as an 
appropriate model choice.  
The data set includes the exact dates when ministers take and leave office. The 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the minister experienced an individual 
terminal event and zero otherwise. The ministers’ observed tenure is right-censored if 
ministers leave office collectively, as it was the case in 2002 and 2012 when the prime 
ministers offered the resignation of their cabinets in the aftermath of parliamentary 
elections. The duration in office is not interrupted if ministers are assigned to different 
portfolios during their tenure. However, if the same ministers return to the cabinet after 
a period of time during which they have not served in the government, they are recorded 
as new cases.  
Figure 4.9 shows the unconditional probability that ministers will survive 
beyond a certain time when no covariates are taken into consideration. Overall, 
ministers have a 50% chance of surviving 1,275 days in office.  
 
Figure 4.9 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across scenarios (France) 
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Figure 4.10 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival by scenario (France) 
 
 
The survivor functions across the two executive scenarios are plotted in Figure 
4.10 to assess the impact of different political circumstances on ministerial survival. 
This data shows that the risk of deselection is higher under a unified executive scenario. 
The result of the log-rank test presented in Figure 4.10 indicates that the assumption of 
proportional hazards across the two scenarios is not violated at the 0.05 level. These 
results indicate that the survival of ministers varies in proportional ways as far as the 
scenarios of unified executive and cohabitation are concerned and confirm that the data 
can be analysed using a Cox model. Additional diagnostic tests for the non-
proportionality of hazards in the models used for the analysis of French ministers are 
provided in the Appendix (A1-A4). They include the Wilcoxon test, which focuses on 
earlier failure times, and tests based on the analysis on Schoenfeld residuals to verify 
that the explanatory variables included in the statistical models presented below have a 
proportional and constant effect that is invariant to time. The specification of the models 
with regard to the nonlinearity of the explanatory variables is assessed using link tests 
(reported at the bottom of Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 presents three models. Model 1 estimates the impact of fixed 
characteristics on ministerial durability, while Model 2 takes into consideration both 
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relationships on the risk of deselection as a function of institutional context. To do so, 
Model 3 includes a contextual variable that tests the ability of principals to reduce 
agency-loss under unified executive and cohabitation. Cohabitation equals 1 to indicate 
the occurrence of cohabitation and 0 in the case of unified executive. The model 
specification adopts the chained-interaction technique, which is employed when one 
variable (in this case cohabitation) is believed to modify the effects of other variables 
(the impact of conflicts with presidents, parties and prime ministers), without 
conditioning each other’s effects (Kam and Franzese 2007: 39–40). Thus, Model 3 
includes three two-way interactions that separate the impact of principals on the 
deselection of ministers under unified executive and cohabitation and respects the 
recommendations regarding the inclusion of all constitutive terms in the case of 
multiplicative interaction models (Braumoeller 2004; Brambor et al. 2006). To adjust 
for within-minister correlation without biasing the cross-minister estimators we use 
cluster-robust standard errors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 335). The observations are 
clustered by ministers and the data set includes 75 clusters. The models present 
coefficients from Cox regressions and report standard errors clustered by ministers. 
Positive coefficients indicate that the risk of deselection increases and indicate a shorter 
length of tenure, while negative coefficients decrease the hazard rate and are expected to 
increase the length of tenure. 
Model 1 emphasises the limited explanatory power of personal characteristics 
variables. Furthermore, the robustness of these results across the three models confirms 
their limited impact on the length of ministerial tenure. The models present some 
evidence that the risk of losing office increases for ministers with previous experience 
in the government and in the legislature, while ministers recruited from the 
parliamentary pool are safer in office. However, these results are not robust across the 
three models. 
Models 2 and 3 estimate the ministers’ risk of losing office taking into account 
the impact of both fixed characteristics and events and as a function of executive 
scenarios. Both models confirm the explanatory power of Resignation calls as 
indicators of ministerial performance and durability in office. However, the statistical 
significance corresponding to this variable in both models suggests that resignation calls 
offer only a partial account of why some ministers resign why they are asked to do so 
and others do not. By comparison, the variables corresponding to principal-agent 
relationships have a stronger explanatory power. 
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The positive and statistically significant mean coefficients of Lost elections and 
Party promotions confirm that electoral defeats and promotions in the party hierarchy 
increase the risk of a premature departure from the cabinet. Given the debates regarding 
the elimination of the simultaneous holding of government and party responsibilities, 
this finding suggests that party promotions may be used as compensatory measures for 
ministers who are fired.  
Apart from downright dismissals, the literature suggests that prime ministers 
may use cabinet reshuffles to sanction ministers who deviate from the preferred 
positions of their principals (Indridason and Kam 2008). The negative and statistically 
significant coefficients on Reshuffles in Models 2 and 3 indicate that ministers who 
change portfolios are likely to survive longer in office. This result suggests that in 
France reshuffles are used as means of promotion rather than demotion.  
The results concerning the relationship between ministers and parliamentary 
majorities indicate that policy disagreements between ministers and the deputies 
representing their parties or coalition partners are not likely to endanger their careers. 
This result is consistent with the expectations put forward in two different literatures. 
On the one hand, the literature focusing on the place of parties in the democratic chain 
of delegation argues that while the deputies retain the ability to hold chief executive 
accountable, prime ministers usually preserve the prime responsibility for monitoring 
and sanctioning other party officials, including cabinet ministers (Müller, 2000). On the 
other hand, according to an extensive survey of legislative powers, the overall influence 
of the French parliament over the government has been rated among the weakest among 
European countries, surpassing only the Russian and Cypriot parliaments (Fish & 
Kroenig, 2009). Consequently, the fact that the parliamentary majority’s policy 
discontent has no consequences on ministerial longevity is not surprising, given the 
absence of any parliamentary procedures for the dismissal of individual ministers and 
the subordination of parliamentary majorities to the de facto leaders of dominant parties. 
The explanatory power of the variables capturing the interaction between 
ministers and their principals is confirmed in Models 2 and 3. The positive coefficients 
of PR Conflicts, PM Conflicts, and PARTY Conflicts indicate that, in general, the more 
conflicts ministers have with their principals the more likely they are to fail. 
Nevertheless, the statistical significance associated with the three principal-related 
variables in Model 2 indicates that, overall, only clashes with presidents have an impact 
on the risk of deselection. The model also provides some evidence that conflicts with
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Table 4.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in France 
                                    Model 1      Model 2       Model 3 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Fixed characteristics   
Cabinet experience            0.84*        0.95**        0.37    
                             (0.44)       (0.49)        (0.58)    
MP/SEN               -0.90*       -0.49         -1.31*   
                                  (0.50)       (0.63)        (0.68)    
Parliamentary experience            0.47         0.67          1.62*   
                                  (0.51)       (0.60)        (0.91)    
Mayor                           0.35         0.42          0.31    
                                  (0.52)       (0.54)        (0.58)    
Local administration experience     0.10         0.13         -0.81    
                                  (0.70)       (0.96)        (0.87)    
Party executive                  0.17        -1.02         -0.50    
                                  (0.41)       (0.79)        (0.84)    
Events 
Local elections lost       3.53**        4.10*** 
             (1.22)        (1.16)    
Party promotions                                  5.83***       7.09*** 
                                             (1.25)        (1.34)    
Legislative defeats                             -0.08         -0.14    
                                             (0.18)        (0.19)    
Social unrest                                   -0.08          0.06    
         (0.17)        (0.15)    
Reshuffles        -5.99**      -11.53**  
         (2.61)        (3.88)    
Resignation calls                                 0.86*         0.75*   
                                             (0.48)        (0.41)    
PR Conflicts                                      2.76***       3.59*** 
                                             (0.68)        (1.01)    
PM Conflicts                                     1.22*        -0.30    
                                             (0.71)        (1.43)    
PARTY Conflicts                                   0.67          1.74**  
                                            (0.42)        (0.73)    
Executive scenarios 
Cohabitation                                -0.56         -0.28    
                                             (0.52)        (0.69)    
PR Conflicts × Cohabitation                                    -1.83    
                                                                1.59) 
PM Conflicts × Cohabitation          3.87**    
             (1.63)    
PARTY Conflicts × Cohabitation                                 -2.59**  
                                                               (0.91)    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
N Ministers                           75            75             75              
N Observations                      2815          2815           2815              
N Failures                            29            29             29             
Log likelihood                   -96.651       -56.576        -51.583    
Linktest hat(squared)              -0.09         -0.06          -0.04            
          p=(.85)       p=(.18)        p=(.44) 
Proportional hazards    5.37(6 df)  7.24 (16 df)   5.93 (19 df) 
Assumption global test chi(2)     p=(.50)       p=(.97)        p=(.99)  
Note: Cell entries are coefficients computed using the Efron method of 
resolving ties. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors 
clustered by minister (75 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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prime ministers may also increase the risk of losing office. However, based on the literature 
on semi-presidentialism and on the operation of the French political system under the Fifth 
Republic (Duverger, 1996; Elgie, 2009; Samuels & Shugart, 2010) we expect conflicts with 
presidents to have a significant impact under unified executive and a low impact under 
cohabitation. Conversely, conflicts with prime ministers are expected to have a significant 
impact under cohabitation and a considerably lower impact under unified executive.  
To verify this hypothesis, Models 3 assesses the impact of conflicts with presidents, 
prime ministers, and party principals on the ministers’ risk of losing office as a function of 
executive scenarios. To do so, the three conflict variables are interacted with an 
institutional variable, Cohabitation. The impact of interaction terms on the risk of 
deselection is not directly revealed by regression coefficients. For example, to assess the 
impact of conflicts with the president we need to take into account the coefficients 
corresponding to both PR Conflicts and PR Conflicts × Cohabitation. When 
Cohabitation=0, which basically means under a scenario of unified executive, the impact of 
conflicts with the president is directly given by the coefficient associated with PR Conflicts. 
As this coefficient is both positive and statistically significant, we can conclude that 
presidents have a significant influence on the process of ministerial deselection during 
periods of unified executive. Under cohabitation, when Cohabitation=1, the impact of 
conflicts with the president is the sum of the coefficient associated to the PR Conflicts and 
PR Conflicts × Cohabitation variables. In this case we have a positive coefficient since this 
sum is equal to 1.75 (3.59-1.83). However, the standard error of this sum of coefficients, 
which is calculated from the standard error of the two separate coefficients, gives a figure 
of about 1.28, which corresponds to a Student t-value of 1.37, which is not a statistically 
significant coefficient.8 This result indicates that presidents do not have a strong influence 
on cabinet composition during periods of cohabitation. The substantive effect of conflicts 
with the president under different executive scenarios is illustrated in the Appendix (A.5). 
 
                                                
8
 The standard error  is calculated using the formula  =  +  + 2	, where γ  is 
the coefficient of PR Conflicts, δ is the coefficient of  PR Conflicts × Cohabitation, and Z is the dummy 
Cohabitation. 
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The impact of conflicts with prime ministers and party principals on the risk of 
losing office under different executive scenarios is calculated in a similar way. Table 4.5 
presents the values of coefficients associated with the conflict variables (when 
Cohabitation=0), the sum of the conflict variables and their interaction with the 
cohabitation variable (when Cohabitation=1), and their level of significance. This 
presentation allows us to compare the impact of conflict variables on the risk of deselection 
directly. 
 
Table 4.5 Principal-agent relationships under different executive scenarios (France) 
Executive scenario PR Conflicts PM Conflicts PARTY Conflicts 
Cohabitation=0        3.59***   -0.30      1.74**  
Cohabitation=1 1.75            3.57*** -0.84 
 
The results presented in Table 4.5 confirm that conflicts with prime ministers do not 
pose a risk to deselection during periods of unified executive. However prime ministers are 
shown to control the process of ministerial deselection under cohabitation. Similarly to 
presidents, and as opposed to prime ministers, the results presented in Table 4.5 indicate 
that party principals have a significant influence on cabinet composition during periods of 
unified executive, but not under cohabitation.  
The substantive effects of conflicts with prime ministers and party principals under 
different executive scenarios are included in the Appendix (A.6-A.7). The data presented in 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 sum up the impact of conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and 
party principals on the risk of deselection under unified executive and cohabitation 
respectively. 
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Figure 4.11 Impact of conflicts under unified executive 
 
Figure 4.12 Impact of conflicts under cohabitation 
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The comparative analysis of ministerial survival in France under both unified 
executive and cohabitation confirms that institutional context matters for the ability of 
presidents and prime ministers to dominate the executive decision-making process: 
presidents are in a better position to influence the deselection of ministers during periods of 
unified executive, while prime ministers regain control over cabinet members under 
cohabitation.  
Our results indicate that the influence of the party principal also varies as a function 
of institutional context. The party principal is shown to have a significant impact on 
ministerial deselection under unified executive, but not under cohabitation. However, the 
discussion in the second section of this chapter has shown that the president maintained a 
strong grip over the party under unified executive, which was expected to reduce the 
influence of the party principal over cabinet composition. By contrast, Lionel Jospin’s 
resignation as party leader during the scenario of cohabitation should have increased the 
party’s authority over the cabinet.  
According to the descriptive statistics in Table 4.3, parties criticised ministers 
almost twice as much as presidents and prime ministers altogether. However, the results 
presented in Table 4.4 suggest that this criticism did not have an impact on deselection 
under cohabitation, where parties do not have to compete with presidents for control over 
the cabinet. Thus, although party principals were more vociferous, they were less able to 
contain agency loss than presidents and prime ministers, despite their ‘pole’ position in the 
chain of delegation. Although Lionel Jospin stepped down as party leader before taking 
office as prime minister, he has nevertheless been recognised as the uncontested leader of 
the Socialist Party and the parliamentary majority by political actors (Chirac & Barré, 2011, 
p. 213; Glavany, 2001, p. 45; Schrameck, 2001, p. 33) and scholars alike (Chevallier et al., 
2009, p. 436; Duhamel, 2011, p. 576; Portelli, 1997, p. 21). Jospin’s ability to sideline the 
party principal in the competition for control over the cabinet during the period of 
cohabitation is explained by his de facto leadership over the Socialist Party. This finding 
has important implications for the study of political accountability at the level of cabinet 
ministers and indicates the circumstances under which informal hierarchies of party 
leadership can indicate more accurately who is accountable to whom than the formal chain 
of political delegation from political parties to their representatives in government. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the determinants of ministerial durability in France, 
where the alternation of dual-executive scenarios generates considerable variation in 
principal-agent relationships between ministers and presidents, prime ministers and party 
principals. The empirical investigation has confirmed the variation in the influence of 
principals over ministerial deselection under different institutional scenarios. While 
presidents are in a better position to influence the deselection of ministers during periods of 
unified executive, prime ministers regain control over cabinet members under cohabitation. 
At the same time, the expectation that parties regain control over their agents in the 
executive branch of government during periods of cohabitation, when presidents are not in 
a position to dominate the parliamentary majority, is not confirmed in the French case. This 
finding is nevertheless in line with  the literature analysing the operation of French political 
parties, which emphasises their weak organisation and dependence on strong leaders 
(Knapp, 2004).  
Similarly to the impact of conflicts with the party principal, the multivariate analysis 
suggests that personal background has a limited effect on the length of ministerial tenure. 
This finding is surprising since we expect political parties to place a premium on political 
experience when selecting ministers. Previous appointments in government, as well as 
experience in local administration, a strong parliamentary record, and party service should 
correlate with longevity in office if parties have a say over cabinet composition. However, 
among the variables related to the ministers’ political background in our data set, only 
incumbency in the parliament has emerged as a significant determinant of ministerial 
durability. 
The party principal’s inability to influence ministerial longevity under cohabitation, 
an institutional scenario that should increase the parties’ control over cabinet composition, 
confirms that party leadership positions make a difference for the principals’ ability to 
influence the process of ministerial deselection. The variation in presidential influence over 
the government as a function of the president’s grip on the majority party has been 
highlighted in the literature of semi-presidentialism (Duverger, 1996; Samuels & Shugart, 
2010). Similarly, a strong grip on the majority party has been recognised as the determinant 
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of the British prime ministers’ extensive control over their cabinets by the literature on 
parliamentary government (A. King, 1994b, p. 210). Our results substantiate and 
complement these arguments by showing that the authority of prime ministers over cabinet 
members also depends on whether they are perceived as uncontested leaders of their parties 
even when they do not formally hold a party leadership position. Thus, as far as the 
operation of the French political system is concerned, the findings of this chapter confirm 
that the principals’ ability to fire ministers depends on both executive scenarios and their de 
facto position as party leaders. 
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Luís Campos e Cunha, a minister of finance in the Socialist government led by PM José 
Sócrates, resigned in July 2005 after criticising the government’s plan to invest in major 
infrastructure projects, such as a new airport serving Lisbon in Ota9. In March 2007, 
President Cavaco Silva of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), also intervened in the debate 
and asked the government to consider alternative locations, such as Alcochete. Mário Lino, 
the minister for public works, ruled out Alcochete as the location of a new airport, calling it 
a “desert” that lacked schools, hospitals, and big cities and had no potential for commerce 
and tourism. Opposition parties and local authorities asked the minister’s resignation over 
his impartiality and offensive remarks. A few months later, José Sócrates announced the 
government’s decision to undertake the construction of the new airport in Alcochete. The 
prime minister defended Mário Lino against new calls for resignation and cleared him of 
any direct responsibility within the collective decision-making process10.  
Why did only one of the two ministers who commented on decisions that required 
the cabinet’s collective endorsement lose his job? Moreover, why did minister Campos e 
Cunha’s concerns about the quality of government investments, which were shared by 
economists and public opinion alike, triggered his resignation, while minister Lino’s 
offensive remarks and poor expertise had no impact on the length of his tenure, although he 
was contested by many professional organisations, local communities, President Cavaco 
Silva and even within José Sócrates’ Socialist party? Despite the similarity of political 
circumstances, a principal-agent perspective on the nature of executive conflicts that 
                                                
9
 More details about the circumstances leading up to the resignation of Luís Campos e Cunha can be found in 
Antão, 2005; Cabral, 2005; Costa, 2005; Costa & Cabrita, 2006; Coutinho, 2005; Delgado, 2005; Diário de 
Notícias, 2005; Silva & Costa, 2005; Suspiro, 2007; Vaz, 2005; Viana, 2005. 
10
 The detailed development of this story from March 2007, when the government made public the calendar of 
works for the construction of the new airport in Ota, until January 2008, when José Sócrates announced the 
government’s decision to change the new airport’s location from Ota to Alcochete can be followed in Cabral, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e; Cabral & Negrão, 2007; Candoso, 2008; Diário de Notícias, 2007a, 
2007b; Francisco, 2007; Francisco & Henriques, 2007; G. Henriques & Correia, 2007; J. P. Henriques, 2009; 
J. P. Henriques & Correia, 2007; J. P. Henriques & Leite, 2007; J. P. Henriques & Negrão, 2007; Leite, 2007; 
Leite & Cardoso, 2007; Leite & Fox, 2007; Leite & Sá, 2008; Marcelino, 2008; Marcelino & Baldaia, 2008; 
Matias, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Moura, 2007; Paula Sá, 2007; Silva, 2007; Suspiro & Santos, 2007; Sá, 2009. 
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characterised the two situations reveals a significant difference between them. Luís Campos 
e Cunha confronted the prime minister on a policy matter of primary importance for the 
majority party, while Mário Lino acted in agreement with the prime minister. As the 
president’s party was not in government and both ministers were non-partisans, the prime 
minister was able to exercise freely his career-control power over cabinet members. 
This chapter is organised as follows. First we outline the research design of the 
Portuguese case-study and we identify the endogenous factors that differentiate the 
operation of semi-presidential institutions in Portugal from their French and Romanian 
counterparts. The second section of the chapter analyses the relationships between parties, 
presidents and prime ministers in the two main political parties in Portugal, the Socialists 
and the Social Democrats, from a principal-agent perspective. This discussion emphasises 
the reasons why the growing influence and the autonomy of Portuguese prime ministers 
with respect to presidents and political parties has not been constrained by executive 
scenarios. The third section of the chapter describes the data collected for the Portugal case 
study and explains the measurement of fixed characteristics and events in this context. The 
last section of this chapter completes the study of ministerial turnover in Portugal with a 
multivariate analysis that estimates the length of ministerial tenure as function of fixed 
characteristics, events, and principal-agent relationships between ministers, presidents, 
premiers, and party principals. 
5.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in Portugal 
The dataset for the Portuguese case-study covers the centre-right government that 
was formed in 2002 by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the People’s Party (CDS-
PP) and the Socialist government that took office in 2005. The PSD-CDS government is 
followed from April 2002 until December 2004, when President Sampaio dissolved the 
parliament and called early elections. The government formed by the Socialist Party (PS) in 
March 2005 is covered until the formation of the next government in October 2009. Both 
governments operated mostly under cohabitation. President Jorge Sampaio of the Socialist 
party, first elected in late 1995 and re-elected in 2000, was succeeded by President Ánibal 
Cavaco Silva of the PSD in 2006. Thus, with the exception of one year, between March 
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2005 and March 2006, when both President Sampaio and Prime Minister José Sócrates 
were from the Socialist party, ministerial tenures are observed under cohabitation.  
The PSD-CDS government that was in office between 2002 and 2005 experienced a 
change of prime minister in July 2004, when Manuel Durrão Barroso of the PSD stepped 
down to become president of the European Commission. Following his resignation as 
prime minister and party leader, the PSD elected Pedro Santana Lopes as party president 
and nominated him for the prime minister position. The change of prime minister did not 
affect the government coalition between the PSD and the CDS-PP. There is also no reason 
to believe that the agency relationships between the president, the prime minister and the 
cabinet ministers were affected by the change of prime minister. As a result, uninterrupted 
ministerial tenures in the Durrão Barroso and Santana Lopes governments are recorded as 
single spells and individual changes that were made in the passing from one cabinet to 
another are recorded as dismissals or reshuffles. The data set also excludes the caretaker 
government formed by Santana Lopes in December 2004, when President Sampaio 
dissolved the National Assembly and called early elections. The inclusion of a caretaker 
government in the analysis of ministerial survival is considered problematic for several 
reasons. First, caretaker governments have been shown to have different hazard rates and 
determinants of durability than common governments (E. C. Browne et al., 1986; Grofman 
& Van Roozendaal, 1994, 1995, 1997). As a result, the determinants of ministerial turnover 
are also likely to vary across common and caretaker governments, since the duration of 
collective ministerial survival is fully determined in the latter case. Second, the 
opportunities for the occurrence of stochastic events are also minimised in the case of 
caretaker cabinets. Since the ministers’ ability to introduce new policies during a caretaker 
period is considerably reduced, they are also less likely to enter into conflict with their 
principals. Therefore, the absence of conflicts between ministers and principals during the 
caretaker period would bias individual survival positively. As the composition of Santana 
Lopes’ caretaker cabinet did not change and the media coverage of its three months in 
office has revealed only one episode of conflict, we can be sure that no information is 
missed if this period of time is excluded from the monitoring of ministerial tenures. 
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The data set includes ministers and state ministers. State secretaries are excluded 
from the analysis because they do not sit in the Cabinet11, as it is also the case of the French 
Secrétaires d’État. In addition, the Portuguese Constitution states that state secretaries are 
subordinate to a single principal and requires them to be recalled when their minister leaves 
office (article 186).12 Overall, the data set for the Portuguese study covers 56 ministers.  
While the units of observation in the data set are the 56 ministers, the units of 
analysis are the events experienced by ministers during their time in office. Overall, 540 
observations related to the events experienced by ministers were recorded from 
approximately 3,500 articles published in Diário de Notícias during the ministers’ time in 
office and accessed through the online archive which is available on the newspaper’s 
website. The articles used for data collection were selected with 12 keywords related to 
major events, such as resignations, dismissals and reshuffles, and to conflictual situations 
involving scandals, disagreements, ministerial performance and errors, protests and strikes. 
Each observation includes the type of event recorded, the political actors involved, and the 
reasons that caused it. The events experienced by ministers may be terminal or non-
terminal. Terminal events refer to individual termination events, such as resignations and 
dismissals. Non-terminal events cover conflicts with presidents, parties and prime ministers 
(recorded each time one of the principals criticises ministers publicly), resignation calls, 
cabinet reshuffles, special parliamentary debates, and national-level strikes and protests that 
occurred within each minister’s area of responsibility. The proximate reasons used for 
coding the occurrence of events include personal and departmental faults or scandals, 
policy disagreements, performance, appointments outside cabinet, intra-cabinet and 
intraparty conflicts, and non-political reasons. 
Similar to France, the analysis of ministerial turnover in Portugal aims to capture the 
variation in the influence of presidents and prime ministers over cabinet composition. 
However, in contrast to France, in Portugal the coincidence between the parliamentary 
majority and the original party of the president is expected to reduce the president’s 
                                                
11
 An exception to this rule is made for the Portuguese state secretary to the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers (Secretário de Estado da Presidência do Conselho de Ministros), the only state secretary who has a 
permanent seat in the cabinet and who answers directly to the prime minister. 
12
 The presidential decrees that appoint new ministers are always accompanied by a full list of state secretaries 
appointed to act under the respective ministers, even if some of them had already been in office up to that 
moment. 
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influence (Martins, 2006, p. 94). None of the three presidents elected since 1986 was 
perceived as a de facto leader of the parliamentary majority when they shared executive 
power with a prime minister from their own party (Magalhães, 2007, p. 266). Despite the 
confrontational style that characterised his second cohabitation with the PSD government 
since 1991, Mário Soares assumed a low-profile role as soon as the 1995 legislative 
elections returned a Socialist majority. President Soares was succeeded in 1996 by Jorge 
Sampaio, the mayor of Lisbon and a secretary general of the Socialist Party from 1989 to 
1992. Although most of Sampaio’s presidency took place under a scenario of unified 
executive, due to the Left’s consecutive election victories in 1995 and in 1999, the 
president did not emerge as a leader of the majority during this period of time (Martins, 
2006, p. 94; Morais, 1998, p. 157). 
The absence of a presidentialised executive in the Portuguese case has been put 
down to the curtailment of presidential powers in the 1982 Constitution, when the 
government ceased to be politically responsible to the president and the parliament’s power 
to control the cabinet was considerably strengthened (Amorim & Lobo, 2009, p. 240). The 
subsequent decrease in presidential influence over the political system has led some 
scholars to define Portugal as a parliamentary system (Bruneau, 1997; Villaverde Cabral 
quoted in Cruz, 1994, p. 259; Sartori, 1994). According to various measurements, though, 
the range of presidential powers laid down in the 1982 Constitution equals the European 
semi-presidential average (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Siaroff, 2003). Other studies have also 
emphasised that the powers held by the Portuguese president render him an influential actor 
at all times (Amorim & Lobo, 2009; Frain, 1995). For example, President Sampaio 
dissolved the Assembly and called early elections in 2004, although the government still 
enjoyed the support of the majority. The presidents’ ability to veto both executive and 
parliamentary bills and to shape the public agenda is also seen as an efficient way of 
wearing down opposing governments (Araújo, 2003, pp. 91–93). The increase in 
presidential activism under cohabitation also explains why Portuguese presidents seem 
considerably stronger than their French counterparts under cohabitation, despite their 
weakness during periods of unified executive (Amorim, 2003, p. 560; Jalali, 2011). 
However, while the variation in the French presidents’ influence across scenarios is due to 
their informal authority over parliamentary majority, the variation in the powers of the 
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Portuguese presidents across periods of unified executive and cohabitation is fully 
accounted for by their range of constitutional prerogatives. 
Similar to the variation in presidential influence across time and political 
circumstances, the variation in prime ministerial leadership follows different rules in 
Portugal compared to France. Portuguese prime ministers are not weaker during periods of 
unified executive than under cohabitation, nor are they seen as subordinates to presidents 
under any political circumstances. The president’s and the prime minister’s influence over 
the political system vary independently of one another in Portugal. The reduction of 
presidential powers in 1982 is not considered the main explanatory factor for the 
reinforcement of the prime ministerial position in Portugal (Amorim & Lobo, 2009, p. 
235). The sources of prime ministerial leadership are rather seen in the consolidation of the 
party system and the increase in the autonomy and power resources of prime ministers as 
party leaders (Lobo, 2005a, 2005b). 
The Portuguese case confirms the theoretical expectations put forward in Chapter 2, 
according to which the variation in the influence of presidents and prime ministers over the 
political system depends on the interaction of executive scenarios and party relationships. 
Similar to France, the personalisation of party politics in Portugal explains why holding the 
presidency of a political party before taking office makes a difference for the extent of 
presidential and prime ministerial influence. An analysis of the 2002 legislative elections 
has shown that party leaders matter more for the electorate of the three centrist parties, the 
PS, the PSD and the CDS than any other social and ideological factors and they become 
absolutely crucial when voters have to decide between the PSD and the CDS (Lobo, 2006). 
However, unlike in France, the personalisation of politics in Portugal is not rooted in the 
adoption of direct presidential elections. Gunther (2003, 2007) and Jalali (2007) explain the 
personalisation of Portuguese politics as a consequence of the catch-all nature of the main 
Portuguese parties, whose ideological positioning and establishment of mass organisations 
was constrained by their emergence in a revolutionary context.  
The difference in the influence of French and Portuguese presidents over the 
political systems is explained by their position in the party hierarchy ahead of presidential 
elections. While French parties nominate their leaders as presidential candidates, none of 
the Portuguese presidents ran in the elections as party leaders. As a result, we have no 
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reason to code them as de facto party leaders during the time period under analysis. 
However, as opposed to French prime ministers, all Portuguese prime ministers were party 
presidents ahead of general elections. Therefore, the Portuguese prime ministers are coded 
as de facto party leaders. From a principal-agent perspective, though, it is important to 
analyse in more detail the extent to which the three prime ministers were autonomous of 
their respective parties so that we can determine the kind of agency relationship established 
between parties and their representatives in government. The second section of this chapter 
focuses on the leadership power of the three prime ministers during the time period under 
study. The analysis reviews the rules governing the internal distribution of power resources 
within the PSD and the PS during 2002-2005 and 2005-2009 respectively, and evaluates 
the ways in which party leaders were able to enhance their intraparty resources and act as 
principals for cabinet ministers. 
The third section of this chapter focuses on the political cursus honorum of the 
ministers covered by the Portuguese data set. This section analyses the parliamentary 
experience of the ministers who joined the PSD-CDS and the PS governments between 
2002 and 2009, their involvement in local politics prior to appointment, as well as their 
membership in the national elite of their respective parties. The patterns of ministerial 
careers in Portugal since 1976 have revealed a relative unimportance of local politics, a 
declining role for parliamentary experience, an increasing overlap between membership in 
party executive bodies and national governments, and a growing presence of independent 
ministers in government (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002; Lobo, 2002).  
The traditional career-path taken by French politicians, who must establish 
themselves locally and develop their career within a party organisation, is not usually 
encountered in Portugal. The different routes that French and Portuguese ministers take to 
advance their political careers at national level may also account for the differences in the 
agency relationship established between parties, presidents, prime ministers and their 
minister-agents in the two countries. Although there are few explicit bans on the multiple-
office holding, the cumul des mandats is not common in Portugal. The horizontal 
combination of offices is formally restricted, as the Constitution forbids the simultaneous 
134 
 
holding of cabinet and parliamentary seats.13 However, ministers can resume their 
parliamentary seats when they leave the government. The limitation of the vertical 
combination of elective offices is relatively recent. It is only since 2001 that deputies who 
are mayors or local councillors at the time of their election to the National Assembly have 
had to choose between their national and local government mandate.14 As a result of this 
ban, most mayors have decided to give up their parliamentary seats and resume their career 
in local politics. However, this rule has not significantly influenced the composition of the 
Portuguese parliament, since less than 5 per cent of deputies elected since 1976 have 
actually combined the two types of office (M. A. P. de Almeida, 2008, p. 366). Similarly, 
cabinet members have not traditionally been recruited from among the number of mayors 
and local councillors. Less than 5 per cent of the ministers appointed during 1976-1999 
served as mayors or local councillors, while the highest percentage of local officials invited 
to join the government corresponds to the First Republic, when it reached 13 per cent (P. T. 
de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31). The relative unimportance of local administration 
experience for the advancement of political careers at national level is put down to the 
traditional administrative centralisation (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 30). 
Consequently, local strongholds are not among the range of political resources that 
Portuguese ministers are likely to rely on, as opposed to their French counterparts. 
Portugal contrasts with many other European democracies in that fewer than half of 
all first-time ministers appointed between 1976 and 2005 had previously been elected to the 
parliament (Pinto & Almeida, 2009, p. 151). The recruitment of so many cabinet ministers 
from outside the parliamentary pool can be explained by the subordinate position of 
parliamentary groups within their party’s internal balance of power. A comparative analysis 
of party statutes and of the composition of national executive bodies across Portuguese 
parties has revealed a relatively small margin of autonomy of parliamentary groups with 
respect to extra-parliamentary parties and their under-representation among the party’s 
national bodies (Van Biezen, 1998). On the other hand, the comparison between the 
composition of governments and that of executive party bodies has emphasised a growing 
                                                
13
 Constitution of the Republic of Portugal, Seventh Revision (2005), article 154. Available from 
http://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Paginas/ConstituicaoRepublicaPortuguesa.aspx. 
14
 Statute of Deputies, article 20. Available from 
http://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/EstatutoDeputados_Simples.pdf.  
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presence of senior party members in government since 1976, irrespective of whether the 
Socialists or the Social-Democrats were in power (Lobo, 2002, p. 270). Political parties are 
also involved directly in the executive decision-making process, since most decisions are 
taken by an inner cabinet formed around prime ministers and the holders of key ministerial 
portfolios, which are usually allocated to senior party members (Lobo, 2005b, p. 279). 
Thus, while parliamentary experience is not a prerequisite for ministerial appointments, 
party experience does seem to favour the advancement of political careers in Portugal. The 
“governmentalisation” of political parties, which denotes the appointment of a high number 
of senior party members in government (Lobo, 2005a, pp. 168–175), suggests that party 
principals have a strong grip on cabinet composition irrespective of institutional context. 
Particular attention needs to be given in the Portuguese context to the significant 
frequency of non-partisan ministerial appointments. This was a common practice during the 
1976-1986 period, when President Eanes imposed several “presidential-inspired” cabinets 
(Lobo, 2000, p. 160). However, the share of non-partisan ministers has remained significant 
even after President Eanes was replaced by a civilian president in 1986, and irrespective of 
the minority or majority status of governments, or whether parties governed alone or in 
coalition. The weak institutionalisation of parties and the negative perception of politicians 
in the Portuguese society explains to a certain extent the opening of cabinet appointments to 
academics, professionals, and policy experts who are not politically affiliated (Pinto & 
Almeida, 2009, p. 153). Such appointments blur the lines of ministerial accountability, as it 
is more difficult to determine which of the three principals controls non-partisan ministers.  
A comparative analysis of semi-presidential and parliamentary systems carried out 
by Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) showed that non-partisan appointments are more 
common under directly-elected presidents and increase with the powers of the president 
relative to the prime minister. Analysing the Portuguese governments formed between 1976 
and 2004, Amorim Neto and Lobo (2009) showed that the share of independent ministers is 
higher in minority cabinets. However, the number of independent ministers has also been 
seen as an indicator for the autonomy of prime ministers with respect to their parties. Lobo 
(2000, 2005a, 2005b) argues that the Portuguese prime ministers’ ability to appoint cabinet 
members from outside their parties emphasises their ability to govern above parties. 
Political parties have also encouraged the appointment of independent ministers, as a means 
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of increasing their legitimacy and the their governments’ technical expertise (P. T. de 
Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 36; Lobo, 2005a, p. 170). Independent candidates are invited to 
join party lists in order to run in the elections, as the Constitution allows political parties to 
include non-partisans on their electoral lists but does not allow independent candidacies in 
the legislative and municipal elections (M. A. P. de Almeida, 2008, 2010). In conclusion, 
there are reasons to believe that each principal can benefit from non-partisan appointments 
and can gain control over independent ministers under certain circumstances. 
5.2 Party relationships in the Portuguese executive 
This section focuses on intraparty politics.  As neither of the two presidents who were in 
office during the time period under study ran in the elections as party leaders, we 
concentrate on the party resources available to prime ministers to assert their leadership 
over the government and within their own parties. This analysis aims to determine whether 
any rules or practices that aimed to curb or to enhance the authority of prime ministers were 
introduced in the Social Democratic Party and in the Socialist Party following their 
accession to power in 2002 and in 2005 respectively. 
The PM-party relationship in the PSD (2002-2005) 
The Social Democratic Party returned to power in February 2002 following a seven-year 
period in opposition. Between 1995 and 2002 the Social Democratic Party experienced a 
series of electoral defeats that also attracted several changes of leadership. Manuel Durrão 
Barroso was elected as president of the PSD only five months before the 1999 legislative 
elections. Although he was not expected to defeats the Socialists so soon after his election, 
Barroso’s internal support eroded rapidly as a result of his inability to lead the PSD into 
government and deliver power quickly (Jalali, 2006, p. 362). Nevertheless, his popularity 
improved when the Social-Democrats won a number of important cities in the 2001 local 
elections and the 2002 early legislative elections that were triggered by the resignation of 
the Socialist government. In the absence of a parliamentary majority, the PSD formed a 
coalition government with the CDS. Despite the animosity between the two parties, the 
coalition was stable until Durrão Barroso stepped down to become president of the 
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European Commission in July 2004. After much hesitation, President Sampaio decided to 
accept the formation of a second PSD-CDS government led by Pedro Santana Lopes, who 
succeeded Durrão Barroso as the PSD leader. However, this government proved so 
unpopular that President Sampaio dissolved the parliament and called early elections in 
December 2004. Notwithstanding the low popularity of both prime ministers, there is 
nevertheless little indication of intraparty challenges to their leadership. As it will be shown 
below, no programmatic or organisational changes were introduced and no attempt was 
made to alter the position of the national leader within the party organisation or the prime 
minister’s relationship with the party during the time period under analysis. 
The organisation of the Social Democratic Party is the least centralised of all the 
Portuguese parties (Corkill, 1995, pp. 69–70; Frain, 1997, p. 85; Lobo, 2002, p. 256). All 
national executive bodies are elected by party delegates during the national congresses, 
with the exception of the party president, who has been directly elected by the party 
members since 2006. However, the PSD’s dependence on a strong and charismatic leader 
as the basis for its unity, coherence and stability has constantly been emphasised as the 
party’s characteristic since its creation in 1974 (Corkill, 1995; Frain, 1996, 1997; Magone, 
1995). Despite the involvement of activists in the selection of national elites, party 
presidents have always been able to count on the obedience of the party apparatus once 
they were elected. As pointed out by Jalali (2006, p. 365), generalised rebellions against the 
party leadership are unlikely to take place in the PSD. No incumbent leader has ever been 
ousted or even defeated in a party congress. Notwithstanding the charismatic power 
exercised by leaders such as Sá Carneiro, Pinto Balsemão and Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the 
prevalence of PSD leaders within their party has been contingent on the electoral success 
and the power resources delivered to the party, rather than on the leader’s personality 
(Jalali, 2006, p. 367). Once in office, the PSD prime ministers are usually given 
considerable autonomy over the formation and composition of governments, the party’s 
election programme and the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections (Lobo, 
2005b, pp. 273–274). By contrast, when the party is defeated in elections, the national 
leadership is likely to be challenged and the PSD leaders find it difficult to assert their 
authority over local barons (Jalali, 2006, pp. 368–370).  
138 
 
The consolidation of Durrão Barroso’s authority within the party was confirmed by 
his re-election as party leader in the 2002 and 2004 party congresses. Compared to 2000, 
when he had to defend his leadership after the 1999 electoral defeat, Barroso’s bid for re-
election was unchallenged in July 2002 and May 2004, when the Social-Democrats were in 
government (Jalali, 2006, p. 368). Barroso reasserted his authority over the party in July 
2004 when he designated Pedro Santana Lopes, a vice-president of the party and the mayor 
of Lisbon since 2001, as his successor (Lobo & Magalhães, 2002, p. 78). Although Santana 
Lopes’ election as party leader in the absence of an extraordinary congress was not 
regarded as the best course of action by the PSD leadership, Barroso’s proposal was 
approved in the National Council with 98 votes in favour and only three votes against.15 
While Barroso’s resignation as prime minister did not trigger a political crisis, the 
poor performance of Santana Lopes’ cabinet did. According to a newspaper poll published 
in November 2004, 55 per cent of the respondents evaluated the prime minister’s 
performance as extremely bad and 52 per cent considered that the president should not have 
appointed Santana Lopes as prime minister (Lourenço, 2004). President Sampaio’s decision 
to call early elections was also influenced by the negative evaluation of the government’s 
performance articulated within the Social Democratic Party (G. Henriques, 2004; Sousa & 
Alvarez, 2004). Just a few days after the cabinet reshuffle operated in November 2004, 
Aníbal Cavaco Silva published an article in the weekly Expresso which demanded the 
replacement of incompetent politicians (Cavaco Silva, 2004c). Santana Lopes’ response, 
comparing the government with a baby who, while still in the incubator, is “smacked and 
kicked” by older siblings, was seen by the president as a confirmation of the confidence 
crisis underwent by the prime minister even within his own party (Público, 2004b). 
Despite this wave of intraparty criticism, Santana Lopes asserted his legitimacy as a 
party leader at the PSD Congress organised in November 2004. While four months before 
Santana Lopes had been elected party president by the National Council, the party 
delegates’ vote at the Barcelos Congress fully legitimised his election. Moreover, his  
leadership was not challenged by any other candidature for this position (Público, 2004a). 
Following President Sampaio’s decision to dissolve the assembly, though, Santana Lopes’ 
opponents in the party did ask that the party be led by a different president in the next 
                                                
15
 For more details about this episode see (TSF, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 2004f, 2004g, 2004h).  
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elections (Lopes, Ferreira, Lourenço, & Pereira, 2004; Pereira, 2004; Público, 2004d). 
However, the National Political Commission decided unanimously to contest the elections 
with Santana Lopes as the party’s prime ministerial candidate (Público, 2004c, 2004e, 
2004f). The Political Commission’s decision was also endorsed by the National Council, 
the party’s legislative body, by more than 90 per cent of the votes cast (Público, 2004g). 
Santana Lopes did step down as president of the PSD, but only after the Social-Democrats 
were defeated in February 2005. His resignation was therefore no different from that of his 
predecessors’, Pinto Balsemão, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Fernando Nogueira and Marcelo 
Rebelo de Sousa, who assumed personal responsibility for failing to deliver electoral 
success. Overall then, the institutional perspective on the prime minister-party relationship 
does not reveal any reason why Santana Lopes should not be coded as a de facto party 
leader. Although his initial election as party leader in July 2004 was internally contested on 
the grounds that he had not been elected by the National Congress, his leadership was 
legitimised at the Barcelos Congress, where he was elected as party president by the party 
militants, and by the PSD’s endorsement as future prime minister in the 2005 elections. 
The PM-party relationship in the PS (2005-2009) 
The 2005 legislative elections returned the Socialist party in government with an absolute 
parliamentary majority. As a result, José Sócrates, the Socialist leader, formed the first 
single-party majority government in the PS history (P. T. de Almeida & Freire, 2005, p. 
458). Sócrates had held the presidency of the Socialist party since 2004, when President 
Sampaio’s decision to appoint Santana Lopes as prime minister instead of calling early 
elections triggered the resignation of the PS leader, Ferro Rodrigues. A former minister in 
António Guterres’ governments between 1997 and 2002, José Sócrates then contested the 
party leadership against the more leftist factions in the Socialist party represented by 
Manuel Alegre and João Soares. He was elected secretary general in September 2004 with 
78.6 per cent of the party members’ vote, while his list for the National Commission 
obtained 81.74 per cent of the vote in the 2004 party congress (Acção Socialista, 2004; 
TSF, 2004j). José Sócrates’ authority was nevertheless consolidated by his ability to deliver 
an absolute majority for the party in the 2005 elections. 
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The personalisation of leadership in the Socialist party has both historical and 
institutional sources. The founding context, as well as the top-down administrative 
approach imposed by Mário Soares, the PS founding president (1973-1986), explains the 
pre-eminence of the leader in the internal balance of power (Magone, 1995, p. 96; 
Sablosky, 1997, p. 62). The existing level of personalisation was nevertheless enhanced by 
the mode of election of the party leader  (Lobo, 2005b, p. 283). In 1998, the PS was the first 
Portuguese party to adopt the direct election of the president by party members using the 
one-person, one-vote method16. The increase in the party’s internal democracy has 
nevertheless increased the centralisation and the concentration of power at the level of 
national leadership (Lobo, 2002, p. 256). The election of the national secretariat through the 
closed-list method on the proposal of the secretary-general, as well as the latter’s control 
over the composition of the political commission and the selection of candidates for general 
elections, explains the leader’s authority within the party’s national bodies (Lisi, 2006, p. 
390). However, similar to the PSD, the influence of the PS leaders has become increasingly 
contingent on their electoral success (Lobo, 2005b, p. 283). 
Several factors bear out José Sócrates’ unchallenged leadership of the Socialist 
party between 2005 and 2009. First, he belonged to the inner circle of new Socialist leaders, 
such as António Guterres and Ferro Rodrigues, who aimed to steer the party towards the 
centre and had campaigned on a “third way” ideological platform since 1992 (Lobo & 
Magalhães, 2001). Consequently, he received the full support of the new leadership when 
he competed against the PS historical leaders grouped around Mário Soares and Manuel 
Alegre in 2004 (TSF, 2004i). However, Sócrates’ election as party leader by over 70 per 
cent of the militants in 2004, when the Socialist party was in opposition, also demonstrated 
his personal base of support among the PS rank-and-file. José Sócrates’ personal authority 
over the party was boosted by the electoral victory delivered in 2005 and by his 
effectiveness as a prime minister. His unquestioned authority over the cabinet and the 
promptness with which he punished any deviation from the government’s programme, as 
emphasised by the abrupt resignation of the Finance Minister Campos e Cunha, did not 
                                                
16
 The 1998 PS statutes required 1,000 signatures from the party members in order to enter the party 
leadership race (article 59). However, the number of signatures required to run for the secretary-general 
position has been considerably reduced after 2003 and has generally varied between one and two hundred 
since then. 
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leave any room for the emergence of a second source of authority within the government or 
in the party (F. S. Costa & Cabrita, 2006; Lopes, 2006). As a result, not only was his bid for 
party leadership unopposed by rival candidatures in 2006, but he was re-elected as 
secretary-general by 97 per cent of the party members who participated to this contest 
(Diário de Notícias, 2006; J. P. Henriques, 2006; M. Silva, 2006). Similarly, he was re-
confirmed as leader at the 2009 Socialist Congress by over 96 per cent of the party 
members, who also endorsed him as the party’s prime ministerial candidate.  
José Sócrates’ base of support within the party did not show any sign of weakening 
four years after he had been appointed as prime minister and in spite of the unprecedented 
waves of street protests raised by the austerity reforms that his government had to introduce 
(Diário de Notícias, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). The lack of competing candidatures as well as 
the near unanimity of José Sócrates’ second re-election as party leader prompted several 
historical leaders, such as Manuel Alegre, to voice concerns regarding the impact of direct 
elections on the quality of debates within the party (Diário de Notícias, 2009d; J. P. 
Henriques, 2009a). However, the possibility of changing the mode of election of the party 
leader did not grow into a dominant theme of debate.  
5.3 The data set on Portuguese ministers 
This section focuses on the political background of the ministers covered by the 
Portugal data set. We begin by describing the variables included in this data set and by 
discussing the measures of fixed characteristics and events in the Portuguese context. 
Subsequently, we compare the distribution of data in the two governments under study. 
This analysis is structured along the four aspects of ministerial career-paths that are 
compared across the country studies: cabinet experience, parliamentary background, 
experience in local administration, and involvement in party organisations. 
The Portugal data set covers 56 ministers, 35 of whom served in the PSD 
government led by Manuel Durrão Barroso and Pedro Santana Lopes, and 21 in the 
Socialist government led by José Sócrates. Over the time period under analysis there have 
been eight state ministers and 48 cabinet ministers. The data set contains 30 instances of 
individual termination events. The fixed characteristics included in the analysis indicate 
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whether or not the ministers had a senior status in the cabinet and their previous experience 
in a full ministerial position and if they were recruited from the parliamentary pool or from 
the local administration pool. Involvement in party politics is captured by two variables. 
The first one indicates whether ministers were politically affiliated to a party organisation, 
while the second one indicates the ministers’ position in the party hierarchy. Table 5.1 
provides definitions for the variables recording personal characteristics and shows basic 
descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers. 
 
Table 5.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (Portugal) 
Variable Definition Mean 
Seniority Dummy variable equal to one for state ministers. 0.14 
Executive experience Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who had 
previously held full cabinet positions. 
0.25 
MP Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
won a seat in last general elections. 0.39 
Parliamentary experience Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
have won at least 2 parliamentary mandates during 
their career. 
0.41 
Local administration 
experience 
Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
held a position in local administration at the 
moment of appointment (mayors and members of 
local executive bodies or municipal assemblies). 
0.13 
Independents Dummy variable equal to one if the minister is not 
affiliated to a political party. 0.27 
Party executives Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are 
members in their parties’ national executive bodies. 0.21 
 
The main events variables included in the Portugal data set record disagreements 
between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties, as indicators of 
principal-agent relationships, and resignation calls as measures of ministerial performance. 
Similar to the French study, conflicts between ministers and presidents, prime 
ministers and parties are recorded each time cabinet members are criticised in public by one 
of the principals, as reported in the newspaper used for data collection. The issue at stake 
may be related to the ministers’ performance in executive or party office or to their 
personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial departments or policy issues. In addition to the 
French case, the pressure exercised by presidents on cabinet ministers includes a legislative 
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component, due to the ability of Portuguese presidents to veto both parliamentary bills and 
executive decrees and refer legislation for constitutional review (Article 136, Portuguese 
Constitution). While the president’s veto on a parliamentary bill may be overturned by the 
absolute majority of the deputies, the political veto on executive decrees is definitive. 
Portuguese presidents use their veto and constitutional referral powers frequently. President 
Sampaio vetoed 55 executive decrees and eight parliamentary bills during his second term 
(2001-2006). In addition, he also referred eight parliamentary bills to the Constitutional 
Court (Freire & Pinto, 2010, p. 108). President Cavaco Silva did not veto any executive 
decree during 2006-2009, but he returned 13 bills to the parliament and he referred another 
12 to the Constitutional Court (Freire & Pinto, 2010, p. 108). The use of legislative veto 
powers is worth taking into account as it does seem to constrain and subject governments to 
greater public scrutiny and debate, while asserting the president’s influence over the 
formulation of policies (Jalali, 2011, p. 170). The dataset includes 28 instances when an 
executive decree or a parliamentary bill initiated by one of the cabinet members covered by 
this dataset was vetoed or referred to the Constitutional Court by the president.  
 The non-legislative component of presidential pressure is related to the Portuguese 
presidents’ “going-public tactics” (Amorim & Lobo, 2009, p. 247) of setting the public 
agenda. These tactics have ranged from president Soares’ open presidencies and 
“magistracy of influence” to public speeches made at public events or in other common 
occasions (Araújo, 2003, p. 95; 96–97; Cruz, 1994, p. 256; Soares, 2002, p. 221). The 
literature has also emphasised the effectiveness of these soft powers in wearing down 
governments and increase opposition to cabinet proposals (Amorim & Lobo, 2009, pp. 
247–250; Jalali, 2011, pp. 170–171). The blocking and reinforcing effects of legislative and 
soft presidential powers on the government’s activity are discussed by Aníbal Cavaco Silva 
in his autobiography (Cavaco Silva, 2004a, pp. 403–444). 
Resignation calls are recorded each time ministers are asked to resign. If they are 
asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new resignation call is recorded only if 
new information comes to light or if a different actor asks the minister to resign. Overall, 
the data set includes 70 resignation calls. They are grouped in four categories, according to 
the proximate reasons that led to their occurrence: personal errors – when ministers are held 
responsible for their own mistakes, errors of judgement, gaffes, involvement in personal or 
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financial scandals, or are seen to be performing badly over a long period of time; 
departmental errors – when serious mistakes occur in the minister’s jurisdiction or 
department; policy disagreements – when ministers are asked to resign because of the 
policies they initiated and/or implemented; and breaches of collective responsibility, when 
ministers are called on to resign because they challenged a decision already made by 
cabinets or prime ministers. 
The analysis also controls for the impact of parliamentary control on the risk of 
deselection. The pressure exercised by the parliament on individual ministers is captured by 
the number of “urgency debates” that ministers are summoned to attend. Created in 1991, 
the “urgency debates” are plenary parliamentary sessions where unexpected polemical 
issues are dealt with in an expeditious way (Leston-Bandeira, 2000, 2004). Each 
parliamentary group is allowed to request the set up of a limited number of urgency debates 
in a given legislative session. They represent a useful and increasingly popular mechanism 
for opposition parties to put pressure on the government in general and on individual 
ministers in particular, given that the parliament cannot vote on individual motions of no-
confidence. They also offer a good opportunity for opposition  to intervene in the policy-
making process in a visible way because urgency debates are extensively reported in the 
mass-media (Leston-Bandeira, 2004, p. 87). The data set includes 37 urgency debates.17  
Other control variables take into account cabinet reshuffles and the impact of social 
unrest on the length of ministerial tenure. Table 5.2 provides definitions for the events 
variables and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17
 Data collected from the official records of the Portuguese National Assembly, including the Diário da 
Assembleia da República and the online archive of parliamentary debates.  
Available at: http://debates.parlamento.pt/search.aspx?cid=r3.dar_s2; 
http://av.parlamento.pt/Default.aspx?s=0&a=Debate+de+actualidade&o=Pinho%2c+Manuel&l=10&fnd=0;  
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Table 5.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (Portugal) 
Variable Definition Mean St. dev. Range 
Tenure The length of ministerial tenure is 
measured in days.  
783.48 562.54 (57, 1690) 
PR Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and 
presidents. 
0.66 1.39 (0, 7) 
PM Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and 
prime ministers. 
0.07 0.26 (0, 1) 
PARTY Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and 
parties. 
0.25 0.84 (0, 5) 
Resignation 
calls 
Number of times ministers have 
been asked to resign. 
1.25 2.96 (0, 16) 
Resignation 
calls (personal) 
Number of times ministers have 
been asked to resign due to personal 
faults. 
0.68 2.27 (0, 16) 
Resignation 
calls 
(departmental) 
Number of times ministers have 
been asked to resign due to 
departmental faults. 
0.16 0.46 (0, 2) 
Resignation 
calls (policy 
disagreements) 
Number of times ministers have 
been asked to resign due to policy 
disagreements. 
0.50 1.68 (0, 9) 
Resignation 
calls (collective 
responsibility) 
Number of times ministers have 
been asked to resign due to 
breaches of collective responsibility. 
0.04 0.27 (0, 2) 
Reshuffles Number of times ministers have 
been reshuffled during current 
mandate. 
0.20 0.44 (0, 2) 
Urgency 
debates* 
Number of times minister have been 
asked to attend urgency debates. 
0.66 0.92 (0, 4) 
Protests Number of national-level strikes and 
protests organised during current 
term. 
1.88 2.91 (0, 12) 
*Source: Obtained from the official records of the Portuguese National Assembly, Diário da 
Assembleia da República, and the online archive of parliamentary debates.  
 
Table 5.3 provides summary statistics for personal characteristics and events 
experienced by ministers within and across the governments in which they served. The data 
shows that the length of ministerial tenure differs significantly in the two cabinets. The 
mean observed tenure is 485 days in the PSD-CDS coalition and 1,281 days in the Socialist 
government. Two events explain the variation in the length of ministerial tenure in the two 
governments. The first one is Durrão Barroso’s resignation as prime minister in July 2004, 
833 days after he took office in April 2002. The second one is the collective resignation of 
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the PSD-CDS government, 149 days after Santana Lopes succeeded Durrão Barroso as 
prime minister. Only six of the ministers who served under PM Barroso continued in office 
under PM Santana Lopes.  
 
Table 5.3 Average fixed characteristics and events by cabinet (Portugal) 
 Barroso/Lopes Socrates Overall 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
N. Ministers 35 21 56 
N. Failures 17 13 30 
Length of tenure (days) 484.86 340.93 1281.19 506.44 783.48 562.54 
Fixed characteristics     
Seniority 0.09 0.28 0.24 0.44 0.14 0.35 
Cabinet experience 0.20 0.41 0.33 0.48 0.25 0.44 
MP 0.43 0.50 0.33 0.48 0.39 0.49 
Parliamentary experience 0.46 0.51 0.33 0.48 0.41 0.50 
Local admin. experience 0.17 0.38 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.33 
Independents 0.11 0.32 0.52 0.51 0.27 0.45 
Party executives 0.20 0.41 0.24 0.44 0.21 0.41 
Events      
Conflicts PR 0.34 1.28 1.19 1.44 0.66 1.39 
Conflicts PM 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.40 0.07 0.26 
Conflicts PARTY 0.11 0.32 0.48 1.29 0.25 0.84 
Resignation calls 1.09 2.86 1.52 3.17 1.25 2.96 
Resignation calls (personal) 0.71 2.72 0.62 1.24 0.68 2.27 
Resignation calls (departmental) 0.20 0.53 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.46 
Resignation calls (policy 
disagreements) 0.20 0.72 1.00 2.55 0.50 1.68 
Resignation calls (collective 
responsibility) 0.06 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.27 
Reshuffles 0.20 0.47 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.44 
Urgency debates 0.46 0.66 1.00 1.18 0.66 0.92 
Protests 1.69 2.83 2.19 3.09 1.88 2.91 
 
 The distribution of events across the two governments is relatively symmetrical. 
The most conflictual principal-agent relationship under both governments is the president-
minister one, seconded by the party-minister relationship. The relatively high number of 
conflicts with presidents is explained by their frequent use of veto powers and “going-
public tactics” to wear down opposing governments during periods of cohabitation. By 
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comparison with presidents and party principals, the amount of conflicts with prime 
ministers was low. As a matter of fact, no conflicts were identified with the two Social-
Democrat prime ministers, Durrão Barroso and Santana Lopes. The lack of conflicts in this 
case may be explained by the code of conduct set by Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who had been 
the Social Democratic Party’s previous prime minister during 1985-1995. Cavaco Silva 
(2004b, p. 126) believed that prime ministers should refrain from criticising ministers in 
public or in front of anybody else and respected this rule throughout his time in office as 
prime minister. The lower frequency of conflicts recorded during Manuel Barroso’ and 
Pedro Santana Lopes’ time in office as prime ministers contrasts with the high number of 
conflicts recorded for José Socrates’ government18. 
The data in Table 5.3 indicates that José Sócrates’ government experienced more 
resignation calls than the centre-right coalition government led by Durrão Barroso and 
Santana Lopes. Figure 5.1 presents the distribution of resignation calls in the two 
governments, according to the proximate reasons of their occurrence and with respect to the 
deselection of the ministers who experienced them. In cases where ministers were asked to 
step down over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded. This is why 
the total number of resignations differs depending on whether one focuses on the exact 
number of calls or on the reason given for their occurrence. Figures above the graph bars 
indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while white figures inside the bars indicate the 
number of resignation calls recorded under each category.  
The data in Figure 5.1 shows that most resignation calls occurred as a reaction to 
personal errors and policy disagreements. However, the data also indicates that ministers 
serving in the PSD-CDS coalition were more often asked to resign over personal errors, 
while members in the PS government faced more policy-related calls for resignation. The 
increased frequency of policy-related resignation calls in José Sócrates’ government 
mirrors the higher number of urgency debates that these ministers were summoned to 
attend by the deputies and the greater number of protests generated by their reforms. 
Policy-related resignation calls also increased the risk of losing office to a considerably 
                                                
18
 Another reason why we may be less likely to observe conflicts between ministers and prime ministers 
during periods of cohabitation in general is related to the strategic occurrence of these events. For example, 
prime ministers may refrain from criticising their ministers in public lest that the president’s party should 
capitalise on the mistakes of the government. 
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greater extent than personal errors or departmental faults. The higher number of resignation 
calls experienced by the Socialist government corresponds to a higher frequency of social 
protests that were directed against this government. Similarly, José Sócrates’ ministers 
were more often summoned to attend urgency debates than ministers in Durrão Barroso’s 
and Santana Lopes’ government. The number of resignation calls triggered by breaches of 
collective responsibility is too low to generalise their impact on the length of tenure. 
However, the fact that the minister who experienced two resignations calls of this type also 
lost office is indicative of their cost for ministerial durability. 
 
Figure 5.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (Portugal) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while numbers 
inside the bars indicate the number of resignation calls recorded under each category. Both 
percentages and numbers refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis and not to the 
total number of resignation calls recorded across cabinets. Source: Own calculations. 
 
The remaining parts of this section focus on the four types of political experience 
that are relevant for ministerial recruitment in Portugal: cabinet experience, parliamentary 
experience, experience in local administration and involvement in party organisations. 
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Similar to France, the analysis of descriptive statistics does not indicate a strong correlation 
between fixed characteristics and the length of ministerial tenure. 
5.4 Political background of Portuguese ministers 
Cabinet experience 
The information related to cabinet experience is captured by two measures. The first 
indicates the senior ministers in the two governments. Out of the 56 ministers under study, 
eight were appointed as state ministers. While seniority may capture the political weight of 
certain ministers, it is not necessarily a good indicator of political experience. For example, 
half of the state ministers covered by the Portugal data set had never been served in 
government before. A few of them were non-partisans and had never been elected to 
parliament. As a result, a second indicator of cabinet experience is needed to indicate the 
ministers who have previously held a seat at the cabinet table. 
Figure 5.2 presents the level of cabinet experience in each government and with 
respect to ministerial survival. The data indicates that cabinet experience was not a 
prerequisite for ministerial recruitment in either of the two governments. Although half of 
the ministers in José Sócrates’ government were non-partisans, the proportion of ministers 
who were at their first appointment was considerably higher in the PSD-CDS government. 
Only one fifth of the ministers who were appointed in the latter government and one third 
of the members in the Socialist government had previously been full cabinet members. An 
average of 19 per cent of all ministers had some previous experience as junior ministers. 
This data does not diverge significantly from the patterns of ministerial recruitment 
observed in Portugal between 1976 and 1999 (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31).  
Cabinet experience does not seem to make a difference for durability in office. 
Similar to France, we find that the lack of cabinet experience does not pose a threat to 
ministerial longevity. Another common finding is that experienced ministers survive in 
office less than their less experienced colleagues. The instability of experienced ministers 
in both cases may be accounted for by the stressful nature of ministerial jobs and by the 
experienced ministers’ tendency to deviate from the preferred positions of their principals. 
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Figure 5.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (Portugal) 
 
 Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Parliamentary experience 
Among Western democracies, Portugal has one of the lowest rates of ministerial 
recruitment from the parliamentary pool. Since 1976, only 51.5 per cent of the Portuguese 
ministers could claim some legislative experience (Pinto & Almeida, 2009, p. 152). Figure 
5.3 confirms this long-term pattern for the two governments under study and shows that 
almost half of the ministers included in the Portugal data set had no parliamentary 
background. The proportion of ministers who lacked any kind of parliamentary experience 
is higher in the Socialist cabinet because of the high number of independents appointed in 
this government.  
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Figure 5.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (Portugal) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
 The data presented in Figure 5.3 also indicates an increase in the parliamentarisation 
of Portuguese cabinets. Compared to the 1976-1999 period, when almost 40 per cent of the 
ministers had been elected only once in the National Assembly (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 
2002, p. 31), the proportion of ministers in this situation dropped to just ten 10 per cent 
between 2002 and 2009. Among the number of ministers with a parliamentary background, 
43 per cent had been elected twice, 18 per cent three times, and almost 22 per cent more 
than three times. Additionally, only seven per cent of the ministers who were elected only 
once had never actually served in parliament due to their promotion in the cabinet. By 
comparison, the proportion of ministers who had actually never served in the parliament 
due to their appointment to government reached 38 per cent during the 1976-1999 period 
(P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31).  
Despite the increasing trend in the recruitment of ministers with a strong legislative 
background, longer parliamentary careers do not necessarily minimise the risk of 
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ministerial deselection. The data in Figure 5.3 does not indicate that ministers without any 
parliamentary background were more likely to lose their job than experienced ministers. 
Similarly, the number of legislatives mandates won does not see to make a difference for 
the length of ministerial tenure.  
Experience in local administration 
Involvement in local and regional politics does not matter as much for the advancement of 
political careers at national level in Portugal as it does in France. In the latter case, deputies 
and ministers usually start their political careers at local level, as political parties value 
local roots and select their candidates for general elections and cabinet positions based on 
the range of political resources they possess (Bach, 2012, p. 17). The same practice does 
not occur in Portugal, where there is a long tradition of separation between national and 
local politics (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 37).  However, compared to the average 
of just five per cent of ministers recruited from among local officials between 1976 and 
1999 (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31), the ministers appointed between 2002 and 
2009 had stronger local roots. Figure 5.4 presents the data corresponding to the experience 
in local administration of the 56 ministers under study. The difference in the composition of 
the two governments is once again accounted for by the high number of independent 
ministers appointed in José Sócrates’ cabinet. 
The data in Figure 5.3 provides some evidence that ministers who have started their 
career at local level before being appointed in government are likely to survive longer in 
office. However, this finding is hardly generalisable, since only a few ministers were 
actually recruited from among local officials. The separation between intraparty politics at 
national and local level may be explained by the personalisation and factionalisation of 
party politics at the start of the democratic transition. For example, the Social Democratic 
Party was initially dominated by local and regional barons, who provided the foundation for 
the national organisation (Corkill, 1995, p. 69). Under these circumstances, the unity of the 
party could only be assured by powerful leaders, such as Sá Carneiro, Pinto Balsemão and 
Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who were able to neutralise the power of local barons. However, as 
the PSD evolved from a party dominated by local notables to a modern party with a large 
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grassroots membership, the barons’ influence on national leadership, gradually diminished 
(Magone, 1995, p. 96). The national leaders’ increase of authority when the party is in 
government also explains the strengthening of the centre with regard to local party notables 
and territorial party units (Bosco & Morlino, 2006, p. 353). 
 
Figure 5.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival 
(Portugal) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
 The formal incompatibility between holding simultaneously a local government 
position, such as that of a mayor or a councillor, and a cabinet seat (Decamp, 1995, p. 136) 
does not allow us to examine the impact of electoral victories and defeats in second-order 
elections on the length of ministerial tenure. Incumbent ministers who wish to contest local 
elections must resign before announcing their candidacy. The decision to leave office in 
order to contest elections is nevertheless rarely taken by Portuguese ministers. During the 
time period under study, only António Costa, a state minister for interior administration in 
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José Sócrates’ cabinet, stepped down in order to contest the snap elections organised in 
Lisbon when the incumbent PSD mayor stepped down in April 2007. These elections were 
regarded by the Socialist party as an opportunity to assert its popularity after one year in 
office, at a time when the government’s key social reforms were raising unprecedented 
waves of social protests. Thus, the candidature of António Costa, the most popular minister 
in the PS government and second only to José Sócrates in the party hierarchy, should be 
interpreted as a strategic move for the benefit of the party rather than as an indicator of a 
change in the patterns of mobility between different levels of government.19 
 
Party experience 
 
Despite their factionalism and weak social infiltration, the PS and the PSD have controlled 
the major routes to executive office since 1976. Almost half of the ministers and state 
secretaries appointed between 1976 and 1999 were senior party members (P. T. de Almeida 
& Pinto, 2002, p. 32). The parties’ control over the government also increases when senior 
positions in the cabinet are allocated to national party executives, as most political 
decisions are taken by an “inner cabinet” that includes the premier and senior ministers 
(Lobo, 2005b, p. 279). 
Figure 5.5 presents the partisan composition of the PSD and the PS governments. 
On average, about one fifth of the ministers appointed in both governments were senior 
party members.20 The data also includes two presidents of local party organisations, who 
are not visible in Figure 5.5 because their national and local leadership roles overlap. 
 
 
 
                                                
19
 More details about the political context of António Costa’s resignation from government to run in the 2007 
mayoral election in Lisbon can be found in J. P. Henriques, Sá, & Morais, 2007; J. P. Henriques, 2007; 
Hortelão & Fragoso, 2007; Santos, 2007; Sá, 2007b. 
20
 In this case seniority denotes membership in national executive bodies such as the Socialist Party’s 
National Political Commission and National Secretariat, the PSD’s National Political Commission and the 
CDS-PP’s National Political Commission and Executive Commission. Presidents of parliamentary caucuses 
are also considered senior party members. 
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Figure 5.5 Party experience across governments and by survival (Portugal) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Taking into account the increase in the authority of national leaders when their party 
is in power, high positions in the party hierarchy should correlate with longer ministerial 
tenures (Bosco & Morlino, 2006, p. 353). This expectation is confirmed by the data 
presented in Figure 5.5. The presence of senior party members in government and their 
longevity in office is a strong indicator for the party principal’s authority over the cabinet.  
Apart from the presence of senior party members in government, Figure 5.5 also 
reveals that a high number of non-partisan ministers were offered a cabinet seat between 
2002 and 2009. The high number of independent ministers appointed in José Sócrates’ 
government stands out because the Socialist party enjoyed an absolute majority in the 
parliament between 2005 and 2009. A precedent for the increase in the number of 
independent ministers in the cabinets formed by the PS had been set by the previous 
Socialist Prime Minister, António Guterres. Ahead of the 1995 general election, Guterres 
set up the Estados Gerais, a political forum that aimed to bring together party members and 
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non-partisans and facilitate their work on a future government programme that could 
present the Socialist Party as a viable alternative to the Social-Democratic Party. The 
legacy of the Estados Gerais for the composition of Guterres’ cabinets translated into 31 
per cent of independent ministers in the government formed in 1995 and 28 per cent of non-
partisan appointments in the 1999 cabinet (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008; Lobo, 2002). 
Figure 5.5 suggests a correlation between non-partisanship and forced exits from 
government. Independent ministers were more likely to lose their job than party members 
or senior party members. Another interesting pattern visible in Figure 5.5 regards the 
correlation between the number of non-partisan ministers and that of senior party members 
appointed in the cabinet. While the composition of the PSD government is dominated by 
party members without leadership experience, there are more senior party members than 
ordinary party members in the PS government. The increased presence of senior party 
members in a government where half of the seats are given to independent ministers can be 
an indicator for the party principal’s grip over the executive decision-making process that 
takes place in the inner cabinet.  
To sum up, the relative unimportance of local politics and parliamentary experience 
and the unusual number of non-partisan ministers suggest that the party principal’s 
influence over the government is not exercised through the usual channels of representation 
in Portugal. However, party principals manage to keep a tight grip on the cabinet due their 
presence in government and to the concentration of the decision-making system in an inner 
cabinet formed around the prime ministers and senior party members. 
5.5 Fixed characteristics, events, and ministerial durability in Portugal 
This section assesses the impact of fixed characteristics and principal-agent relationships on 
the length of ministerial tenure in Portugal. The data set includes the exact dates when 
ministers take and leave office. The ministers’ observed tenure is right-censored if they 
leave office collectively, as happened in December 2004 when Santana Lopes and his 
cabinet resigned after President Sampaio’s dissolved the assembly and called early 
elections. Ministers are also right-censored if they are still in office at the end of the time 
period under study. This is the case for several ministers in José Sócrates’ government who 
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were reappointed in the PS government formed after the 2009 elections. Ministers who 
were not reappointed in the 2009 government are recorded as failed observations. 
Additionally, the length of tenure is not interrupted for ministers who continue in office 
when Durrão Barroso was succeeded as prime minister by Santana Lopes. The duration in 
office is also not interrupted if ministers are assigned to different portfolios during their 
time in office. The Portugal data set includes 56 ministers who were appointed between 
2002 and 2009. 30 ministers stepped down before the collective end of their cabinets or 
were not reappointed when their government returned to power after general elections.  
Figures 5.6 shows the unconditional probability that ministers will survive beyond a 
certain time when no covariates are taken into consideration.  
 
Figure 5.6 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival (Portugal) 
 
Overall, Portuguese ministers have a 50% chance of surviving 1,053 days in office. 
However, the length of ministerial tenure varies significantly in the two governments. As 
shown in Figure 5.7, ministers who served in the Socialist government had a 50% chance of 
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surviving 1,689 days in office, while those who were appointed in the PSD-CDS coalition 
had a 50% chance of surviving only 833 days in office. The difference in the ministers’ 
length of tenure is explained by the dissolution of the assembly and the calling of early 
elections in December 2004, 22 months after Manuel Durrão Barroso was appointed as 
prime minister and just four months after he was succeeded in office by Pedro Santana 
Lopes. The result of the log-rank test presented in Figure 5.7 indicates that the survival of 
ministers varies in proportional ways in the two governments. 
 
Figure 5.7 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across cabinets (Portugal) 
 
 
 Table 5.4 presents three models. Model 1 focuses on personal characteristics 
variables, while Model 2 takes into consideration only events variables. Model 3 estimates 
the joint impact of political background and events on ministerial longevity. The models 
present coefficients from Cox regressions and report standard errors clustered by ministers. 
The observations are clustered by ministers and the data set includes 56 clusters. Positive 
coefficients imply that the risk of deselection rises and indicate a shorter length of tenure, 
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while negative coefficients decrease the hazard rate and are therefore expected to increase 
the length of tenure. The specification of the models with regard to the nonlinearity of the 
explanatory variables is assessed using link tests (reported at the bottom of Table 5.4). The 
diagnostic tests verifying that the explanatory variables included in the models have a 
proportional and constant effect that is invariant to time are reported in Appendix B (B.1, 
B.3, and B.5). The analysis of Schoenfeld residuals has revealed that several variables 
violate the assumption of proportional hazards. To address their non-proportionality and 
increase the models’ accuracy in assessing their effects, these variables were interacted 
with the natural logarithm of time (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001, p. 978). As a result, 
the three regressions presented in Table 5.4 are extended applications of the Cox model. 
The Appendix includes a comparison of the results obtained before and after the treatment 
of non-proportional variables for each of the three models (B.2, B.4, and B.6). All variables 
that have been found to violate the proportional hazard assumption at the 0.05 level in one 
model have been interacted with the natural logarithm of time in all models for the ease of 
comparative interpretations of their effects across the three models. The results presented in 
the Appendix show that the treatment of non-proportional variables does not affect 
significantly the size of the estimated coefficients or their sign. 
Model 1 confirms the limited impact of fixed characteristics on the length of 
ministerial tenure. Ministers recruited from the parliamentary pool seem to survive in office 
longer than their non-elected peers. However, this finding is not robust and the statistical 
significance of this variable disappears in Model 3, which estimates the joint impact of 
fixed characteristics and events on the length of tenure. Similarly, ministers with a stronger 
parliamentary background appear more prone to deselection in Model 1, but not in Model 
3. The only robust finding related to the impact of political background on ministerial 
durability concerns the ministers’ position in the party hierarchy. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of Party experience indicates that senior party members 
appointed in the cabinet are likely to survive longer in office. This finding confirms the 
expectation regarding the increase in the authority of senior party members over the 
government and party organisations when they are in power (Bosco & Morlino, 2006, p. 
353).
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Table 5.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in Portugal 
 
 Model 1  Model2   Model3 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Fixed characteristics 
Seniority        0.53       0.72 
       (0.85)           (0.69) 
Cabinet experience              -0.05                           0.09    
                              (0.45)                         (0.41)    
MP#                        -0.12*                          0.02    
                              (0.08)                         (0.10)    
Parliamentary experience        0.95*                          0.69    
                              (0.52)                         (0.69)    
Local administration experience       0.65                           0.64    
                              (0.50)                         (0.40)    
Party executive            -2.15**                        -2.48** 
                              (0.82)                         (0.93)    
Independent                   -0.66                          -0.19    
                              (0.55)                         (0.47)    
Events 
Urgency debates                                     3.79***         3.11*** 
                                                (0.58)          (0.81)    
Protests#                                      0.14***         0.20*** 
                                                (0.03)          (0.05)    
Reshuffles#                                 -0.19            0.16    
                                                (0.39)          (0.39)    
Resignation calls (personal)                    -1.19**         -1.90** 
                                               (0.50)          (0.89)    
Resignation calls (departmental)                -5.18**         -5.50** 
                                                (1.90)          (2.39)    
Resignation calls (policy disagreements)          1.45***         1.37**  
                                                (0.32)          (0.44)    
PR Conflicts                                         1.83***         0.85    
                                                (0.46)          (0.61)    
PM Conflicts                                         3.92**          4.83**  
                                                (1.55)          (2.30)    
PARTY Conflicts                                      3.43***         4.64**  
                                                 (0.76)          (1.49)    
____________________________________________________________________________ 
N Ministers                            56              56              56              
N Observations                        540             540             540              
N Failures                             30              30              30             
Log-likelihood              -85.488         -73.319         -69.144    
Linktest hat(squared)               -0.14           -0.09           -0.08            
                     p=(.57)         p=(.57)         p=(.53) 
Note: Cell entries are coefficients computed using the Efron method of 
resolving ties. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered 
by minister (56 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
# Variables interacted with the natural logarithm of time to address their 
non-proportional effects.   
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The variation in the weight of party roles on the durability of French and Portuguese 
ministers points towards a relationship between different types of party systems and 
ministerial turnover. The organisational weakness of French political parties and their 
operation within a presidentialised party system explains why experienced ministers, who 
have fewer incentives to put up with policy compromises that may endanger their re-
election at national and local level, are not willing to cling to office at any cost. By contrast, 
the governmentalisation of Portuguese parties, which control both cabinet appointments 
and the executive decision-making process that takes place in the inner cabinet, explains the 
longer durability of ministers with senior positions in the party hierarchy. 
Model 2 estimates the impact of events on the risk of deselection, while Model 3 
estimates the joint impact of fixed characteristics and events on the length of tenure. The 
results corresponding to the impact of cabinet reshuffles, resignation calls, parliamentary 
control and social unrest are robust and hardly change from one model to another. While all 
variables corresponding to different types of resignation calls are statistically significant, 
only the coefficient corresponding to policy-related resignation calls is positive.21 Thus, 
only policy-related resignation calls increase a minister’s risk of losing office. Resignation 
calls related to personal faults and departmental faults have not cost ministers their jobs. 
For example, recurring resignation calls did not lead to the dismissal of Paulo Portas, the 
CDS leader and state minister who was involved in several scandals of financial 
embezzlement such as the Moderna Affair and the Portucale case. Similarly, Jaime Silva, 
the minister for agriculture in the PS government, did not lose his cabinet seat although he 
was repeatedly called on to resign by backbenchers on account of his negative performance 
in office. Instead, ministers who initiated unpopular reforms and attempted to reduce 
spending in their departments, such as the education minister Pedro Lynce in the PSD-CDS 
cabinet, or the health and education ministers in the Socialist cabinet, Maria de Lurdes 
Rodrigues and António Correia de Campos, were either dismissed or not re-appointed when 
their government returned to power after the 2009 elections.  
The detrimental effect of unpopular reforms on ministerial longevity is confirmed 
by the results corresponding to the impact of social protests and urgency debates on 
                                                
21
 The resignation calls related to breaches of collective responsibility have not been included in the analysis 
because only two episodes of this kind were recorded for the time period under study. 
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deselection. The positive and statistically significant mean coefficient on Protest in Models 
2 and 3 indicates that social unrest increased the risk of deselection, despite the high 
popularity ratings of the Socialist government and prime minister (Dores, Fonseca, & 
Cabrita, 2007; V. J. Silva, 2007). 
Similarly, ministers summoned by deputies to attend urgency debates, mostly 
related to unpopular reforms, were also more likely to lose their jobs. The impact of 
parliamentary pressure on ministerial longevity is not entirely surprising. As far as its 
institutional autonomy is concerned, the weakness of the Portuguese parliament is 
outranked in Europe only by the French, Russian and Cypriot assemblies (Fish & Kroenig, 
2009, p. 755). On the other hand though, the National Assembly’s influence over the 
executive is one of the strongest among European parliaments, as Portuguese deputies have 
extensive powers of control, investigation, oversee and interpellation over the executive 
branch of government (Fish & Kroenig, 2009, p. 545). 
The positive and statistically significant coefficients corresponding to the conflict 
variables in Model 2 confirm that ministers who are at odds with their principals are more 
likely to lose their jobs. The only principal-agent relationship that loses statistical 
significance in Model 3 is the minister-president one. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient corresponding to PR Conflicts in Model 2 indicates that conflicts 
with presidents increase the risk of deselection. However, when the ministers’ political 
background is also taken into account the statistically significant impact of conflicts with 
presidents disappears. As the only personal characteristic that reaches statistical 
significance in Model 3 concerns the ministers’ position in the party hierarchy, the impact 
of presidential pressure on ministerial survival may be taken over by the combined effect of 
the variables recording party-related personal characteristics and events. Thus, while party 
executives do not suffer any repercussions over clashes with presidents, they are still under 
the control of prime ministers and party principals outside the government.  
In general, though, there is evidence to suggest that conflicts with presidents are not 
entirely consequence free. An example of the effective way in which presidents can use 
both means of influence to block or at least slow down the reforms pursued by cabinet 
ministers is visible in the policy record of Mário Lino, the minister for public works in José 
Sócrates’ cabinet. President Cavaco Silva was a prominent actor in the public debates 
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generated by minister Lino’s policy initiatives, most of which failed or were withdrawn (J. 
P. Henriques, 2009b). Within less than a year after the president expressed his doubts 
regarding the location of a new international airport in Ota, the government reversed 
minister Lino’s original decision and eventually postponed the construction of the new 
airport altogether. Another two projects that President Cavaco Silva held up by expressing 
his reservation, as well as by asking the government to revise Mário Lino’s decrees in 
January 2009, regarded the construction of four high-speed railway routes and the re-
evaluation of the highway concession arrangements to Estradas de Portugal. Mário Lino 
was constantly weakened by the president’s interventions in the policy process, which 
constrained his ability of action and made him the subject of increased public scrutiny and 
debates (Sá, 2009). Shortly before the 2009 elections, minister Lino announced his decision 
not to continue in office if the government returned to power. Thus, Portuguese presidents 
are sometimes able to influence both the policy-making process and the length of 
ministerial tenure. 
The results presented in Model 3 confirm the undisputed authority of Portuguese 
prime ministers over the cabinet executive decision-making process and emphasise the 
considerable extent of influence that the party principal retains over the cabinet 
composition. The effects of the conflict variables are graphically interpreted in Figure 5.8. 
Separate illustrations of the impact of conflicts with each principal on ministerial durability 
are included in the Appendix (B.7-B.9). 
Figure 5.8 confirms the significant variation in the ability of each principal to 
influence the length of ministerial tenure. Overall, conflicts with any of the three principals 
are more likely to cost ministers their jobs in the early days of their appointment than later 
on. The intensity of control increases in the first two years following appointment and then 
declines. A final increase in the risk of deselection occurs towards the end the ministers’ 
term in office, as the next electoral cycle comes closer. The results in Figure 5.8 clearly 
emphasise that the party principal’s authority over cabinet ministers outweighs both 
presidents and prime ministers. Compared to presidents and prime ministers, conflicts with 
party principals have a considerably stronger impact on deselection immediately after 
appointment. The maximum impact of conflicts is reached within the first year after 
appointment and then decreases gradually. Overall, these results emphasise a direct 
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relationship between the governmentalisation of Portuguese parties and ministerial 
turnover. Thus, the presence of senior party members in government and their inclusion in 
the inner cabinet formed around the prime minister does make a difference not only for 
their own longevity in ministerial office, but also for the party principal’s ability to keep a 
tight grip on cabinet composition in general. 
 
Figure 5.8 Impact of principal-agent relations (Portugal) 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the determinants of ministerial survival in Portugal. The patterns 
of ministerial recruitment in Portugal stand out because of the relative unimportance of 
local politics, the declining importance of parliamentary experience and the frequent non-
partisan appointments in government (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002; Pinto & Almeida, 
2009). This chapter has confirmed that the two governments under study make no 
exception to these patterns. The empirical analysis has also shown that with the exception 
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of the ministers’ position in the party hierarchy, no other fixed characteristics affect their 
length of tenure. This finding suggests that although the Portuguese parties have less 
control on the usual channels of representation that place a premium on political 
experience, they are able to keep a tight grip on governments due to their increased 
presence in government and to the concentration of the decision-making process in the 
inner cabinet. 
In stark contrast with France, the analysis of principal-agent relationships in 
Portugal has confirmed the standard wisdom that Portuguese presidents have considerably 
fewer means of influencing the process of cabinet deselection compared to prime ministers. 
The weakness of Portuguese presidents and the tight grip of prime ministers over cabinet 
members have proved robust with regard to institutional context. However, this chapter has 
also emphasised that under certain circumstances presidents can use both legislative powers 
and “going-public” tactics to wear down individual ministers. The analysis has also 
confirmed the general assumption that the Portuguese government operates under the rule 
of party leadership (Colomer, 1996). We have presented empirical evidence that 
substantiates the extensive involvement of parties in the process of cabinet appointments, as 
well as in the deselection of ministers. The multivariate analysis has also shown that the 
governmentalisation of political parties has important consequences for the process of 
ministerial turnover in Portugal.  
The comparison of the variation in the impact of different principal-agent 
relationships on the length of ministerial tenure in different national contexts reveals a 
direct link between different types of party systems and ministerial accountability. The 
French case shows that when the party system undergoes a process of presidentialisation, 
cabinet ministers are likely to fall under the direct control of presidents or prime ministers, 
depending on the institutional context that favours the pre-eminence of one or the other 
within the political system. Conversely, the Portuguese case suggests that when the party 
system undergoes a process of governmentalisation, cabinet ministers are more likely to be 
accountable to prime ministers and their parties regardless of institutional context. 
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On 29 June 2006, Teodor Atanasiu, the National Liberal Party’s (PNL) minister of defence, 
urged the Supreme Defence Council (CSAT) to order the withdrawal of the Romanian 
military forces from Iraq. The decision had been taken by the central leadership of the PNL, 
which included Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, as the prime minister and leader of this political 
party. The minister also sent a telegram to the Romanian military attaches abroad, asking 
them to inform the authorities of the countries in which they served that the Romanian 
troops would be withdrawn from the US-led coalition in Iraq. This initiative had not been 
discussed with coalition partners or with the president, who is the commander-in-chief of 
the army, and none of Romania’s allies had been previously informed about the troop 
pullout plan. Although the plan was eventually rejected by the CSAT and strongly 
criticised by the president, the minister remained in office (Ruse, 2006).  
In October 2006, two Romanian workers were detained for taking pictures without 
permission on a US military base close to Mosul. They were subsequently transferred to 
Baghdad where they were debriefed by the Romanian authorities. When this information 
appeared in the media at the end of January 2007, President Băsescu declared that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had informed him about the workers’ situation in November 
2006. PM Tăriceanu, who had not been informed about this issue, urged the foreign affairs 
ministers to resign. Ungureanu resigned two days later, despite the internal and 
international appreciation of his competency (Pora, 2007). 
Why was minister Ungureanu sacked for failing to inform the prime minister about 
a regular consular issue, while his colleague at the department of defence was not 
sanctioned for not informing the president, who is also the commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, about a fundamental military situation? A principal-agent perspective 
captures the essence of such a situation, which cannot be accurately decoded by a 
constitutional reading of this political scenario. The foreign affairs minister’s failure to 
keep the prime minister informed on the evolution of the release operation may not have 
had an impact on the success of the release operation, but it gave the president a personal 
Chapter Six: Ministerial deselection in Romania
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edge over the prime minister in executive affairs (Popescu et al. 2007). Conversely, the Iraq 
troop pullout plan had been drawn by the defence minister with the tacit approval of the 
prime minister, his principal in the government as well as the party hierarchy. Of the two 
ministers in the wrong, it was the one who had the support of the prime minister that 
survived, while the one who was supported by the president stepped down. The different 
resolution of two conflicts between cabinet ministers and the two principals in the 
executive allows us to single out the circumstances under which presidents and the prime 
ministers can sanction agency loss. 
This chapter is structured into four parts. The first section outlines the data, the time 
period, the institutional context, and the determinants of ministerial duration that are 
captured by the analysis of Romanian ministers. The second section focuses on intraparty 
politics and examines the organisational transformation undergone by the Social-
Democratic Party (PSD), the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Party 
(PD/PDL) during the time period under analysis. This analysis reveals to what extent 
holding the presidency of a political party before taking office allows presidents to control 
their parties even after they formally step down as party leaders. The third section describes 
the data collected for the Romanian case study and explains the measurement of fixed 
characteristics and events in this context. The last section of this chapter completes the 
study of ministerial turnover in Romania with a multivariate analysis that estimates the 
length of ministerial tenure as function of fixed characteristics, events, and principal-agent 
relationships between ministers, presidents, premiers, and party principals. This analysis 
also estimates the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to control the 
process of ministerial deselection under different executive scenarios. 
6.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in Romania 
The data set corresponding to the Romania case-study covers 101 ministers who were in 
office between 2000 and 2008. Each of the three dual-executive scenarios that can be used 
to describe the relationship between presidents and prime ministers in semi-presidential 
systems occurred during this period of time. The scenario of unified executive occurred as a 
result of the Social-Democratic Party’s (PSD) victory in the presidential and parliamentary 
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elections of 2000. President Iliescu and PM Năstase, both of whom were PSD members, 
remained in office until November 2004, when new presidential and parliamentary 
elections were organised. The scenario of divided executive, which is defined as the 
situation when the president and the prime minister belong to different political parties and 
the president’s party is in government, started in December 2004, when President Băsescu 
of the Democratic Party (PD) appointed Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu of the PNL as prime 
minister. The period of divided executive ended in April 2007, when President Băsescu’s 
PD/PDL party left the governing coalition. This political event triggered the onset of a 
period of cohabitation, which lasted until the 2008 election. The alternation of the three 
executive scenarios between 2000 and 2008 provides a good opportunity to test the impact 
of different president-prime minister relations on ministerial turnover in the same country. 
 Similar to the French and the Portuguese studies, the Romanian data set includes 
ministers and state ministers, but does not cover state secretaries due to their exclusive 
accountability to line ministers. While the units of observation in the data set are the 101 
ministers, the units of analysis are the events experienced by ministers during their time in 
office. Overall, 1,717 observations related to the events experienced by ministers were 
recorded from approximately 23,724 articles published in Evenimentul zilei during the 
ministers’ time in office and accessed through the online archive which is available on the 
newspaper’s website. The articles used for data collection were selected using keywords 
related to major events, such as resignations, dismissals and reshuffles, and to conflictual 
situations involving scandals, policy disagreements, personal and departmental faults, 
breaches of collective responsibility, and protests. Each observation includes the type of 
event recorded, the political actors involved, and the reasons that caused it. The events 
experienced by ministers may be terminal or non-terminal. Terminal events refer to 
individual termination events, such as resignations and dismissals. The non-terminal events 
cover conflicts with presidents, parties and prime ministers (recorded each time one of the 
principals criticises ministers publicly), resignation calls, cabinet reshuffles, simple motions 
tabled in either of the two parliamentary chambers against individual ministers, and 
national-level strikes and protests that occurred within each minister’s area of 
responsibility. The proximate reasons used for coding of events include policy 
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disagreements, personal and departmental errors, performance in office, appointments 
outside cabinet, intra-cabinet and intra-party conflicts, and non-political reasons.  
Like in France, and in contrast to Portugal, the institutional framework adopted after 
the fall of communism has led to the presidentialisation of Romanian parties. The directly 
elected presidency was introduced in 1990, in the context of a weakly institutionalised party 
system dominated by a single political organisation, the National Salvation Front (FSN). 
The FSN was set up during the Revolution of December 1989 as an umbrella movement 
designed to act as a provisional body of state power until new elections were organised. Its 
decision to contest the first post-communist elections was considered unfair and sparked 
countrywide protests (S. Stoica, 2010, p. 28). The FSN also controlled a majority of seats in 
the Provisional Council of National Union (CPUN) that administered the country ahead of 
the first free elections. The CPUN set out Romania’s semi-presidential framework by 
passing the Electoral Law of 14 March 1990, which established that the presidency should 
be directly elected and set a common date for presidential and parliamentary elections in 
May 1990 (Verheijen, 1999, p. 195). The concurrent date for presidential and legislative 
elections focused politics on national leadership. The results of the first presidential and 
parliamentary elections, where Ion Iliescu won 85 per cent of the vote and the FSN more 
than two-thirds of the mandates, established the figure of the head of state as the de facto 
leader of the parliamentary majority.  
The presidentialisation of intraparty relations explains the presidential working 
mode of the Romanian political system during periods of unified executive, when 
presidents act as de facto leaders of their former parties and are able to turn prime ministers 
into their agents (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). As a result, we expect that the 
president’s authority over cabinet ministers increases during periods of unified executive. 
Comparative studies of presidential and prime ministerial power in post-communist 
countries have also singled out the weakness of prime ministers when they belong to the 
same party as the president (Baylis, 1996, 2007, p. 97). However, presidents should have 
fewer opportunities of intervening in executive affairs during cohabitation, when they lack 
both formal and informal means of controlling the parliamentary majority. Under this 
executive scenario, prime ministers should assume a strong leadership role over their 
cabinets. In addition to the unified executive and the cohabitation scenarios, which are also 
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present in the French and Portuguese country-studies, the Romanian data set also covers a 
period of divided executive. Due to the president’ and the prime minister’s affiliation with 
different parties during periods of divided executive, presidents are less likely to succeed in 
altering the principal-agent relationship between prime ministers and their parties. If prime 
ministers no longer act as presidential agents, then the head of state’s informal influence 
may only extend to ministers who belong to his or her former party. Overall then, 
presidents should be less influential under divided executive than under unified executive, 
but more powerful than under cohabitation. Similarly, the prime minister’s control over the 
cabinet should be stronger under divided executive than under unified executive.  
The second section of this chapter analyses the party relationships between 
presidents and prime ministers. The considerable influence of Romanian presidents over the 
government has been put down to their authority over their former parties in spite of a 
limited range of formal executive powers (Krouwel, 2003, pp. 13–14; Pîrvulescu, 2000, p. 
11). This section emphasises the intraparty organisational resources that allow presidents to 
continue in their role as de facto party leaders after they formally given up their party 
responsibilities. To emphasise the circumstances that allow presidents to turn prime 
ministers and cabinet members into their own agents, the analysis focuses on the 
inclusiveness and the competitiveness of the leadership selection process in the Social-
Democratic Party between 2000 and 2004 and in the Democratic Party between 2004 and 
2008. This analysis shows that presidents who are allowed to organise their own succession 
in the party are able to control not only the party organisation, but also the parliamentary 
parties and their representatives in government if their party is in power. Similarly, we also 
emphasise to what extent the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy matters for the 
extent of their authority over the cabinet. To do so we analyse the relationship between 
prime ministers and their parties in the Social-Democratic Party between 2000 and 2004 
and in the National Liberal Party between 2004 and 2008. This approach allows us to 
compare the influence of a prime minister who was elected as party leader after his 
appointment as head of government with the authority of a prime minister who came to 
power as a party leader.  The analysis emphasises the difference that holding the presidency 
of a party makes for the autonomy of prime ministers with respect to their own party and 
for their ability to act as principals for cabinet members. 
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The third section of the chapter focuses on the political background of the ministers 
covered by the Romania data set. Although the reproduction of the old nomenklatura elite 
during the first years of regime transition reached one of the highest rate in Romania 
compared to other East European countries22, the patterns of ministerial careers have 
undergone a gradual process of institutionalisation. Similar to other European democracies, 
the standard route to ministerial office in Romania includes some experience acquired at 
different levels of the national government or in local administration and may the 
culmination of a long parliamentary or party career (Ionaşcu, 2011, p. 39). The third section 
of this chapter analyses the salience of each political resource for government appointments 
and looks at the correlation between different types of political experience and the length of 
tenure. In addition to discussing the individual weight of political resources for the 
appointment and durability of cabinet ministers, this section also emphasises the variation 
in their importance in different governments and political parties.  
The analysis of different types of political experience reveals significant differences 
between the composition of the centre-left and centre-right governments. The Social-
Democratic Party’s presence in power between 1990 and 1996 explains why the level of 
political professionalisation and executive experience in the PSD government is 
considerably higher than that of the PNL-PD government (Ionaşcu, 2006a, p. 47). 
Similarly, the parliamentary background of the PSD ministers is stronger than that of the 
PNL or PD/PDL ministers. However, the parliamentary route has not been the single most 
important path to ministerial office in post-communist Romania, although the combination 
of parliamentary and cabinet positions is the only type of multiple office-holding legally 
permitted23. Only 50 per cent of the ministers who took office between 1990 and 2008 had 
been elected at least once to either of the two parliamentary chambers (Ionaşcu, 2011, p. 
40). The separation between the parliamentary and the executive elites of the Romanian 
parties has been put down to the indiscipline of parliamentary groups (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 
611). The deputies selected for ministerial appointments are those who have a senior 
position in the parliamentary hierarchy, such as the presidency or the vice-presidency of 
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 While the rejuvenation of political elites in most other East European countries had largely been carried out 
by 1993 (Szelényi & Szelényi, 1995, p. 629), it was only after 1996 that the presence of former communist 
office-holders in the Romanian governments dropped below 40 per cent (Grosescu, 2004, p. 120). 
23
 Law no. 161/2003, art. 81. 
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parliamentary commissions (Ionaşcu, 2011, p. 40). Since the allocation of these positions is 
made on a political basis, their holders are usually high-ranking party officials. As a result, 
the potential for agency loss is considerably reduced. 
Party experience emerges as the single most successful route to executive office. 
The majority of cabinet ministers appointed between 1990 and 2008 were members in their 
parties’ executive bodies (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 603). By comparison, the parliamentary route 
accounts for little more than 50 per cent, while only 12 per cent of the post-communist 
ministers have had any experience in local administration (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 603). The legal 
ban on the simultaneous holding of local and national offices24 has prevented the 
emergence of a similar cumul de mandats phenomenon as in France and explains the 
separation between the local and the national levels of decision-making. A separation 
between national and local leadership also exists within political parties, as few leaders of 
local party organisations have been offered a seat at the cabinet table. Thus, national party 
leaders are both the selectorate and the main contenders for high public office. 
The presence of senior party members in cabinet depends on the political parties 
that are in power. In general, the PSD governments have included fewer senior party 
members than the centre-right governments. While the PSD values party seniority, this 
party has also actively pursued the recruitment of outsiders with no party credentials, such 
as technocrats, popular figures, businessmen, and potential donors (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 
243). The combination of two different patterns of recruitment has increased the circulation 
of party elites and the central leadership’s grip over the party’s representatives in public 
office. Among all Romanian parties, the Democratic Party places the highest premium on 
party experience as a criterion for appointment in government. The explanation for this 
pattern of ministerial recruitment has been put down to the stability of the PD’s national 
elite, which underwent just one major overhaul in 2001 (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 240). In 
contrast, the high rate of leadership turnover and factionalism in the National Liberal Party 
has resulted in the appointment of ministers with high political visibility and governmental 
experience, but shorter party careers (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 245).  
To sum up, despite the variation in patterns of ministerial recruitment, the constant 
presence of senior party members in cabinet suggests that Romanian parties may have 
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undergone a similar process of governmentalisation as the Portuguese parties. If this is true, 
then party principals should be in a good position to control the process of ministerial 
deselection. To verify this hypothesis we need to examine to what extent a high position in 
the party hierarchy makes a difference for the length of ministerial tenure. This is the aim 
of the third section of this chapter, which provides descriptive statistics for the relationship 
between fixed characteristics and the length of ministerial tenure. 
The last section of the chapter analyses the variation in the length of ministerial 
tenure as a function of fixed characteristics, events, and principal-agent relationships. We 
also verify to what extent the principals’ influence on the process of ministerial deselection 
depends on institutional context. To do so their ability to sanction agency loss is estimated 
separately during periods of unified executive, divided executive, and cohabitation. The 
multivariate analysis emphasises that fixed characteristics do not explain why some 
ministers survive in office longer than others. Depending on executive scenarios, some 
principal-agent relationships are more likely to influence the ministers’ durability in office 
than others. This analysis confirms the standard wisdom that the authority of prime 
ministers increases considerably under cohabitation. However, the analysis also provides 
strong evidence that under certain circumstances presidents may have a bigger impact on 
ministerial deselections under cohabitation than during periods of unified executive. 
Another intriguing finding is that the influence of party principals over cabinet ministers 
outweighs the authority of the president and the prime minister under divided executive 
even though both of them acted as de facto party leaders. 
6.2 Party relationships in the Romanian executive 
This section analyses the impact that different party relationships between presidents and 
prime ministers have on their authority over cabinet members. As both presidents included 
in the analysis won elections as party leaders, the analysis discusses to what extent and 
under what circumstances holding the presidency of a political party increases a president’s 
authority over the government in Romania. To emphasise the intraparty organisational 
resources that allow presidents to continue in their role as de facto party leaders after they 
formally step down from party office we focus on the inclusiveness and the 
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competitiveness of the leadership selection process in the PSD and in the PD/PDL between 
2000-2004 and 2004-2008 respectively. We also discuss the intraparty resources that prime 
ministers can use to assert their leadership over the government and within their own 
parties. This analysis indicates that whether or not prime ministers come to office as party 
leaders makes a difference for the extent of their authority over the cabinet. To do so we 
analyse the relationship between prime ministers and their parties in the PSD between 2000 
and 2004 and in the PNL between 2004 and 2008.  
The president- and PM-party relationships in the PSD (2000-2004) 
The leadership of the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), also known as PDSR, FDSN, 
or FSN until 2001, was remarkably stable until 2004. Since 1992, the president of the party 
was elected by party delegates at a national conference convened every two years, unless 
special circumstances called for an extraordinary national conference. It was only after 
2010 that the statute of the Social-Democratic Party was changed to introduce the election 
of the president by all party members and the organisation of primaries for the selection of 
presidential candidates (Partidul Social Democrat, 2010, art. 135). Until 2005, when a 
majority run-off formula was introduced, the president was elected through one round of 
voting, provided two-thirds of the delegates were present at the National Conference 
(Partidul Social Democrat, 2005, art. 77). Alongside territorial delegates, ex-officio 
delegates representing the central leadership also participated to national conventions 
(Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 517).  Before 2005, the number of territorial delegates 
representing each local party organisation was determined by an algorithm of 
representation decided by the national Executive Bureau (Partidul Social Democrat, 2005, 
art. 46). The central leadership’s control over the delegate selection process explains the 
centralisation of the party and the inability of local organisations to influence the outcome 
of leadership contests until 2005 (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 527). Party leadership 
elections also displayed a low degree of competitiveness, as only one candidate contested 
the presidency of the party until 2005 (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 526). Moreover, the 
candidate for this position was either Ion Iliescu, or a successor whom he hand-picked. 
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Except for the short period of time that preceded the first free elections of May 
1990, Ion Iliescu was an actual president of the Social-Democratic Party only between 1997 
and 2000. However, there was never any doubt that the main party in government was 
headed in all but name by the incumbent head of state between 1990 and 1996 
(Evenimentul zilei, 2002f; Shafir, 1997a). Iliescu’s re-election as party leader in January 
1997, after his party lost the presidential and legislative elections in November 1996, was a 
mere formality (Dimancea, 2005; Tismăneanu & Mihăieş, 2011). Similar to 1992, when the 
FSN split as a result of the pressure put on the party leadership to endorse a different 
presidential candidacy than Iliescu’s, the reformist groups who challenged Iliescu’s 
leadership in 1997 were excluded from the party (Shafir, 1997a, 1997b). Iliescu was re-
elected as party president and presidential candidate one year before the 2000 elections, at 
the National Conference organised in October 1999. Iliescu’s control over the party ahead 
of the 2000 elections is therefore unquestionable. 
Following the presidential and legislative elections of 2000, Iliescu was also able to 
organise his succession in the party before taking office again as President of Romania. He 
handed over the leadership of the party to his second-in-command, first deputy president 
Adrian Năstase, and appointed him as prime minister. Iliescu’s choice for the leadership of 
the party was ratified in January 2000, when Adrian Năstase was unanimously elected as a 
new party president by the 869 delegates to the extraordinary National Conference 
(RFE/RL, 2001). From this moment on, the two leaders engaged in a competition for the 
control of the party and the government. 
Adrian Năstase was re-confirmed as party leader when the PDSR merged with the 
Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSDR) to form the Social Democratic Party in June 
2001. He was unanimously elected as party leader by the 4,030 delegates who participated 
at the party congress approving the merger between the two parties in June 2001 
(Dimancea, 2005). The prime minister’s authority over the ruling party was considerably 
enhanced by his uncontested election as leader of a new political party, with a different 
statute and leadership structure than those inherited from Ion Iliescu. 
As prime minister, Adrian Năstase was determined to limit the president’s 
interference in government affairs (Evenimentul zilei, 2002b; Frison-Roche, 2011, p. 70; 
Tismăneanu & Mihăieş, 2011, p. 391). Their relationship between 2000 and 2004 was 
176 
 
marked by several conflicts triggered by their competition for control over the party and 
cabinet (Crowther, 2004, p. 390; Dima, 2009, p. 44; Sedelius & Ekman, 2010, p. 529; 
Sedelius, 2006, p. 146). Furthermore, Năstase aimed to redefine the formal role of the 
presidency so that the working mode of executive politics could shift from presidential to 
prime ministerial leadership. For example, Năstase suggested the elimination of direct 
presidential elections.25 In response, not only did Ion Iliescu turn down the proposal, but he 
also announced that Năstase was the Social-Democratic Party’s best placed candidate for 
the 2004 presidential elections and that he intended to take over the party at the end of his 
presidential term. To avoid this scenario, Năstase proposed that Iliescu be allowed to 
remain in office for a fourth presidential term (Evenimentul zilei, 2002g, 2002h; 
Teodorescu, 2002). The head of state condemned this idea. As a last resort, the prime 
minister pleaded for the organisation of early elections in 2003, so that the government 
could rely on a stable majority while carrying out the reforms required for Romania’s EU 
accession in 2007 (Braileanu & Zanfir, 2002; Evenimentul zilei, 2002j, 2002l, 2002m). 
This scenario was also vetoed by President Iliescu, who had no interest in disconnecting 
presidential from parliamentary elections (Culcer, 2002; Evenimentul zilei, 2002i, 2002k).  
The relationship between the president and the prime minister took a turn for the 
worse after the 2004 local elections, which plunged the ruling party into a major leadership 
crisis. PM Năstase threatened to resign as party president after Ion Iliescu criticised the 
party for its electoral performance. Eventually, Năstase reconsidered his decision to step 
down in exchange for a free hand in reshuffling both the cabinet and the party leadership. 
First, he banned the simultaneous holding of party and cabinet positions and removed all 
ministers holding a high position in the party hierarchy from the government. Then he 
dissolved the party’s national executive body and replaced it with a co-ordination bureau 
dominated by his allies. The main task of the co-ordination bureau was to convene an 
extraordinary congress for internal elections. Adrian Năstase was unanimously elected as 
the party’s presidential candidate by the 1,200 delegates who participated to this congress 
in August 2004. The delegates also approved Iliescu’s return as party leader after the 2004 
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 More details about the proposals for constitutional reform debated in between 2002 and 2003 can be found 
in Cornea, 2002; Evenimentul zilei, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e; Preda, 2002; RFE/RL, 2002; 
Sofronie, 2002; V. Stoica, 2005; Tănase, 2002b. 
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presidential election.  Thus, in exchange for temporary control over cabinet composition, 
Năstase virtually agreed to step down as party president regardless of whether or not he 
won the 2004 presidential elections.26 
The compromise reached by Iliescu and Năstase ahead of the 2004 elections reveals 
the importance of party resources for the extent of a prime minister’s authority over the 
government. Overall, the analysis of the party relationship between the president and the 
prime minister has emphasised the subordination of the latter to the former on the party 
line. The president’s ability to choose his successor for the party leadership and his plans to 
resume this position at the end of his presidential term indicates his de facto authority over 
the ruling party. Although the double electoral defeat suffered by the PSD in 2004 
prevented his reinstatement as the PSD president, his future in the party was the main 
theme of debate in the national congress organised in 2005 (Institutul “Ovidiu Sincai,” 
2005). In contrast, although the prime minister succeeded the president as party leader, he 
constantly competed with him for control over the party and government. Overall, this 
analysis provides strong evidence that whether or not presidents and prime ministers come 
to office as party leaders makes a difference for the extent of their influence over the 
government. 
The president-party relationship in the PD/PDL (2004-2008) 
 The Democratic Party (PD) was the name adopted by the National Salvation Front 
(FSN) after Iliescu’s supporters split up in 1992 and formed the Democratic National 
Salvation Front (FDSN). The leader of the party until 2000 was Petre Roman, who was 
chosen by Ion Iliescu as his successor at the party leadership in May 1990, when he stepped 
down to become President of Romania. Petre Roman’s durability as a party leader is 
explained by the method used in the PD for the election of the party president. While in 
theory the election of the party president is conceived as a competition between motions, 
the requirement that motions be supported by more than half of the party organisations or 
by a third of the members in the National Co-ordination Council (Partidul Democrat 
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 More details about the leadership struggles occasioned by the extraordinary congress of the PSD in 2004 
can be found in Adevărul, 2004; Dimancea, 2005; Hotnews, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d; Radulescu, 2004; 
RFE/RL, 2004d, 2004e, 2004f, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Ziua, 2004. 
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Liberal, 2012, art. 79) has resulted in only one motion being presented to the National 
Convention until 2000. As a result, Petre Roman ran alone for the party president position 
and was easily re-elected in 1994, 1997, and 2000 (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 523; 
Pantelimon, 2006, p. 420).  
After the party’s defeat in the 2000 elections the election rules were relaxed27 and 
three motions were presented to an Extraordinary National Convention convened in May 
2001. The winner of this competition was Traian Băsescu, the incumbent mayor of 
Bucharest. Băsescu gathered twice as many votes than Roman and became the Democratic 
Party’s second leader since the party had been set up in 1993. This was the first time in the 
history of Romanian post-communist parties when an incumbent party leader ran in and 
lost an internal election.28  
Băsescu’s legitimacy as a party leader was reinforced in 2004, when he was re-
elected to the mayor’s office after crushing the ruling party’s candidate in the first round of 
local elections. However, it was the victory in the presidential elections six months later 
that cemented Băsescu’s authority over the PD. Not only did he win the presidential race in 
2004, but he also took government formation out of the ruling social-democrats’ hands by 
nominating his coalition partner, the president of the National Liberal Party, as prime 
minister (Downs & Miller, 2006; Stan & Zaharia, 2007). As the Democratic Party owed its 
presence in government together with the National-Liberals to the president, its 
subordination to the head of state can hardly be doubted. Two additional events indicate the 
party’s subsequent transformation into a “presidential machine” (Thiébault, 1993).  
First, Băsescu had no difficulty in imposing Emil Boc, his second in command, as 
the new president of the PD. Boc’s appointment as a caretaker president was unanimously 
endorsed by 5,000 party delegates in December 2004 (Evenimentul zilei, 2004b; Istodor, 
2004). Six months later, Boc ran unopposed and was elected as a party president by over 
4,000 party delegates. Moreover, his bid to withdraw the PD from the International 
                                                
27
 Since 2001, a motion needs to obtain the support of only ten local organisations in order to be debated in 
the National Convention (Partidul Democrat Liberal, 2012, art. 74). A two-round system is used to select the 
winning motion at the National Convention – if none of the motions debated receives 50 per cent of the 
delegates’ votes then a second round is organised for the first two motions that obtain the most votes. The 
leader of the winning motion becomes the new president of the party (Partidul Democrat Liberal, 2012, art. 
79). 
28
 More details about the 2001 election in the Democratic Party can be found in Csiki, 2001; Evenimentul 
zilei, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2004a; Pantelimon, 2006; Radu, 2004. 
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Socialist Organisation and adopt a centre-right doctrine was also unanimously approved.29 
Boc’s virtually unanimous election as party leader was hailed as the birth of a presidential 
party, whose electoral future depended on the popularity and power resources of the head 
of state (Cochino, 2005). As a matter of fact, a few days before the National Convention 
Emil Boc publicly thanked the president for the party’s surging popularity in the opinion 
polls, which for the first time showed that the PD was ahead of the PNL (Evenimentul zilei, 
2005j). That the PD’s main purpose was to serve as an organisational resource for the 
president (Clift, 2005, p. 225) also transpired from its early pledge to support Băsescu’s 
candidacy for a new presidential term in 2009 (Evenimentul zilei, 2005k). 
Second, the president was able to decide almost single-handedly on the future of the 
party by engineering the merger with a splinter group from the PNL. The new Democrat 
Liberal Party (PDL) was formed under the leadership of Teodor Stolojan, the PNL’s initial 
candidate for the 2004 presidential elections (Stan, 2005, pp. 7–8). The decision was taken 
behind closed doors and involved only the head of state and the leaders of the two parties, 
without consulting the party’s local organisations, which were particularly unenthusiastic 
about sharing their resources with the newcomers. The PD and the PDL leaders declared 
that the unification of the two parties had not been possible without the involvement of the 
head of state and pointed out that the aim of the new party was to obtain a presidential 
majority in the next general elections. The merger of the two parties was unanimously 
approved in a common congress that also elected Emil Boc as the leader of the new party.30  
The set up of the PDL was compared in the Romanian media with the Gaullist party 
and with Sarkozy’s UMP. Romanian analysts emphasised that the creation of a presidential 
party was as a typical phenomenon for a semi-presidential system, where presidents are de 
facto leaders of their former parties and of the government (Kivu, 2008; Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2007). As no elections were organised in the PDL until the end of 2008 and given that Emil 
Boc’s leadership and Traian Băsescu’s ascendancy over the party were never under 
question during this time period, we have no reason to believe that the president’s de facto 
authority over his party was challenged. Traian Băsescu’s ability to control his party’s 
                                                
29
 More details about the 2005 National Convention and the change of ideology can be found in Evenimentul 
zilei, 2005a, 2005b, 2005m, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, 2005f, 2005g, 2005h, 2005i, 2005l; Hriban, 2005.  
30
 More details about the context in which the Democratic-Liberal Party was set up can be found in Dinu, 
2007; Evenimentul zilei, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f; Fati, 2007; Nicolae, 2007; Oprea, 2007a, 2007b; 
România liberă, 2007b, 2007c; Stan & Zaharia, 2008; Vaida, 2007b. 
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agents in government was also enhanced by the fact that the leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party was not appointed in the cabinet. 
The PM-party relationship in the PNL (2004-2008) 
The National Liberal Party has experienced more leadership changes, has been more 
factionalised and has had to deal with more party splits than any other Romanian 
parliamentary party (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011; De Waele & Ionaşcu, 2008). Călin 
Popescu-Tăriceanu, the prime minister appointed by Traian Băsescu in 2004, succeeded 
Theodor Stolojan as the president of the party when the latter pulled out from the 2004 
presidential race. Tăriceanu’s leadership was reconfirmed in early 2005, when he was 
officially elected as president by the party delegates. He ran unopposed and won the vast 
majority of the votes cast. His control over the party was also strengthened by the list 
system used for the election of national leaders in the PNL, which allows presidents to 
hand-pick the members of the national executive body team (România liberă, 2006; 
Telegraf, 2007). Given the prime minister’s ability to run unopposed for the presidency of 
the party and the overwhelming majority of the delegates who endorsed his political 
platform, there is hardly any reason to doubt that at the beginning of the time period under 
study the newly appointed prime minister maintained a strong grip over his party31. 
Tăriceanu was re-elected as party leader in 2007. Following the split of Theodor 
Stolojan’s faction, which merged with the PD, he called for the organisation of an 
extraordinary congress to legitimise his leadership. The party’s internal crisis can be traced 
back to the 2005 congress, when a small group of notable party members backed President 
Băsescu’s project to create a strong centre-right party by merging the PNL and the PD. To 
facilitate the merger, the PD had also switched from social-democracy to a centre-right 
political orientation in June 2005. The negotiations between the PNL and the PD leaders 
continued throughout 2005 and 2006. However, the two parties had different stances on the 
unification project: while the PD presented a calendar for the merger in February 2006, the 
liberals advocated the continuation of the PNL-PD alliance until after the 2009 presidential 
elections. The PNL’s division over the merger project led to the split of the faction led by 
                                                
31
 For a detailed analysis of the 2005 PNL congress see Evenimentul zilei, 2005a, 2005b; Mihalache & Huiu, 
2011; RFE/RL, 2005a, 2005b. 
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Theodor Stolojan. To counteract the erosion of his legitimacy as a party leader, PM 
Tăriceanu not only called for the organisation of new elections, but also replaced the list 
system with a plurality formula. According to the statute adopted at the extraordinary 
congress organised in January 2007, the delegates elected the president and a 30-member 
national executive body based on the number of votes each candidate obtained  (Partidul 
National Liberal, 2007, art. 61). Similar to the 2005 congress, Tăriceanu ran unopposed for 
the presidency of the PNL. Only 61 of the 1,300 delegates to the congress voted against 
him. The overwhelming majority obtained by the PNL leader for the second time within 
two years and the absence of challengers for the national leadership presented the liberals 
united behind their leader32. 
Overall, although the 2004-2008 period revealed the same struggle for leadership 
between competing factions that has characterised the PNL since 1990 (De Waele & 
Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 89; Stanomir, 2007), there is little evidence that the national leader lost 
control over the party. On the contrary, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu’s unopposed and virtually 
unanimous re-election following the party statute change operated in 2007, which aimed to 
decentralise the party and increase the competitiveness of the leadership selection process, 
indicates his confidence regarding his authority over the party. The comparison of 
Năstase’s and Tăriceanu’s record as prime ministers indicates that whether or not prime 
ministers come to power as leaders of their parties makes a difference for their ability to 
control the government as de facto leaders. 
6.3 The data set on Romanian ministers 
This section focuses on the political background of the ministers covered by the Romania 
data set. We begin by describing the variables included in this data set and we discuss the 
measures of fixed characteristics and events in the Romanian context. Subsequently, we 
compare the distribution of data in the governments under study. This analysis is structured 
along the four aspects of ministerial career-paths that are compared across the country 
                                                
32
 For a detailed analysis of the PNL split and the 2007 extraordinary congress see Anghel, 2006; Ciobanu, 
2006; Dinu, 2006; Evenimentul zilei, 2007b, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f, 2007a; Hotnews, 
2007; Lupea, 2007; Radu, 2010; România liberă, 2006. 
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studies: cabinet experience, parliamentary background, experience in local administration, 
and involvement in party organisations. 
The Romania data set covers 101 ministers. 48 of them served under PM Adrian 
Năstase (2000-2004) and 53 under PM Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu (2004-2008). Over the 
time period under analysis there have been ten state ministers, 73 cabinet ministers, and 18 
delegated ministers. The data set contains 61 instances of individual termination events. 
The fixed characteristics included in the analysis indicate whether or not the ministers had 
previously held a cabinet seat in either full or junior positions and if they were recruited 
from the parliamentary pool or from among local officials. Involvement in party politics is 
captured by two variables. The first one indicates whether ministers held a position in the 
party’s national executive bodies, while the second one indicates whether they were leaders 
of local party organisations. Another variable indicates the ministers’ party affiliation. 
Table 6.1 provides definitions for the variables recording personal characteristics and 
shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers. 
 
Table 6.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (Romania) 
Variable Definition Mean 
Cabinet experience Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
had previously held a full or junior ministerial 
position. 
0.45 
MP/SEN Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
won a seat in last general elections. 0.50 
Parliamentary experience Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
have won at least 2 parliamentary mandates during 
their career. 
0.50 
Local administration 
experience 
Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
held a position in local administration at the 
moment of appointment (mayors and members of 
local executive bodies or municipal assemblies). 
0.10 
Party executives Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are 
members in their parties’ national executive 
bodies. 
0.29 
Local party leaders Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who   
lead local party organisations. 0.20 
PM Party Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are 
from the same party as the prime minister. 0.71 
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The main events variables included in the Romania data set record disagreements 
between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties, as indicators of 
principal-agent relationships, and resignation calls as measures of ministerial performance. 
Similar to the French and the Portuguese studies, conflicts between ministers and 
presidents, prime ministers and parties are recorded when cabinet members are criticised in 
public by one of the principals, as reported in the newspaper used for data collection. The 
issue at stake may be related to the ministers’ performance in executive or party office or to 
their personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial departments or policy issues. The variable 
measuring the president-minister relationship also takes into account the constitutional right 
of Romanian presidents to demand the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members 
and to request their suspension from office if such an action is taken (Art. 109). The dataset 
includes nine conflicts of this type between presidents and cabinet ministers. 
Similar to the analysis of French ministers, the weight of political experience on 
ministerial durability is not only captured by fixed characteristics at the moment of 
appointment, but also monitored during the ministers’ time in office. The analysis of 
Romanian ministers verifies whether promotions in the party hierarchy are also used as 
compensatory moves for ministerial deselection, as in the case of France. 
Resignation calls are recorded each time ministers are asked to resign. If they are 
asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new resignation call is recorded only if 
new information comes to light or if a different actor asks the minister to resign. Overall, 
the Romania data set includes 241 resignation calls.  
Parliamentary pressure is captured in the Romania data set by the number of simple 
motions tabled in the parliament against individual ministers. These motions may be 
initiated by at least 50 deputies or senators who wish to express their position on a matter of 
domestic or foreign affair policy (Constitution of Romania, Art. 112). Both deputies and 
senators may use simple motions to criticise governmental policies and recommend the 
removal of individual ministers; however, their recommendations are not binding for the 
government not even when they are adopted by a majority of the deputies or senators 
attending the debate. Due to the symmetry and congruence of the Romanian bicameralism, 
the present data set includes all simple motions tabled between 2000 and 2008 regardless of 
whether they were initiated in the Chamber of Deputies or in the Senate. According to the 
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online records of the Chamber of Deputies33, 20 simple motions were tabled between 2000 
and 2004 in the Chamber of Deputies and another 14 in the Senate. Similarly, 15 simple 
motions were tabled in the Chamber of Deputies between 2004 and 2008, and 13 in the 
Senate. Out of a total of 62 simple motions that were tabled in the Romanian Parliament 
between 2000 and 2008, the current data set includes 52 motions that clearly targeted the 
work of an individual minister. 
Other control variables take into account cabinet reshuffles and the impact of social 
unrest on the length of ministerial tenure. Table 6.2 provides definitions for the events 
variables and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers. 
 
Table 6.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (Romania) 
Variable Definition Mean St. dev. Range 
Tenure The length of ministerial tenure is measured 
in days.  
638.16 638.16 (23, 1461) 
PR Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and presidents. 1.06 2.04 (0, 10) 
PM Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and prime 
ministers. 
1.03 1.95 (0, 12) 
PARTY Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and parties. 1.68 2.89 (0, 21) 
Resignation calls Number of times ministers have been asked 
to resign. 
2.31 2.99 (0, 13) 
Reshuffles Number of times ministers have been 
reshuffled during current mandate. 
0.21 0.52 (0, 2) 
Party promotions Number of promotions in the party hierarchy 
during current mandate. 
0.39 0.73 (0, 3) 
Simple motions Number of simple motions tabled against 
ministers in the parliament 
0.51 0.94 (0, 5) 
Protests Number of national-level strikes and protests 
organised during current term. 
0.81 1.66 (0, 7) 
*Source: Obtained from the official records of the Romanian Parliament. Available online from 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/motiuni.lista.   
 
Table 6.3 provides summary statistics for personal characteristics and events. While 
the PSD government (2000-2004) operated only under a scenario of unified executive, two 
executive scenarios occurred between 2004 and 2008. The 2004 elections triggered a period 
of divided executive, as President Băsescu of the PD appointed the leader of the PNL as 
prime minister. The period of divided executive ended in April 2007, when President 
                                                
33
 http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/motiuni.lista 
185 
 
Băsescu’s party left the governing coalition, beginning a period of cohabitation. Romania’s 
first cohabitation ended in December 2008. The data presented in Table 6.3 indicates the 
distribution of data by executive scenarios. 
 
Table 6.3 Average fixed characteristics and events by cabinet (Romania) 
 Năstase    
(Unified 
executive) 
Tăriceanu I 
(Divided 
executive) 
Tăriceanu II 
(Cohabitation) Total 
  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
No Ministers 48 37 24 101 
Termination events 24 29 8 61 
Tenure (days) 751.17 469.60 446.34 267.70 643.92 444.73 638.16 431.29 
Fixed characteristics       
Cabinet experience 0.54 0.50 0.28 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.50 
MP/SEN 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.50 
Parliamentary 
experience 0.40 0.49 0.24 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.32 0.47 
Local administration 
experience 0.06 0.24 0.17 0.38 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 
Party executives 0.17 0.38 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.50 0.29 0.45 
Local party leaders 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.44 0.20 0.40 
PM Party 0.98 0.14 0.34 0.48 0.63 0.49 0.71 0.45 
Events     
  PR Conflicts 0.25 0.70 1.03 1.94 2.71 2.88 1.06 2.04 
PM Conflicts 0.65 0.96 1.45 2.56 1.29 2.46 1.03 1.95 
PARTY Conflicts 1.56 3.41 1.55 1.99 2.08 2.75 1.68 2.89 
Resignation calls 2.65 3.35 2.10 2.66 1.88 2.59 2.31 2.99 
Reshuffles 0.25 0.53 0.03 0.19 0.33 0.70 0.21 0.52 
Party promotions 0.54 0.77 0.14 0.35 0.38 0.92 0.39 0.73 
Simple motions 0.56 1.03 0.45 0.78 0.50 0.98 0.51 0.94 
Protests 0.88 1.76 0.59 1.52 0.96 1.65 0.81 1.66 
 
 
The data in Table 6.3 shows that the mean length of ministerial tenure between 
2000 and 2008 was approximately 21 months. This result suggests an increase in the 
stability of ministerial personnel, as the average length of ministerial tenure between 1990 
and 2004 was only 14.85 months (Ionaşcu, 2006a, p. 44). The length of ministerial tenure 
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differs under divided executive compared to the other two scenarios. The mean observed 
tenure is 25 months under unified executive, 15 months under divided executive, and 22 
months under cohabitation. The considerably shorter length of tenure under divided 
executive is explained by the break-up of the PNL-PD coalition in April 2007, which was 
responsible for the resignation of a significant number of ministers and also ended the 
period of divided executive. The data indicates a similar length of tenure under unified 
executive and cohabitation, although the period of unified executive lasted three times 
longer than that of cohabitation. Thus, similar to France, the evidence suggests that 
ministerial durability increases under cohabitation.  
The level of conflict between ministers and each of their three principals varies 
significantly across executive scenarios. The data in Table 6.3 indicates that the president-
ministers relationship was particularly tense during the cohabitation between PM 
Tăriceanu’s second cabinet and President Băsescu. This finding seems to confirm the 
hypothesis that cohabitation increases the likelihood of executive deadlock (Fabbrini, 1995, 
p. 133; Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 286; Sedelius & Ekman, 2010, p. 519; Sedelius, 2006, p. 
193; Stepan & Suleiman, 1995, p. 399). According to the data in table 6.3, though, the 
cabinet members’ relationship with the prime minister was also particularly tense during 
the divided executive scenario, when President Băsescu’s PD/PDL formed a coalition 
government with PM Tăriceanu’s PNL. By contrast, the level of conflict between ministers, 
presidents and prime ministers was considerably lower during the unified executive 
scenario that characterised Năstase’s governing period.  
The data indicates a relatively similar frequency of resignation calls across the three 
scenarios. Figure 6.1 presents the distribution of resignation calls in the two governments, 
according to the proximate reasons of their occurrence and with respect to the deselection 
of the ministers who experienced them. In cases where ministers were asked to step down 
over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded. This is why the total 
number of resignations differs depending on whether one focuses on the exact number of 
calls or on the reason given for their occurrence. Figures above the graph bars indicate the 
percentage of resignation calls, while white figures inside the bars indicate the number of 
resignation calls recorded under each category.  
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Figure 6.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (Romania) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while numbers 
inside the bars indicate the number of resignation calls recorded under each category. Both 
percentages and numbers refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis and not to the 
total number of resignation calls recorded across cabinets. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure 6.1 indicates that personal faults have attracted the majority of resignation 
calls in both governments under analysis. Three quarters of the calls for resignation made 
for the PSD ministers were generate by personal faults. Many of them were the 
consequence of the corruption scandals exposed by the mass media. The small proportion 
of resignation calls motivated by departmental faults and policy disagreements, and the 
absence of resignation calls due to breaches of collective responsibility is explained by the 
single-party composition of the social-democratic government. Conversely, the higher 
proportion of policy disagreements and collective responsibility calls experienced by the 
ministers who took office in Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu’s government is explained by the 
high level of intra-executive conflict that characterised the PNL-PD coalition during the 
scenarios of divided executive and cohabitation. The sacking of the PD ministers from 
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government in April 2007 also explains why the majority of ministers who were asked to 
resign over departmental faults, policy disagreements and breaches of collective 
responsibility lost office. A similar pattern for the frequency and types of resignation calls 
across executive scenarios and different types of cabinets was also found in France. While 
Lionel Jospin’s four-party coalition government experienced more policy-related 
resignation calls, most resignation calls issued for the UMP government were generated by 
personal errors. Similar to Portugal, the data indicates a correlation between a high number 
of policy-related calls for resignation and an increase in the number of simple motions 
tabled against individual ministers in the parliaments and in the occurrence of protests. 
Two patterns emerge as far as the variation in the ministers’ personal background is 
concerned. While the PSD cabinet had considerable more executive and parliamentary 
experience, the PNL-PD cabinet was more experienced in local administration and more 
likely to have a high position in the party hierarchy than the PSD ministers. Additionally, 
the appointment of non-partisan ministers became more common after 2004 and 
particularly after the Democratic Party left the coalition government in April 2007. The 
next sections analyses in more detail the patterns of ministerial recruitment across the two 
governments under study. Similar to France and Portugal, the descriptive statistics do not 
indicate a strong correlation between fixed characteristics and the length of tenure. 
6.4 Political background of Romanian ministers 
Cabinet experience 
The information related to cabinet experience concerns the ministers’ previous 
appointments as junior or full cabinet members. We do not take into account the ministers’ 
ranking in the cabinet this time, because of the incidental appointment of state ministers in 
Adrian Năstase’s government. Only two state ministers were appointed and only within the 
last six months of this cabinet. Figure 6.2 illustrates the distribution of cabinet experience 
across governments and with respect to survival.  
Figure 6.2 confirms our expectation that the PSD ministers had more executive 
experience than the PNL-PD ministers. The political professionalisation of the PSD’s elites 
due to the party’s presence in government between 1990 and 1996 explains why this party 
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could rely on more experienced personnel. Nevertheless, both governments included a 
significant number of ministers who had never been appointed to government. Almost half 
of the PSD ministers were in this situation. However, cabinet experience does not seem to 
make a difference for durability in office. Similar to France and Portugal, we find that the 
inexperienced ministers and junior ministers are likely to survive longer in office than more 
experienced ministers.  
Figure 6.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (Romania) 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure 6.2 confirms our expectation that the PSD ministers had more executive experience 
than the PNL-PD ministers. The political professionalisation of the PSD’s elites due to the 
party’s presence in government between 1990 and 1996 explains why this party could rely 
on more experienced personnel. Nevertheless, both governments included a significant 
number of ministers who had never been appointed to government. Almost half of the PSD 
ministers were in this situation. However, cabinet experience does not seem to make a 
difference for durability in office. Similar to France and Portugal, we find that the 
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inexperienced ministers and junior ministers are likely to survive longer in office than more 
experienced ministers.  
Parliamentary experience 
Parliamentary experience does not play the most important role in the Romanian 
patterns of ministerial recruitment. Although the parliamentary and executive offices are 
not incompatible, only half of the Romanian ministers who took office between 1990 and 
2005 had been elected at least once in a post-communist legislature (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 619), 
Thus, the parliamentary background of Romanian ministers is considerably weaker than 
that of French ministers, but similar to that of Portuguese ministers. Furthermore, 
Romania’s case is less of an outlier among other Central and East European countries, 
where only 41.8 per cent of all ministers appointed after the breakdown of communism had 
been elected first in the parliament (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, p. 217). 
Figure 6.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (Romania) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
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This pattern is confirmed in Figure 6.3, which indicates that less than half of the 
ministers had no legislative experience. The slightly higher proportion of ministers with no 
parliamentary record in the PSD government confirms the separation between this party’s 
selection pools for parliamentary and executive office (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 611). However, 
the PSD ministers who were recruited from the parliament were more experienced: almost 
40 per cent of the PSD ministers had been elected more than once, compared to only 25 per 
cent of the PNL-PD ministers. This pattern confirms the premium placed by the PSD on 
senior positions in the parliamentary hierarchy (Ionaşcu, 2011, p. 40). 
The data in Figure 6.2 does not indicate a strong correlation between parliamentary 
experience and durability in ministerial office. However, there is some evidence that non-
parliamentary ministers are likely to survive longer in office. This result may be explained 
by the stability of non-partisan ministers who were appointed in both governments. Similar 
to France, more experienced ministers seem more likely to leave office sooner rather than 
later. This finding suggests that professional deputies may be less inclined to engage in 
policy compromises and therefore more susceptible to be sanctioned for agency loss. 
Experience in local administration 
Similar to Portugal, involvement in local politics is not essential for Romanian 
politicians who want to play a role in national politics. In Romania, as in Portugal, national 
and local politics have remained separated in the first decade after the fall of communism. 
Up to 1996, when the Social-Democratic Party lost a general election for the first time since 
the beginning of the democratic transition, less than five per cent of the ministers had held a 
position as councillors or mayors. Between 1996 and 2008, the average ministerial 
experience in local administration increased to over 17 per cent (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 619). 
The patterns of ministerial recruitment changed mainly as a result of the Democratic 
Party’s presence in government. Recognised for most of its existence as a “party of 
mayors” (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 522), the PD regards long party membership and 
localism as the most important criteria for the selection of its parliamentary and ministerial 
elite (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 241). In contrast to other parliamentary parties where 
politicians without a high-ranking position in the party hierarchy can only aspire to local 
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offices, the PD has used the same selection pool for both types of office. The intake of local 
office-holders into the central party leadership has been low in centralised parties like the 
PSD and the PNL, where ministers and state secretaries have been promoted in the party 
hierarchy soon after their appointment to government (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 222). The 
Democratic Party’s more decentralised structure and the premium this party places on 
experienced local administrators explains why more local leaders were invited to join the 
government at the expense of high-profile national leaders (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 241).  
Figure 6.4 confirms these patterns of ministerial recruitment for the two 
governments under study. While less than 15 per cent of the PSD ministers had previously 
held a position in local administration, the cabinet formed by Călin Popescu Tăriceanu in 
2004 included more ministers with experience in local administration than any other 
Romanian cabinet: more than one quarter of the ministers had held local office and almost 
6 per cent were incumbent mayors at the moment of their appointment.  
 
Figure 6.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival 
(Romania) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
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Overall, the data in Figure 6.4 does not indicate a strong correlation between local 
roots and ministerial survival. Interestingly, though, none of the ministers who were 
incumbent mayors at the moment of appointment completed their term in office. To a 
certain extent, this result may be explained by the Democratic Party’s pull out from 
government in April 2007. However, ministers with strong local roots, such as a mayoralty, 
may be more difficult to control by their principals. Since their political influence is due 
more to their work in the constituency than to their position in the party hierarchy, these 
ministers may be more willing to step down from government rather than to conform to 
their principals’ preferred positions. Perhaps due to the instability of Romanian 
governments, when asked to choose between a mayoralty and a cabinet seat, Romanian 
politicians are more likely to choose the former over the latter. A good example in this 
regard is that of Emil Boc, President Băsescu’s successor in the Democratic Party, who 
turned down a cabinet seat in the 2004 government to maintain the mayoralty of Cluj that 
he had won earlier that year. 
Although local and national offices are incompatible in Romania, ministers are not 
required to step down from government if they want to run in local elections. They must 
only choose between the cabinet seat and the local office in case they are successful. Only 
four out of the 101 ministers covered by this data set contested local elections. Two of them 
resigned at the beginning of the electoral campaign, the other two did not. Although both 
ministers who remained in office while contesting local elections were defeated, this is too 
small a sample to control for in a statistical model. 
Party experience 
Similar to Portugal, Romanian parties have controlled the main route to executive office 
after 1989. However, in contrast to France and Portugal, the proportion of senior party 
members in the Romanian cabinets varies as a function of the parties in government. Thus, 
while fewer than 40 per cent of the ministers appointed in the left wing governments 
formed between 1990 and 2008 held a position in one of their party’s national bodies, 
almost 70 per cent of the ministers who were appointed in the governments formed by 
centre-right during 1996-2000 and 2004-2008 had a senior position within their parties 
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(Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 619). The lower incidence of party executives in the PSD governments is 
explained by this party’s reliance on two different recruitment strategies that target both 
party veterans and outsiders without party credentials (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 243).  
The data in Figure 6.7 shows a similar trend. The proportion of senior party 
members in the PNL-PD government is twice that of the PSD government.  
 
Figure 6.5 Party experience across governments and by survival (Romania) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
The composition of the PSD government also reflected the prime minister’s concern 
to renew the Social-Democratic Party’s image and dissociate it from the anti-democratic 
reputation of the previous left-wing cabinets. As a result, instead of experienced party 
leaders, Năstase favoured the appointment of former secretaries of state whose experience 
in public office was a valuable asset for the government and who lacked public visibility 
(Ionaşcu, 2006b, p. 347). This strategy also explains the higher incidence of cabinet 
members with previous experience as junior ministers in the PSD government (Figure 6.2). 
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As far as the presence of non-partisan ministers in government is concerned, the 
Romanian cabinets seem to resemble more the French than the Portuguese cabinets. Figure 
6.5 indicates that none of the PSD ministers was independent, while less than eight per cent 
of the ministers appointed between 2004 and 2008 were non-partisans. However, the data 
in Figure 6.5 only takes into account the ministers’ political affiliation at the end of their 
tenure. In fact, three of the ministers who joined the PSD government between 2000 and 
2004 were independent at the moment of their appointment. However, they all joined this 
party soon after their appointment and were also promoted in the party’s national executive. 
This phenomenon indicates that the goal of non-partisan appointments differs across 
Romanian and Portuguese parties. The latter regard non-partisan appointments as a way of 
counterbalancing their weak institutionalisation and the negative public perception of 
politicians (Pinto & Almeida, 2009, p. 153). In contrast, the Romanian PSD uses non-
partisan appointments to increase and diversify its personnel resources and to intensify the 
circulation of party elites (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 243). This is another characteristic that 
sets the PSD apart from the PNL and the PD, as none of independent ministers who joined 
the centre-right government between 2004 and 2008 became a party member by the end of 
their term. On the contrary, one of the liberal ministers gave up his party membership so 
that he could continue in office after the 2008 elections34. From a principal-agent 
perspective, the rapid ascension of non-partisans to national leadership positions indicates a 
strong centralisation of the party and a considerable influence of the party leadership on the 
recruitment of executive elites. 
The data in Figure 6.5 indicates a correlation between high positions in the party 
hierarchy, at both national and local level, and forced exits from government. In contrast, 
independent ministers were more likely to complete their term in office. The inability of 
senior party members and leaders of local organisations to survive longer in office than 
their less experienced colleagues indicates the concentration of the decision-making process 
in the hands of the national leadership and party presidents.  
                                                
34
 This was the case of Cătălin Predoiu, who was appointed as Minister of Justice by PM Tăriceanu in 
February 2008. Predoiu was a member in the National Liberal Party. He ran for a seat in the 2008 election on 
the PNL list but was not elected. After the formation of the PSD-PDL coalition government in late 2008, 
Predoiu self-suspended his membership in the PNL so that he can maintain his position as a minister of 
justice. Predoiu remained in office until February 2012, when Emil Boc’s government was dismissed by a 
non-confidence vote in the parliament. 
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Figure 6.9 focuses on the circulation of ministers between cabinet and national party 
bodies. None of the three parties analysed in this chapter has adopted a policy of separating 
positions in the party hierarchy from public office at the beginning of a government term. 
Cabinet positions have actually been a springboard for promotion in the Social-Democratic 
Party’s central leadership since the early 1990s (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 601). The increased 
factionalisation of the national liberals and the struggles for party leadership between 
factions also explains the promotion of cabinet members in the party hierarchy. Thus, 
ministerial recruitment and promotion in the party hierarchy should be positively 
correlated. The Romania data set confirms this expectation only partially. 
 
Figure 6.6 Party promotions across governments and by survival (Romania) 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments 
indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Overall, the data in Figure 6.9 does not indicate a strong correlation between party 
promotions and ministerial longevity. However, the PSD ministers who advanced on the 
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the way in which Adrian Năstase handled the leadership crisis triggered by the 2004 local 
elections in the PSD. After he first threatened to resign as a result of President’s Iliescu 
interference in party affairs, Năstase reshuffled both the party’s national executive and the 
government. The PSD’s main executive body was dissolved and replaced with a co-
ordination bureau made up of Năstase’s allies, including some of the politically 
inexperienced ministers he had appointed in 2004. The ministers who had been promoted in 
the party hierarchy were then removed from the cabinet.35 The context in which PM 
Năstase took this decision suggests that the separation of public and party responsibilities 
was motivated by the need to strengthen the prime minister’s authority over the party at the 
expense of the president and his allies in the national leadership. 
To sum up, the analysis of the ministers’ political experience has emphasised that in 
Romania, as in Portugal, there is an increased presence of party executives in government. 
However, in contrast to Portugal, we find that party executives are more likely to lose their 
jobs than cabinet members without political experience. This finding indicates that the 
authority over cabinet composition belongs to national leaders, such as presidents and 
prime ministers, rather than to the extra-parliamentary and extra-governmental party. 
6.5 Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, and ministerial durability 
in Romania 
This section presents a multivariate analysis of ministerial tenure in Romania. Similar to 
France and Portugal, the Romania data set includes the exact dates when ministers take and 
leave office. The ministers’ observed tenure is right-censored if they leave office 
collectively, after general elections. Ministers are also right-censored if they are still in 
office at the end of the time period under study. This is the case for one minister in 
Tăriceanu’s government, who continued in office under the PSD-PDL government that 
came to power after the 2008 parliamentary election. The length of tenure is not interrupted 
for ministers who continued in office after the PDL left the coalition government in 2007, 
although the new government formed by PM Tăriceanu received a formal vote of 
investiture in the parliament. Additionally, the duration in office is not interrupted if 
                                                
35
 For a detailed analysis of this episode see  Hotnews, 2004a, 2004b; RFE/RL, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 
2004e. 
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ministers are assigned to different portfolios during their tenure. The Romania data set 
includes 101 ministers who took office between 2000 and 2008. 61 ministers stepped down 
before the collective end of their cabinets. Figure 6.7 shows the unconditional probability 
that ministers survive in office beyond a certain time when no explanatory factors are taken 
into account. 
 
Figure 6.7 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across scenarios (Romania) 
 
Overall, the ministers covered by the Romanian data set had a 50% chance of 
surviving 826 days in office during the time period under study. However, the length of 
ministerial tenure varied across executive scenarios. Figure 6.8 shows that ministers have a 
50% chance of surviving 903 days and 916 days in office under unified executive and 
cohabitation respectively, which decreases to only 590 days under divided executive. The 
difference in the ministers’ risk of losing office across scenarios is explained by the 
dismissal of the PD ministers from government in April 2007, which started a period of 
cohabitation.  
The ministerial survivor functions across the three executive scenarios are plotted in 
Figure 6.8. The graph indicates that the risk of deselection increases under divided 
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executive and is similar under unified executive and cohabitation. However, this result 
should not necessarily be taken at face value, since the period of unified executive lasted 
three times longer than that of cohabitation. The survivor functions corresponding to the 
three scenarios also show that the risk of deselection increased faster under divided 
executive and cohabitation than under unified executive. 
 
Figure 6.8 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival by scenario (Romania) 
 
The result of the log-rank test presented in Figure 6.8 indicates that the assumption 
of proportional hazards across the three scenarios is not violated at the 0.01 level. These 
results indicate that the survival of ministers varies in proportional ways as far as the 
scenarios of unified executive, divided executive and cohabitation are concerned and 
confirm that the data can be analysed using a Cox model. Additional diagnostic tests for the 
non-proportionality of hazards in the models used for the analysis of Romanian ministers 
are provided in the Appendix (C1-C8). They include the Wilcoxon test, which focuses on 
earlier failure times, and tests based on the analysis on Schoenfeld residuals to verify that 
the explanatory variables included in the statistical models presented below have a 
proportional and constant effect that is invariant to time. The specification of the models 
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with regard to the nonlinearity of the explanatory variables is assessed using link tests 
(reported at the bottom of Table 6.4). 
The analysis of Schoenfeld residuals has revealed that several variables violate the 
assumption of proportional hazards (see C.2 and C.4 in Appendix C). To address their non-
proportionality and increase the models’ accuracy in assessing their effects, these variables 
were interacted with the natural logarithm of time (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001, p. 
978). As a result, the three regressions presented in Table 6.4 are extended applications of 
the Cox model. The Appendix includes a comparison of the results obtained before and 
after the treatment of non-proportional variables for each of the three models (C.3 and C.5). 
Variables that have been found to violate the proportional hazard assumption at the 0.05 
level in one model have been interacted with the natural logarithm of time in both models 
to facilitate the comparative interpretation of their effect. The results presented in the 
Appendix show that the treatment of non-proportional variables does not affect 
significantly the size of the estimated coefficients or their sign. 
Table 6.4 presents two models. Model 1 focuses on personal characteristics 
variables, while Model 2 estimates the joint impact of fixed characteristics and events on 
the length of tenure. The models present coefficients from Cox regressions and report 
standard errors clustered by ministers. The observations are clustered by ministers and the 
data set includes 101 clusters. Positive coefficients imply that the risk of deselection rises 
and indicate a shorter length of tenure, while negative coefficients decrease the hazard rate 
and are therefore expected to increase the length of tenure. 
Models 1 and 2 confirm that fixed characteristics have a weak explanatory power 
for the variation in the length of ministerial tenure. None of the variables related to cabinet 
experience, parliamentary experience, positions in local administration or in the party 
hierarchy emerges as a powerful predictor of ministerial durability. The results in Model 2 
show some evidence that leaders of local party organisations incur a higher risk of 
deselection However, this result is not robust across the two models. The only fixed 
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Table 6.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in Romania  
                                  Model 1         Model 2          
       
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Fixed characteristics 
Cabinet experience                    0.54            0.56    
                              (0.38)          (0.43)    
MP/SEN                       0.15            0.47    
                              (0.43)          (0.48)    
Parliamentary experience#   -0.08      -0.12 
        (0.07)      (0.08) 
Local administration experience       0.51           -0.21  
                              (0.38)          (0.46)    
Party executive          -0.36           -0.30  
                              (0.28)          (0.38)    
Local leader               0.37            0.53*     
                              (0.34)          (0.29)    
PM Party                        -1.08***        -1.29**   
                              (0.32)          (0.36)    
Events 
Party promotions                                      2.00*** 
                                                 (0.43)    
Protests                                        -0.63    
                                                 (0.63)    
Simple motions                                        0.63 
                                                     (0.82)    
Reshuffles                               3.20** 
                                                 (1.05) 
Resignation calls                                     0.86**  
                                                     (0.26)    
PR Conflicts                                          0.51**  
                                                     (0.22)    
PM Conflicts        0.19**  
                                                     (0.22)    
PARTY Conflicts                                       0.88**   
                                                     (0.29)    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
No. of ministers                       101             101              
No. of observation                    1717            1717                
No. of failures                         61              61 
Log-likelihood                    -221.337        -165.553                 
Linktest hat(squared)                 0.37           -0.03                     
                      p=(.19)          p=(.57)          
Note: Cell entries are coefficients computed using the Efron method of 
resolving ties. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors 
clustered by minister (101 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
# Variables interacted with the natural logarithm of time to address 
their non-proportional effects.  
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characteristic indicating a significant and stable effect in both models is that of party 
affiliation. Ministers who are in the prime minister’s party are likely to survive longer in 
office. This result is explained by the exclusion of the president’s party from 
government in April 2007. 
Model 2 estimates the joint impact of fixed characteristics and events on the risk 
of deselection. With the exception of protests and simple motions, all variables included 
in the analysis emerge as strong predictors of ministerial deselection. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient corresponding to Reshuffles 
suggests that prime ministers use reshuffles to sanction agency loss (Indridason & Kam, 
2008; Kam & Indridason, 2005). In general, though, Romanian prime ministers rarely 
resort to reshuffles, which are regarded in Romania as an acknowledgement of poor 
ministerial performance (Flonta, 2003, p. 12). Only 15 per cent of the ministers under 
study were reshuffled and most of them were promoted to a higher position in the 
cabinet hierarchy. However, their association with an increase in the risk of deselection 
is explained by the reshuffle carried out by PM Năstase in July 2004, when all cabinet 
members who were promoted in the party hierarchy lost their cabinet seat. This event 
also explains why Party promotions also emerge as strong predictors of deselection. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficients corresponding to 
resignation calls and conflict variables in Model 2 confirm that ministers who enter into 
conflict with their principals are likely to lose their jobs. However, we expect that the 
ability of each principal to sanction agency loss varies as a function of institutional 
context. To verify this hypothesis we present three models that estimate the effect of 
principal-agent relationships separately under unified executive, divided executive, and 
cohabitation. To do so, we interact the conflict variables and the resignation calls with 
an institutional variable corresponding to each executive scenario. To ease the 
interpretation of results, Table 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 present only the coefficients related to 
the impact of conflict variables and resignation calls on the risk of deselection under 
unified executive, divided executive, and cohabitation respectively. The full results of 
the three models are presented in the Appendix (C.9). The Appendix also includes the 
diagnostic tests that verify the assumption of proportional hazards for the models with 
interacted variables (C.6-C.8). The specification of the models with regard to the 
nonlinearity of the explanatory variables is assessed using link tests (reported at the 
bottom of table C.9). The robustness of the results presented in these models is also 
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borne out by the fact that the coefficients and signs of the variables that are not 
interacted are almost identical across the models. 
Table 6.5 presents the values of the coefficients associated with the conflict 
variables and resignation calls (outside periods of unified executive, when the Unified 
executive dummy is 0), the sum of the coefficients corresponding to the conflict 
variables and resignation calls interacted with the Unified executive dummy (when 
Unified executive is 1), and their level of significance.  
 
Table 6.5 Principal-agent relationships under unified executive (Romania) 
Executive scenario PR Conflicts PM Conflicts PARTY Conflicts Resignation calls 
Unified=0       0.48**       0.45**         1.59*** 0.15 
Unified=1 -0.01 -3.67  0.45        1.39*** 
 
The results presented in Table 6.5 are intriguing and show that none of the 
principal-agent relationships has had a significant impact on ministerial deselection 
during the period of unified executive. Resignation calls emerge as the only strong 
predictor of deselection. This result is explained by the high number of corruption 
scandals in which the members in the PSD government (2000-2004) were involved. The 
scandals escalated in the media and attracted the attention of EU officials. As Romania 
was under close scrutiny by the European Union and needed to prove its commitment to 
reform the judicial system and fight against corruption, the prime minister had no 
choice than to let the ministers involved in corruption scandals go. Under these 
circumstances, although the descriptive statistics reported in Table 6.3 indicate that a 
significant number of conflicts were recorded for the principal-agent relationships 
between 2000 and 2004, the resignation calls variable captures most of the explanatory 
power regarding the reasons why ministers lost office. Due to the particular 
circumstances in which the PSD government operated, this result does not necessarily 
invalidate our hypothesis regarding the ability of principals to control cabinet 
composition under unified executive. The substantial impact of resignation calls on 
ministerial durability compared to that of principal-agent relationships is presented in 
Figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.9 Conflicts and resignation calls under unified executive (Romania) 
 
 
Table 6.6 presents the coefficients related to the impact of resignation calls and 
conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals on the risk of deselection 
under divided executive. In contrast to the scenarios of unified executive and 
cohabitation, the period of divided executive did not end as a result of an electoral cycle 
but following the Democratic Party’s pull out from the PNL-PD government. As a 
result, the impact of explanatory variables on the risk of deselection may be 
overestimated. 
 
Table 6.6 Principal-agent relationships under divided executive (Romania) 
Executive scenario PR Conflicts PM Conflicts PARTY Conflicts Resignation calls 
Divided=0      0.90***        1.60*** 0.05      0.73** 
Divided=1 0.53* 0.02        1.40*** 0.75 
 
According to Table 6.6, resignation calls do not lead to deselection during a 
period of divided executive. Conflicts with the president increase the risk of losing 
office, which confirms our hypothesis that they are likely to preserve some influence 
over the cabinet when this scenario occurs. However, conflicts with the party principal 
have a stronger impact on a minister’s career than conflicts with both presidents and 
prime ministers. This result is explained by the political deadlock generated by the 
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conflictual relationship between President Băsescu and PM Tăriceanu (Stan & Zaharia, 
2008). As the president and the prime minister criticised each other’s ministers 
relentlessly, the process of ministerial deselection turned into a zero-sum game. Under 
these circumstances, the only principal that could offset the balance and decide the 
ministers’ fate was the party. Figure 6.10 presents a graphical interpretation of these 
results. 
 
Figure 6.10 Conflicts and resignation calls under divided executive (Romania) 
 
As a matter of fact, Figures 6.9 and 6.10 suggest that conflicts with the party 
principal posed a higher risk for deselection than conflicts with presidents and prime 
ministers under both unified and divided executive. In both cases, the relationship 
between the president and the prime minister was characterised by a relatively high 
level of conflict (Sedelius & Ekman, 2010, p. 529). While President Iliescu and PM 
Năstase were competing for control over the government and over the party, the 
confrontation between President Băsescu and PM Tăriceanu often led to political 
deadlock. All else equal then, these results suggest that the party principal has a better 
chance to control the composition of government when the president and the prime 
minister have a conflictual relationship under both unified and divided executive. 
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Table 6.7 presents the coefficients related to the impact of resignation calls and 
conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals on the risk of deselection 
under cohabitation. The results indicate again that resignation calls do not increase the 
ministers’ risk of losing office. The fact that resignation calls do not predict ministerial 
deselection under divided executive and cohabitation bears out the uniqueness of the 
events that occurred under the scenario of unified executive, which played down the 
explanatory power of conflict variables under that scenario and downgraded the 
explanatory power of resignation calls under the other two scenarios. Table 6.7 confirms 
our expectation that conflicts with prime ministers have the strongest impact on 
ministerial deselection under cohabitation. Additionally, the results indicate that the 
president was also able to control cabinet composition under this scenario, which is an 
intriguing finding. 
 
Table 6.7 Principal-agent relationships under cohabitation (Romania) 
Executive scenario PR Conflicts PM Conflicts PARTY Conflicts Resignation calls 
Cohabitation=0 0.78*** -0.01      0.80**          0.89*** 
Cohabitation=1 1.55***         3.24*** 0.83 -0.28 
 
The result indicating the president’s unusual impact on ministerial deselection 
under cohabitation is explained not only by Traian Băsescu’s political activism, but also 
by the range of powers granted to Romanian presidents. Traian Băsescu has been able to 
influence the selection of cabinet ministers by vetoing some nominations. For example, 
he refused to appoint Paul Dobre’s promotion from the Interior Ministry where he was a 
junior minister to a full minister position at the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs in 
March 2006 (Mediafax, 2012). Băsescu also vetoed Adrian Cioroianu’s nomination as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 2007 and Norica Nicolai’s appointment as 
Minister of Justice in December 2007. The latter case was taken to the Constitutional 
Court by the prime minister, who argued that the president lacked the constitutional 
power to refuse ministerial nominations. The Court ruled that the president can decline 
to appoint a minister once for grounded reasons. This decision set a legal precedent for 
the president’s involvement in the appointment of ministers and formally increased his 
influence over cabinet composition. 
President Băsescu also influenced the deselection of ministers by using his 
constitutional right to demand the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members 
for acts committed while holding office and to suspend ministers if such an action is 
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taken (Art. 109) 36. The most famous case was that of Tudor Chiuariu, the PNL Minister 
of Justice who was charged with corruption in April 2007. President Băsescu asked PM 
Tăriceanu to dismiss the Justice Minister and allowed an official criminal enquiry to 
investigate the minister in September 2007. Chiuariu stepped down two months later 
after Băsescu threatened to suspend him.37  
Băsescu also used his power to suspend ministers before the onset of 
cohabitation. He suspended Teodor Atanasiu, the PNL Minister of Defence, in 
September 2006, after a criminal inquiry had been set against him for abuse in office. 
Although he was cleared for any wrongdoing by the prosecutors, Atanasiu eventually 
stepped down38. During the cohabitation with the PNL-UDMR government, President 
Băsescu suspended ministers from both parties. Zsolt Nagy, the Hungarian party’s 
Information, Technology and Communications Minister, resigned after President 
Băsescu asked that a criminal inquiry investigate the accusations of cooperation with a 
transnational organized crime group and suspended him from office in June 200739. 
Paul Păcuraru, the Liberal Minister of Labour, resigned after he was suspended from 
office by the president in September 2008 over a charge of bribery40. These examples 
emphasise that the presidents’ formal powers of control over individual ministers can 
make a difference for their authority over the government even under an executive 
scenario that does not create favourable conditions for their authority over cabinet 
members. 
Figure 6.16 presents the impact of resignation calls and principal-agent 
relationships on the ministers’ risk of losing office under cohabitation. Separate graphs 
for the variation in the impact of conflicts with principals over cabinet composition 
under different executive scenarios are presented in the Appendix (C.11-C.13). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
36
 The suspension of cabinet members from office is also regulated by the law on ministerial 
responsibility 115/1999 (published in the Official Monitor 334/20.05.2002 and re-published in 2007, 
available at http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/lege_responsabilitate_ministeriala.php).  
37
 For a more detailed analysis of this episode, see Evenimentul zilei, 2007e; România liberă, 2007a; 
Simina, 2008; Vaida, 2007a; Ziare.com, 2007. 
38
 More details about the events and legal procedures that led to Minister Atanasiu’s resignation can be 
found in Evenimentul zilei, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d. 
39
 More details about Minister Nagy’s suspension and resignation can be found in Evenimentul zilei, 
2007a, 2007b. 
40
 See Dordea, 2008; Georgescu & Simina, 2008; Marian & Georgescu, 2008; Simina, 2008; Vadan, 
2008; Ziare.com, 2007. 
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Figure 6.11 Conflicts and resignation calls under cohabitation (Romania) 
 
Overall, these findings confirm our expectations regarding the variation in 
presidential and prime ministerial influence across executive scenarios. The results also 
contribute to a better understanding of ministerial accountability under a scenario of 
divided executive. Due to the rare occurrence of this institutional context, its 
consequences on the executive decision-making process have remained understudied. 
Although it is too early to generalise this finding, the results of this chapter indicate that 
the party principal is more likely to gain control over the process of ministerial 
deselection when the intra-executive conflict between the president and the prime 
minister intensifies. Our data also suggest that this phenomenon may take place 
regardless of whether the president and the prime minister belong to the same party or 
to different parties, as long as both of them are in government. The analysis of 
ministerial turnover in Romania has also revealed that if presidents are granted formal 
powers of control over ministers, then they can play an important role in the process of 
ministerial selection and deselection even during periods of cohabitation. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the determinants of ministerial durability in Romania. 
Similar to the previous country-studies, we have shown that fixed characteristics are not 
strong predictors for the length of ministerial tenure. Like in Portugal, the composition 
of Romanian governments is dominated by the presence of senior party members. In 
contrast to Portugal, though, a high-ranking position in the party hierarchy does not 
increase a minister’s chance of surviving longer in office. This finding suggests that the 
authority over cabinet composition belongs to national leaders, such as presidents and 
prime ministers, rather than to political parties. As a result, we do not find a similar 
process of party governmentalisation in Romania as we did in Portugal. Instead, like in 
France, the Romanian party system has undergone a process of presidentialisation that 
focuses attention on national leadership. As a result, we have shown that whether or not 
presidents and prime ministers come to power as party leaders makes a difference for 
the extent of their authority over the political system. The fine-grained analysis of 
principal-agent relationships in the Romanian parties has highlighted the organisational 
resources that allow presidents to control their formal parties as de facto leaders after 
they step down from party office. Similarly, this analysis has also emphasised that 
prime ministers who come to office as party leaders keep a tight grip on cabinet 
members. 
The alternation of executive scenarios during the time period under study has 
offered a rare opportunity to test the impact of three types of president-prime minister 
relations on ministerial turnover in the same country. This analysis has confirmed our 
theoretical expectations regarding the variation in presidential and prime ministerial 
authority over the cabinet as a function of institutional context and has highlighted 
several intriguing findings.  
First, the results indicate that inter-executive conflicts may reduce the 
presidents’ influence over the government even under a scenario of unified executive 
and even when they are perceived as de facto party leaders. Similarly, a high level of 
intra-executive conflict during periods of divided executive may decrease the ability of 
both presidents and prime ministers to fire cabinet members. Both situations lead to an 
increase in the ability of party principals to control cabinet ministers. Second, the 
analysis of presidential influence over the cabinet during Romania’s first period of 
cohabitation has emphasised that presidents can use several constitutional powers to 
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hold ministers accountable even when their informal partisan authority over the political 
system is reduced. These powers have never been used in Romania during a period of 
unified executive. Apart from emphasising the factors that lead to an increase of 
presidential influence over the cabinet under cohabitation, these findings also indicate 
the institutional instruments that may increase the accountability of ministers across 
institutional contexts. 
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This chapter assesses the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of 
both executive scenarios and party relationships between ministers, presidents, and 
prime ministers. The country studies have focused on the influence of presidents, prime 
ministers, and party principals on ministerial deselection as a function of institutional 
context. Specifically, the France, Portugal, and Romania chapters have shown that the 
ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to influence the deselection 
of cabinet members depends on whether the president and the prime minister belong to 
different parties and on whether the president’s party is in government. The chapters 
focusing on ministerial turnover in France and in Romania have shown that presidents 
are more likely to have a say over ministerial deselection when the president and the 
prime ministers belong to the same party, a situation that is defined as unified executive. 
Each country study has also shown that prime ministers have a stronger grip on cabinet 
composition when the president’s party is not in government, a situation which is 
known as cohabitation. Additionally, the analysis of Romanian ministers has indicated 
that the party principal’s ability to influence the deselection of ministers increases under 
divided executive, when the president and the prime minister are from different parties 
but the president’s party is in government.  
As each case study focused on the analysis of ministerial turnover in only two 
governments, the impact of party relationships between ministers, presidents and prime 
ministers on the length of ministerial tenure has raised several problems of 
measurement and quantitative assessment. For example, since the French and the 
Romanian presidents covered by this study have contested the presidential race from the 
position of party leaders, it was not possible to compare their influence on the process 
of ministerial deselection with that of presidents who were not party leaders prior to 
their election. The situation of the French and Romanian presidents contrasts with that 
of the Portuguese presidents covered by this study, who did not contest the presidency 
of the country from the position of party leaders. Finally, while only some of the French 
and Romanian prime ministers under study held the presidency of their parties while 
holding office, all Portuguese prime ministers were party leaders. As a result, while the 
Chapter Seven: Ministerial deselection in France, Portugal, and 
Romania 
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case-study chapters have put forward a finely-grained analysis of the party relationships 
between presidents, prime ministers and their minister-agents using a wide selection of 
primary and secondary sources, this aspect could not be studied quantitatively within 
each country. However, the rich variation in both institutional context and party 
relationships across the three countries under study allows us to carry out a full 
empirical test of the two factors accounting for the variation in the influence of the three 
principals over cabinet composition in this comparative chapter. 
This chapter is divided in two parts. The first section provides an overview of 
the pooled data set of French, Portuguese, and Romanian ministers and describes the 
variation in independent variables within and across countries and as a function of 
executive scenarios. This section also reviews the patterns of ministerial selection in 
each country and offers a general overview of the importance that different types of 
political experience have for the recruitment of executive elites in different national 
contexts. The second section of this chapter presents a multivariate analysis of 
ministerial tenure across the three countries under study. This section highlights the 
impact that formal and informal hierarchies of party leadership have on the ability of 
presidents and prime ministers to influence the process of ministerial deselection and 
emphasises the political circumstances that are likely to strengthen this effect. 
7.1 The pooled data set on French, Portuguese, and Romanian ministers 
The cross-country data set includes 232 cabinet members who served in the 
French, Portuguese, and Romanian governments under analysis. While the units of 
observation in the data set are the 232 ministers, the units of analysis are the events 
experienced by ministers. Overall, 5,072 observations related to the events experienced 
by ministers were recorded from 50,921 articles published in Le Figaro, Diário de 
Notícias, and Evenimentul zilei.  
The independent variables included in the analysis are presented in Tables 7.1 
and 7.2, which provide definitions for the variables recording personal characteristics 
and events and show basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers. Due 
to idiosyncratic differences in the patterns of ministerial selection across the three 
countries, fewer independent variables are included in the cross-country analysis 
compared to the single case studies. 
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Table 7.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean 
Cabinet experience Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
had previously held full cabinet positions. 
0.35 
Deputies 2 mandates Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
won a seat in last general elections and who were 
not at their first legislative mandate at the 
moment of appointment. 
0.46 
Local office Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
held an elective position in local administration at 
the moment of appointment. 
0.50 
Party executives Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
are members in their parties’ national executive 
bodies at the end of tenure. 
0.40 
Local party leaders Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who   
lead local party organisations at the end of tenure. 
0.15 
PM Party Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who 
are from the same party as the prime minister. 
0.72 
 
Table 7.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean St. dev. Range 
Tenure The length of ministerial tenure is measured 
in days.  
759.55 504.49 (23, 1816) 
PR Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and presidents. 1.05 2.06 (0, 11) 
PM Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and prime 
ministers. 
0.94 1.88 (0, 14) 
PARTY Conflicts Conflicts between ministers and parties. 1.75 3.17 (0, 21) 
Resignation calls Number of times ministers were asked to 
resign. 
1.75 2.89 (0, 16) 
Reshuffles Number of times ministers were reshuffled 
during current mandate. 
0.30 0.67 (0, 4) 
Protests Number of national-level strikes and protests 
organised during current term. 
4.70 11.34 (0, 80) 
 
Owing to the variation in the patterns of executive recruitment across national 
contexts, the comparative analysis uses a slightly different range of fixed characteristics 
to capture the four types of political experience that have proven important to 
ministerial selection in the three countries. Previous appointments to government in 
either full or junior positions are still the main indicator of previous experience of 
serving in office. However, due to the variation in the rules or qualities required for 
appointment in senior cabinet positions in the three countries, the comparative analysis 
no longer uses ministerial rank as an indicator of executive experience.  
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The country studies look at membership in the parliament and prior experience 
as members of the parliament to assess the ministers’ parliamentary background. To 
compensate for the variation in the role of parliamentary experience for appointments to 
national government across the three countries, the comparative analysis combines these 
two indicators of parliamentary experience. In the pooled analysis, experienced 
ministers are deputies who had previously been elected to parliament.  
To compensate for the variation in the role of local politics for the advancement 
of political careers at national level, the comparative analysis only looks at whether 
ministers held an elective position in local administration at the moment of 
appointment. Finally, top executive positions in a party organisation at both local and 
national level indicate the ministers’ experience as party executives in the country 
studies as well as in the pooled analysis. 
Ministers are also unlikely to experience the same range of events during their 
time in office across different countries. For example, while Portuguese ministers must 
step down if they want to compete in local elections, the French and the Romanian 
ministers are not required to do so. As a result of this difference across the three 
countries, it is no longer possible to analyse the impact of defeats in local elections on 
the risk of losing office in the pooled comparison. Additionally, although there is no 
legal or party ban on the mobility of Portuguese ministers in the party hierarchy while 
they are in office, in practice no cabinet member has been demoted or promoted in the 
party hierarchy during the time period under study. Consequently, this factor is not 
included in the cross-country analysis, since it is not possible to verify whether 
promotions in the party hierarchy are used as compensatory moves for ministerial 
deselection across all three countries.  
Another explanatory factor included in the country studies takes into account the 
formal link of delegation between parliaments and cabinets and controls for the impact 
of parliamentary control on the risk of deselection. However, while an indicator of 
parliamentary control on individual ministers has been identified in each country, there 
is significant variation in the type of parliamentary pressure that ministers experience in 
each case. Romanian senators and deputies can table simple motions against individual 
ministers and may recommend their removal from the cabinet. These recommendations 
are, however, not binding for the government. Although Portuguese deputies cannot 
vote on individual motions of no-confidence, they can request ministers to attend 
urgency debates when they wish to discuss unexpected polemical issues and to put 
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pressure on the government. French deputies and senators can neither vote on individual 
no-confidence motions nor request individual ministers to take part in special debates. 
However, the roll-call records of the French National Assembly can be used to identify 
policy disagreements between cabinet members and parliamentary majorities by 
analysing the abstentions and the votes cast against ministerial bills. Each of these 
indicators of parliamentary control has been included in the country-based analyses to 
test the impact of parliamentary pressure on the risk of losing office. However, since 
each form of parliamentary pressure relies on a different aspect of the relationship 
between parliaments and cabinets, their impact on ministerial careers cannot be 
compared across countries. 
The main explanatory factors used to estimate the variation in ministerial tenure 
across countries are resignation calls, as a measure of ministerial performance, and 
disagreements with principals, as a measure of principal-agent relationships. Similar to 
previous studies that have relied on agency theory to study the relationship between 
prime ministers and their cabinets (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012), we see resignation calls 
as indicators of the ministers’ performance in office. Consequently, we expect that 
principals use this information when they decide to fire ministers and we expect the 
relationship between the number of resignation calls and the length of ministerial tenure 
to be negative. To compensate for this measure’s exposure to noisy signals of the 
minister’s performance (Berlinski et al., 2010, p. 561), we also take into account the 
direct relationship between ministers and their principals. Our assumption in this case is 
that the risk of losing office increases when the occurrence of conflicts between 
ministers and their principals is made public. The accumulation of conflicts between 
ministers, presidents, prime ministers and parties is therefore a proxy for agency loss 
that each principal should aim to contain. If the principals have the power to fire agents, 
then they should be in a position to do so when the level of conflict with their agents 
increases. If the ministers’ risk of losing office does not increase in the presence of 
conflicts with principals, then we assume that the latter do not have the ability to 
sanction agency loss. The indicator of conflicts between ministers and principals is the 
number of times the former are criticised by the latter during their time in office, as 
reported in the press. The issue at stake may be related to the ministers’ performance in 
executive or party office or to their personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial 
departments or policy issues.  
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The information contained by the three explanatory variables that record 
disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties is 
used to estimate the influence of each principal on the deselection of ministers in the 
country studies as well as in the cross-country analysis. To make sure that the pooled 
analysis is not driven by country-specific factors, the observations related to the 
Portuguese president’s ability to veto executive decrees and to the Romanian president’s 
power to demand the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members and to request 
their suspension from office are excluded from the cross-country analysis.  
Table 7.3 provides summary statistics for events and fixed characteristics across 
the three countries. Table 7.4 presents summary statistics across executive scenarios.  
 
Table 7.3 Average events and fixed characteristics across countries 
 
 
 France  Portugal  Romania  Overall 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
 
N. Ministers 
 
75 
 
56 
 
101 
 
232 
N. Failures 29 30 61 120 
Length of tenure 
(days) 905.15 515.65 783.48 562.54 638.16 431.29 759.55 504.49 
Fixed characteristics       
Executive 
experience 0.51 0.50 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.33 0.35 0.48 
MPs & 2 
mandates 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Local office 0.78 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.50 0.50 
Party executives 0.44 0.50 0.24 0.43 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 
Local party 
leaders 0.14 0.35 0.03 0.18 0.21 0.40 0.15 0.36 
PM Party 0.75 0.43 0.55 0.50 0.73 0.44 0.72 0.45 
Events        
Conflicts PR 1.69 2.55 0.16 0.46 1.06 2.04 1.05 2.06 
Conflicts PM 1.47 2.24 0.07 0.26 1.03 1.95 0.94 1.88 
Conflicts PARTY 2.96 4.04 0.25 0.84 1.68 2.89 1.75 3.17 
Resignation calls 1.19 2.42 1.38 2.99 2.39 3.04 1.75 2.89 
Reshuffles 0.51 0.92 0.92 0.44 0.21 0.52 0.30 0.67 
Protests 12.04 17.61 1.88 2.91 0.81 1.66 4.70 11.34 
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Table 7.4 Average events and fixed characteristics across executive scenarios 
 Unified Divided Cohabitation Overall 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
N. Ministers 105 37 111 253 
N. Failures 44 29 47 120 
Length of       
tenure (days) 762.64 459.12 446.34 267.70 838.81 556.45 759.55 504.49 
Fixed characteristics       
Cabinet experience 0.39 0.49 0.08 0.26 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 
MPs & 2 mandates 0.53 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.50 
Local office 0.51 0.50 0.12 0.32 0.58 0.49 0.50 0.50 
Party executives 0.37 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49 
Local party leaders 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.36 
PM Party 0.83 0.38 0.33 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.72 0.45 
Events        
Conflicts PR 1.02 1.99 1.03 1.94 1.07 2.17 1.05 2.06 
Conflicts PM 0.79 1.19 1.45 2.56 0.93 2.12 0.94 1.88 
Conflicts PARTY 2.15 3.72 1.55 1.99 1.47 2.90 1.75 3.17 
Resignation calls 1.80 2.84 2.24 2.72 1.59 2.97 1.75 2.89 
Reshuffles 0.48 0.86 0.03 0.19 0.23 0.53 0.30 0.67 
Protests 3.66 7.27 0.59 1.52 6.63 14.71 4.70 11.34 
 
The comparative data set includes the exact dates when ministers take and leave 
office. The dependent variable records the length of ministerial tenure. Out of the 232 
ministers included in the analysis, 120 stepped down before the end of their term. The 
statistics in Table 7.3 show that the rate of ministerial turnover is higher in Romania, 
where only 40 per cent of the ministers completed their term in office. The data also 
indicates that the mean length of ministerial tenure ranges from 21 months in Romania 
to 30 months in France. However, if the rate of ministerial turnover across countries 
(Table 7.3) is compared with the frequency of deselection across executive scenarios 
(Table 7.4) then it becomes apparent that ministers incur a much greater risk of losing 
office under divided executive than under both unified executive and cohabitation. The 
data set includes only one spell of divided executive, which occurred between 
December 2004 and April 2007 in Romania. However, the data in Table 7.4 also 
indicates that the chance of observing ministerial termination events under unified 
executive and cohabitation is similar. Since the Romanian governments included in this 
analysis were observed under conditions of both unified executive and cohabitation, we 
can conclude that the variation in the frequency of deselection does not necessarily 
depend on the countries selected for analysis, but rather on the type of scenario under 
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which ministers are appointed. If the occurrence of a certain scenario makes a difference 
for ministerial survival, then the impact of principal-agent relationships on the risk of 
deselection should also vary as a function of different scenarios. 
The occurrence of conflicts between ministers and their principals is balanced 
across executive scenarios. However, when we compare their incidence across 
countries, some differences stand out. The most conflictual principal-agent relationship 
across the three countries as well as across scenarios is the party-minister one. The level 
of conflicts between ministers, presidents, and prime ministers is similar in France and 
Romania, but lower in Portugal. The analysis of ministerial turnover in Portugal has 
nevertheless emphasised that Portuguese presidents rely more on legislative powers and 
soft presidential powers, such as the open presidencies and the “magistracy of 
influence”, to wear down governments than on public criticism towards individual 
ministers (Araújo, 2003, p. 95; 96–97; Cruz, 1994, p. 256; Soares, 2002, p. 221). For the 
reasons explained above, though, these forms of presidential pressure are not included 
in the cross-country analysis. Moreover, Portuguese prime ministers from the Social-
Democratic Party seem to follow the code of conduct set by Ánibal Cavaco Silva during 
his long prime ministership between 1985 and 1995 and refrain from criticising their 
ministers in public. The lower frequency of conflicts recorded during Manuel Barroso’ 
and Pedro Santana Lopes’ time in office as prime ministers contrasts with the high 
number of conflicts recorded for José Socrates’ government.  
Overall, the correlation among the values of the conflict variables across 
countries presented in Table 7.3 is above 0.90. The correlation coefficients differ when 
the variation in the level of conflict is compared across scenarios in Table 7.4. Thus, 
while the correlation between the occurrence of conflicts under the scenarios of unified 
and divided executive is above 0.99, the correlation of conflict variables between 
divided executive and either of the other two scenarios is only around 0.50. The 
variation in the conflicts variables with institutional context and not as a function of the 
countries selected for analysis strengthens our expectation that the impact of principal-
agent relationships on the risk of deselection depends on institutional context. 
Tables 7.5-7.8 present a series of descriptive statistics related to the occurrence 
of resignation calls across countries and executive scenarios. According to Tables 7.5-
7.6, at least one resignation call was made for 103 out of the 232 ministers covered by 
the pooled data set. Of the 103 ministers, 27 were asked to resign only once, 25 were 
asked to resign twice, 13 were asked to resign three times, and 38 were asked to resign 
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at least four times. Similar to other works that study resignation calls (Berlinski et al., 
2010, p. 562), if a minister is asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new 
resignation call is recorded for this issue only if new information comes to light or if a 
different actor asks the minister to resign. In total there are 388 resignation calls in the 
data. Although the period of analysis is more or less evenly split between the three 
countries under analysis, Table 7.5 shows that a higher number of resignation calls was 
recorded in Romania compared to France and Portugal. The number of resignation calls 
is, however, more evenly distributed when we compare their occurrence across 
executive scenarios. Table 7.6 shows that the occurrence of resignation calls is 
remarkably balanced across unified executive and cohabitation, but considerably lower 
under divided executive. This variation is explained by the shorter time interval 
occupied by the scenario of divided executive in our data set, as it occurred only in 
Romania between December 2004 and April 2007. 
 
Table 7.5 Resignation calls for ministers facing resignation calls across countries 
Resignation calls Overall France Portugal Romania 
One 27 6 6 15 
Two  25 7 6 12 
Three 13 4 2 7 
Four or more 38 7 5 26 
Total 103 24 19 60 
 
 
Table 7.6 Resignation calls for ministers facing resignation calls across scenarios 
Resignation calls Overall Unified executive 
Divided       
executive Cohabitation 
One 27 9 5 13 
Two  25 12 2 11 
Three 13 4 3 6 
Four or more 38 17 7 14 
Total 103 42 17 44 
 
 
Tables 7.7 and 7.8 classify the calls for resignation according to the reasons that 
led to their occurrence. The proximate reasons for resignation calls are grouped into the 
same four categories, including personal errors, departmental errors, policy 
disagreements, and breaches of collective responsibility. In cases where ministers were 
asked to step down over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded. 
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This is why the total number of resignations differs depending on whether one focuses 
on the exact number of calls, or on the reason given for their occurrence. 
Table 7.7 shows that, overall, the majority of resignation calls are related to 
personal errors. However, the frequency of resignation calls related to personal errors is 
more balanced in France and in Portugal, compared to Romania. The disproportional 
occurrence of this type of resignation calls in Romania is to a certain extent explained 
by the abundance of corruption scandals that occurred during the social-democratic 
government’s time in office between 2000 and 2004. This hypothesis is confirmed in 
Table 7.8, which shows that a higher number of resignation calls related to personal 
errors occurred under the scenario of unified executive compared to the other two 
executive scenarios. The data in Table 7.8 also indicates that the number of resignation 
calls is likely to increase with the number of actors involved in the policy-making 
process, as there are considerably more calls for resignation related to policy errors and 
breaches of collective responsibility under cohabitation, when the president’s party 
opposes the government, than under unified and divided executive, when the president’s 
party is in government.  
 
Table 7.7 Resignation calls by reason across countries 
 
Reason for resignation calls France Portugal Romania Total 
Personal or ministerial error 38 38 163 239 
Departmental error 17 9 47 73 
Policy error 29 28 45 102 
Collective responsibility 8 2 5 15 
Total 92 77 260 429 
 
 
Table 7.8 Resignation calls by reason across scenarios 
 
Reason for resignation calls Unified     executive 
Divided 
executive Cohabitation Total 
Personal or ministerial error 122 34 83 239 
Departmental error 28 15 30 73 
Policy error 21 18 63 102 
Collective responsibility 1 4 10 15 
Total 172 71 186 429 
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The remaining parts of this section focus on the four types of political 
experience that have proven relevant for the selection of executive elites in each of the 
three countries. The following sub-sections discuss various issues related to differences 
in the types of variables included in the pooled comparison compared to the individual 
country studies. Overall, the analysis of descriptive statistics shows that the results 
obtained in the country studies are robust at the cross-country level even when the 
country-specific factors related to different types of political experience are not taken 
into account. 
Cabinet experience 
The information related to cabinet experience in the cross-country analysis concerns the 
ministers’ previous appointment to government as junior or full cabinet members. The 
measurement of this variable at cross-country level follows the same rules as in the 
country studies. As a result, the data presented in the Appendix (D.1) show a similar 
distribution of cabinet experience across countries and with respect to terminations 
events as the case-study chapters. Regardless of the variation in the professionalisation 
of executive elites across national contexts, the cross-country data corroborates the 
results obtained in the individual studies. While the lack of previous appointments in 
government does not seem to increase the risk of losing office, veteran ministers are 
more likely to step down than their less experienced colleagues. The correlation 
between inexperience and durability is hardly surprising taking into account the 
importance of the cabinet prize for ministers who enter government for the first time. 
Thus, inexperienced ministers are less likely to enter into conflict with their principals 
than cabinet members who have held such highly pressured jobs for a longer period of 
time.  
Parliamentary experience 
The country studies assess the weight of legislative careers on the length of ministerial 
tenures by taking into account not only the ministers’ recruitment from the 
parliamentary pool, but also their previous experience as members of the parliament. 
The cross-country analysis combines the two indicators of legislative experience and 
takes into account the number of times ministers had previously been elected in the 
parliament only for those cabinet members who held a parliamentary seat at the moment 
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of appointment. This measure of parliamentary experience reduces the possibility that 
different perceptions associated with the status of national representatives within 
individual countries drive the relationship between parliamentary experience and 
ministerial durability across countries. However, the use of a slightly different measure 
of parliamentary experience does not expose a different impact of parliamentary 
background on the length of ministerial tenure. The data related to the parliamentary 
background of the ministers who served in the governments under study across 
countries and with respect to their survival in office until the end of their term is 
presented graphically in the Appendix (D.2). The relationship between parliamentary 
experience and survival in office is remarkably balanced. The proportion of ministers 
with no parliamentary background is equally spread out among the ministers who 
stepped down and those who completed their term. The data do not emphasise any 
correlation between the number of legislative mandates held by ministers and their 
length of tenure either. 
Experience in local administration 
To assess the extent to which ministers come to executive office from local politics, the 
comparative analysis looks at whether the members of the governments under study 
held an elective position as councillors, presidents of local councils, mayors, or 
presidents of regional at the moment of appointment. As opposed to the country studies, 
the pooled analysis does not take into account the experience in local administration for 
ministers who were not holding local office at the moment of appointment in 
government. The comparative analysis does not take into account whether ministers lost 
or gained local office during their time in government either, as the simultaneous 
holding of local and national offices is banned in Portugal and in Romania. 
The cross-country data presented graphically in the Appendix (D.3) confirm the 
results obtained in the country studies and show that the local route to national politics 
is likely to increase a minister’s length of tenure. The ministers who were either 
councillors or mayors at the moment of appointment were more likely to survive in 
office than their colleagues who did not hold local office. This finding substantiates the 
expectation that the authority and durability of ministers depends not only on the 
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importance of their portfolios, but also on the range of political resources they hold at 
both national and local level41 (Duhamel, 2011, p. 604; François, 2006, p. 269).  
Party experience  
To determine the extent to which being a party executive makes a difference for a 
minister’s durability in office, the comparative analysis controls for membership in 
national executive bodies as well as for the leadership of local party organisations. We 
also compare the party offices held by ministers at the moment of appointment with the 
party roles they played at the end of tenure in each of the three countries under study. 
Similarly to the assessment of parliamentary and local administration experience, the 
cross-country analysis does not take into account the ministers’ positions in the party 
hierarchy prior to the moment of appointment. Notwithstanding the differences in the 
ministers’ mobility in the party hierarchy across the three countries, the data presented 
in the Appendix (D.4) do not suggest a correlation between durability and party 
seniority. There is hardly any indication that non-partisanship increases the risk of 
losing office, or that national or local party leaders are likely to survive longer in office. 
Additionally, the pattern of ministerial survival does not change as a function of 
whether one takes into account the party positions held at appointment or at the end of 
tenure.  
This summary suggests that, overall, fixed characteristics hold little explanatory 
power for the variation in the ministers’ length of tenure. This pattern does not 
necessarily mean that they are not an important determinant of the ministers’ 
professional advancement. However, it is unlikely that fixed characteristics at any 
moment in a minister’s career can explain a dynamic phenomenon like survival in a 
particular office, which depends primarily on what ministers do while they hold that 
office. For example, the lack of correlation between seniority in the party and durability 
in ministerial office does not necessarily mean that party positions do not make a 
difference for the length of tenure. It is more likely that we cannot actually observe this 
relationship because the ministers’ status in the party hierarchy is not fixed during the 
                                               
41
 The variation in the importance associated to local politics across countries may also explain why some 
ministers may be more eager to return or to devote more of their time to local politics in some countries 
than in other. For example, it is not unknown for French ministers to give up their position in the cabinet 
after winning local elections or even to prepare for local elections. This was the case of Martine Aubry in 
2000 when she stepped down from Lionel Jospin’s cabinet to prepare for the local elections in Lille where 
she wanted to run for the mayor position. Although such resignations are not unknown situation in 
Portugal and Romania either, their likelihood is considerably smaller. 
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time period under study. Thus, the party principal’s ongoing adjustment of the positions 
held by ministers in the party hierarchy according to their performance in office makes 
it difficult to measure how a minister’s length of tenure varies with their position in the 
party hierarchy when this quality is observed as a fixed characteristic at the beginning or 
at the end of tenure. 
 
7.2 Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, party relations, and 
ministerial durability across countries 
The remaining parts of this chapter present a multivariate analysis that estimates 
the impact of personal characteristics, party relations, institutional context, and party 
relationship on the length of ministerial tenure. We start with a nonparametric analysis 
that allows the data set to speak for itself without making any assumption about the 
functional form of the survivor function or about the effects of independent variables on 
survival experiences (Cleves et al., p. 91). Then we justify our model choice for the 
pooled analysis of ministerial turnover and the technique used to estimate the impact of 
events on the length of tenure. The next two sub-sections present the models that 
estimate the variation in the length of ministerial tenure first with institutional context 
and second as a function of the party relationship between ministers, presidents, and 
prime ministers. 
7.2.1 Nonparametric estimation and model specification 
The data set of French, Portuguese, and Romanian cabinets covers 232 ministers 
and includes 5,072 observations related to the events experienced by ministers while in 
office. Of the 232 ministers included in the pooled analysis, 120 stepped down before 
the collective end of their governments.  
Figure 7.1 shows that the probability of failing climbs rather steeply during the 
first three years in office and then starts to decline.  
Figure 7.2 presents a Kaplan-Meier plot which shows the unconditional 
probability that ministers will survive beyond a certain amount of time across countries 
and executive scenarios when no covariates are taken into consideration.  
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Figure 7.1 Hazard rate for ministerial survival across countries and scenarios 
 
Figure 7.2 Kaplan-Meier plots of ministerial survival across countries & scenarios 
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According to Figure 7.2, ministers have a 50% chance of surviving 943 days in 
office. Additional Kaplan-Meier plots reported in the Appendix (D.5-D.6) show that the 
probability of failing varies significantly across countries and scenarios. Thus, 
Romanian ministers have a 50% chance of survival beyond 826 days in office (when no 
explanatory factors are taken into account), while Portuguese and French ministers have 
a 50% chance of surviving beyond 1,053 and 1,275 days respectively. The probability 
of losing office also varies as a function of executive scenarios. The shorter survival 
rates are encountered in a divided executive, where ministers have a 50% chance of 
surviving only 590 days in office. A situation of unified executive increases the 50% 
survival probability to 1,168 days, while under cohabitation ministers have a 50% 
chance of surviving beyond 1,211 days in office. The Kaplan-Meier plots reported in 
the Appendix also display the results of the log-rank tests that determine whether or not 
the surviving functions across different countries and scenarios are the same. The p 
values indicate that there is enough evidence to reject the null of no difference in the 
survivor functions across countries and scenarios. 
A first issue involved in model specification regards the shape of the hazard 
function. As the pooled data set contains considerably more observations than the 
country-based data sets, parameter estimates would be able to exploit the available 
information more efficiently than the semi-parametric method we have used to estimate 
the risk of losing office in the country analyses (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 223). However, 
since we do not have any theoretical insight into the variation in the length of tenure as 
a function of time, it is necessary to assess the goodness of fit for different parametric 
distributions of the time dependency using the Akaike Information Criterion or AIC 
(Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 44). The AIC tests for the pooled data set indicate 
that the Weibull model is the most appropriate for the analysis of this data.42  
An alternative method to choose between different parametric models and 
determine how the hazard rate varies with time is to fit the data using a piecewise-
constant exponential (PCE) model. This is a semi-parametric duration model that leaves 
the shape of the hazard rate unspecified with respect to time. The time interval is 
divided into discrete units within which the hazard rate is assumed to be constant. The 
hazard rate may nevertheless vary across different periods of time. If the PCE model 
reveals that the hazard rate increases monotonically with time, then the Weibull model 
                                               
42
 Due to computational problems, the generalised gamma model could not be estimated. As a result the 
Akaike Information Criterion tests were used to discriminate only between the exponential, the Weibull, 
the  Gompertz, the log normal, and the log-logistic models. 
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is an appropriate choice for data analysis (Golder, 2011a). Figure 7.3 compares the 
shape of the baseline hazard estimated with a step function, in which the height of each 
step is its own model parameter, with a baseline hazard that can only increase at an 
increasing rate (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 243). Both hazard functions have been estimated 
after fitting the baseline model presented in Table 7.11. Figure 7.3 shows a reasonable 
fit, indicating that the hazard increases monotonically with time. As a result, we can be 
confident that the Weibull model is an appropriate choice for analysis. 
 
Figure 7.3 Comparison of estimated baseline hazards 
 
A second issue we need to consider is how to model the potential correlation 
between ministers in the same country and the within-minister correlation that may arise 
when ministers experience more events during their time in office. In the latter case, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that there is no connection between the events that 
ministers experience. To adjust for within-minister correlation without biasing the 
cross-minister estimators we need to use clustered robust standard errors (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2010, p. 335). In this case, the observations in the data set are clustered by 
ministers and the data set includes 232 clusters. However, ministers in one country may 
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turnover using shared frailty models, which assume that ministers in one country share a 
frailty term that differs from country to country (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). 
However, this technique can only provide reliable estimates of parameters and standard 
errors when the data includes a sufficient number of clusters (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 
193). Due to the small number of countries included in our analysis, as well as to the 
difficulties raised by the use of frailty terms for the interpretation of models that rely on 
the proportional hazards assumption (Golder, 2011b), the Weibull regressions presented 
in Table 7.9 report standard errors clustered by ministers. 
The remaining of this section focuses on the variation in the length of ministerial 
tenure as a function of institutional context and party relationships. 
7.2.2 The length of ministerial tenure and executive scenarios 
Table 7.9 presents four models that estimate the impact of personal characteristics, 
events, and party relationships on the length of ministerial tenure across and within 
dual-executive scenarios. Model 1 estimates the impact of all variables across executive 
scenarios and serves as a baseline for comparison. Model 2, 3, and 4 assess the extent to 
which resignation calls, as performance measures, and conflicts with presidents, prime 
ministers, and party principals, as proxies for the principal-agent relationships, affect the 
ministers’ risk of losing office as a function of institutional context. To do so, the three 
models include a contextual variable that verifies to what extent resignation calls 
increase the risk of being sanctioned under different political circumstances and tests the 
ability of principals to reduce agency-loss under unified executive, divided executive, 
and cohabitation. The model specification adopts the chained-interaction technique, 
which is employed when one variable (in this case one of the executive scenarios) is 
believed to modify the effects of other variables (the impact of conflicts with presidents, 
parties and prime ministers), without conditioning each other’s effects (Kam and 
Franzese 2007: 39–40). Thus, Models 3 and 4 include three two-way interactions that 
separate the impact of resignation calls and of conflicts with principals on the risk of 
losing office under unified executive, divided executive and cohabitation and respects 
the recommendations regarding the inclusion of all constitutive terms in the case of 
multiplicative interaction models (Braumoeller 2004; Brambor et al. 2006). The models 
present coefficients from Weibull regressions. Positive coefficients indicate that the risk 
of deselection increases and indicate a shorter length of tenure, while negative 
coefficients decrease the hazard rate and are expected to increase the length of tenure. 
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The four models highlight the overall limited explanatory power of personal 
characteristics. Furthermore, the robustness of these results across the four models 
confirms the limited impact of fixed characteristics on the length of ministerial tenure 
with regard to institutional context. However, the models emphasise that previous 
experience in full cabinet positions increases the risk of losing office by about 55 per 
cent.43 This finding confirms the impact of executive experience on the length of tenure 
across national contexts, as British ministers who come to government with some 
ministerial experience are also 58 per cent more likely to lose office than those without 
previous experience (Berlinski et al., 2007, p. 258). The greater durability of 
inexperienced ministers may be explained by the longer period of time they require 
before they develop independence with regard to their principals. More experienced 
ministers are also more likely to disregard their principals’ instruction and less inclined 
to accept policy compromises than their inexperienced colleagues who are “still in hot 
pursuit of their ambition” (Lord Wilson, 2013). The local politics route to national 
office also seems to have a significant impact on the length of tenure. The four models 
in Table 7.9 indicate that the risk of losing office was 40 to 50 per cent lower for 
ministers who held an elective position at local level. This finding substantiates the 
expectation that local strongholds increase a minister’s standing at the cabinet table, as 
emphasised in the country studies particularly in the case of France and Romania. The 
only other fixed characteristic shown to have a significant event on the length of tenure 
refers to whether ministers are in the prime minister’s party. Because prime ministers 
are expected to have more opportunities to replace cabinet ministers than other leaders, 
ministers from the prime minister’s party are expected to incur a higher risk of 
deselection than other cabinet members (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008, p. 171). 
This expectation is not confirmed by the models presented in Table 7.14, which indicate 
that being in the prime minister’s party increases a minister’s chance of surviving in 
office regardless of institutional context. This finding may suggest that the extent of the 
prime minister’s power over ministers in his or her party depends on the limits imposed 
on the prime minister’s control over the cabinet by the president and the party principal. 
The impact of resignation calls and conflicts with the three principals on the 
length of tenure is analysed across scenarios in Model 1 and within scenarios in Models 
2, 3, and 4. The results in Model 1 indicate that, overall, ministers who are asked to 
resign and who enter into conflicts with any of the three principals are more likely to  
                                               
43
 This value was calculated by exponentiating the coefficients of the Cabinet experience variable 
reported in the four models from Table 7.11 to obtain time ratios. 
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Table 7.9 Ministerial durability across executive scenarios 
                         Model 1    Model 2   Model 3    Model 4    
________________________________________________________________________ 
Fixed characteristics                                                                          
Cabinet experience      0.44**     0.45*      0.44*      0.40*   
        (0.22)     (0.23)     (0.23)     (0.23)    
MPs & 2 mandates            -0.06      -0.04      -0.06      -0.01    
        (0.21)     (0.22)     (0.23)     (0.23)    
Local office                -0.67**    -0.65**    -0.60**    -0.87**  
        (0.23)     (0.23)     (0.25)     (0.27)    
Party executives      -0.22      -0.26      -0.33      -0.18  
        (0.22)     (0.22)     (0.23)     (0.22)    
Local party leaders      0.16       0.23       0.17       0.01    
        (0.28)     (0.29)     (0.29)     (0.30)    
PM Party       -0.56**    -0.58**    -0.42*     -0.64**  
                        (0.21)    (0.21)     (0.22)     (0.21)    
Events  
Social unrest           0.07*      0.05       0.08**     0.11**  
        (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)    
Reshuffles        1.64       1.56       1.87*      1.87*   
          (1.10)     (1.37)     (1.09)     (1.09)    
Resignation Calls       0.74***    0.77***    0.79***    0.69*** 
                            (0.12)     (0.19)     (0.14)     (0.13)    
PR Conflicts            0.82***    0.73***    0.90***    0.88*** 
                       (0.11)     (0.12)     (0.12)     (0.18)    
PM Conflicts            0.61***    0.58***    1.24***    0.46*** 
                       (0.14)     (0.16)     (0.32)     (0.12)    
PARTY Conflicts           0.44**     0.53**     0.11       0.47**  
        (0.15)     (0.17)     (0.25)     (0.18)    
Executive scenario 
Unified        -0.07                                    
         (0.22)                                    
Resignation calls × Unified      0.07                                   
         (0.24)                                    
PR Conflicts × Unified       1.25**                                  
         (0.38)                                    
PM Conflicts × Unified      -1.32                                    
         (0.81)                                    
PARTY Conflicts × Unified     -0.25                                    
         (0.43)                                    
Divided          1.02***                 
          (0.27)                    
Resignation calls × Divided      -0.11                    
          (0.42)                    
PR Conflicts × Divided       -0.46*                   
          (0.27)                    
PM Conflicts × Divided       -0.88**                  
          (0.38)                    
PARTY Conflicts × Divided       0.47                    
          (0.33)                    
Cohabitation          -0.54**  
                                                             (0.22)    
Resignation calls × Cohabitation                              0.21    
                                                             (0.24)    
PR Conflicts × Cohabitation                                   0.05    
                                                             (0.21)    
PM Conflicts × Cohabitation                                   1.36*** 
                                                             (0.27)    
PARTY Conflicts × Cohabitation                               -0.64**  
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                                                             (0.29)    
Constant                    -9.70***  -9.59***  -10.56***    -9.74*** 
                            (0.87)    (0.85)     (0.94)      (0.90)    
Shape parameter              1.35      1.34       1.44        1.40      
                            (0.12)    (0.12)     (0.13)      (0.13)                  
________________________________________________________________________ 
N Ministers                   232       232        232         232 
N Failures                    120       120        120         120  
N Observations               5072      5072       5072        5072                
Log likelihood           -105.126  -101.087    -96.262     -97.546    
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by 
ministers.  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
lose office (see D.7 in the Appendix for a graphical interpretation of the impact of 
principal-agent relationships and the length of tenure across executive scenarios).    
Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 7.9 assess the impact of resignation calls and 
conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals on the ministers’ risk of 
losing office as a function of institutional context. Model 2 estimates the impact of 
events variables on the ministers’ risk of losing office under unified executive. 
However, the impact of interaction terms is not revealed directly by the regression 
coefficients. For example, to measure the impact of resignation calls under a scenario of 
unified executive it is necessary to sum up the coefficients associated with Resignation 
calls and Resignation calls × Unified. This sum reveals a positive coefficient, which is 
equal to 0.84 (0.77 + 0.07). The standard error of this sum of coefficients is also 
calculated from the standard error of the two separate coefficients and indicates a highly 
significant coefficient. Thus, resignation calls are strongly associated with an increase in 
the risk of losing office under unified executive. The impact of resignation calls outside 
period of unified executive, when Unified is equal to 0, is revealed directly by the 
coefficient associated with Resignation calls and its standard error. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient associated with Resignation calls in Model 2 
indicates that resignation calls increase the risk of deselection outside periods of unified 
executive as well. 
The results in Model 2 show that conflictual relationships with presidents are 
associated with a shorter length of ministerial tenure during periods of unified 
executive. This is also the case for party principals, but not for prime ministers. Figure 
7.4 illustrates the effects of conflicts with the three principals under unified executive 
and reveals the considerable influence of the minister-president relationship on 
ministerial turnover.  
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Figure 7.4 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive 
 
Although the impact of the conflicts with the party principal on the risk of losing 
office is statistically significant, the data in Figure 7.4 indicates that its substantive 
effect is negligible compared to the magnitude of the impact of conflicts with 
presidents. The country studies have nevertheless revealed that the detrimental effect of 
conflicts with the president on the length of tenure is mostly limited to the scenario of 
unified executive. This expectation is confirmed at cross-country level, as detailed in the 
Appendix (see D.8 for an illustration of the relationship between the length of tenure 
and conflicts with presidents across executive scenarios). 
Model 3 estimates the variation in the length of tenure under a situation of 
divided executive. However, as this scenario occurred only in Romania, between 
December 2004 and April 2007, this model does not carry out a cross-country analysis. 
As a result, the figures in Model 3 replicate the results reported in the models that 
estimate ministerial turnover in Romania in Chapter Six. Specifically, the regression 
results show that resignation calls lose their explanatory power under this scenario and 
that only conflicts with the party principals increase the risk of deselection. Figure 7.5 
confirms that the influence of the party principal on ministerial deselection matters more 
than that of presidents and prime ministers when a scenario of divided executive occurs. 
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Figure 7.5 Impact of principal-agent relationships under divided executive 
 
 
As the data related to ministerial turnover under divided executive is limited to just one 
occurrence of this scenario in only one country, it is premature to generalise this 
finding. However, the data suggests that the influence of the party principal over the 
cabinet peaks during periods of divided executive compared to both unified executive 
and cohabitation (a graphical interpretation of the variation in the influence of conflicts 
with political parties across executive scenarios can be found in the Appendix, see D.9). 
The increase in the party principal’s influence over cabinet composition during periods 
of divided executive may be due to high and prolonged inter-governmental dissensions. 
For example, when President Băsescu of the PD and Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu 
of the PNL set against each other between late 2004 and 2007, Democratic ministers 
sided with the president and defied the prime minister, while Liberal ministers did 
exactly the opposite (Stan & Zaharia, 2007). Consequently, the process of ministerial 
deselection became a zero-sum game for the president and the prime minister as they 
criticised the ministers from opposing parties. Our results may indicate that when the 
president-premier relationship leads to political deadlock, the only principal-agent 
relationship that has a significant impact on the process of deselection may be the one 
between ministers and party principals. 
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The last model in Table 7.9 focuses on ministerial turnover under cohabitation. 
The results of this model confirm the findings of the country studies and show that a 
conflictual relationship with the prime minister under this executive scenario increases 
significantly the risk of losing office. Nevertheless, the fact that conflicts with the 
president are not completely risk-free under cohabitation confirms Duverger’s (1996, p. 
517) expectation that although presidents have less power than prime ministers when 
this scenario occurs, they are still not completely powerless. Figure 7.6 illustrates the 
substantive effects of conflicts with the three principals under cohabitation and shows 
that the only relationship that increases the risk of deselection in this case is the one 
with the prime minister. The expectation put forward in the country studies regarding 
the decrease in the power of prime ministers under unified and divided executive, is 
confirmed at the cross-country level (see D.10 in the Appendix for the variation in the 
impact of conflicts with prime ministers across executive scenarios). Model 3 in Table 
7.9 also shows that ministers who are asked to resign during periods of cohabitation are 
also more likely to step down that ministers who are not.  
 
Figure 7.6 Impact of principal-agent relationships under cohabitation 
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Overall, the results reported by the four models in Table 7.9 confirm the findings 
obtained in the country studies. The authority of presidents and prime ministers over 
ministers increases under unified executive and cohabitation respectively, while the 
influence of the party principal on ministerial deselection reaches a significant level 
only when a situation of divided executive occurs. The following section examines the 
variation in the length of tenure as a function of party relationships. Due to the lack of 
variation in the party roles played by presidents and prime ministers within the countries 
under study, this relationship could not be analysed in the case study chapters. The 
following section emphasises that in addition to institutional context, party leadership 
positions are a good predictor of the presidents’ and the prime ministers’ ability to 
influence the process of ministerial deselection. 
7.2.3 The length of ministerial tenure and party relations 
This section analyses the extent to which the impact of resignation calls and principal-
agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure depends on the interaction 
between institutional context and the party relationships between ministers, presidents, 
and prime ministers. The party relationships vary depending on whether the presidents 
and prime ministers hold a party leadership position or not. However, as explained in 
the first section of this chapter, in order to account for the informal partisan authority 
that presidents preserve even after they step down as leaders of their own party, it is 
necessary to take into account the party leadership positions held by presidents and 
prime ministers not only after they take office, but also before the elections that brought 
them into this position. To account for this variation in party relationships, the following 
analysis assesses the impact that principal-agent relationships have on ministerial 
deselection according to the leadership positions held by presidents and prime ministers 
before and after they took office. If the analysis reveals a difference in the impact of 
formal and de facto party relationships on the ministers’ risk of losing office, then we 
will be in a better position to determine to which extent informal or de facto party 
hierarchies matter for a correct assessment of the impact that different principal-agent 
relationships have on the process of ministerial deselection. 
To test whether the party leadership positions held by presidents and prime 
ministers before and after they take office make a difference for their ability to influence 
the process of ministerial deselection three sets of models are estimated. First we look at 
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the formal party leadership roles held by presidents and prime ministers after they take 
office. In this case we can only estimate the impact of conflicts with prime ministers 
who act as formal leaders of their parties, since presidents are required to give up their 
party responsibilities before taking office. The case studies have nevertheless shown 
that the party leadership positions held by prime ministers before and after elections 
may vary as well. Lionel Jospin in the case of France stepped down as party leader upon 
taking office, while Adrian Năstase in the case of Romania was elected as party leader 
only after elections. To account for the variation that may take place in the party 
leadership positions held by prime ministers before and after elections, the second set of 
models estimate the impact of conflicts on ministerial turnover for the case of prime 
ministers who were party leaders before the elections that preceded their appointment. 
Finally, the third set of models takes into account the party leadership positions held by 
presidents before their election. Each set of models estimates the variation in the length 
of ministerial tenure as a function of institutional context and party relationships, 
provided there is variation in the party leadership roles held by presidents and prime 
ministers within each scenario. If there is no difference in the party leadership positions 
held by presidents and/or prime ministers before and after elections within a certain 
scenario, then it is not possible to assess the variation in the length of ministerial tenure 
as a function of institutional context and different party relationships.  
Prime ministers and party relationships after elections 
First we estimate the impact of principal agent relationships on the length of 
tenure taking into account the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy after 
elections. To do so, the conflict variables are interacted with a dummy variable, PM 
leader, which is 1 for prime ministers who were party leaders and 0 for the prime 
ministers who did not hold a formal party leadership position after elections. For 
example, Lionel Jospin, who stepped down as party leader when he became a prime 
minister is coded with 0, while Adrian Năstase, who succeeded Ion Iliescu as party 
leader after the concurrent elections that took place in 2004 is coded with 1. The other 
prime ministers covered by the data set who preserved their position as party leaders in 
the aftermath of elections are coded with 1. The interaction terms indicate the impact of 
different principal-agent relationships as a function of the prime ministers’ position in 
the party hierarchy. For example, if the prime minister is not a party leader, the 
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coefficient on PR Conflicts indicates the impact of conflicts with the president when PM 
Leader is 0. If the prime minister was a party leader, then the impact of conflicts with 
the president is given by the sum of the coefficients associated to PR Conflicts and PR 
Conflicts × PM leader. The variation in the length of ministerial tenure is estimated 
across executive scenarios, as well as separately under unified executive and 
cohabitation. Due to the lack of variation in the party leadership roles held by prime 
ministers under unified executive before and after elections, a separate model could not 
be estimated for this scenario.  
To ease the interpretation of results, Table 7.10 presents only the coefficients 
related to the impact of conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals 
on the risk of deselection. The full results of this regression model are presented in the 
Appendix (D.11). The coefficients presented in Table 7.10 correspond to the conflicts 
variables when prime ministers are not party leaders (PM Leader=0), the sum of 
conflicts variables and conflicts variables interacted with PM Leader (when PM 
Leader=1), and their level of significance. Each row in Table 7.10 presents the results 
corresponding to a particular institutional context. This presentation allows us to 
compare directly the results for the impact of conflicts with principals when prime 
ministers are party leaders and when they are not. 
 
Table 7.10 Principal-agent relationships and the prime ministers’ position in the party 
hierarchy after elections 
Party leadership roles after elections PR Conflicts PM Conflicts PARTY Conflicts 
PM Leader =0 Unified, Divided, Cohabitation      0.93**      1.63**  0.02 
PM Leader =1 Unified, Divided, Cohabitation        0.62***         0.44***          0.54*** 
PM Leader =0 Unified=1      2.08** -0.57 -0.21 
PM Leader =1 Unified=1 0.98 -1.62     0.84* 
PM Leader =0 Cohabitation=1 0.24        2.23***  0.08 
PM Leader =1 Cohabitation=1       1.02***      1.50** -0.21 
PM Leader =0 Divided=0    1.06**       1.73**   0.03 
PM Leader =1 Divided=0      0.76*** 0.47  0.39 
 
Table 7.10 shows that the results differ within executive scenarios although, 
overall, all principal-agent relationships are significantly related to the risk of losing 
office across executive scenarios. The results indicate that a conflictual relationship with 
prime ministers does not have an impact on the length of tenure under unified executive, 
regardless of the prime minister’s position in the party hierarchy. Conversely, the results 
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in the third row suggest that conflicts with prime ministers increase the risk of 
deselection significantly under cohabitation irrespective of whether they are party 
leaders or not. Due to the lack of variation in the party leadership positions held by 
prime ministers under the scenario of divided executive, which occurred only in 
Romania between December 2004 and April 2007, it is not possible to present a model 
that estimates the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of the party 
leadership roles held by prime ministers under this executive scenario. We can 
nevertheless assess the impact of principal-agent relationships outside the scenario of 
divided executive. If we compare the results of the variation in the length of tenure 
outside periods of divided executive, reported in the last row in Table 7.10, with the 
estimated variation in the length of tenure across all three scenarios, reported in the first 
row of this table, then we notice a significant difference in the impact of conflicts with 
prime ministers and party principals. Specifically, the comparison of the two sets of 
results indicates that the increase in the authority of prime ministers and parties over 
cabinet composition under divided executive is actually driving the estimation results 
across the three scenarios. The substantive effects of the principal-agent relationships on 
the length of tenure when prime ministers are party leaders after elections across and 
within executive scenarios are graphically presented in the Appendix (D.12-D14). 
Overall, the results presented in Table 7.10 indicate that the position held by 
prime ministers in the party hierarchy after elections do not make a difference for their 
influence over cabinet composition regardless of whether there is unified executive or 
cohabitation. The relationship with prime ministers is shown to have an insignificant 
impact on the length of ministerial tenure under unified executive, and a strong impact 
under cohabitation regardless of their position in the party hierarchy. This is a counter-
intuitive finding, as prime ministers who are party leaders are expected to have more 
control over their cabinets than prime ministers who are not party leaders. These results 
may indicate either that the influence of prime ministers over cabinet composition is 
likely to be weak under unified executive and strong under cohabitation regardless of 
their position in the party hierarchy, or that the party leadership role played by prime 
ministers is not accurately captured in these models. To answer this question we will 
estimate the impact of conflicts with prime ministers on the risk of deselection taking 
into account their position in the party hierarchy before elections.  
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Prime ministers and party relationships before elections 
Table 7.11 presents the coefficients related to the impact of conflicts with 
presidents, prime ministers and party principals on the risk of deselection according to 
the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy before elections. In this set of 
models Lionel Jospin is coded with 1, while Adrian Năstase is coded with 0. The other 
prime ministers who preserved their positions as party leaders following the elections 
are coded with 1. The full regression results of these models are presented in the 
Appendix (D.16). 
Table 7.11 presents a more nuanced picture of the relation between principal-
agent relationships and the length of ministerial tenure when the position held by prime 
ministers in the hierarchy of their parties before elections is taken into account. Overall, 
these results provide consistent evidence that a conflictual relationship with prime 
ministers poses a risk to deselection only when prime ministers are party leaders before 
elections. The results in Table 7.11 reveal that this finding does not change as a function 
of institutional context. 
 
Table 7.11 Principal-agent relationships and the prime ministers’ position in the party 
hierarchy before elections 
Party leadership roles before elections PR Conflicts PM Conflicts PARTY Conflicts 
PM Leader =0 Unified, Divided, Cohabitation       1.97*** -0.74 0.31 
PM Leader =1 Unified, Divided, Cohabitation        0.71***         0.56***         0.50*** 
PM Leader =0 Divided=0        2.00*** -0.71 0.41 
PM Leader =1 Divided=0        0.94***         1.84*** -0.08 
PM Leader =0 Cohabitation=0      1.61** -0.98 0.27 
PM Leader =1 Cohabitation=0 0.39       0.37**        0.52*** 
 
The lack of variation in the party leadership roles held by prime ministers before 
elections during the periods of cohabitation and divided executive included in our data 
set, as well as for most of the periods of unified executive, does not allow us to estimate 
the variation in the length of ministerial tenure separately within each scenario. 
However, the variation in the prime ministers’ positions in the party hierarchy across 
scenarios allows us to separate the risk of losing office in one scenario compared to the 
other two scenarios. Thus, while the first row in Table 7.11 estimates the variation in 
the length of tenure across the three scenarios, the second row focuses on the occurrence 
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of unified executive and cohabitation and the third row reports the results related to the 
variation in the length of tenure across unified and divided executive.  
Each of the three models reported in Table 7.11 indicate a statistically 
significant relationships between conflicts with prime ministers and a shorter length of 
tenure only when prime ministers contested the preceding elections as party leaders. 
The comparison of the results across and within executive scenarios indicates that the 
strongest impact of conflicts with prime ministers on the risk of deselection take place 
under unified executive and cohabitation. This relationship is also illustrated in Figure 
7.7 (the relations between principal-agent relationships and the length of tenure in the 
other two models presented in Table 7.11 are reported in the Appendix, D17-D18). The 
statistically significant impact of conflicts with prime ministers on the risk of losing 
office does not disappear when this relationship is estimated outside periods of 
cohabitation. The results presented in the last row in Table 7.11 indicate that prime 
ministers are in control of ministerial deselection under unified and divided executive 
provided they held the presidency of their parties prior to elections. 
 
Figure 7.7 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and 
cohabitation when prime ministers are party leaders before elections 
 
 
Prime minister
President
Party
0
2
4
6
8
10
H
az
a
rd
 
fu
n
ct
io
n
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
(under unified executive and cohabitation, at max. level of conflict with principals)
Party relationships before elections, when PM is party leader
241 
 
These results complement and enhance the findings obtained when the relation 
between principal-agent relationships and the length of tenure was estimated as a 
function of the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy after elections. The 
estimation results presented in Table 7.10 suggest that the positions held by prime 
ministers in their parties’ formal hierarchy do not make a difference to their ability to 
control the process of ministerial deselection. Moreover, their influence over cabinet 
composition appears limited to the scenario of cohabitation. However, if we take into 
account the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy ahead of elections, then it 
becomes apparent that the authority of former party leaders over their cabinets is not 
bounded by any political circumstances. This result adds to our understanding regarding 
the variation in prime ministerial leadership across and within national contexts. For 
example, the country studies discussed in this work have shown that the authority of 
Portuguese prime ministers over their cabinets does not vary across executive scenarios 
as much as the authority of French and Romanian prime ministers does. These results 
confirm our expectation that the lack of variation in prime ministerial leadership in 
Portugal is due to the fact that prime ministers always lead their parties in elections in 
this country. Furthermore, the France and the Romania studies show that prime 
ministers who are party leaders before elections keep a strong grip over cabinets even if 
they step down as party leaders before taking office, as shown by the case of Lionel 
Jospin; while prime ministers who are not party leaders ahead of elections are faced 
with increased presidential activism even if they are eventually elected as party leaders 
in the aftermath of general elections, as indicated by the case of Adrian Năstase. This is 
an important finding, highlighting the circumstances under which informal hierarchies 
of intraparty relationships may explain the variation in prime ministerial leadership 
across and within political systems. 
Table 7.11 contains strong evidence that the ability of presidents and party 
principals to control cabinet composition also varies as a function of the party 
leadership roles held by prime ministers ahead of elections. The results presented in 
Table 7.11 show that the relationship between conflicts with presidents and the risk of 
losing office is statistically significant under unified executive and cohabitation 
regardless of the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy. This finding confirms 
the expectations formulated in the case studies regarding the ability of presidents to 
preserve some influence over the political system even under an institutional context 
that weakens their overall influence over the political system and regardless of the 
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position of prime ministers in the hierarchy of their parties. For example, the Portugal 
case study has emphasised that the presidents’ use of veto powers and going-public 
tactics can increase a minister’s risk of losing office even under cohabitation and even 
when prime ministers keep a tight grip over their parties. Similar patterns were also 
highlighted in the case of France and Romania, where President Chirac and President 
Băsescu were still able to have their voice heard in resignation debates even during 
periods of cohabitation. However, the data presented in Figure 7.7 indicates that the risk 
of losing office because of conflicts with presidents when prime ministers contested 
general elections as party leaders is not substantial. The coefficients reported in Table 
7.11 suggest that the impact of conflicts with the president on the risk of losing office is 
substantially higher when prime ministers are not party leaders ahead of elections. 
Figure 7.8 illustrates this relationship under unified executive and cohabitation. In other 
words, prime ministers who are not party leaders or who are promoted in the party 
hierarchy after elections will need to put up with a much higher level of presidential 
activism than prime ministers who won elections as party leaders.  
 
Figure 7.8 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and 
cohabitation when prime ministers are not party leaders before elections 
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The comparison of the results reported in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 indicates that the 
position of prime ministers in the party hierarchy before and after general elections 
makes a difference to their authority over cabinets. Furthermore, the party leadership 
roles played by prime ministers also make a difference for the presidents and the party 
principals’ authority over cabinet composition. Overall, the influence of both presidents 
and party principals has been shown to increase when prime ministers do not take office 
as party leaders. Additionally, both sets of models indicate that the influence of party 
principals over the cabinet increases during periods of divided executive, although this 
finding cannot be generalised due to the limitation of the data. The next set of models 
assess whether the presidents’ position in the party hierarchy ahead of their election 
makes a difference for their control over the cabinet and to what extent the authority of 
prime ministers and party principals over cabinet ministers is affected by the party 
leadership roles played by presidents. 
Presidents and party relationships before elections 
Table 7.12 presents the coefficients related to the impact of conflicts with three 
principals on the risk of deselection according to the presidents’ position in the party 
hierarchy before elections. In this case we are interested to know the extent to which the 
conflicts between ministers and the presidents who were party leaders before elections 
increase their risk of losing office and limit the influence of prime ministers and party 
principals over the process of deselection. In this set of models the French and the 
Romanian presidents are coded with 1, while the Portuguese presidents are coded 0. The 
full regression results of these models are presented in the Appendix (D.19). 
The limited amount of variation in the party leadership roles held by presidents 
before elections in the countries selected for analysis allows us to estimate the variation 
in the length of ministerial tenure separately only under the scenario of cohabitation. 
However, the variation in the presidents’ positions in the party hierarchy across 
countries allows us to analyse the risk of losing office in cohabitation and one additional 
scenario. Thus, the first row in Table 7.12 presents the coefficients related to the 
conflict variables across the three scenarios, while the second row presents the 
coefficients related to the conflict variables under cohabitation. The next two rows 
report the coefficients related to the conflict variables jointly under unified executive 
and cohabitation and under divided executive and cohabitation.  
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Table 7.12 Principal-agent relationships and the presidents’ position in the party 
hierarchy before elections 
Party leadership roles after elections PR Conflicts PM Conflicts PARTY Conflicts 
PR Leader =0 Unified, Divided, Cohabitation    1.59*      2.71***    1.41* 
PR Leader =1 Unified, Divided, Cohabitation        0.82***     0.62***      0.44** 
PR Leader =0 Cohabitation=1 1.15   3.06**   1.80* 
PR Leader =1 Cohabitation=1     1.25**     2.01*** 0.17 
PR Leader =0 Divided=0 1.33  2.51**   1.44*      
PR Leader =1 Divided=0        0.96***    1.41*** 0.12 
PR Leader =0 Unified=0  1.64* 2.85**    1.32 
PR Leader =1 Unified=0      0.74***   0.62***        0.65*** 
 
The results presented in the first row in Table 7.12 show that all principal-agent 
relationships have a significant impact on the risk of losing office across executive 
scenarios regardless of whether or not presidents contested elections as party leaders. 
However, the results presented in the next three rows suggest that the presidents’ 
position in the party hierarchy ahead of elections makes a difference for the extent of 
their authority over cabinets. Specifically, these results indicate a statistically significant 
relationship between conflicts with presidents and shorter lengths of tenure only in the 
case of presidents who were party leaders ahead of elections.  
The presidents’ position in the party hierarchy ahead of elections also affects the 
extent of the prime ministers’ and party principals’ authority over cabinet members. As 
cohabitation is part of all the situations within which the variation in the length of tenure 
was estimated, prime ministers are shown to be in control of cabinet composition 
regardless of whether or not presidents were party leaders before taking office. Thus, 
the strength of prime ministerial leadership under cohabitation is driving the four 
estimations presented in this table. However, a closer look at the reported results reveals 
that the magnitude of the coefficients associated with the Conflicts PM variable is 
considerably higher when presidents are not party leaders. This result accounts for the 
variation in presidential involvement in cabinet affairs in Portugal as opposed to France 
and Romania and for the ability of Portuguese prime ministers to work unhindered by 
too much presidential activism in contrast to their French and Romanian counterparts. 
Figure 7.9 illustrates this relationship and shows that although prime ministers keep a 
tight grip on their cabinets under cohabitation, presidents who contested elections as 
party leaders are still able to have a say over cabinet composition (the graphs illustrating 
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the variation in the impact of conflicts with presidents on the length of tenure in the 
remaining situations presented in Table 7.12 are included in the Appendix, see D20-
D22). 
 
Figure 7.9 Impact of principal-agent relationships under cohabitation when presidents 
are party leaders before elections  
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over cabinet composition but not for others. This finding confirms and extends the 
results obtained in the country studies. 
Overall, it has been shown that both presidents and prime ministers have more 
control over cabinet members if they contest elections as party leaders. Regardless of 
whether presidents were party leaders ahead of elections, their ability to involve in 
cabinet affairs will be greater when the prime ministers with whom they share executive 
powers were not party leaders during the last general elections. This finding provides 
substantial evidence that de facto leadership positions and informal party hierarchies 
make a difference for the extent of both presidential and prime ministerial leadership in 
cabinet governments. Institutional factors were also shown to have a considerable 
impact on the authority of political actors over cabinet members. Due to the institutional 
configuration of semi-presidential systems, prime ministers were shown to keep a 
strong grip over cabinet members during periods of cohabitation regardless of their 
position in the party hierarchy before or after elections. However, the analysis has also 
shown that prime ministers who led their parties during the preceding general elections 
were able to control the cabinet under all executive scenarios, not only during 
cohabitation. This is an important finding that highlights not only the considerable 
weight of intraparty politics on executive politics, but also the impact of informal 
hierarchies of party relationships on the extent of political leadership. The influence of 
party principals over cabinet composition has also been shown to increase when 
presidents and prime ministers do not hold party leadership positions. However, the 
results related to the variation in the authority of party principals over cabinet members 
seem to have been driven by a considerable increase in their strength under divided 
executive.  
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a comparative analysis of the variation in the length of 
ministerial tenure in France, Portugal, and Romania. Following the approach taken by 
the literature on ministerial turnover we have analysed the extent to which the ministers’ 
length of tenure depends on characteristics that are fixed at the moment of appointment. 
Although the comparative study has used different measures of political experience to 
prevent country-specific factors from driving the results across countries, the analysis 
has confirmed that fixed characteristics do not explain why some cabinet members 
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survive in office longer than others. The comparative analysis has nevertheless 
highlighted that ministers who have previous experience of serving in government are 
more likely to leave office sooner than inexperienced ministers. By contrast, it has been 
shown that ministers who come to national office after serving at local level are likely to 
survive longer in office. This finding confirms the importance of local strongholds for a 
successful career in national politics and suggests that the authority and durability of 
cabinet members depends not only on the importance of their portfolios, but also on the 
wider range of political resources that they hold at both national and local levels.  
The fact that fixed characteristics hold little explanatory power for the variation 
in the length of ministerial tenure does not necessarily mean that they are not an 
important determinant of the ministers’ professional advancement. However, it is 
unlikely that fixed characteristics at any moment in a minister’s career can explain a 
dynamic phenomenon like survival in a particular office, which depends primarily on 
what ministers do while they hold that office. As an example of how some 
characteristics that are regarded as fixed at the moment of appointment can change 
repeatedly during the ministers’ time in office we have focused on positions in the party 
hierarchy. The in-depth analysis of the ministers’ promotions and demotions in the party 
hierarchy has shown that these positions do not emerge as strong predictors of the 
length of tenure because party principals punish and reward their agents continuously as 
a function of their performance in office.  
The comparative analysis has also studied the effect of political events on the 
tenure of ministers. The analysis has particularly focused on the extent to which 
resignation calls, as indicators of the ministers’ performance in office, and conflicts with 
presidents, prime ministers, and party principals, as proxies for the principal-agent 
relationships, influence the risk of losing office. To identify the circumstances under 
which these events are more likely to cost ministers their office, we have estimated the 
length of ministerial tenure as a function of executive scenarios and party relationships. 
The results of the comparative study have confirmed the findings obtained in the 
country studies: the authority of presidents is likely to increase during periods of unified 
executive, while prime ministers regain control over their cabinets under cohabitation. 
Party principals have also been shown to keep a tight grip on cabinet members during 
periods of divided executive. Resignation calls have also emerged as strong predictors 
of ministerial deselection under unified executive and cohabitation, but not under 
divided executive. The second explanatory factor used to identify which principal-agent 
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relationships are associated with shorter and longer ministerial tenures has revealed that 
the party relationships between ministers, presidents, and prime ministers account for 
the discrepancy between the formal powers held by political actors and their actual 
influence over cabinet members. Specifically, the analysis has shown that the positions 
held by presidents and prime ministers in the hierarchy of their political parties ahead of 
the elections leading up to their investiture can accurately predict the extent of their 
influence over cabinet members during their term of office. 
To test whether the presidents’ and the prime ministers’ positions in the party 
hierarchy make a difference for their authority over the cabinet we estimated their 
impact on the deselection of ministers as a function of the party leadership positions 
they held before and after elections. The analysis has shown that when we pay attention 
only to the party leadership positions held by prime ministers after elections, their 
influence over cabinet composition appears limited to the scenario of cohabitation. 
However, if their position in the party hierarchy before taking office is taken into 
account, then prime ministers who lead their parties into elections appear able to have a 
say over cabinet composition at all times, regardless of the executive scenario that 
occurs during their time in office. Similarly, the authority of presidents has been shown 
to increase considerably under unified executive, when prime ministers do not hold 
party leadership positions before elections. Presidents who are party leaders before 
elections have also been shown to preserve a significant amount of influence over 
cabinet composition even under cohabitation, although prime ministers are able to keep 
a tight grip over ministers when this scenario occurs irrespective of their position in the 
party hierarchy before and after elections.  
The findings of this chapter cast a new light on the relationship between 
ministers, presidents and prime ministers and on the impact that formal and informal 
party hierarchies have on the nature of ministerial accountability. Our results have 
shown that institutional factors account to a certain extent for the variation in 
presidential and prime ministerial influence over cabinet composition. However, 
institutional factors alone cannot explain why some presidents are more powerful than 
others under situations of unified executive and why some prime ministers maintain the 
same amount of control over their cabinets irrespective of the executive scenarios that 
occur during their time in office. By taking into account both party relationships and 
executive scenarios, this chapter has shown that the presidents’ influence over cabinet 
composition increases under unified executive only when they control their parties and 
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parliamentary majorities from a de facto party leadership position. Moreover, presidents 
who act as de facto party leaders may be more influential during periods of divided 
executive and cohabitation than presidents who do not come to office as party leaders 
under a unified executive scenario. Similarly, this chapter has emphasised that prime 
ministers who take office as party leaders are likely to keep a tight grip on their cabinets 
independently of the institutional context under which they take office. This finding 
bears out the importance of institutional factors in structuring the relationship between 
political actors. However, prime ministers who take office under a scenario of unified 
executive without being de facto party leaders are likely to be confronted with an 
increased level of presidential activism. This finding is indicative of the impact that 
intraparty politics have on the running of parliamentary and semi-presidential cabinets 
and accounts for the discrepancy between the formal powers held by political actors and 
their actual influence over the cabinet. 
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This final chapter draws together the main arguments, findings and implications of this 
research. First, we reiterate the aim of this thesis to explain the variation in ministerial 
accountability as a function of institutional factors and party relationships. Then we 
present the findings corresponding to each country study and we explain their relevance 
for the comparative study of this topic. This leads to a more general discussion 
regarding the links between this research and the study of party government, party 
patronage, and the presidentialisation of politics in contemporary democracies. Finally, 
we suggest several ways in which the scope of this research may be extended to 
parliamentary and presidential systems, or deepened for a more focused analysis of the 
relationship between parties and their agents in government as a function of different 
party system characteristics. 
Political institutions, parties, and ministerial accountability 
The amount of time cabinet ministers spend in their post has important consequences 
for government performance, policy outcomes and political accountability. A recent 
report published by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the House of 
Commons (2013) has explored the impact of cabinet reshuffles on the overall 
effectiveness of the government. The report emphasises that while the appointment 
prerogatives of British prime ministers are limited by some legislative constraints, there 
are no restrictions on when, or how often, or for what reasons ministers should be 
moved around. Cabinet reshuffles have a considerable impact on policy making and 
delivery. Specifically, frequent moves destabilise the government, damage the 
effectiveness of individual ministers and are not good for policy continuity and 
consistent delivery. A research report on the reduction in the average tenure of the 
British cabinet members over the past thirty years points out that the consequences of 
ministerial churn are policy short-termism and power imbalances: “first, ministers are 
moved so frequently that they have little incentive to grapple with difficult policy 
problems; and second, ministerial shuffling around results in an imbalance of power 
Conclusion 
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between elected ministers and unelected civil servants” (Cleary & Reeves, 2009, p. 5). 
Additionally, the House of Commons Committee (2013) found that a high ministerial 
turnover affects the parliament’s ability to hold cabinet members accountable for policy 
failures.  
According to the witnesses interviewed by the Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee, including former and current Secretaries of State, ministers, and 
civil servants, ministerial reshuffles are rarely motivated by the prime minister’s wish to 
change policy. While some changes are unavoidable because of occasional resignations, 
illness or deaths, “party management” is usually the main reason for most reshuffles. 
Ben Bradshaw, a former Labour Minister for Health and Secretary of State for Culture, 
told the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (2013) that prime ministers 
resort to reshuffles to “balance governments politically and give ‘big beasts’ jobs”. 
According to Bradshaw, reshuffles allow prime ministers to: “test and bring on young 
talent by giving them experience in different departments; resolve problems when 
ministers get into difficulty and are forced to resign or are sacked; refresh governments 
or departments that appear tired or underperforming; reward loyalty”. The former Prime 
Minister, John Major, told the Committee (2013) that one of the objectives he had 
pursued in any reshuffle was to “bring a regional and political balance to the 
Government, in order to fairly reflect opinion within Parliament”. Mr Major has also 
mentioned that, during his time in office as prime minister, the pressure for reshuffles 
began to build up in the parliamentary party at regular intervals.  
The evidence collected by the House of Commons Committee confirms that 
ministerial changes are very much part of politics. They are responses to political 
pressures on the government. Many witnesses have also indicated that parliamentary 
parties put considerable pressure on prime ministers. Even British prime ministers, who 
are considered more powerful than their European counterparts, are constrained in their 
ability to decide whom to let go and whom to keep in office by the need to balance their 
governments politically and keep the “big beasts” happy. What form does this process 
take in other representative democracies? Do prime ministers have more or less 
authority over the composition of their cabinets? Do they have to share this prerogative 
with presidents? Are political parties able to influence this process? What circumstances 
are likely to increase or decrease each of these actors’ influence over cabinet 
composition? These are the questions that a comparative study of ministerial 
accountability and turnover should be able to answer. However, a cross-country 
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comparison of this political process can only be carried out within a clearly delimited 
theoretical framework. 
This study has adopted a multiple-principal-agent model to study an important 
question of political delegation in representative democracies: how does the 
accountability of cabinet ministers vary when more than one principal can influence 
their longevity in office? To take advantage of the variation in principal-agent 
relationships that characterises the position of cabinet ministers in political systems 
where directly elected presidents share executive power with a prime minister and 
cabinet who are accountable to the parliament, we have studied this question in semi-
presidential systems. The idea that practical politics entail both a constitutional kind of 
delegation to the governmental institutions and a political kind of delegation to political 
parties (Müller, 2000, p. 310) has allowed us to study cabinet ministers as agents to 
multiple principals in government and in the party. Thus, we have argued that a 
principal-agent approach to ministerial deselection should include not only the agency 
relationship between prime ministers and cabinet members (Berlinski et al., 2010, 
2012), but also the agency relationships between cabinet members and other political 
actors who have the formal or informal power to hold them accountable. To capture the 
variation in the ability of principals to influence the ministers’ survival in office we 
have focused on the interaction of institutional scenarios and party relationships and its 
consequences for the variation in presidential and prime ministerial powers in semi-
presidential systems. Building on the work that has identified a link between the 
variation in the separation of powers and the organisation and behaviour of political 
parties (Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart, 2005), we have 
started from the assumption that a highly valued presidency loosens the link between 
parties and their agents in government (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, p. 668). Even 
though political representatives in public office are the agents of the extra-parliamentary 
party organisations in every representative democracy (Müller, 2000), a directly elected 
presidency alters the intraparty mechanisms that allow political parties to contain 
agency loss. According to Samuels and Shugart (2010), a constitutionally separated 
executive authority decreases the accountability of party leaders. Thus, political parties 
lose the ability to hold their leaders accountable after they take office as heads of state. 
Under certain circumstances, party leaders can take advantage of their partisan authority 
to control the other party agents in office, such as prime ministers and cabinet members. 
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Controlling for the institutional factors that allow presidents who act as de facto 
party leaders to turn prime ministers and cabinet members into their own agents is 
important. Not all presidents who take office as party leaders are able to take control of 
the government. Whether or not the president’s party is in government and whether or 
not the prime minister is in the president’s party makes a difference for the extent of the 
president’s influence over the political system. In other words, whether or not 
governments are formed during periods of unified executive, divided executive, or 
cohabitation matters for the relationships between presidents, prime ministers, and 
political parties. That said, countries like Austria, Ireland, Slovenia, or Portugal show no 
variation in the presidents’ influence regardless of the institutional context in which 
they take office. Instead, these countries have revealed significant variation in the prime 
ministers’ authority over the cabinet and in their autonomy with regard to political 
parties and parliamentary majorities. All the same, the variation in presidential and 
prime ministerial powers across countries and over time indicates that the impact of 
intraparty politics on cabinet politics depends on the institutional context. If this is true, 
then the accountability of cabinet ministers towards presidents, prime ministers, and 
political parties should also vary as a function of the same factors that constrain the 
presidents’ and the prime ministers’ authority over the political system. This is the 
theoretical argument that this thesis has set out to test through a comparative analysis of 
ministerial turnover in semi-presidential systems. 
The findings 
The hypotheses derived from the principal-agent approach to ministerial deselection 
have been tested in France, Portugal, and Romania. The three countries were selected 
according to the principles of the most-similar systems design. They share the same 
institutional framework of premier-presidentialism, where cabinet ministers are 
simultaneously accountable to presidents, prime ministers, and political parties. The 
time period under study has been selected so as to provide variation in the independent 
variables of party relationships and institutional scenarios. This case selection and time 
period under study allowed us to observe variation in the dependent variable of the 
length of ministerial tenure as a function of the interaction between the party leadership 
roles played by presidents and prime ministers and the institutional context in which 
ministers take office. Specifically, we expected that the president’s influence over the 
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process of cabinet composition increased under a unified executive if the president was 
a de facto party leader. If the president was not a party leader, then we did not expect 
him or her to influence this process regardless of whether there was a unified executive, 
a divided executive, or cohabitation. We also expected prime ministers who were de 
facto party leaders to keep a tight grip on the cabinet independently of whether there 
was a unified executive, a divided executive, or cohabitation. We expected the party 
leader’s influence over the cabinet to increase when neither the president, nor the prime 
minister was a party leader. The influence of party principals was also expected to 
increase under cohabitation, when the president is opposed to the parliamentary 
majority and cannot use his or her partisan authority to turn prime ministers and cabinet 
members into presidential agents. 
These hypotheses were tested within and across the three countries. The 
variation in institutional context within countries allowed us to estimate the influence of 
principals on ministerial deselection as a function of executive scenarios separately in 
France, Portugal, and Romania. However, the interaction effect of institutional contexts 
and party relationships could not be measured within single case studies because of the 
lack of variation in the position held by presidents and prime ministers in the party 
hierarchy before taking office. The lack of variation in party relationships within 
countries is not surprising, since political parties have no reason to change their 
organisation and behaviour in the absence of institutional reforms. This is one of the 
reasons why the theoretical framework put forward in this thesis cannot be studied 
within single case studies, given the slow change in structural variables within 
individual countries (Ragin, 1987, p. 70). As a result, while the case studies tested 
separately the impact of institutions and party relationships on the ministers’ risk of 
losing office, the cross-country analyses estimated the length of ministerial tenure as a 
function of both institutional contexts and party relationships between ministers, 
presidents, prime ministers and party principals. 
The case-study findings largely confirm the theoretical argument. The ability of 
presidents and prime ministers to influence the process of ministerial deselection varies 
under different institutional contexts. In France, presidents are in a better position to fire 
ministers during periods of unified executive than under cohabitation. By contrast, 
prime ministers are much more powerful under cohabitation than under unified 
executive. This is not the case in Portugal, where prime ministers are always more 
powerful than presidents, regardless of the institutional context. Similarly to France, 
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Romanian prime ministers have more control over the cabinet under cohabitation, than 
under unified or divided executive. However, the results obtained in this country study 
suggest that the party principal’s influence over cabinet composition increases in the 
presence of high inter-executive conflict, regardless of whether the president and the 
prime minister are from the same party or not. Additionally, the Romanian president 
was shown to have considerable influence over the deselection of ministers during 
periods of divided executive and cohabitation due to his constitutional power to demand 
the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members and to suspend them. The 
analysis has emphasised that although ministers were involved in corruption scandals 
under all three executive scenarios, the presidential power to suspend cabinet ministers 
from office was enforced only outside periods of unified executive.  
In contrast to our expectations, party principals did not increase their control 
over cabinet composition under cohabitation compared to periods of unified executive. 
This finding indicates that the party principal’s influence over ministers does not 
depend only on whether presidents are able to turn cabinet members into their own 
agents, but also on the authority and autonomy of prime ministers relative to their own 
parties. In other words, whether prime ministers come to office as party leaders also 
makes a difference for the extent of the party principal’s authority over cabinet 
members.  
The cross-country analysis has allowed us to test the interactive hypothesis on 
ministerial turnover. Here we have been able to verify whether a de facto party 
leadership position makes a difference for the extent of presidential influence over the 
cabinet. The results confirmed our expectations. Only presidents who contested the 
presidential race as party leaders were able to have a say over the deselection of 
ministers during periods of unified executive. This finding clarifies why presidents have 
usually had little influence on cabinets in countries like Portugal, but also Austria, 
Iceland, Ireland, or Slovenia, where party leaders are not usually nominated as 
presidential candidates. Presidents who acted as de facto party leaders also appeared 
more influential under cohabitation than presidents who were not party leaders before 
taking office. However, prime ministers were generally more likely to fire ministers 
under cohabitation than presidents. This finding confirms that institutions do make a 
difference for the extent of presidential and prime ministerial influence over the cabinet. 
Similarly, we have compared the influence of prime ministers over cabinet 
composition, depending on whether or not they were party leaders before taking office. 
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When we did not take into account the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy, 
they only appeared able to fire ministers under cohabitation. However, when we did 
take into account their position in the party hierarchy, party leadership emerged as a 
strong predictor of prime ministerial control over ministerial deselection across 
institutional contexts. 
The analysis of ministerial turnover in France, Portugal, and Romania suggests 
that the interaction of intra-party politics and institutional factors captures well the 
variation in the accountability of cabinet ministers to presidents, prime ministers and 
party principals. Both institutional contexts and party relationships have emerged as 
strong predictors of the principals’ power to fire ministers in individual case studies. 
However, owing to the limited variation in structural variables, single cases have not 
been able to explain why some presidents are more powerful than others under 
situations of unified executive and why some prime ministers maintain the same amount 
of control over their cabinets irrespective of the executive scenarios that occur during 
their time in office. Estimating the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a 
function of both political institutions and party relationships deepens our understanding 
of the impact and the circumstances under which partisan politics account for the 
discrepancy between the formal powers held by political actors and their actual 
influence over the cabinet. 
Ministerial accountability, party government, and the 
presidentialisation of politics 
This thesis has argued that the variation in ministerial accountability in representative 
democracies is determined by the same factors that affect the variation in the political 
influence of their principals in government and in the party hierarchy. The use of such a 
parsimonious account of ministerial survival in office has involved a trade-off between 
focusing on the events that ministers experience during their time in office and 
incorporating a wide range of personal and political resources that politicians need to 
rely on in order to advance their careers at national level in the analysis. However, we 
believe that the three-principal-agent approach to study ministerial deselection 
simplifies the complexity of ministerial careers in a theoretically guided manner and 
adds to our understanding regarding the factors that have a direct impact on the 
ministers’ risk of losing office. While generalisations from case studies are difficult, the 
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integration of several features of case-oriented and variable-oriented research strategies 
has allowed us to address a question that is relevant for representative democracies in 
general, without contradicting the complexity of this political process in individual 
national settings. The first implication of this study is then that this theory can travel to 
any political system where the principles of representative democracy apply. 
Secondly, the findings of this research indicate that the principal-agent approach 
to ministerial deselection is an adequate theoretical framework for political systems 
with considerable variation in democratic experience. By analysing this process in 
France, Portugal, and Romania, the scope of this theory has been tested through a 
comparative analysis of political systems that belong to different waves of 
democratisation. This comparison has allowed us to test whether the accountability of 
ministers to competing principals in government and in the party varies as a function of 
democratic development. Our findings suggest that, all else equal and past a certain 
threshold of democratic consolidation, institutional frameworks and partisan politics 
have a predictable impact on the process of ministerial accountability.  
Thirdly, the findings speak to the debate regarding the evolution of party 
government in modern democracies. A growing body of literature has identified the 
challenges faced by party government in modern democracies over time (Katz, 1986, 
1987; Mair, 2008) and has set out to determine how well the party government thesis 
fits contemporary democracies, whether new or long-established (Webb et al., 2002; 
Webb & White, 2007a). Regardless of the definitions given to this concept, one of the 
conditions for parties to be able to influence government requires that political leaders 
are selected within parties and held responsible for their actions and policies through 
parties (Katz, 1986, 1987; Mair, 2008; Rose, 1969). In this work we have considered 
one aspect of party government, the personnel involved in the governing process. As the 
ideological differences between political parties wane, patronage is increasingly seen as 
one of the sinews of party government (Kopecký, Mair, & Spirova, 2012). Understood 
as an organisational resource, party patronage represents a “procedural mechanism for 
ensuring the election of office-holders and the recruitment of personnel [...] mechanism 
by which the party leadership, or individual elements within the party leadership, can 
ensure the provision of safe pairs of hands in key corners of the policy-making process” 
(Kopecký & Mair, 2012a, p. 12). Therefore, the parties’ ability to place their agents in 
governmental institutional is now seen as a form of institutional control that operates for 
the benefit of the party organisation (Kopecký & Mair, 2012a, p. 7). The scope of 
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patronage, and the answer to the question of how far government is party government, 
refers then to the range of jobs in state institutions where parties are able to appoint their 
agents. 
Although the conditions for party government are challenged by the changing 
nature of party competition, the existing literature emphasises that political parties 
continue to dominate the function of political recruitment to public and governmental 
office in both Western and Eastern democratic systems (Webb & White, 2007b, pp. 
363–364; Webb, 2002, p. 445). Thus, the political parties’ centrality to national 
governmental processes and outcomes is not questioned (Webb, 2002, p. 446). Our data 
has also confirmed that parties are not less marginal to recruitment and governance in 
Romania than in France or in Portugal. While the frequency of non-partisan 
appointments to senior governmental posts may suggest that the Portuguese executive is 
somewhat less partified, our analysis has confirmed that parties retain a central role in 
cabinet appointments (Jalali, Silva, & Moreira, 2012) and that they are closely 
associated in the executive decision-making process (Lobo, 2005).  
In addition to their role in political appointments, this thesis suggests an 
alternative way of studying the political parties’ capacity for political control by looking 
at the extent to which they can hold their agents in government accountable. Due to the 
challenges inherent in the recruitment of party leaders by, but not necessarily through 
parties (Mair, 2008, p. 227), the political parties’ ability to contain agency loss and fire 
their representatives in central government is a good complementary test for the extent 
of their control over the executive decision-making process. Additionally, we also 
suggest that the extent of the parties’ ability to influence the government should also 
vary as a function of the institutional contexts that characterise the interaction of 
political actors. 
The theoretical argument tested in this thesis generates several expectations 
regarding the institutional circumstances under which party principals are expected to 
control the process of ministerial deselection. In general, we expect that the parties’ 
influence increases under cohabitation relative to periods of unified executive. While 
during periods of unified executive parties must engage in a transactional relationship 
with a directly elected president who cannot be held accountable although he or she is a 
party agent, parties regain control over the government under cohabitation, when there 
are no constitutional limits to their power of replacing prime ministers. However, we 
have shown that presidents who are not de facto party leaders do not have a substantial 
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influence over the political system regardless of whether there is a unified executive, a 
divided executive, or cohabitation. Therefore, in political systems where presidents are 
not de facto party leaders, the influence of parties over the government should depend 
on their relationship with prime ministers. Our results have confirmed this expectation. 
The analysis of ministerial turnover in France and in Romania, where presidents usually 
come to office as party leaders, has shown that political parties do not control cabinet 
members under unified executive. By comparison, political parties are in a better 
position to hold ministers accountable across executive scenarios in Portugal, where 
presidents do not usually act as de facto party leaders. In this case, the extent of party 
influence over the government depends on the strength of prime ministerial leadership 
and on the autonomy of prime ministers relative to their parties. 
The variation in party influence over the government as a function of the 
president’s and the prime minister’s leadership resources leads to the fourth implication 
of this thesis, which regards the trend towards the “presidentialisation” of political 
leadership in modern democracies (Poguntke & Webb, 2005a). Our findings add to 
those studies that emphasise an increase in the growth of executive leadership power 
resources and autonomy from their supporting parties across regime types (Poguntke & 
Webb, 2005a; Webb, Poguntke, & Kolodny, 2012). By studying the implications of the 
growing autonomy of leaders within their own parties for the chief executives’ ability to 
control their minister-agents, our results speak to the “executive” and the “party” faces 
of presidentialisation that characterise the tension between political parties and their 
leaders (Poguntke & Webb, 2005b).  
This thesis has emphasised that prime ministers are more likely to dominate the 
process of ministerial deselection if they take office as party leaders. The analysis of 
ministerial turnover in Romania has revealed that a prime minister who takes office 
during a period of unified executive and is not a de facto party leader has fewer means 
of control over the cabinet than a prime minister who comes to office as a party leader 
during a period of divided executive. Adrian Năstase, who succeeded Ion Iliescu as the 
president of the Social Democratic Party after the former stepped down to become the 
president of Romania, was constrained to compete with the president for control over 
the cabinet and the party throughout his time in office. By contrast, due to their 
uncontested leadership over their parties, Portuguese prime ministers do not have to 
compete with presidents for control over the government regardless of the institutional 
context in which they take office. The estimation of prime ministerial control over the 
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cabinet as a function of party leadership roles also explains why the trend towards the 
presidentialisation of the prime ministerial office in France is contingent on the 
occurrence of cohabitation (Webb & Poguntke, 2005, p. 343; Webb, 2002, p. 446).  
So, what does all this tell us about ministerial turnover and accountability? 
Three ideas emerge from this discussion. First, ministerial deselection is a key process 
of executive decision-making. Therefore, we should study the variation in the length of 
ministerial tenure as a function of the same institutional factors that matter for the 
variation in the powers of the political actors involved in cabinet politics. If certain 
institutional scenarios increase the influence of presidents over the political system, then 
they should have a similar impact on the accountability of cabinet members towards 
presidents. Similarly, if prime ministers are more influential under certain 
circumstances, then they should also exert more control over cabinet members when 
those conditions are met. Having said that, executive decision-making processes should 
not be dissociated from party politics in those political systems where there are 
conditions for party government. This leads to the second point. The selection and 
deselection of ministers should be regarded as twin conditions for party government. To 
determine whether political parties exert control over the government one should focus 
not only on their control over political appointments, but also on their ability to contain 
agency loss. After all, if patronage is regarded as a mechanism by which parties ensure 
the provision of safe pair of hands in key corners of the policy-making process 
(Kopecký & Mair, 2012a, p. 12), then parties should also be able to remove the office-
holders who deviate from the preferred positions of their patrons. So, the extent to 
which parties can fire their agents can be regarded as a direct and measurable indicator 
of party government. It can also be used to validate the “parties-do-matter” thesis in the 
sense of the management and organisation of policy making (Kopecký & Mair, 2012b, 
p. 357). Similarly to presidents and prime ministers, the ability of parties to influence 
cabinet politics should be analysed as a function of institutional factors. Especially 
when there are constitutional limits on the control that parties can exert over their agents 
in government, institutional factors should be reliable indicators of the conditions under 
which they are more likely to influence government. The theoretical framework put 
forward in this thesis for the study of ministerial accountability assumes that institutions 
matter and that the influence of political parties over the government matters as well. 
This study has aimed to highlight their interactive effect on the accountability of cabinet 
members and their key relevance for a general theory of ministerial turnover. 
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Future research 
Although the argument developed in this thesis has been tested on only three countries, 
this theory can serve as a starting point for future work. The interactive impact of 
political institutions and party relationships on ministerial turnover can be tested in 
other semi-presidential systems within and beyond Europe. The dual chain of political 
delegation from voters to governmental institutions and to political parties renders this 
theory applicable in parliamentary and presidential systems as well. A large-n, cross-
country test of this theory may compare the variation in the length of ministerial tenure 
in Western and Eastern European democracies, in European, Asian, and Latin American 
democracies and in democratic systems across different waves of democratisation. 
The focus on political parties as the central mechanism within the chain of 
delegation and accountability in modern democracies could be exploited for the analysis 
of the relationship between political parties and their agents in government as a function 
of different party system characteristics. For example, do different types of intraparty 
leadership selection procedures have an effect on the durability of party agents in 
government? Do different mechanisms of intraparty accountability affect the quality of 
political accountability in the executive branch of government? Do they have different 
outcomes under different institutional contexts? In particular, the variation in political 
accountability as a function of both intraparty politics and political institutions offers a 
rich avenue for future research. 
One of the difficulties of replicating this study in other countries resides in the 
lack of appropriate data that can be used as valid measures of principal-agent relations 
and in the range of background variables that matter for ministerial longevity. This 
study has suggested a way of generating data in a way that is consistent with the 
political context and which maximises the internal validity of the quantitative measures 
that are developed on this basis. Although this kind of data collection is a labour-
intensive method, it has two advantages: one the one hand it allows the study of 
principal-agent relationships in a way that takes into account the context within which 
political actors interact; on the other hand, it facilitates the development of reliable 
indicators that can be compared across a large number of countries. Of course, what 
constitutes a good indicator for the relationship between ministers, presidents, prime 
ministers and party leaders may vary from one country to another. Different routes to 
ministerial office may also prove more successful in some countries than in others. 
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Crucial factors for the understanding of ministerial durability in different countries 
should always be included in single studies and may add to our understanding of the 
complex nature of this political process. However, the development of several standard 
measures that can be used for cross-country analysis, such as resignation calls and 
conflicts or policy disagreements between ministers and their principals, will confirm 
whether we can study this process in a theoretically guided manner or whether we can 
only understand its mechanisms in a highly personalised context. 
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Appendix A - Robustness tests and graphs (Chapter 4) 
 
 
A.1 The Wilcoxon test 
 
Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions 
 
             |      Events       Events       Sum of 
Cohabitation |     observed     expected       ranks 
-------------+-------------------------------------- 
0            |        73          57.50         1582 
1            |        47          62.50        -1582 
-------------+-------------------------------------- 
Total        |       120         120.00            0 
 
             chi2(1) =       5.02 
             Pr>chi2 =     0.0250 
 
The Wilcoxon test assesses the equality of survivor functions across the unified 
executive and cohabitation scenarios. This test is constructed in the same way as the 
log-rank test but places more weight on earlier failure times than to failures that occur 
later in the distribution (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 125). Similarly to the log-rank test, the 
Wilcoxon test confirms that the risk of deselection during periods of unified executive 
and cohabitation varies proportionally with respect to time. 
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A.2 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 1 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
       
Time:  Time 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
exp3        |      0.07096         0.49        1         0.4858 
mpsen       |     -0.02144         0.03        1         0.8641 
paexp28     |     -0.01080         0.01        1         0.9403 
mayor1      |      0.10225         0.94        1         0.3327 
locmand2    |     -0.01379         0.02        1         0.8954 
partylead3  |     -0.01375         0.02        1         0.8908 
lostraces_w |     -0.07971         0.86        1         0.3544 
promotions_w|      0.11667         0.62        1         0.4307 
totparlmaj_w|      0.12035         0.42        1         0.5148 
totunrest_w |     -0.00766         0.01        1         0.9316 
totreshuff~w|      0.15302         1.84        1         0.1751 
totrescall_w|      0.06616         0.47        1         0.4908 
totallpr_w  |     -0.07675         0.40        1         0.5281 
totallpm_w  |      0.10479         0.84        1         0.3597 
totparty_w  |     -0.21499         2.64        1         0.1045 
cohab       |      0.15494         1.55        1         0.2127 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test |                      7.24       16         0.9683 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
 
 
A.3 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 2 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
 
Time:  Time 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
exp3        |      0.07096         0.49        1         0.4858 
mpsen       |     -0.02144         0.03        1         0.8641 
paexp28     |     -0.01080         0.01        1         0.9403 
mayor1      |      0.10225         0.94        1         0.3327 
locmand2    |     -0.01379         0.02        1         0.8954 
partylead3  |     -0.01375         0.02        1         0.8908 
lostraces_w |     -0.07971         0.86        1         0.3544 
promotions_w|      0.11667         0.62        1         0.4307 
totparlmaj_w|      0.12035         0.42        1         0.5148 
totunrest_w |     -0.00766         0.01        1         0.9316 
totreshuff~w|      0.15302         1.84        1         0.1751 
totrescall_w|      0.06616         0.47        1         0.4908 
totallpr_w  |     -0.07675         0.40        1         0.5281 
totallpm_w  |      0.10479         0.84        1         0.3597 
totparty_w  |     -0.21499         2.64        1         0.1045 
cohab       |      0.15494         1.55        1         0.2127 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test |                      7.24       16         0.9683 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
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A.4 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 3 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
      
Time:  Time 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
exp3        |     -0.05894         0.30        1         0.5818 
mpsen       |     -0.13305         0.89        1         0.3442 
paexp28     |      0.11692         0.88        1         0.3473 
mayor1      |     -0.02731         0.04        1         0.8355 
locmand2    |     -0.05489         0.15        1         0.6999 
partylead3  |     -0.17258         2.66        1         0.1030 
lostraces_w |     -0.01637         0.01        1         0.9217 
promotions_w|      0.15715         1.36        1         0.2443 
totparlmaj_w|     -0.12309         0.65        1         0.4216 
totunrest_w |      0.00081         0.00        1         0.9941 
totreshuff~w|      0.05151         0.17        1         0.6761 
totrescall_w|      0.02287         0.03        1         0.8582 
totallpr_w  |      0.02941         0.05        1         0.8270 
totallpm_w  |      0.11731         1.02        1         0.3134 
totparty_w  |      0.01680         0.02        1         0.8912 
prcoh       |     -0.14312         1.11        1         0.2920 
pmcoh       |     -0.04733         0.15        1         0.7019 
partycoh    |     -0.11168         0.70        1         0.4033 
cohab       |      0.24434         2.69        1         0.1011 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test |                      5.93       19         0.9981 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
 
A.5 Impact of conflicts with the president 
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A.6 Impact of conflicts with the prime minister 
 
 
 
A.7 Impact of conflicts with the party 
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Appendix B - Robustness tests, supplemental models, graphs 
(Chapter 5) 
 
B.1 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 1 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
Time:  Time 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
statemin    |     -0.14981         1.91        1         0.1665 
exp3        |     -0.17144         2.25        1         0.1335 
mpsen       |      0.12615         0.54        1         0.4611 
paexp28     |     -0.12338         0.56        1         0.4558 
locmand1    |      0.13435         0.59        1         0.4421 
partylead3  |     -0.13942         0.83        1         0.3626 
indep       |     -0.10024         0.75        1         0.3856 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test |                      5.11        7         0.6465 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
 
 
B.2 Estimations Model 1 with and without interactions with time 
 
                             (1)              (2) (log time)   
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
statemin                     0.54            0.53    
                            (0.85)          (0.85)    
exp3                        -0.05           -0.05    
                            (0.45)          (0.45)    
mpsen                       -0.75                    
                            (0.51)                    
mpsen_lnt                                   -0.12*   
                                            (0.08)    
paexp28                      0.91*           0.95*   
                            (0.52)          (0.52)    
locmand1                     0.63            0.65    
                            (0.50)          (0.50)    
party executive end         -2.20**         -2.15**  
                            (0.83)          (0.82)    
indep                       -0.64           -0.66    
                            (0.54)          (0.55)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N Ministers                    56              56    
N Observations                540             540    
Log-likelihood            -85.660         -85.488    
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by 
minister (56 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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B.3 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 2 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption    
  
Time:  Time 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
----------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
Totsimplemot_w  |     -0.04246         0.04        1         0.8344 
totunrest_w     |     -0.37553         4.38        1         0.0364 
totreshuffle_w  |     -0.38863        14.78        1         0.0001 
totcallpers_w   |     -0.17985         0.21        1         0.6443 
totcalldep_w    |      0.26964         1.51        1         0.2193 
totcallpoldis_w |     -0.10879         0.16        1         0.6894 
totallpr_w      |     -0.08612         0.11        1         0.7419 
totallpm_w      |     -0.22323         0.35        1         0.5544 
totparty_w      |     -0.10865         0.14        1         0.7106 
----------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test     |                     15.37        9         0.0814 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
 
 
B.4 Estimations Model 2 with and without interactions with time 
 
                             (1)              (2) (log time)   
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
totsimplemot_w               3.85***         3.79*** 
                            (0.58)          (0.58)    
totunrest_w                  0.98***                 
                            (0.22)                    
totunrest_wlnt                               0.14*** 
                                            (0.03)    
totreshuffle_w              -0.16                    
                            (1.81)                    
totreshuffle_wlnt                           -0.19    
                                            (0.39)    
totcallpers_w               -1.12**         -1.19**  
                            (0.51)          (0.50)    
totcalldep_w                -5.54**         -5.18**  
                            (1.86)          (1.90)    
totcallpoldis_w              1.46***         1.45*** 
                            (0.34)          (0.32)    
totallpr_w                   1.85***         1.83*** 
                            (0.48)          (0.46)    
totallpm_w                   3.90**          3.92**  
                            (1.56)          (1.55)    
totparty_w                   3.56***         3.43*** 
                            (0.75)          (0.76)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N Ministers                    56              56    
N Observations                540             540    
Log-likelihood            -73.287         -73.319    
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by 
minister (56 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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B.5 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 3 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
       
Time:  Time 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
----------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
statemin        |     -0.02212         0.01        1         0.9049 
exp3            |      0.01777         0.01        1         0.9211 
mpsen           |      0.23147         3.88        1         0.0488 
paexp28         |     -0.19825         2.68        1         0.1015 
locmand1        |     -0.02647         0.01        1         0.9045 
partylead3      |      0.21561         2.32        1         0.1274 
indep           |     -0.04049         0.05        1         0.8203 
totsimplemot_w  |      0.11114         0.71        1         0.4004 
totunrest_w     |     -0.27051         2.66        1         0.1026 
totreshuffle_w  |     -0.30170         6.90        1         0.0086 
totcallpers_w   |      0.21893         2.50        1         0.1140 
totcalldep_w    |     -0.06379         0.13        1         0.7198 
totcallpoldis_w |      0.05347         0.08        1         0.7810 
totallpr_w      |     -0.05754         0.11        1         0.7437 
totallpm_w      |     -0.24723         2.65        1         0.1038 
totparty_w      |      0.06723         0.16        1         0.6931 
----------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test     |                     11.09       16         0.8036 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
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B.6 Estimations Model 3 with and without interactions with time 
 
 
                             (1)              (2) (log time)   
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
statemin                     0.80            0.72    
                            (0.69)          (0.69)    
exp3                         0.13            0.09    
                            (0.40)          (0.41)    
mpsen                       -0.00                    
                            (0.73)                    
mpsen_lnt                                    0.02    
                                            (0.10)    
paexp28                      0.79            0.69    
                            (0.72)          (0.69)    
locmand1                     0.69*           0.64    
                            (0.42)          (0.40)    
party executive end         -2.64**         -2.48**  
                            (0.90)          (0.93)    
indep                       -0.14           -0.19    
                            (0.49)          (0.47)    
totsimplemot_w               3.10***         3.11*** 
                            (0.79)          (0.81)    
totunrest_w                  1.42***                 
                            (0.31)                    
totunrest_wlnt                               0.20*** 
                                            (0.05)    
totreshuffle_w               1.43                    
                            (1.55)                    
totreshuffle_wlnt                            0.16    
                                            (0.39)    
totcallpers_w               -1.99**         -1.90**  
                            (0.99)          (0.89)    
totcalldep_w                -5.53**         -5.50**  
                            (2.38)          (2.39)    
totcallpoldis_w              1.38**          1.37**  
                            (0.46)          (0.44)    
totallpr_w                   0.87            0.85    
                            (0.62)          (0.61)    
totallpm_w                   5.07**          4.83**  
                            (2.50)          (2.30)    
totparty_w                   4.63**          4.64**  
                            (1.45)          (1.49)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N Ministers                    56              56    
N Observations                540             540    
Log-likelihood            -68.517         -69.144    
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by 
minister (56 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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B.7 Impact of conflicts with presidents 
 
 
 
 
B.8 Impact of conflicts with prime ministers 
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B.9 Impact of conflicts with party principals 
 
 
 
 
 
Max. level of conflict
No conflicts
0
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
H
az
ar
d
0 500 1000 1500
Days
Impact of conflicts with party principals
274 
 
Appendix C - Robustness tests, supplemental models, graphs 
(Chapter 6) 
 
 
C.1 The Wilcoxon test 
 
Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions 
 
         |   Events         Events        Sum of 
scenario |  observed       expected        ranks 
---------+-------------------------------------- 
1        |        24          37.30         -921 
2        |        29          13.93          923 
3        |         8           9.77           -2 
---------+-------------------------------------- 
Total    |        61          61.00            0 
 
               chi2(2) =      21.55 
               Pr>chi2 =     0.0000 
 
 
 
The Wilcoxon test assesses the equality of survivor functions across the unified 
executive and cohabitation scenarios. This test is constructed in the same way as the 
log-rank test but places more weight on earlier failure times than to failures that occur 
later in the distribution (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 125). Similarly to the log-rank test, the 
Wilcoxon test confirms that the risk of deselection during periods of unified executive, 
divided executive, and cohabitation varies proportionally with respect to time. 
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C.2 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 1 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
     
Time:  Time 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
exp23       |     -0.00462         0.00        1         0.9592 
mpsen       |     -0.20027         3.64        1         0.0564 
paexp28     |      0.21284         4.79        1         0.0286 
locadmin    |      0.04370         0.10        1         0.7492 
partylead3  |     -0.03009         0.05        1         0.8249 
partylocal  |      0.00851         0.01        1         0.9347 
PMparty     |     -0.02113         0.03        1         0.8569 
------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test |                      6.69        7         0.4616 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
 
 
 
 
C.3 Estimations Model 1 with and without interactions with time 
 
 
                             (1)              (2) (log time)   
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
exp23                        0.54            0.51    
                            (0.39)          (0.37)    
mpsen                        0.17                    
                            (0.43)                    
paexp28                     -0.53                    
                            (0.49)                    
paexp28_lnt                                 -0.06    
                                           (0.05)    
locadmin                     0.51            0.46    
                            (0.37)          (0.37)    
party executive end         -0.35           -0.33    
                            (0.28)          (0.28)    
local leader end             0.37            0.37    
                            (0.34)          (0.34)    
PMparty                     -1.07***        -1.03*** 
                            (0.32)          (0.29)    
paexp28_lnt                                 -0.06    
                                            (0.05)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N Ministers                   101             101    
N Observations               1717            1717    
Log-likelihood           -221.284        -221.410    
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by 
minister (56 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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C.4 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 2 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
       
Time:  Time 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
---------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
exp23          |     -0.03774         0.26        1         0.6082 
mpsen          |     -0.08769         0.81        1         0.3695 
paexp28        |      0.06520         0.52        1         0.4719 
locadmin       |     -0.07744         0.56        1         0.4539 
partylead3     |     -0.04392         0.30        1         0.5848 
partylocal     |     -0.05030         0.24        1         0.6210 
PMparty        |      0.09715         0.87        1         0.3514 
allprom_w      |     -0.02640         0.08        1         0.7722 
totunrest_w    |     -0.01182         0.05        1         0.8319 
totsimplemot_w |     -0.05023         0.42        1         0.5182 
totreshuffle_w |     -0.10032         0.63        1         0.4260 
totrescall_w   |      0.01418         0.03        1         0.8542 
totallpr_w     |      0.05181         0.43        1         0.5098 
totallpm_w     |     -0.07702         0.68        1         0.4083 
totparty_w     |     -0.09119         0.94        1         0.3316 
---------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test    |                      7.76       15         0.9330 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used 
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C.5 Estimations Model 1 with and without interactions with time 
 
 
                             (1)              (2) (log time)   
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
exp23                        0.53            0.56    
                            (0.43)          (0.43)    
mpsen                        0.44            0.47    
                            (0.49)          (0.48)    
paexp28                     -0.70                    
                            (0.54)                    
locadmin                    -0.21           -0.21    
                            (0.45)          (0.46)    
party executive end         -0.28           -0.30    
                            (0.37)          (0.38)    
local leader end             0.53*           0.53*   
                            (0.29)          (0.29)    
PMparty                     -1.27***        -1.29*** 
                            (0.35)          (0.36)    
allprom_w                    1.98***         2.00*** 
                            (0.43)          (0.43)    
totunrest_w                 -0.62           -0.63    
                            (0.63)          (0.63)    
totsimplemot_w               0.66            0.63    
                            (0.81)          (0.82)    
reshuffles                   3.20**          3.20**  
                            (1.03)          (1.05)    
totrescall_w                 0.85***         0.86**  
                            (0.26)          (0.26)    
totallpr_w                   0.51**          0.51**  
                            (0.22)          (0.22)    
totallpm_w                   0.20            0.19    
                            (0.22)          (0.22)    
totparty_w                   0.87**          0.88**  
                            (0.29)          (0.29)    
paexp28_lnt                                 -0.12    
                                            (0.08)    
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N Ministers                   101             101    
N Observations               1717            1717    
Log-likelihood           -165.713        -165.552    
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by 
minister (56 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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C.6 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 3 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
        
Time:  Time 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
---------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
exp23          |     -0.02738         0.08        1         0.7771 
mpsen          |     -0.12168         1.79        1         0.1812 
paexp28        |      0.06710         0.55        1         0.4594 
locadmin       |     -0.08264         0.36        1         0.5463 
partylead3     |     -0.08043         0.64        1         0.4254 
partylocal     |     -0.00351         0.00        1         0.9757 
PMparty        |      0.00778         0.00        1         0.9485 
allprom_w      |     -0.11590         1.25        1         0.2635 
totunrest_w    |     -0.09325         2.60        1         0.1071 
totsimplemot_w |      0.01892         0.04        1         0.8398 
totreshuffle_w |     -0.17479         1.63        1         0.2016 
totrescall_w   |     -0.07079         0.65        1         0.4194 
totallpr_w     |      0.04334         0.19        1         0.6609 
totallpm_w     |     -0.01289         0.01        1         0.9114 
totparty_w     |      0.11547         1.53        1         0.2165 
unified        |      0.22969         3.02        1         0.0821 
rescall_uni    |     -0.00138         0.00        1         0.9898 
pruni          |     -0.01252         0.06        1         0.8095 
pmuni          |      0.11065         2.17        1         0.1403 
partyuni       |     -0.10371         1.31        1         0.2519 
---------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test    |                     10.45       20         0.9592 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used 
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C.7 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 4 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
       
Time:  Time 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
---------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
exp23          |     -0.05393         0.43        1         0.5141 
mpsen          |     -0.06337         0.60        1         0.4403 
paexp28        |      0.07363         0.86        1         0.3532 
locadmin       |     -0.06101         0.30        1         0.5825 
partylead3     |     -0.03440         0.24        1         0.6253 
partylocal     |      0.00366         0.00        1         0.9761 
PMparty        |      0.05134         0.35        1         0.5564 
allprom_w      |     -0.06977         0.49        1         0.4833 
totunrest_w    |     -0.01167         0.07        1         0.7852 
totsimplemot_w |     -0.02902         0.27        1         0.6058 
totreshuff~w   |     -0.08553         0.29        1         0.5928 
totrescall_w   |     -0.00848         0.03        1         0.8701 
totallpr_w     |      0.01362         0.05        1         0.8191 
totallpm_w     |      0.00793         0.01        1         0.9259 
totparty_w     |     -0.00709         0.01        1         0.9357 
divided        |     -0.00945         0.01        1         0.9221 
rescall_div    |     -0.02021         0.21        1         0.6466 
prdiv          |      0.00502         0.01        1         0.9244 
pmdiv          |      0.01181         0.01        1         0.9119 
partydiv       |      0.04134         0.17        1         0.6813 
---------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test    |                      3.42       20         1.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used 
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C.8 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 5 
 
Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
       
Time:  Time 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
---------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
exp23          |     -0.08902         2.33        1         0.1272 
mpsen          |     -0.07632         0.63        1         0.4258 
paexp28        |      0.10169         1.84        1         0.1748 
locadmin       |     -0.06406         0.36        1         0.5476 
partylead3     |      0.02301         0.08        1         0.7796 
partylocal     |     -0.07018         0.76        1         0.3843 
PMparty        |      0.06050         0.45        1         0.5016 
allprom_w      |      0.00507         0.00        1         0.9532 
totunrest_w    |      0.03933         0.51        1         0.4760 
totsimplemot_w |      0.02751         0.16        1         0.6927 
totreshuffle_w |     -0.10911         0.68        1         0.4113 
totrescall_w   |     -0.06110         0.62        1         0.4310 
totallpr_w     |      0.11497         0.97        1         0.3251 
totallpm_w     |     -0.02874         0.07        1         0.7881 
totparty_w     |     -0.08452         0.97        1         0.3259 
cohab          |     -0.11089         1.52        1         0.2174 
rescall_cohab  |     -0.06396         0.42        1         0.5145 
prcoh          |      0.08089         0.83        1         0.3626 
pmcoh          |      0.10684         1.72        1         0.1901 
partycoh       |      0.02335         0.05        1         0.8175 
---------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
global test    |                      7.60       20         0.9942 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
note: robust variance-covariance matrix used 
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C.9 Determinants of ministerial duration in Romania across executive scenarios 
 
                                Model 1       Model 2       Model 3    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Fixed characteristics 
Cabinet experience                  0.55           0.57         0.49    
                                   (0.38)         (0.43)       (0.53)    
MP/SEN                              0.45           0.18         0.76    
                                   (0.52)         (0.49)       (0.53)    
Parliamentary experience           -0.32    -0.31     -0.74 
                                   (0.55)         (0.59)     (0.58) 
Local administration experience    -0.00          -0.39        -0.02    
                                   (0.42)         (0.42)       (0.44)    
Party executive                    -0.59          -0.25        -0.44    
                                   (0.40)         (0.32)       (0.39)    
Local leader                        0.40           0.32         0.25    
                                   (0.29)         (0.29)       (0.32)    
PM Party                           -1.15**        -0.63        -1.68*** 
                                   (0.39)         (0.43)       (0.41)    
Events 
Party promotions                   2.20***        2.24***      1.96***  
                                 (0.48)         (0.46)       (0.49)    
Protests               0.43          -0.83        -0.92    
                                 (0.66)         (0.73)       (0.63)    
Simple motions                 1.02           1.20         1.26   
                                 (0.78)         (0.83)       (0.78)    
Reshuffles               3.55**         3.38***      3.25*** 
                                 (0.95)         (0.87)       (0.96)    
Resignation calls         0.15           0.73**       0.89*** 
                                 (0.39)         (0.33)       (0.31)    
PR Conflicts                    0.48**         0.90**       0.78**  
                                 (0.23)         (0.33)       (0.27)    
PM Conflicts                   0.45**         1.60**      -0.00    
                                 (0.22)         (0.58)       (0.21)    
Party Conflicts                   1.59**         0.05         0.80**  
                                 (0.41)         (0.46)       (0.32)    
Executive scenarios 
Unified executive        -0.51                                    
                                 (0.38)                                    
Resignation calls x Unified  1.24** 
          (0.44) 
PR Conflicts x Unified       -0.49                                  
          (2.11)                                    
PM Conflicts x Unified       -4.12**                                    
          (2.01)                                    
Party Conflicts x Unified      -1.14                                    
          (0.60)                                    
Divided executive                                  1.53***                 
                                              (0.44)                    
Resignation calls x Divided       0.02 
          (0.66) 
PR Conflicts x Divided                            -0.38                    
                                              (0.44)                    
PM Conflicts x Divided                         -1.58**                  
                                              (0.63)                    
Party Conflicts x Divided                          1.35**                   
                                              (0.63)         
            
Cohabitation                                                   -2.08**  
                                                               (0.86)    
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Resignation calls x Cohabitation        -1.18* 
                 (0.60) 
PR Conflicts x Cohabitation                                     0.77    
                                                               (0.56)    
PM Conflicts x Cohabitation                                 
3.25***  
                                                               (0.97)    
Party Conflicts x Cohabitation                                  0.03    
                                                               (0.65)   
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
No. of ministers                      101            101           101 
No. of observation                   1717           1717          1717    
No. of failures                        61             61            61 
Log-likelihood                   -159.271       -156.880      -157.490    
Linktest hat(squared)               -0.01           0.02          0.01            
                p=(.82)        p=(.70)       p=(.89) 
Proportional hazards       10.45(20 df)   3.40 (20 df)  7.60 (20 df) 
Assumption global test chi(2)     p=(.96)        p=(1.00)      p=(.99)  
Note: Cell entries are coefficients computed using the Efron method of 
resolving ties. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors 
clustered by minister (75 clusters).  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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C.10 Impact of conflicts with the president across executive scenarios 
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C.11 Impact of conflicts with the prime minister across executive scenarios 
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C.12 Impact of conflicts with the party principal across executive scenarios 
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C.13 Impact of resignation calls across executive scenarios 
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Appendix D - Supplemental models and graphs (Chapter 7) 
D.1 Cabinet experience across countries and with respect to survival 
 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific 
governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
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D.2 Parliamentary experience across countries and with respect to survival 
 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific 
governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
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D.3 Local administration experience across countries and with respect to survival 
 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific 
governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
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D.4 Party experience across countries and with respect to survival 
 
 
Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific 
governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations. 
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D.5 Kaplan Meier plot of ministerial survival across countries 
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D.6 Kaplan Meier plot of ministerial survival across executive scenarios 
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D.7 Impact of principal-agent relationships across countries and scenarios 
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D.8 Impact of the president-minister relationship across executive scenarios 
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D.9 Impact of the minister-party relationship across executive scenarios 
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D.10 Impact of the minister-prime minister relationship across executive scenarios 
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D.11 Ministerial turnover and the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy 
after elections 
 
                            Model 1     Model 2    Model 3   Model 4 
Scenario         All       Unified    Cohab.    Uni & Cohab 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Fixed characteristics                                                                                    
Cabinet experience           0.48*       0.06      0.92**      0.37    
                            (0.26)      (0.45)    (0.42)      (0.27)    
MPs & 2 mandates            -0.02       -0.42      0.60        0.07    
                            (0.21)      (0.36)    (0.41)      (0.26)    
Local office                -0.25       -0.22     -0.12       -0.29    
                            (0.22)      (0.50)    (0.49)      (0.27)    
Party executive             -0.28       -0.34     -0.85*      -0.55**  
                            (0.22)      (0.50)    (0.49)      (0.27)    
Local party leader           0.24        0.04      0.49        0.27    
                            (0.30)      (0.58)    (0.66)      (0.40)    
PM Party                    -0.61**     -0.35     -0.65       -0.42*   
                            (0.21)      (0.47)    (0.43)      (0.26)    
Events 
Social unrest                0.11**      0.32**    0.12        0.07    
                            (0.05)      (0.15)    (0.10)      (0.06)    
Reshuffles                   1.68        0.04      1.93        0.99    
                            (1.14)      (2.71)    (1.56)      (1.58)    
Resignation calls            0.84**      1.05***   0.91**      0.87***  
                            (0.13)      (0.29)    (0.29)      (0.16)    
PR Conflicts                 0.93**      2.08**    0.24        1.06**  
                            (0.40)      (0.87)    (1.08)      (0.42)    
PM Conflicts                 1.63**     -0.57      2.23***     1.73**  
                            (0.38)      (1.91)    (0.39)      (0.38)    
PARTY Conflicts              0.02       -0.21      0.08        0.03    
                            (0.24)      (0.94)    (0.36)      (0.28)    
Party leadership 
PM leader                    0.91**      0.28      1.55**      0.74**  
                            (0.32)      (0.47)    (0.63)      (0.35)    
PR Conflicts × PM leader    -0.32       -1.10      0.78       -0.30    
                            (0.42)      (1.40)    (1.10)      (0.47)    
PM Conflicts × PM leader    -1.19**     -1.06     -0.73       -1.26    
                            (0.42)      (2.22)    (0.71)      (0.90)    
PARTY Conflicts × PM leader  0.52**      1.05     -0.29        0.36    
                            (0.23)      (1.02)    (0.52)      (0.43)    
Constant                   -10.47***   -11.45*** -13.46***   -11.98*** 
                            (0.91)      (1.64)    (1.62)      (1.21) 
Shape parameter              1.35        1.58      1.61    1.56        
                            (0.12)      (0.25)    (0.21)      (0.16)  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N Ministers                   232         105       111         203 
N Failures                    120          44        47          91  
N Observations               5072        2055      2417        4472 
Log-likelihood            -96.124     -27.614   -30.795     -71.667            
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by the 
ministers.  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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D.12 Impact of principal-agent across scenarios when prime ministers are party 
leaders after elections (Model 1) 
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D.13 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive when prime 
ministers are party leaders after elections (Model 2) 
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D.14 Impact of principal-agent relationships under cohabitation when prime 
ministers are party leaders after elections (Model 3) 
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D.15 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and cohabitation 
when prime ministers are party leaders after elections (Model 4) 
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D.16 Ministerial turnover and the prime ministers’ position in the party hierarchy 
before elections 
                                Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
Scenario              All    Uni & Cohab Uni & Divided 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Fixed characteristics     
Cabinet experience              0.46**      0.34    0.31 
                             (0.22)      (0.25)       (0.33) 
MPs & 2 mandates               -0.03        0.12        -0.33 
                             (0.21)      (0.27)       (0.30) 
Local office                   -0.66**     -0.87**      -0.46 
                             (0.22)      (0.29)       (0.36) 
Party executive           -0.25       -0.43         0.06 
                             (0.22)      (0.26)       (0.30) 
Local party leader             0.22        0.11        -0.09 
                             (0.29)      (0.37)       (0.39) 
PM party                       -0.57**     -0.49*       -0.23 
                             (0.21)      (0.26)       (0.30) 
Events 
Social unrest                 0.05        0.09**      0.32** 
                             (0.04)      (0.03)      (0.12) 
Reshuffles                      1.57        1.09        1.33 
                             (1.36)      (1.65)      (2.30) 
Resignation calls     0.81***     0.80***     0.82*** 
                             (0.11)      (0.11)      (0.14) 
PR Conflicts     1.97***     2.00***     1.61** 
                             (0.36)      (0.35)      (0.49) 
PM Conflicts    -0.74       -0.71       -0.98 
                             (0.80)      (0.71)      (0.90) 
PARTY Conflicts     0.31        0.41        0.27 
                             (0.35)      (0.34)      (0.45) 
Party leadership 
PM leader                  0.05       -0.21        0.77** 
                             (0.21)      (0.25)      (0.31) 
PR Conflicts × PM leader       -1.26**     -1.06**     -1.22** 
                             (0.37)      (0.37)      (0.54) 
PM Conflicts × PM leader   1.30        2.55***     1.34 
                             (0.83)      (0.75)      (0.93) 
PARTY Conflicts × PM leader   0.19       -0.49        0.25 
                             (0.34)      (0.33)      (0.44) 
Constant                      -9.65***   -11.22***   -10.26*** 
                             (0.83)      (1.13)      (1.20) 
Shape parameter       1.34        1.56        1.40              
                             (0.12)      (0.16)      (0.17)     
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N Ministers                          232         203         142 
N Failures                           120          91          73 
N Observations                     5072        4472        2655 
Log-likelihood      -101.093     -69.555     -51.320 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by the 
ministers.  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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D.17 Impact of principal-agent relationships across scenarios when prime ministers 
are party leaders before elections (Model 1) 
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D.18 Impact of principal-agent relationships across scenarios when prime ministers 
are party leaders before elections (Model 3) 
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D.19 Ministerial turnover and the presidents’ position in the party hierarchy before 
elections 
 
                          Model 1   Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
Scenario               All     Cohab      Cohab&Uni  Cohab&Div 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Fixed characteristics 
Cabinet experience             0.36*       0.55       0.19      0.81**  
                            (0.22)      (0.44)     (0.26)    (0.32)    
MPs & 2 mandates               0.00        0.72*      0.18     -0.03    
                            (0.21)      (0.41)     (0.26)    (0.28)    
Local office             -0.62**     -0.28      -0.55*    -0.47    
                            (0.24)      (0.56)     (0.29)    (0.31)    
Party executive          -0.21       -0.75      -0.45*    -0.23    
                            (0.22)      (0.46)     (0.25)    (0.28)    
Local party leader             0.20        1.20**     0.43      0.66**  
                            (0.28)      (0.56)     (0.35)    (0.30)    
PM Party               -0.58**     -0.71      -0.32     -0.84**  
     (0.22)      (0.47)     (0.28)    (0.29)    
Events 
Social unrest    0.07*       0.10**     0.08**    0.04    
     (0.04)      (0.05)     (0.04)    (0.04)    
Reshuffles                1.71        1.57       1.19      2.80**  
     (1.05)      (1.54)     (1.15)    (0.92)    
Resignation calls    0.72***     0.72***    0.76***   0.73***  
     (0.12)      (0.21)     (0.14)    (0.17)    
Conflicts PR         1.59*       1.15       1.33      1.64*    
     (0.88)      (1.12)     (0.99)    (0.93)    
Conflicts PM    2.71***     3.06**     2.51**    2.85**    
                          (0.79)      (0.94)     (0.80)    (0.96)    
Conflicts PARTY         1.41*       1.80*      1.44*     1.32    
                              (0.73)      (1.08)     (0.84)    (0.81)    
Party leadership 
PR leader                     -0.01       -1.40**    -0.43     -0.08    
                            (0.25)      (0.51)     (0.29)    (0.31)    
Conflicts PR × PR leader -0.77        0.09      -0.38     -0.90    
                            (0.89)      (1.13)     (1.00)    (0.94)   
Conflicts PM × PR leader -2.08**     -1.05      -1.10     -2.23**    
                            (0.79)      (0.96)     (0.85)    (0.96)    
Conflicts PARTY × PR leader -0.97       -1.63*     -1.31*    -0.66    
                            (0.70)      (0.98)     (0.79)    (0.77)   
Constant    -9.52***   -10.91***  -11.11***  -8.72*** 
     (0.85)      (1.34)     (1.13)    (0.81)    
Shape parameter           1.32        1.49       1.54      1.20        
     (0.12)      (0.18)     (0.15)     (0.11) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N Ministers                    232         111        203       140 
N Failures                     120          47         91        76  
N Observations                5072        2417       4472      3017 
Log-likelihood            -102.069     -27.463    -71.531   -60.354            
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by the 
ministers.  
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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D.20 Impact of principal-agent relationships across scenarios when presidents are 
party leaders before elections (Model 1) 
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D.21 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and cohabitation 
when presidents are party leaders before elections (Model 3) 
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D.22 Impact of principal-agent relationships under divided executive and cohabitation 
when presidents are party leaders before elections (Model 4) 
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